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Abstract
The ‘Quartet’ is an informal diplomatic mechanism designed to coordinate the efforts of 
major actors within the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Formed in 2001, the 
grouping is composed of representatives from the United States, the European Union, 
Russia and the Office of the UN Secretary General. Existing analysis of the Quartet, 
especially concerning the capacity of the grouping to facilitate both individual and 
collective outcomes for its members, is in some respects misleading.
This thesis establishes the historical precedents to the formation of the Quartet, and 
examines the outputs and outcomes of the grouping within the politico-strategic context 
of the Middle East peace process from 2001-2011. It presents each of the Quartet 
members as actors, who, while working in support of a peace process between the 
Israelis and Palestinians, also hoped to advance their national or organisational 
objectives through the association itself.
By examining the interplay between the complimentary and competing agendas and 
capabilities of the Quartet members, the thesis aims to provide enhanced insight into the 
role of external parties in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. Accordingly, it examines 
the key factors that motivated individual governments and institutions to form the 
Quartet, and analyses the extent to which the Quartet members had both collective and 
individual objectives for the grouping.
In examining whether these objectives were achieved during the period, the thesis 
argues that the outcomes of the Quartet were shaped by its internal decision-making 
processes, the exclusivity of the US-Israel relationship, the nature of the Israeli- 
Palestinian conflict and the regional contexts in which its members sought collective 
influence. It argues that the Quartet demonstrated potential as a diplomatic tool, 
although in practice it had greater utility as a forum for coordination among its members 
than for influencing the behaviour of the parties to the conflict.
viii
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Chapter One: Introduction to the Quartet
We, the Quartet, as we have named ourselves, are committed to working with the 
Israelis and Palestinians, with Arab governments, and with the international 
community to restore the hope of all the people in the region for a peaceful, secure and 
prosperous future.
- Colin Powell, United States Secretary of State (2001-2005).' 
Oh, the Quartet is nothing! Don't take it seriously!
- Ariel Sharon, Israeli Prime Minister (2001-2006).1 2 3
Introduction
' j
The first official statement of the Quartet was the product of an all-nighter/ Diplomatic 
representatives from the United States, the European Union, Russia and the Office of 
the United Nations Secretary General (UNSG) were unable initially to reach consensus 
on the wording of the statement, which addressed the dramatic breakdown in relations 
between the Israelis and Palestinians unfolding in early 2002.4 UNSG Kofi Annan 
remarked to his envoy at the time, Norwegian diplomat Terje Roed-Larsen,5 that 
rectifying the divisions between the members seemed unlikely.6 Nonetheless, Roed- 
Larsen dispatched his Special Assistant, Bruce Jones, who worked with envoys and 
experts through the night, and produced a statement that was acceptable for all parties 
by the early morning.7
On 10 April 2002, in Madrid, the principal representatives of the Quartet addressed the
o
international press for the first time as a collective. Prior to delivering the
1 US Department of State, "Remarks by US Secretary of State Colin Powell and UN Secretary-General 
Kofi Annan on "Madrid Quartet" Initiative to Convene a Regional Peace Conference in the Middle East," 
Washington, DC: 2 May, 2002.
2 Lally, W., "Fighting Words, Hard Choices," Newsweek, Vol. 141, no.4,2003.
3 Roed-Larsen, T., Former United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East peace process, 
interview with the author, New York City, October, 2011.
4 This thesis uses the following abbreviations for the Quartet members: United States (US), European 
Union (EU), and the United Nations Secretary General (UNSG).
5 Roed-Larsen served as UN Special Coordinator for the Middle East peace process and Personal 
Representative of the Secretary-General to the Palestine Liberation Organization and the Palestinian 
Authority from 1999 to 2004. He was a key figure in the negotiations that led to the 1993 Oslo Accords.
6 Annan later noted that: T knew this would be a test for my fledgling foursome, and I was worried we 
would not be able to find common ground. But the envoys worked through the night before the meeting to 
agree to a statement, which sent tough and clear messages to both the Israelis and the Palestinians, and 
gave our full support to Powell before he visited the region -  a position subsequently backed up by the 
Security Council.’ See: Annan, K., Interventions: A Life in War and Peace (New York: Penguin Press, 
2012), p.279.
7 Roed-Larsen. Interview with the author, New York City, October, 2011.
s Specifically, these representatives were the US Secretary of State, Colin Powell, the Russian Foreign 
Minister, Igor Ivanov, the EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy (from here 
on, CFSP), Javier Solana, and the Foreign Minister of Spain, Joseph Pique.
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abovementioned joint statement, UNSG Annan commented on the deteriorating security 
situation in the Middle East at that time.9 He stated that he was ‘appalled’ by the 
humanitarian crisis developing in the West Bank and Gaza, and added that the 
international community ‘demanded’ that the Government of Israel ‘honour its 
obligation under international law to protect civilians.’10 Annan then read the joint 
statement, which centred on the Quartet’s efforts to de-escalate the situation and return 
the parties to a mediation framework. Shortly afterward, Secretary of State Colin 
Powell, the US representative to the Quartet, was asked by a member of the press 
whether he too was ‘appalled,’ and whether he shared the sentiments expressed in Kofi 
Annan’s opening statement. Powell replied that ‘in that instance, the Secretary General 
was speaking in his own authority as the Secretary General of the United Nations,’ but 
that he was certainly ‘concerned’ by the humanitarian situation.11
The contrast between the respective comments of Annan and Powell highlighted a core 
feature of the Quartet, namely that, from its inception, the grouping was a balancing act 
for its members, who attempted to reach consensus (or at least maintain a semblance of 
collective agreement on broad principles) and affect changes within the context of a 
complex and variable regional conflict.
Research Question
Why did the Quartet form, and what were the outputs and outcomes o f the grouping 
from 2001-2011?
This thesis establishes the historical precedents to the Quartet, and examines the outputs 
and outcomes of the group within the politico-strategic context of the Middle East peace 
process (MEPP) from 2001-2011. It presents the key factors that motivated the 
individual governments and institutions to form the Quartet, and analyses how 
membership in the grouping shaped their approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It 
establishes the extent to which the Quartet members had both collective and individual
9 The second intifada erupted in late September 2000. As violence on both sides escalated, the political 
process completely disintegrated. On 27 March 2002, a suicide bomber killed 30 people at the Pesach 
Hotel, and the Israeli Defence Forces responded by launching ‘Operation Defensive Shield’, the largest 
Israeli incursion into the West Bank since the 1967 war.
10 US Department of State, "Remarks with Foreign Minister of Spain Josep Pique, United Nations 
Secretary General Kofi Annan, Foreign Minister of Russia Igor Ivanov and European Union Senior 
Official Javier Solana," Madrid, Spain: 10 April, 2002.
11 Ibid.
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objectives for the group, and whether these objectives -  to the extent that they existed -  
were achieved during the period of 2001-2011.
Furthermore, the thesis presents each of the Quartet members as actors, who, while 
working in support of a peace process between Israelis and Palestinians, also hoped to 
advance their national or organisational objectives through the association itself, 
including harmonising their conflicting approaches, and enhancing collaboration in 
other areas of mutual interest. It argues that, overall, the Quartet had a greater utility for 
its members than for the parties to the conflict.
The thesis presents the Quartet as an adaptive and flexible mechanism, operating within 
a period of paradigmatic shifts in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and argues that the 
outputs of the grouping evolved in response to these changes. It presents the Quartet as 
a microcosm of the interactions of major actors during this period that reflected the 
changes in the priorities and policies of its members, as well as changes in the conflict 
itself.
Moreover, it argues that the outcomes of the Quartet were shaped by its internal 
decision-making processes, the exclusivity of the US-Israel relationship and the regional 
contexts in which its members sought collective influence. The nature of the Quartet 
and the nature of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict both affected the work of the grouping -  
often simultaneously and unequally.
By examining the interplay between the complimentary and competing agendas and 
capabilities of the Quartet members, the thesis aims to provide enhanced insight into the 
role of external parties in the functioning of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, and 
into the broader interaction between major actors in the Middle East.
Thesis Scope
The thesis situates the Quartet within the recent historical context of previous peace 
initiatives in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and presents the key precedents and 
motivating factors that led to its formation. Subsequently, the analysis of the outputs of 
the Quartet focuses specifically on the period of 2001-2011. There are two main reasons 
for this approach. Firstly, a ten year time frame is necessary to capture adequately 
various developments within the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, as well as the changes in 
the responses and outputs of the Quartet. The personnel within of the Quartet changed 
over time, as did its outputs within the context of the Middle East peace process, from
3
Chapter One: Introduction to the Quartet
initially focusing on ending the second intifada to becoming more involved in 
Palestinian institutional reform and the promotion of final status negotiations. The 
conflict itself altered as a result of -  to name but a few factors -  the death of Yasser 
Arafat; the 2006 Hamas election victory and the Fatah-Hamas split; the Israeli 
withdrawal from Gaza; and the construction of the so-called ‘Security Barrier.’
Secondly, from early 2011 onwards, a series of popular resistance movements engulfed 
much of the Middle East and altered the political landscape of the region. The 
ramifications of this regional upheaval on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, including the 
responses of the members of the Quartet and the parties to the conflict, cannot be 
addressed adequately within the confines of this research. For this reason, the thesis 
does not seek to explain the emergence of these uprisings, nor their effects on the 
Middle East peace process. The analysis of the outputs of the Quartet concludes in 
January of 2011, when mass demonstrations began in Egypt.
While this analysis necessarily includes assessments of the effectiveness of peace 
initiatives during this period, it is also important to establish at the outset that the thesis 
should not be viewed as a comprehensive history of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, or of 
the Middle East peace process in its entirety. It is primarily an evaluation of the efforts 
of international diplomats working, specifically under the umbrella of the Quartet, on 
the peace process from 2001 -2011.
Finally, as discussed at the conclusion of this chapter, this thesis does not rely on a 
theoretical approach to explaining the role of the Quartet, nor will it use the Quartet as a 
case study to validate (or challenge) a paradigm or theoretical model of diplomacy or 
international relations.
Defining the Quartet
There are both practical and conceptual challenges to defining and evaluating the 
Quartet. Firstly, the Quartet members have never provided an official definition, or a 
modus operandi of the group. There are no foundational documents, no charter or 
bylaws, and the group meets and functions on an ad hoc basis, in varying locations and
12 Entrenched and repressive Governments were removed in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya and a massive 
resistance movement emerged in Syria that escalated into open conflict. At the time of writing, control 
over the power structures within these countries remains highly contested, and the regional and global 
repercussions of these events are still emerging.
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in response to shifting circumstances.13 In the Quartet statements from April 2002 until 
January 2011 there were no attempts to define the Quartet in any way, other than by 
repetition of the phrase, ‘Following is the text of a statement issued by the Quartet 
(United Nations, Russian Federation, the United States and European Union).14 In 
seeking to maximise their individual interests and enhance the flexibility of the group, 
the members saw nothing to gain by removing ambiguity concerning the Quartet’s 
precise nature and functions.15 This ambiguity facilitated the shift in the Quartet’s roles 
over time, but also resulted in a variety of differing characterisations from observers 
outside the Quartet.
At inception, the Quartet was hailed as an ‘ingenious diplomatic experiment,’ that had 
the potential to ‘harmonise disparate diplomatic efforts and to discourage potentially 
contradictory solo forays by important actors in the Middle East.’16 The Quartet has also 
been characterised as a collaborative multilateral ‘stabilisation effort’ that, through 
leveraging the combined clout of its members, could revive the political process in the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict,17 or act as a mediatory body.18 Others argued that the
Quartet functioned more as a ‘group of friends’ of the United States,19 or as a ‘control
20framework’ for bilateral negotiations, than as a genuine multilateral grouping.
The Quartet is simply an ad hoc high level consultative mechanism by which the United 
States, Russia, the European Union, and the United Nations Secretary General 
coordinate their work within the context of the Middle East peace process. The depth, 
type and relative success of this coordination are the key focus areas of this thesis.
The Quartet has evolved over time, and its functions have changed to adapt to the needs 
of its members. During different periods, it has functioned as a normative body, a 
legitimising mechanism for supporting the actions of its members, a forum for
13 The only time and location that the Quartet meets regularly is in New York City, during the annual 
convening of the UN General Assembly each September.
14 See: US Department of State, "Joint Statement by the Quartet," Washington, DC: 20 December, 2002.
15 In particular, the UNSG avoided institutional complications, such as having to report to the Security 
Council, that would have arisen from a more formal and structured arrangement. See: de Soto, A., "End 
of Mission Report," The Guardian, 12 June, 2007.
16 Ibid., p. 23.
17 Kurtzer, D. and Lasensky, S., Negotiating Arab-Israeli Peace: American Leadership in the Middle East 
(Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2007), p. 42.
18 Bauman, K., "The Middle East Quartet o f Mediators: Understanding Multiparty Mediation in the 
Middle East Peace Process" (3372461, University of Denver, 2009).
19 de Soto, "End of Mission Report," p. 24.
20 Musu, C. "The Madrid Quartet: An Effective Instrument of Multilateralism?" International Studies 
Association 48th Annual Convention, Chicago, USA, 28 February 2007.
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discussing and coordinating policy, and even a grouping that has produced its own 
envoys. In essence, however, the Quartet is a tool, the flexible and ambiguous nature of 
which has allowed it to be used by its members to pursue numerous objectives in 
diverse ways within the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
The Importance of Examining the Quartet
Despite its powerful membership, there has never been a comprehensive and in-depth 
analysis of the formation, outputs and outcomes of Quartet, which is a platform for the 
intersection and competition of the policies and positions of the Secretary of State of the 
world’s only super power, the Foreign Minister of a former super power, the Secretary 
General of the world’s largest international organisation and the Foreign Affairs 
representative of the world’s largest supranational organisation. Through the Quartet, 
these parties seek to have an active role in resolving one of the most prolonged and 
penetrative conflicts of the modem era.
The reason for this absence of academic analysis may reflect, at least in part, the fact 
that as a mechanism, the Quartet is unlike multilateral institutions such as UNESCO or 
UNRWA, which have a degree of agency that goes beyond the inputs of individual 
member countries.21 The Quartet has no institutional identity or agency that exists in 
isolation from the contributions of its members. Instead, the Quartet functions as a 
microcosm of the interactions between global powers within the context of the Middle 
East peace process, and as one UN official noted, ‘the instrument reflects the 
ingredients. ’22 While the members of the Quartet have sometimes professed to speak on 
behalf of the international community,“' in actuality the policies of the grouping are 
reflective only of the areas of commonality between the policies of its members.
21 For an in-depth analysis of UNRWA’s organisational agency within the context o f the Israeli- 
Palestinian conflict, see: Bowker, R., Palestinian Refugees: Mythology, Identity, and the Search for Peace 
(Boulder; London: Lynne Rienner, 2003). For an examination of the relationship between structures and 
agents within UNESCO, see: Finnemore, M., National Interests in International Society (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1996), pp. 34-66. For an expanded discussion of international organisations and global 
politics, see: Finnemore, M., Rules for the World: International Organizations in Global Politics (New 
York: Cornell University Press, 2004).
22 UN official. Interview with the author, Jerusalem, November, 2011.
22 See for example Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov’s statement on 26 September 2003 that: ‘The 
Quartet, of course, represents the States [US), represents the European Union, the UN, but we're entitled 
to say that the Quartet basically speaks on behalf of the entire international community since we have 
very active consultations with the Arab states and with other states of the world.’ Similarly, in the same 
Quartet press conference, UNSG Annan noted that ‘The international community, represented by the 
Quartet, has presented the parties with a roadmap towards peace.’ See: US Department of State, "Press 
Availabilty With UN Secretary General Kofi Annan; Foreign Minister Franco Frattini o f Italy in the
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Furthermore, while the internal practices and mechanisms of the Quartet are discussed 
further in Chapter Three: The Formation o f the Quartet, it is important to emphasise 
that the Quartet is a mechanism based on consensus among its members. All Quartet 
positions, therefore, represent the areas of overlap between the individual positions of 
Quartet members on particular issues. When diplomats within the Quartet cannot reach 
consensus on an issue, the group either takes no action, or focuses purely on the limited 
areas of agreement between the members. Consequently, both the outputs and outcomes 
of the Quartet members throughout the period of analysis were dictated by efforts -  of 
varying success -  to overcome internal disagreements concerning the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict. As this thesis establishes, this process was, and remains, inherently political.
There are several misconceptions and mischaracterisations in the limited existing 
literature on the Quartet that this research seeks to address. These misconceptions, 
largely based on an inability to differentiate between the failings and the limitations of 
the Quartet, include the following:
The Quartet as a singular actor
Within the literature on the Quartet, the grouping is often presented as a singular actor 
in its own right; seemingly capable of making decisions independent of the constraints 
that its constituent members face.24 This form of misrepresentation commonly takes
25place when the Quartet’s utility is appraised within the context of the peace process, 
although the Quartet members themselves often present their shared views in a way that 
downplays the heterogeneous nature of the grouping.26
However, the Quartet can only be as active or effective as the individual members of the 
grouping allow it to be. The policies pursued by the Quartet always originate within the 
polities of the Quartet members. It is, therefore, not an independent actor, but a vessel 
for the coordination and transmission of messages by its members.
Capacity of European Union Presidency; European Union High Representative Javier Solana; and 
Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov of the Russian Federation," New York City: 26 September, 2003.
24 See: Bauman, "The Middle East Quartet o f Mediators: Understanding Multiparty Mediation in the 
Middle East Peace Process". Elgindy, K., "The Middle East Quartet: A Post Mortem," The Saban Center 
for Middle East Policy, Brookings Institute, 25 (2012).
25 For example, in Evans, G., "Israel and the Quartet must seize the moment," Financial Times, 19 
September, 2006.
26 This can be as simple as the persistent use of the word ‘Quartet’ as a collective noun -  for example, 
‘The Quartet calls on all parties to respect the Blue Line, halt all attacks, and show the utmost restraint.’ 
See: US Department of State, "Remarks with Foreign Minister of Spain Josep Pique, United Nations 
Secretary General Kofi Annan, Foreign Minister of Russia Igor Ivanov and European Union Senior 
Official Javier Solana."
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The peace process has failed, therefore the Quartet has failed 
Evaluating mediation attempts from 2001-2011 must take into consideration both the 
fundamental and contemporary characteristics of the conflict, as well as the dynamics of 
dealings among the Quartet members. Given that the Quartet reflects the levels of 
agreement among its members regarding the peace process, and operates as a forum for 
discussion in the event of disagreement, then authors that call for the dissolution of the 
Quartet, or declare it dead,“ must explain how less collaboration between global powers 
would be more effective in the context of achieving an Israeli-Palestinian accord.
From its first official statement, the Quartet was defined by compromise. Its members 
operated within challenging organisational and regional circumstances, and pursued 
collaboration while aware fully of the limitations of their role and influence, both 
collective and individual, from 2001-2011. The idea that underpins the Quartet is that its 
members stand to achieve more together than they would separately.28 Testing this 
notion within the context of an extremely challenging and resilient conflict requires 
more than simply looking at end results. As one UN official remarked:
Most peace processes fail more often than they succeed. You need enormous amounts 
of luck, the right leader here, the right leader there, and also the right regional context. 
Everything’s got to fall into place, and four times out of five, that won’t happen.29
Moreover, while the efforts of the Quartet members during this period did not culminate 
in the successful resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, neither did the efforts of 
other actors during this same period -  or throughout the preceding history of the 
conflict.30
The merit of a collaborative approach to the Middle East peace process, therefore, 
cannot be determined solely by analysing the extent to which it has resulted in a 
resolution of the conflict. Such analysis not only pre-supposes that the Israeli- 
Palestinian conflict has a ‘solution,’ but downplays the extent to which the actions and 
reactions of the parties to the conflict (including paradigmatic shifts such as the collapse 
of the Oslo Accord framework of negotiations, the Gaza Disengagement, the Fatah- 
Hamas split, and the Israeli domestic shift to the right of the political spectrum) impact 
on the success or failure of third-party initiatives.
27 Elgindy, "The Middle East Quartet: A Post Mortem."
2S Roed-Larsen. Interview with the author, New York City, October, 2011.
UN official. Interview with the author, Jerusalem, November, 2011.
30 The strengths and limitations of the Quartet for the pursuit of both collective and individual outcomes 
are discussed in-depth in Chapter Nine: Conclusion -  The Outcomes of the Quartet.
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The Quartet as a level playing field
Finally, while the Quartet powers operate within the group on the basis of consensus, 
the extent to which individual positions are amenable to pressure from other Quartet 
members necessarily reflects the political realities that exist both outside and within the 
Quartet. Essentially, the members of the Quartet have always been free to disagree with 
each other but, by default, some members are more persuasive than others. As former 
EU Quartet envoy Marc Otte noted, ‘powers get together to influence each other; it’s 
the essence of diplomacy.’31 Authors that point to US dominance of the discourse within 
the Quartet as evidence of its defects as an instrument, therefore, are downplaying the 
fact that within the Quartet, the realities of diplomacy, pressure, power and influence are 
the same as they are outside the Quartet."2 For example, while European involvement in 
the Quartet functioned as a forum for the pursuit of European foreign policy objectives 
vis-ä-vis the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, European officials interviewed as part of this 
research consistently acknowledged that the United States remained the primary third- 
party within this context.3' Likewise, while UNSG Annan sought to revitalise the 
political role of his office through membership in the Quartet, UN officials interviewed 
recognised the limited ability of the UNSG to influence other members of the group.34
Thesis Contribution
This thesis is the first comprehensive account of the formation and operation of the 
Quartet. It establishes the key factors that motivated the individual governments and 
institutions that formed the Quartet, and where membership in this body fitted into their 
broader strategic visions.
The thesis provides enhanced insight into the role of external parties in the functioning 
of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, sheds light on the tensions between national and 
institutional interests that often exist in the Middle East, and provides an historical 
record and critical evaluation of the key mediation efforts from 2001-2011.
Finally, this thesis is the first comprehensive textual analysis of the Quartet statements 
produced from 2002-2011. It assesses the impact that the members of the Quartet had
31 Otte, M., Former European Union Quartet envoy, Interview with author, Brussels, November, 2011.
32 For an example of such a conclusion, see: Elgindy, "The Middle East Quartet: A Post Mortem."
33 EEAS Official. Interview with the author, Brussels, November, 2011.
’4 de Soto, A., Former United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process, interview 
with the author, New York City, October, 2011.
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within the context of the Middle East peace process, and the extent to which the 
grouping facilitated the harmonisation of the approaches of the members.
Key Literature on the Quartet
The majority of the literature on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is either uncritical of the 
Quartet (simply making passing references to its key members) or dismissive of its 
impact on the peace process and capabilities as a meaningful actor in the region, and 
thus unconcerned with its workings. This thesis argues that a more nuanced and 
comprehensive approach is needed to explain the functioning and capabilities of the 
Quartet; one that accounts for the organisational and political constraints on the work of 
its members. This section discusses the key works that have examined aspects of the 
Quartet, and presents the ways in which this research differs in scope, focus, depth and 
conclusions to these previous works.
Kris Bauman: The Middle East Quartet of Mediators -  Understanding Multiparty 
Mediation in the Middle East Peace Process 
At the time of writing, only one other doctoral thesis examines the Quartet, and in this
'iC
case it is the secondary focus. Bauman’s analysis is within the context of a broader 
discussion of multiparty mediation theory, in which he seeks to determine the 
conditions under which multiparty mediation is unsuccessful in moving conflicting 
parties to resolution. By Bauman’s own admission, the Quartet has ‘rarely, if ever,
36conducted actual multiparty mediation,’ despite creating the opposite impression.
While Bauman’s thesis briefly mentions the politics of the formation of the Quartet, it 
does not examine the motivations of each actor in-depth, especially in regard to Russia. 
Furthermore, Bauman frames his analysis of the operation of the Quartet within an 
exploration of Druckman’s theory of turning points, which focuses primarily on 
negotiations.37 Because the Quartet spent much of 2001-2011 attempting to bring the 
parties to the conflict back into a negotiations framework, and rarely, if ever, took part 
in negotiations as a collective when they did occur, the benefits of applying the theory 
of turning points to Quartet behaviour during this period are limited.
35 Bauman, "The Middle East Quartet o f Mediators: Understanding Multiparty Mediation in the Middle 
East Peace Process".
36 Ibid., p .234.
37 Druckman, D., "Stages, Turning Points, and Crises: Negotiating Military Base Rights, Spain and the 
United States," The Journal of Conflict Resolution 30, no. 2 (1986).
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Ultimately, Bauman’s analysis presents the absence of positive developments within the 
context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as evidence of the ineffectiveness of the 
Quartet as a tool for conflict resolution.38 In contrast, this thesis concludes that the 
Quartet operated during a period in which progress in the Middle East peace process 
was complicated by circumstantial factors outside Quartet influence. Therefore, it 
differs in scope and focus from Bauman’s, and ultimately comes to substantially 
different conclusions.
Khaled Elgindy: The Middle East Quartet -  A Post Mortem 
Elgindy’s analysis draws heavily from that of Bauman, and argues that the effectiveness 
of the Quartet can be determined by analysing the impacts that the Quartet’s policies 
have had on the parties to the conflict.39 This is but one aspect of the functioning of the 
Quartet, and this thesis argues that the primary justification for the Quartet is as a tool 
for coordinating and harmonising (or at least reducing competition) among the 
approaches of its members. The eventual success or failure of these policies must take 
many other factors into account that fall beyond the control of the Quartet members.
Furthermore, and in a similar fashion to Bauman, Elgindy’s work presents and critiques 
the Quartet as a singular actor, rather than as a platform for the policies of several 
actors, each under their own political constraints. His analysis calls for more robust 
policies from the Quartet, but neglects the fact that any Quartet policy is a 
representation of the areas of policy overlap of its members.40 Finally, Elgindy’s 
analysis includes no in-depth examination of the Quartet statements, and presents only 
four case studies of the functioning of the Quartet.41 Elgindy’s work does add value to 
the discussion of the Quartet, but this thesis differs in scope and focus, and offers more 
comprehensive findings.
Alvaro de Soto: End of Mission Report
One of the only accounts of the internal political processes of the Quartet is the leaked 
classified ‘End of Mission Report’ of former UNSG envoy to the Quartet, Alvaro de
3X Bauman, "The Middle East Quartet of Mediators: Understanding Multiparty Mediation in the Middle 
East Peace Process", pp. 207-26.
39 Elgindy, "The Middle East Quartet: A Post Mortem."
40 Ibid.: p. 52.
41 These are: The construction of the Roadmap document; the Quartet position on Hamas in 2006; the 
Gaza Flotilla movement; and the role of the Office of the Quartet Representative. This thesis argues that 
the work of the Quartet members was highly context dependant, and that Quartet behavior cannot be 
encapsulated through the examination of discrete historical events.
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Soto.42 In it, de Soto candidly details the internal politics of the Quartet, and his 
resulting frustrations during the period of his posting from 2005-2007. While this 
account is an important critical evaluation of Quartet functionality, it deals only with the 
period of de Soto’s employment. Because of the intended audience of the report, and the 
author’s experience, it is also heavily UN-centric.
This thesis expands upon de Soto’s report, examining the Quartet not only on a larger 
scale, but also from the perspective of multiple actors. It draws upon de Soto’s 
conclusions regarding the role of the Secretary General within the context of the 
Quartet, but comes to different conclusions regarding the utility of the Quartet as a 
mechanism, including its potential future use.
Key diplomatic memoirs: James Wolfensohn, Martin Indyk, Condoleezza Rice, 
Kofi Annan, George W. Bush and Tony Blair 
The work of the Quartet was the culmination of the inputs of its member organisations. 
This process played out through the interactions of individuals representing these 
organisations within the Quartet. Consequently, within the Quartet, individuals and 
working relationships mattered, and the memoirs of diplomats and officials whose 
careers involved direct access to (or familiarity with) the grouping act as key sources of 
information for this thesis.
The thesis utilises the anecdotal evidence presented in these accounts in order to 
contextualise the outputs and outcomes of the Quartet throughout the period of analysis. 
However, while these authors provide useful supporting information concerning the 
functioning of the Quartet from 2001-2011, they all do so within the context of personal 
and professional narratives -  rather than through in-depth academic analysis of the 
grouping. None provides a comprehensive history or assessment of the Quartet beyond 
the limits of their personal involvement with the group.
Former US State Department official Martin Indyk discusses his involvement in the 
formation of the Quartet during his appointment as the US Ambassador to Israel.43 His 
account provides useful examples of the early approach to the peace process adopted by
42 de Soto, "End of Mission Report," p. 3.
43 Indyk, M., Innocent Abroad: An Intimate Account of American Peace Diplomacy in the Middle East 
(New York: Simon & Schuster, 2009).
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the Bush Administration, and provides important observations concerning the US-Israel 
relationship during this period.44
Former World Bank President James Wolfensohn’s autobiography includes discussion 
of his tenure as the Quartet envoy responsible for overseeing the Israeli withdrawal 
from Gaza, and offers insights into the functioning of the grouping in 2005 and 2006 45 
In particular, his account is illustrative of the role that former US Secretary of State 
Condoleezza Rice played in the negotiation of the so-called Agreement on Movement 
and Access following the Israeli disengagement from Gaza, and his conclusions 
regarding the utility of the grouping itself are discussed in subsequent chapters of this 
thesis 46
Former US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice’s account of her years in the Bush 
Administration provides many important observations regarding the US approach to the 
peace process during this period 47 In particular, Rice’s account comments on the 
divisions that existed between the US State Department and the White House during the 
first term of the Bush Administration (crucial to the formation of the Quartet), and her 
eventual work as the US Secretary of State from 2005-2009. Importantly, this work 
included coordination with the Quartet members, and Rice’s account provides 
contextualisation of the US-Israel relationship during this period, which inherently 
affected the functioning of the grouping.
Former UNSG Kofi Annan’s 2012 autobiography is an important record of the personal 
role that he played within the Quartet from 2001-2006, and includes a first-hand account 
of the formation of the grouping.48 Annan provides insights into the capacity of the 
UNSG to affect meaningful change within the context of the Middle East peace process, 
and includes numerous examples of Quartet functionality during his tenure. As a driving 
force for the formation and continuation of the Quartet, Annan’s views are cited
44 As a follow-up to Indyk’s account, an interview was conducted with the author in October 2011. 
References to this interview are present throughout this thesis.
45 Wolfensohn, J., A Global Life: My Journey Among Rich and Poor, from Wall Street to the World Bank 
(Pan Macmillan Australia Pty. Limited, 2009).
46 These events are discussed in greater detail in Chapter Six: The Disengagement Process.
47 Rice, C., No Higher Honor: A Memoir of My Years in Washington, 1st ed. (New York: Crown 
Publishers, 2011).
48 Annan, Interventions: A Life in War and Peace.
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frequently throughout this thesis, and his conclusions regarding the utility of the 
grouping are afforded special consideration in subsequent chapters.49
Finally, the accounts of former US President George W. Bush and former British Prime 
Minister Tony Blair are both relevant to the work of the Quartet, despite neither making 
a single specific mention of the grouping.50 In both cases, this absence is conspicuous. 
Bush’s account offers insights into his relationship with Israeli Prime Minister Ariel 
Sharon, his de-prioritisation of the peace process in favour of US intervention in Iraq, 
and the decisions of his Administration within the context of the peace process. 
However, in his account, Bush does not describe the role of the Quartet within these 
contexts, an absence that is arguably indicative of his lack of direct association with the 
work of the grouping.51 Blair’s account offers useful insights into the US-UK 
relationship during the early stages of the Quartet’s work, and also provides Blair’s 
observations of President Bush during moments of key relevance to the peace process. 
Furthermore, in 2007 Blair was appointed as the official Quartet Representative, and -  
at the time of writing -  continues to hold this position/ Despite his prominent role as 
the face of the Quartet within the region, however, Blair makes no direct reference to 
the work of the grouping, or the circumstances surrounding his involvement with it. 
Despite this, his account offers indirect insights into the functioning of the grouping.
The overall pattern in the autobiographical literature on the Quartet is of fractured 
accounts that are narrow in scope, and that come to different conclusions regarding the 
role and impact of the grouping. However, this thesis is the first work to bring together 
the observations of these separate authors in support of a comprehensive analysis of 
Quartet behaviour.
49 Annan’s conclusions regarding the work of the Quartet are discussed in-depth in both Chapter Seven: 
The Palestinian Divide, and Chapter Nine: Conclusion -  The Outcomes of the Quartet. In addition to his 
autobiography, a key source for Annan’s views on the Quartet is his 2006 ‘End of Mission Report’ to the 
UN Security Council. See: United Nations Security Council, "Report of the Secretary General on the 
Middle East," United Nations: S/2006/956: 11 December, 2006.
50 Bush, G. W., Decision Points, 1st ed. (New York: Crown Publishers, 2010), Blair, T., A Journey: My 
Political Life, 1st ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2010).
51 As this thesis establishes, the Quartet operates exclusively at the ministerial or secretarial level or 
below. The involvement of the United States with the Quartet, for example, includes only the US 
Secretary of State and their envoys. This level is known as the principals level, and there is no higher 
level of interaction within the Quartet. While the efforts of Secretaries of State Condoleezza Rice and 
Colin Powell necessarily included constant interactions with President Bush, his involvement with the 
Quartet in a direct sense was almost non-existent.
52 The politics surrounding Blair’s appointment are discussed in Chapter Seven: The Palestinian Divide.
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The Quartet Statements: 2002-2011
The public statements of the Quartet were -  in effect -  the official means through which 
the members sought to exert normative influence, and usually coincided with the
c  o
meetings of the principals. * This thesis is the first comprehensive critical analysis of the 
47 Quartet statements issued from April 2002 to January 2011.54
Analysis of these statements takes place over several chapters of this thesis. Chapter 
Three: The Formation o f the Quartet discusses the role of the Quartet envoys in the 
authorship of the Quartet’s statements. Chapter Four: The General Practices o f the 
Quartet, offers general observations regarding the nature and frequency of Quartet 
messaging, and provides analysis of the timing and scope of the Quartet statements from 
2002-2011. Finally, chapters five, six, seven and eight provide the context for each of 
the Quartet statements throughout the period of analysis, and situate the public work of 
the grouping within both the organisational and regional environments.
As the subsequent chapters demonstrate, while the Quartet statements were primarily 
intended as a means for the presentation of a unified and cohesive public stance, they 
also often presented a secondary narrative of compromise among the members, and 
demonstrated changes over time in Quartet positions and policies. The statements 
provided an important account of the key areas of agreement and disagreement among 
the Quartet members, how they wanted to be viewed and their intended audiences. By 
extension, these statements serve as an important record of the key diplomatic initiatives 
of international actors from 2002-2011 within the context of the Middle East peace 
process.
Thesis Methodology
Document analysis
In addition to analysis of the first-hand accounts of officials familiar with the work of 
the Quartet and its members, this thesis draws extensively from organisational 
documents produced by the Quartet members. Specifically, this includes documentation 
relating to the work of the Quartet or the Quartet members -  such as reports, press
53 However, not all meetings of the Quartet resulted in statements, particularly when the conflicting 
positions of the members could not be reconciled, or when the meetings were held in secret. EEAS 
Official. Interview with the author, Brussels, November, 2011.
54 This analysis spans from 2002-2011 because -  despite forming in 2001 -  the Quartet did not release its 
first official statement until April 2002.
15
Chapter One: Introduction to the Quartet
releases, briefing papers or memoranda -  generated in the United Nations, the European 
Union, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the US State Department, or by the 
Quartet itself (i.e. the Quartet statements).
Analysis of external literature was also undertaken to complement, reinforce and 
challenge the Quartet member documentation. This literature consisted of accounts and 
documentation produced by organisations outside the membership of the Quartet, or by 
individuals whose governmental or organisational affiliation did not fit under the 
umbrella of Quartet membership. Specifically, this included governmental 
documentation relating to the Quartet produced by key regional actors in the Middle 
East, especially Israel, and documentation produced by key non-state actors, especially 
non-government organisations (NGOs). Furthermore, this category includes analysis of 
the literature of the global academic and journalistic communities regarding the Quartet, 
particularly regarding its internal politics.
Interviews
In addition to analysis of relevant academic and organisational literature, a key 
component of this thesis is comprised of data from interviews conducted with Quartet 
principals, their envoys, members of their respective organisations, academics and 
journalists. Interviewees were approached on the basis of their personal experience with 
the Quartet, including the functioning of the governments and organisations involved in 
the grouping, or their broader strategic understanding of Israeli-Palestinian conflict and 
the Quartet’s role within it. The key function of the interviews was to test the findings 
of the document analysis, and to put the hypotheses of the thesis under direct scrutiny 
from those who played significant roles during the period. It is important to 
acknowledge that this process was inherently dependant on interviewees being on 
public record.
All interviews were conducted in person by the researcher, from October-December in 
2011, in Washington DC, New York, Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, Ramallah, Cairo and 
Brussels. The interviews were semi-structured, centring on the core themes of the 
research. With consent, these interviews were recorded by the researcher to ensure the 
accuracy of the subsequent quotations presented in this thesis. When consent for 
publication was not given, interviews were either documented with hand written notes, 
or, if requested, not documented at all.
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Interviewees were given the option to remain anonymous and to have no attribution of 
their remarks in this thesis, or to be indentified clearly and have their responses 
attributed. This flexible approach was adopted to increase the likelihood that individuals 
concerned about speaking candidly would participate in the research. Unsurprisingly, 
individuals working currently in Quartet member organisations often chose to remain 
anonymous, though the vast majority of interviewees allowed the interviews to be 
recorded. It should be noted that participation was entirely voluntary and no 
interviewees were paid by the researcher.
There were limitations to the interview approach adopted in this research. Firstly, the 
approach necessarily dictated that only individuals willing to volunteer their time 
without financial compensation took part in the research. Compounding this issue was 
the fact that many individuals with intimate knowledge of the Quartet held high public 
profile positions with demanding schedules. This made direct contact with these 
individuals problematic, and securing interviews with them was extremely difficult. 
Secondly, by primarily approaching individuals whose experience with the Quartet was 
a matter of public record -  an approach necessitated by the limited literature on the 
grouping -  individuals who worked in less public roles may have been overlooked.
Some interviewees went to the trouble of introducing the researcher to less well-known, 
but equally experienced, colleagues, but this was rare. Finally, the selection of 
individuals interviewed was in some ways dictated by the financial constraints of the 
researcher, and upon the geographic limitations of meeting interviewees in person.
Ultimately, the accounts collected throughout the interview process constitute an 
important source of information on the work of the Quartet members, as well as the 
functioning of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This thesis combines both documentary 
analysis and interview data to provide -  to the maximum extent possible -  a 
comprehensive account of the work of the grouping.
Theoretical component
While it is useful to acknowledge and incorporate theories of diplomatic strategy, 
international relations, and conflict resolution when examining the behaviour of actors 
on the global stage, this research does not rely on a theoretical approach the Quartet, nor 
does it use the Quartet as a case study to validate (or challenge) a paradigm or 
theoretical model in any of those fields.
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The hazard of rigid theoretical frameworks -  which by default affect the values 
promoted or excluded -  is that, as Charles Taylor argues, if certain outcomes are ruled 
out, the ‘framework will usually determine for itself what is the best possible state of 
affairs.55 For example, Bauman’s analysis of the Quartet was situated within a study of 
multiparty mediation that used Druckman’s ‘turning point analysis’56 to narrow 
examination of Quartet action to five so-called ‘precipitant events.’ As a study of 
multiparty mediation failure, Bauman’s analysis presupposed not only that the Quartet 
was a mediatory body, but also that the responses of its members to each of these events
CO
resulted in failure. Therefore, Bauman’s analysis approached the Quartet with its 
outcomes already established, and excluded contradictory evidence by narrowing its 
focus to only five events.
As previously established, this thesis is exploratory in nature, and is the first 
comprehensive analysis of the outputs and outcomes of the Quartet. As such, it avoids 
the application of a theoretical framework that could create a path dependency regarding 
its findings. Instead, it adopts a qualitative approach that emphasises complex 
explanations for Quartet behaviour. As Creswell argues, such an approach is useful for 
analysis of topics that do not have a well-established academic discourse:
If a concept or phenom enon needs to be understood because little research has been  
done on it, then it m erits a qualitative approach. Q ualitative research is exploratory 
and is useful when the researcher does not know the important variables to exam ine. 
This type o f  approach may be needed because the topic is new , the topic has never 
been addressed with a certain sam ple or group o f  people, or existing theories do not 
apply with the particular sam ple or group under study.59
As well as being exploratory, this thesis argues that the Quartet, including the regional 
context in which it operates, involves a complex web of interactions that defy elegant, 
mono-causal explanations. The Quartet itself involves the relations of international, 
state, and trans-state actors, each of which are bound by different organisational
55 Taylor, C., "Neutrality in Political Science," in The philosophy of social explanation, ed. Alan Ryan 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1973), pp. 153-4. As cited by Richardson, J. L., "The Ethics of 
Neoliberal Institutionalism," in The Oxford handbook of international relations, ed. Christian Reus-Smit 
and Duncan Snidal (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 226.
56 Druckman argues that successful mediators identify potential ‘precipitant events’, and depart from 
established process to create a ‘turning point,’ which can be either positive or negative. Druckman, 
"Stages, Turning Points, and Crises: Negotiating Military Base Rights, Spain and the United States."
57 These were the death of Yasser Arafat; the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza; the stroke of Ariel Sharon; 
the Hamas election victory and; the Mecca agreement.
58 Bauman, "The Middle East Quartet of Mediators: Understanding Multiparty Mediation in the Middle 
East Peace Process", p. 16.
Creswell, J. W., Research Design : Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed Methods Approaches, 2nd ed. 
(Thousand Oaks, Calif: Sage Publications, 2003), p. 22.
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constraints and formulate and act upon policies in varying ways. Furthermore, these 
actors attempt to exert normative influence upon the parties to a conflict that is 
protracted, penetrative, and resilient to change, with strong historical, legal and 
geopolitical undercurrents. Consequently, the research presented in this thesis 
deliberately eschews theoretical explanations in favour of complex and contextual 
assessments of the decision-making processes of policy makers in the various Quartet 
member organisations.
In essence, the thesis argues that the work of Quartet cannot be assessed through any 
single theoretical framework until the nature and scope of its outputs and outcomes have 
been better established. It engages necessarily with the world of policy and practice by 
adopting a pragmatist ethos, and downplays theoretical explanations for individual 
behaviour.
Thesis Structure
The thesis structure is designed to address the research question. Chapter One: 
Introduction to the Quartet lays out the key components of the analysis, situates the 
research within the existing literature, outlines the methodological and analytical 
framework, and explains the contributions of the thesis.
The two subsequent chapters establish the factors that contributed to the formation of 
the Quartet. Chapter Two: The Historical Precedents to the Quartet contextualises the 
Quartet within the modern history of mediation in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It 
focuses primarily on the post-Cold War development, in each of the Quartet member 
organisations, of policies concerning the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and the extent to 
which the Quartet itself was a departure from the diplomatic initiatives of this period. 
The chapter argues that the Quartet was a unique approach to the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict by the Quartet powers, and that both the design and the membership of the 
grouping reflected historical considerations.
Chapter Three: The Formation o f the Quartet examines the politics of the formation of 
the Quartet, including the rationale of the parties that created it, the extent to which they 
each had expectations from membership, and where the Quartet fitted into their 
organisational or national strategies in the region. It argues that personal and 
professional relationships contributed strongly to the composition and formation of the 
Quartet, and that the main driving forces for the creation of the grouping were the
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second intifada, the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the perceived disengagement of the Bush 
Administration from the Middle East peace process.
The chapter argues that each of the Quartet members sought membership in order to 
pursue organisational objectives within the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 
Specifically, for Secretary of State Powell, the Quartet was a mechanism for the US 
State Department to re-engage with the peace process in a collaborative forum, despite 
the disinclination to do so of the Bush White House, without compromising on the 
established US role as the primary third-party within this context. Furthermore, the 
Quartet was a means for expanding European involvement in the Middle East peace 
process from the traditional approach that focused on economic development and 
institution building to one that also included visibility and influence within the political 
sphere. Russian involvement in the Quartet was an important tool for bolstering its 
image as a great power. From the perspective of the other Quartet members, Russia’s 
membership also reduced the incentive for it to act as a spoiler for Quartet initiatives. 
Finally, the chapter argues that UN involvement in the Quartet fell exclusively under the 
authority of the Office of the UNSG, and did not involve directly either the General 
Assembly, or the Security Council.60 The decision to enter into the Quartet was made 
personally by UNSG Kofi Annan, and in some ways can be explained by his personal 
ambition to revitalise the diplomatic involvement of the Secretary General in the Middle 
East peace process.
Having presented the factors that underpinned the formation of the Quartet, the 
remainder of the thesis establishes and evaluates its members’ work in relation to the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Chapter Four: The General Practices o f the Quartet, 2001- 
2011 outlines the general working practices of the Quartet members that remained 
consistent throughout the period of analysis. It offers general observations about the 
statement authorship process, and establishes the practical constraints of Quartet 
collective action.
The four subsequent chapters examine the outputs of the Quartet members from 2001- 
2011, and include discussion of the relevant developments within the context of the 
Middle East peace process during this period. In particular, the chapters establish the
60 There were instances, however, when the UN Security Council legitimised and supported the actions 
taken by the UNSG within the context of the Quartet. For example, UNSCR 1515, adopted on 19 
November 2003, supported the Roadmap for Peace in the Middle East and, by extension, the work of the 
UNSG.
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ways in which these developments affected the ability of the Quartet members to exert 
influence on the parties to the conflict, and on each other. In order to avoid a 
reductionist approach to examining the work of the Quartet, including the inherent risk 
of selective bias, the analysis is organised chronologically and thematically to represent 
four distinctive periods that occurred within the context of the Middle East peace 
process from 2001 -2011.
The rationale for this approach is that a comprehensive and contextual analysis of the 
work of the Quartet inevitably involves expansive discussion of regional developments 
and Quartet responses that could not be encapsulated adequately in a single chapter. The 
approach is also designed to avoid the selection of discrete events that would act as case 
studies for explaining the work of the Quartet, as seen in the works of Elgindy and 
Bauman, and instead to offer a more holistic and context-driven examination of the 
grouping.
By situating analysis of the Quartet within the dominant frames of reference within the 
peace process, these chapters also emphasise the effects that paradigmatic shifts in that 
process had on the functioning of the grouping. This approach should not imply that 
these shifts were discrete events, easily contained within calendar years. Instead they 
were clusters of interrelated and mutually enforcing events that altered the 
characteristics of the conflict itself and, by extension, dominated the work of actors 
invested in it during this period. It should also be noted that these chapters do not 
comment on other parallel regional events that occurred during this period, unless they 
impacted directly on the Middle East peace process or the work of the Quartet.61 This is 
partly a reflection of the specific efforts of the Quartet members to comment exclusively 
on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and partly an effort to avoid broadening the scope of 
the thesis beyond reasonable limits.
Finally, it must be emphasised that chapters five, six, seven and eight are largely 
explanatory in their discussion of the outputs of the Quartet from 2001-2011. In 
Chapter Nine: Conclusion -  The Outcomes o f the Quartet, 2001-2011, a more 
evaluative approach is adopted to establish both the strengths and limitations of the 
Quartet as a mechanism for pursuing individual and collective outcomes within the 
context of the Middle East peace process.
61 For example, these chapters do not offer in-depth discussion of the War in Afghanistan, the Iraq War, 
or the 2006 Israel-Lebanon war.
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Accordingly, Chapter Five: The Roadmap Process, 2002-2003 examines the work of 
the Quartet members within the context of international efforts to end the violence of 
the second intifada, and to address the perceived flaws of the Oslo period. " It argues 
that despite the proactive contributions of the Quartet members towards the authorship 
of the Roadmap document -  now synonymous with the grouping -  their ability to 
support the implementation of the plan was hindered by the divisions within the Bush 
Administration and the responses of the parties to the conflict. While the authorship 
process acted as a catalyst for the early coordination of the Quartet members, the 
eventual breakdown in the implementation process produced the opposite effect.
Chapter Six: The Disengagement Process, 2004-2005 examines the work of the Quartet
z: o
members within the context of the Israeli disengagement from the Gaza Strip. It 
argues that Israeli Prime Minister Sharon circumvented and sidelined the Roadmap 
implementation process during this period, and reframed the discourse of the peace 
process on territorial and security issues. For the Quartet members, the disengagement 
process complicated efforts to restart a political process between the Israelis and the 
Palestinians, and active US engagement both inside and outside the grouping stifled 
Quartet member collaboration during this period. Consequently, the Quartet largely 
functioned in response to regional developments and US initiatives.
Chapter Seven: The Palestinian Divide, 2006-2007 examines the work of the Quartet 
members within the context of the 2006 Hamas election victory and the subsequent 
political and geographic schism in the Palestinian territories.64 It argues that the 
Quartet’s response to the Hamas election victory was the catalyst for several 
overlapping and interrelated developments within the Middle East peace process. This 
had far reaching consequences that came to define the work of the grouping. During this 
period, the members of the Quartet championed a strategy of political and social
62 Specifically, this chapter focuses on the role of the Quartet in regional developments such as the Arab 
Peace Initiative; Israeli ‘Operation Defensive Shield;’ the 24 June Rose Garden speech by US President 
Bush; the nomination of Mahmoud Abbas as the Palestinian Prime Minister and the politics surrounding 
the authorship and implementation of the Roadmap document.
63 Specifically, this chapter examines the role of the Quartet in regional developments including the 
announcement and implementation of the Israeli disengagement from Gaza; the subsequent exchange of 
letters of assurance between Ariel Sharon and George W. Bush; the appointment of James Wolfensohn as 
the Quartet envoy to the Gaza disengagement and the politics surrounding the negotiation of the 
Agreement on Movement and Access.
64 Specifically, this chapter focuses on the role of the Quartet in regional developments including the 2006 
Palestinian Legislative Council elections; the Quartet’s subsequent ‘conditions’ on the Hamas-led 
Palestinian Authority; the 2007 Mecca agreement and the collapse of the Palestinian Unity Government; 
the appointment of Tony Blair as the Quartet representative and the politics of the Annapolis conference.
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isolation of Hamas that resulted in a fiscal and humanitarian crisis in the Palestinian 
territories. Furthermore, the Quartet members discouraged subsequent inter-Palestinian 
reconciliation attempts, which prolonged and intensified the domestic political divide 
between Fatah and Hamas. Finally, this chapter argues that the Annapolis process was 
facilitated by the breakdown in the Palestinian National Unity Government, and that in 
that context the Quartet members operated largely in support of US efforts to restart a 
political process between Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas and Israeli 
Prime Minister Ehud Olmert.
Chapter Eight: The Post-Annapolis Period, 2008-2010 examines the work of the 
Quartet members within the context of the post-Annapolis period. Despite early political 
progress, this period was characterised by both the regression of the Israeli-Palestinian 
bilateral relationship and the solidification of the Palestinian geographic and political 
divide.65 It argues that the Quartet members worked in support of the bilateral process 
between Prime Minister Olmert and President Abbas, but were ultimately unable to 
prevent the deterioration of this process in the aftermath of both Olmert’s exit from 
government and the breakdown in the Gaza ceasefire. In the period that followed, the 
Quartet members worked exclusively in pursuit of the re-establishment of direct 
negotiations between the parties. These efforts, however, were complicated by changes 
in political leaderships in the United States and Israel, and by the ramifications of events 
in the region. Both the parties to the conflict and the members of the Quartet were 
unable to escape the adverse conditions for peace making created in the preceding 
period, and the prospects for negotiated solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict 
diminished further.
Finally, Chapter Nine: Conclusion -  The Outcomes of the Quartet, 2001-2011 reviews 
and draws upon the findings of the preceding chapters to establish the strengths and 
limitations of the Quartet as a mechanism for delivering outcomes for its members. It 
concludes that from 2001 -2011 the nature of the Quartet and the nature of the Israeli- 
Palestinian conflict both affected the work of the grouping, often simultaneously and 
unequally. It argues that the grouping had a limited capacity for securing collective 
outcomes within the context of the peace process as a result of both its internal decision-
65 Specifically, this chapter focuses on the role of the Quartet in regional developments including the 
Israel-Hamas Gaza ceasefire; the final status negotiations process between Abbas and Olmert; Israeli 
Operation Cast Lead; the elections of Barack Obama and Benjamin Netanyahu; the US-led proximity 
talks and the Gaza flotilla incidents.
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making structure, and US and Israeli resistance to the expansion of Quartet member 
involvement within the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. However, the chapter concludes that 
the Quartet operated as a useful mechanism for coordination and regular information 
sharing between its members, and that this function underpins the continuation of the 
grouping.
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Chapter Two: The Historical Precedents to the Quartet
Experience can tell you that the Arab-Israeli conflict is a conflict that, in addition to its 
resilience in existence, also has resilience in documents. The amount of resolutions, 
maps, plans, and ideas make it a big laboratory of political science and international 
law.
- Abdelmonem Said Aly, President of Al-Ahram Center for 
Political and Strategic Studies, Cairo.1
Equally, each partially conceived or unimplemented political initiative -  from Oslo to 
the Roadmap to the Gaza disengagement -  eventually discredited the very concept of 
a negotiated peace for both peoples.
- Kofi Annan, United Nations Secretary General (1997-2006).2 3
Introduction
The Middle East peace process is a museum of diplomacy. In the Brussels office of 
EEAS Middle East advisor Christian Jouret, there is an unused peace agreement for the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This agreement, written by European officials after the 
Taba Summit in January 2001, details the positions of the parties during the talks and 
presents a basis for the resolution of the final status issues of the conflict.4 As Jouret 
explained:
We call it a European Deposit, which means that it’s a sort of non-paper written on 
our own responsibility. If one day the Palestinians or the Israelis, or both, want to take 
it as a basis for something, it’s free of charge.5
This peace agreement was never built upon. Instead it functions solely as a point of 
reference for European officials working on the MEPP, within the same milieu as 
developments such as the Madrid Multilaterals, the Oslo Accords and the Annapolis 
process.6
The Israeli-Palestinian conflict has many such points of reference, and actors involved 
in mediation are well versed in the core paradigms and precedents that have emerged in
1 Said Aly, A., President of Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, interview with the 
author, Cairo, Egypt, November, 2011.
2 Annan, K., Interventions: A Life in War and Peace (New York: Penguin Press, 2012), p. 308.
3 Jouret, C., Middle East Advisor, European External Action Service (EEAS), interview with the author, 
Brussels, November, 2011.
4 The plan, sometimes referred to as the ‘Moratinos Document’ was authored by the EU’s Special Envoy 
to the peace process, Miguel Moratinos who, later that year, acted as the European Union’s first envoy to 
the Quartet. The core positions of the Palestinians and the Israelis on issues such as the status of 
Jerusalem, borders, narratives and refugees are summarised and rectified in the document. For analysis 
and full text, see: Eldar, A., "The peace that nearly was at Taba," Haaretz, 12 February, 2002.
5 Jouret. Interview with the author, Brussels, November, 2011.
6 EEAS Official. Interview with the author, Brussels, November, 2011.
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modern history.7 As a UN official noted, ‘you create over time, and this is what most 
peace processes are like, sediment, or layer upon layer of different normative 
instruments.’ However, the danger of accumulating these instruments is that ‘there are 
now so many lying around the ruins of this conflict, that the parties can play games all 
the time.’9
For the Quartet members, the selection of specific reference points was designed to 
carry normative significance, even in cases where these reference points were contested 
by the parties to the conflict. For example, the first Quartet statement, issued in April 
2002, referred to United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242, 338, 1373, 1397, 
1402 and 1403, the Madrid Terms of Reference, the Mitchell Report, the Tenet Plan and 
the Arab Peace Initiative.10 Former European envoy to the Quartet, Marc Otte explained 
this process:
In this conflict, like in many others, you have a pile of UN resolutions that have 
accumulated along the years. There are incantations in multilateral diplomacy that are 
obligatory. Everyone has to have their reference, and it’s still useful, if only so that 
someone can get up from time to time and say ‘you don’t fulfil your obligations.’11
While the notion of the Quartet itself, an informal mechanism for coordinating 
approaches to the MEPP, was unique within the context of the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict, the members of the grouping actively incorporated and promoted initiatives 
from the preceding periods that had mixed results.12 In essence, this approach reflected 
a pragmatic understanding among the members that neither the grouping itself nor the 
work of its composite organisations could exist in isolation from historical context.
This chapter seeks to answer the question, what were the historical precedents to the 
formation o f the Quartet?
7 Many such reference points are built upon previous initiatives, and the boundaries between them can 
become blurred. For example, former UNSG Kofi Annan recalled a press conference in 2002 in which his 
spokesperson declared that: ‘The US mediator, General Anthony Zinni, has been trying to get the two 
sides to begin the Tenet process; which is to lead back to the Mitchell understandings; which is to lead 
back to the negotiating table. But they’re still stuck in the pre-Tenet stage while the violence goes on.’
See: Annan, Interventions: A Life in War and Peace, p. 278.
K UN official. Interview with the author, Jerusalem, November, 2011.
9 Ibid.
10 The Quartet’s reference to the Arab Peace Initiative was an effort to promote Israeli consideration of 
the plan, despite its cold reception in Jerusalem. Chapter Five: The Roadmap Process expands on these 
dynamics. For the Quartet statement, see: US Department of State, "Remarks with Foreign Minister of 
Spain Josep Pique, United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan, Foreign Minister of Russia Igor Ivanov 
and European Union Senior Official Javier Solana," Madrid, Spain: 10 April, 2002.
11 Otte, M., Former European Union Quartet envoy. Interview with author, Brussels, November, 2011.
12 These results are evidenced in the layering of the resolutions. For example, UNSCR 338 calls for 
compliance with UNSCR 242, and UNSCR 1403 calls for compliance with UNSCR 1402.
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It argues that the Quartet formed as a consequence of both the historical experiences 
within the Middle East peace process of its member organisations, and the evolution of 
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It argues that the formation of the grouping reflected the 
culmination of these experiences.
It should be noted that this chapter is not intended as a comprehensive history of the 
Arab-Israeli conflict. Consequently, it presupposes knowledge of the core dynamics and 
key historical developments of the conflict, especially during the Cold War period. To 
approach this topic in any other way would be to repeat unnecessarily the work of other 
authors, and to introduce more material than is necessary to establish the core 
hypotheses of the chapter.13
Ultimately, this chapter functions as a precursor to Chapter Three: The Formation o f the 
Quartet, and charts the evolution of the Quartet members as foreign policy actors within 
the recent history of mediation in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In addressing the key 
precedents to the formation of the group, this chapter presents the Quartet as an original 
attempt by its members to respond to the deficiencies of the processes and initiatives 
that preceded it.
The chapter is divided into two sections, each approaching the historical precedents of 
the Quartet from a different perspective. Section One examines the evolution of the 
individual Quartet members as third-party actors within the Middle East peace process. 
It argues that each of the Quartet members adapted their involvement in the Israeli- 
Palestinian conflict in response to regional and organisational developments, and that 
these developments subsequently underpinned the formation and operation of the 
Quartet. In particular, this section emphasises the importance of the post-Cold War 
period for the evolution of the Quartet members as foreign policy actors. Section Two 
examines the key peace initiatives of the post-Cold War period, and establishes the 
extent to which these initiatives acted as precedents to the formation of the Quartet. It 
argues that the Madrid Multilaterals and the Oslo process shaped the experiences of the
13 For thorough analysis of the history and functioning of the Arab-Israeli conflict, see: Quandt, W. B., 
Peace process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict Since 1967 - Revised Edition 
(Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2001). Said, E. W., The Question of Palestine (New York: 
Vintage Books, 1980). Hirst, D., The Gun and the Olive Branch: The Roots of Violence in the Middle 
East (London: Faber and Faber, 1984). Morris, B., Righteous Victims: A History of the Zionist-Arab 
Conflict, 1881-2001 (New York: Vintage Books, 1999).
27
Chapter Two: The Historical Precedents to the Quartet
Quartet members in relation to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and that subsequent 
efforts by the grouping reflect this.
There are two reasons for the post-Cold War focus of this chapter. Firstly, the Cold War 
period in the Middle East was characterised by US-Soviet strategic competition that 
stifled international cooperation vis-ä-vis the Arab-Israeli conflict -  especially in the 
UN Security Council. 14 After the end of the Cold War, regional polarisation was 
diminished and US primacy within the context of the peace process was solidified.
These changes to the regional and international order facilitated developments within 
the context of the peace process that had previously been impossible. It was within this 
context that the Quartet formed. Secondly, both the members of the Quartet and the 
parties to the conflict evolved substantially during the post-Cold War period. In 
particular, this period saw the formation of the European Union, the transition from the 
Soviet Union to the Russian Federation, and the evolution of the role of the UN 
Secretary General as a foreign policy actor. The Quartet could not have existed during 
the Cold War period, both because international cooperation was problematic during 
this period and because the actors themselves did not exist in their present forms.
The Quartet Members and the Arab-Israeli Conflict
I believe the failure to achieve an Arab-Israeli peace is a core source of frustration and 
instability in the region. This failure also remains for the UN a deep internal wound as 
old as the organisation itself, given that the Arab-Israeli conflict began at the very 
inception of the UN -  a painful and festering sore consequently felt in almost every 
intergovernmental organ and Secretariat body.
- Kofi Annan, United Nations Secretary General (1997-2006).15
No variable within the context of the Middle East peace process has remained constant. 
The conflict underwent paradigmatic shifts throughout its history, and both regional and 
international actors have varied their subsequent responses in accordance with their own 
interests, and their national or organisational development as actors within this context.
The Role of the United States
The evolution of the US role in the Arab-Israeli conflict was characterised by both Cold 
War strategic competition and by the deepening of the US-Israel relationship.16 While
14 For a discussion of US and Soviet veto power during the Cold War period, see: Sarsar, S., "The 
Question of Palestine and United States Behavior at the United Nations," International Journal of 
Politics, Culture, and Society 17, no. 3 (2004).
15 Annan, Interventions: A Life in War and Peace, p. 254.
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the United States and the Soviet Union supported the 1947 UN partition plan, the 
subsequent period was marked by US efforts to oppose or counterbalance Soviet 
influence in the region. The ideological and strategic competition of the Cold War 
period made US-Soviet relations in the Middle East a zero sum game. However, both 
the United States and the Soviet Union prioritised crisis prevention during this period, 
and sought to avoid an escalating conflict in the region.19 Consequently, US-Soviet 
rivalry was manifested in competition between regional proxies, and the Arab-Israeli 
conflict became a key dividing line between the superpowers. For example, when US 
support for Israel negatively impacted US relations with the emerging Arab nationalist
70movements of the post-colonial period, the Soviets sought to amplify this trend.
The solidification of the US-Israel relationship accelerated dramatically in the period 
following the June 1967 war. During this period, US policymakers saw Israel both as 
a strong ally in the region, and as a potential counterbalance to the Soviet-supported 
Arab powers. In the post-1967 period, as a result of the escalating cost of modem 
weapons and its recent material losses, Israel began to increase its requests for military 
and economic aid from the United States. * As US financial and military support for
16 For a concise overview of this evolution, see: Baxter, K. and Akbarzadeh, S., US Foreign Policy in the 
Middle East (New York: Routledge, 2008), pp. 136-59.
17 Former State Department Official John Campbell encapsulated early US concerns regarding Soviet 
expansion in the Middle East when he argued that: ‘The entrenchment of Soviet power in that strategic 
region would bring a decisive shift in the world balance, outflanking NATO. Soviet control of Middle 
Eastern oil could disrupt the economy of the free world. And the triumph of communism in the heart of 
the Islamic world could be the prelude to its triumph through Asia, Africa and Europe.’ Campbell, J. C., 
Defense o f the Middle East: Problems o f American policy, [1st] ed. (New York: Harper, 1958), p. 4.
18 For an in-depth discussion of the key areas of strategic competition between the US and the Soviet 
Union during the Cold War period, see: George, A. L., "US-Soviet Global Rivalry: Norms of 
Competition," in New Issues in International Crisis Management, ed. Gilbert R. Winham (Boulder: 
Westview Press, 1988).
19 However, Gross Stein argued that the superpowers both showed a limited capacity to restrain regional 
allies from escalating confrontations. See: Gross Stein, J., "The Managed and the Managers: Crisis 
Prevention in the Middle East," in New Issues in International Crisis Management, ed. Gilbert R.
Winham (Boulder: Westview Press, 1988).
20 Hudson, M. C., "To Play the Hegemon: Fifty Years of US Policy toward the Middle East," Middle East 
Journal, 50, no. 3 (1996): p. 331.
21 The 1967 conflict, which included Jordan and Syria, effectively superseded the status quo based on the 
armistice lines of 1949. By the end of the war, in which a dominant Israeli military routed the Arab forces 
in six days, Israel was occupying the Gaza Strip, the Sinai Peninsula, the West Bank, East Jerusalem and 
the Golan Heights. Israel for the first time was left in control of 100 percent of historical Palestine. For an 
in-depth analysis of Israeli decision-making during this period, see: Bregman, A., Israel's Wars: A 
History Since 1947, Third ed. (New York: Routledge, 2010), pp. 62-102.
22 Hudson, "To Play the Hegemon: Fifty Years of US Policy toward the Middle East," p. 334.
23 Lewis, S. W., "The United States and Israel: Evolution of an Unwritten Alliance," Middle East Journal 
53, no. 3 (1999): p.367.
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Israel grew, so too did the US insistence that it should take the lead on matters 
pertaining to the Arab-Israeli conflict.24
This trend was exemplified by the prominent role played by US Secretary of State 
Henry Kissinger in the negotiations between the parties to the 1973 Arab-Israeli war. 
Indeed, this period marked the first time that the United States gave Israel written 
assurances of its support for Israel’s security.25
The end of the Cold War largely removed the strategic basis of US-Russia rivalry in the 
Arab-Israeli context. Established as the global superpower, American policy-makers 
and academics began to speculate about a ‘new world order,’ in which the triumph of 
Western liberalism would remove the ideological barriers that had perpetuated conflict 
across the globe.26 This coincided with the rise of theories of globalisation that 
presented the post-Cold War world as an increasingly interconnected global community, 
in which instability could no longer be contained by state borders. No longer dictated 
by Soviet containment, American national priorities in the Middle East became 
increasingly focused on the promotion of bilateral relationships, and on the defence of
98strategic and economic interests from globalised threats.
Within that context, US-Israel strategic and military cooperation also deepened, 
including joint development of weapons systems, the formation of a joint strategic 
planning committee, and billions of dollars in military aid.29 In the subsequent period, 
the security of Israel became a central pillar of US policies in the Middle East, and the 
closeness of the US-Israel relationship cemented the United States as the preferred 
intermediary of both the Palestinians and the Israelis.30 As the following chapters 
demonstrate, US primacy within the context of the Middle East peace process was an
24 US grants to Israel from 1952-1989 totaled approximately $53 billion. Khalidi, W., "The Palestine 
Problem: An Overview," Journal of Palestine Studies 21, no. 1 (1991): p. 10.
2:1 For an in-depth examination of Kissinger’s diplomatic involvement during this period, see: Quandt, 
Peace process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict Since 1967 - Revised Edition, pp. 98- 
BO.
26 Fukuyama, F., The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Maxwell Macmillan International, 
1992).
27 Korany, B., "The Middle East Since the Cold War: Torn Between Geopolitics and Economics," in 
International Relations of the Middle East ed. L Fawcett (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 
2009), p. 61.
25 Milton-Edwards, B., Contemporary Politics in the Middle East, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, UK; Malden, MA: 
Polity, 2011), p .266.
29 Lewis, "The United States and Israel: Evolution o f an Unwritten Alliance," p. 372.
30 Kurtzer, D., Former United States Ambassador to Israel, interview with the author, Princeton, NJ, 
October, 2011.
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important aspect of both the formation of the Quartet, and its subsequent work as a 
grouping.
The Role of the Soviet Union and Russia
Soviet interests in the Middle East during the Cold War period were characterised by 
efforts to counter US influence in the region, and to contain or prevent the emergence of 
strategic and other challenges along their southern border -  specifically in Turkey, Iran 
and Afghanistan.31 The Soviets sought to increase their influence in the Arab world, and 
developed close relations with a number of radical Arab nationalist regimes, including 
Egypt, Iraq, Syria and Libya.32 With the US-Israel relationship strengthening, Soviet 
strategy in the region was to ‘supply arms to Arab states sufficiently so that they could -  
within limits imposed by Moscow and without prejudicing wider Soviet interests -
' I ' l
move towards achieving some measure of strategic capability to resist Israel.’
The resulting regional dichotomisation complicated international efforts to forge a 
response to the June 1967 war, with the United States and the Soviet Union acting at 
cross purposes.34 These divisions complicated the creation and passage of UNSCR 242, 
and resulted in ambiguities and deficiencies in the resolution that have produced lasting 
consequences.”  It should be noted that despite these deficiencies, in the post-1967 
period, UNSCR 242 has taken on a near canonical status within the discourse of the 
MEPP -  especially by groups such as the Quartet. Of the 47 Quartet statements between
31 Halliday, F., The Middle East in International Relations: Power, Politics and Ideology (Cambridge, 
UK; New York: Cambridge, 2005), p. 98.
32 Freedman, R. O., "Israeli-Russian Relations since the Collapse of the Soviet Union," Middle East 
Journal 49, no. 2 (1995): p. 233.
33 Herrmann, R. K., "Russian Policy in the Middle East: Strategic Change and Tactical Contradictions," 
Middle East Journal 48, no. 3 (1994): p. 463.
34 In response to the 1967 war, the Soviet Union -  siding with the Arab states -  argued in the UN for a 
robust resolution that condemned Israel and called for its withdrawal from the territories, but was unable 
to overcome American resistance in both the Security Council and the General Assembly. The United 
States initially objected to Security Council action on the matter and advocated direct negotiations 
between the parties.
35 UNSCR 242 emphasised the ‘inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war,’ and is often 
referred to as the ‘land for peace’ resolution. However, the resolution lacked specificity regarding both 
the exact territorial withdrawals required, and the nature of the proposed resolution of the ongoing Arab- 
Israeli dispute. Furthermore, this resolution made no reference to Palestinian self-determination, instead 
framing Palestinian involvement within the context of a general reference to a ‘just solution’ to the 
refugee issue. For the full text of UNSCR 242, see: United Nations Security Council, "Resolution 242 " 
S/RES/242: 22 November, 1967. For an in-depth discussion of the deficiencies and legacy of the 
resolution, see: Falk, R., "Forty Years after 242: A "Canonical" Text in Disrepute?," Journal o f Palestine 
Studies 37, no. 1 (2007). See also: Dajani, O. M., "Forty Years without Resolve: Tracing the Influence of 
Security Council Resolution 242 on the Middle East Peace Process," Journal of Palestine Studies 37, no. 
1 (2007).
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April 2002 and January 2011,42 mention, either directly or indirectly, United Nations 
Security Council Resolution 242.36
During the Cold War period, the Soviets used the prospect of re-establishing diplomatic 
relations with Israel as a bargaining chip for gaining concessions from the Israelis.
With the rise of Mikhail Gorbachev to the leadership of the USSR in 1985, Soviet
i o
policy regarding the Middle East, and the Cold War more generally began to shift.' 
Soviet Policy during the first Palestinian intifada?9 while still supportive of the PLO, 
began to soften in regard to Israel.40 This process culminated in the 1991 revocation of 
UNGA Resolution 3379, determining that ‘Zionism is a form of racism and racial 
discrimination’, and the consequent warming of relations between Israel and the Soviet 
Union.41
With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation began to court the 
conservative Arab monarchies of the Persian Gulf, seeking capital investment and 
markets for advanced weaponry.42 This included the creation of strong trade relations 
with Iran, which -  especially with the recent sale of nuclear technology -  has remained 
a source of Russo-American strain in the region.43 However, in the post-Soviet era, 
Russia no longer positioned itself in direct opposition to US interests in the region, and 
pursued a strategy based more on pragmatism than ideological competition 44
36 Indirect references include mentions of other peace plans that use UNSCR 242 as a term of reference, 
such as the Roadmap document. See Chapter Four: The General Practices of the Quartet for further 
observations regarding the Quartet statements in aggregate.
37 Herrmann, "Russian Policy in the Middle East: Strategic Change and Tactical Contradictions," p. 463.
3S Dannreuther, R., The Soviet Union and the PLO (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1998), p. 143.
39 The Palestinian intifada that lasted from 1987-1991 represented a social and political revolution for the 
Palestinian community. While complex and multifaceted, broadly speaking it encompassed a large scale 
resistance movement involving Palestinians in the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, Jerusalem and various 
refugee camps seeking to disengage from the structures of the Israeli occupation, and to move towards 
Palestinian political independence. For Arafat and the Fatah, the intifada presented an opportunity to not 
only continue their transition from armed resistance to non-violent means, but also to abandon the goal of 
recovering historic Palestine in its entirely and to shift towards a pursuit of a two state solution. This 
process culminated in the PLO recognition of Israel, and participation in the Oslo process after the end of 
the Cold War.
40 Freedman, "Israeli-Russian Relations since the Collapse of the Soviet Union."
41 United Nations General Assembly, "Resolution 3379: Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination," 2400th Plenary Meeting,: 10 November, 1975.
42 Herrmann, "Russian Policy in the Middle East: Strategic Change and Tactical Contradictions," p. 455.
43 Freedman, R. O., "Russian Policy toward the Middle East: The Yeltsin Legacy and the Putin 
Challenge," Middle East Journal 55, no. 1 (2001): p. 63.
44 Freedman, R. O., Professor at Johns Hopkins University, interview with the author, Baltimore, USA, 
October, 2011.
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After formally re-establishing relations with Israel in 1991, one week before the Madrid 
Multilaterals began,45 the flow of Russian Jewish immigrants increased dramatically, 
along with Russian trade with Israel 46 By the end of that decade, Israel was Russia’s 
leading trade partner in the region, and home to one million Russian-speaking former 
residents of the USSR 47
For the Israelis, Russia became an important strategic ally, not only because of the 
cultural ties that resulted from Russian immigration, but because the Russians had 
inherited the Soviet seat on the UN Security Council 48 Furthermore, throughout the 
1990s, Russia sought to cultivate relationships with a diverse range of regional actors, 
including Hamas, Hezbollah, Israel and the Arab governments. This was especially the 
case when these relationships advanced the interests of Kremlin-connected Russian 
businesses, in particular the petroleum, arms, and nuclear reactor industries 49
The willingness to trade and negotiate with a diverse range of regional actors was 
viewed in Moscow as an enhancement to Russia’s potential for developing a more 
influential mediatory role in the Middle East and for re-establishing Russian political 
prestige on the world stage. However, the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict 
from the Russian strategic perspective was less important than controlling any 
escalation in regional violence and protecting Russian economic interests.50
The Role of the European Union
The post-colonial legacy factored heavily into relations between European and Middle 
Eastern actors in the aftermath of the Second World War. In particular, France and 
England were confronted with numerous anti-imperialist movements in the region that 
were bolstered by the rise and spread of Arab nationalism.51 Indeed, part of the British 
disentanglement from the region in the post-colonial period included referring the 
question of the mandate for Palestine to the newly formed United Nations in 1947. This
4> For an in-depth analysis of the genesis and execution of the Multilaterals process, see: Peters, J., 
Pathways to Peace: The Multilateral Arab-Israeli Peace Talks (London: Royal Institute of International 
Affairs, 1996).
46 Freedman, "Russian Policy toward the Middle East: The Yeltsin Legacy and the Putin Challenge," p. 
63.
47 Ibid.
4S Freedman, "Israeli-Russian Relations since the Collapse of the Soviet Union," p. 234.
44 Katz, M. "Major World Powers and the Middle East." Symposium by the Middle East Policy Council, 
United States Capitol Building, Washington, DC, 23 October, 2009. p. 14
50 Herrmann, "Russian Policy in the Middle East: Strategic Change and Tactical Contradictions," p. 473.
51 Hollis, R., "Europe in the Middle East," in International Relations of the Middle East, ed. L Fawcett 
(Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2009).
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process culminated in the UN partition plan (UNGA Resolution 181), the Israeli 
Declaration of Independence, and the first Arab-Israeli war in 1948.53
The 1948 war divided the six European Community (EC) members.34 Commenting later 
on the European division over the issue, German Chancellor Kiesinger recalled feeling 
‘ashamed’ that at the moment the war had broken out the European powers ‘could not 
even agree to talk about it.’55 The subsequent period saw the recession of European 
influence in the conflict at the same time as internal European cooperation and 
integration was increasing.
At the 1961 Hague Summit, the structure of European Political Cooperation (EPC) was 
developed, and it was through this structure that the first European common positions 
on the Arab-Israeli conflict were adopted.56 The Schuman Report of 1971 emphasised 
the significance of UNSCR 242 as the basis for the resolution of the conflict, and on 6 
November 1973, the nine Member States broke explicitly with the US vision for peace
S7and called for the realisation of the ‘legitimate rights’ of the Palestinians.
This positional shift was a corollary of the development of Euro-Arab dialogue during 
this period, which saw a strengthening of political and economic ties between the 
European Community and the Arab states. Consequently, in the London Declaration
52
52 See United Nations General Assembly, "Resolution 181 (II): Future Government of Palestine,"
A/RES/181(11): 29 November, 1947.
53 Saikal, A., "The Role of the United Nations in the Middle East," in Peacekeeping and peacemaking : 
towards effective intervention in post-Cold War conflicts, ed. Tom Woodhouse, Robert H. Bruce, and 
Malcolm Dando (Houndsmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire :New York: Macmillan; St. Martin's Press,
1998).
54 Germany sought to present a ‘neutral’ position, but was closer to the Israeli position than the Arab 
position. Italian governing circles were divided. Belgium emphasised the importance of the United 
Nations for resolving the conflict, and the Netherlands openly supported Israel. Finally, France 
condemned Israel at the United Nations, with French President Charles de Gaulle stating that: ‘The Israeli 
occupation of the territories it captured cannot continue without oppression, repression, expulsions, nor 
without the emergence over time of a resistance that it will then label terrorism.’ See: Rondot, P., "France 
and Palestine: From Charles de Gaulle to Francois Mitterand," Journal of Palestine Studies 16, no. 3 
(1987): p. 89. For discussion of the varying European positions during this period, see: Greilsammer, I. 
and Weiler, J., "European Political Cooperation and the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict: An Israeli 
Perspective," in European foreign policy-making and the Arab-Israeli conflict, ed. David Allen and 
Alfred Pijpers (The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1984).
55 Greilsammer and Weiler, "European Political Cooperation and the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict: An 
Israeli Perspective," p. 131.
56 For an examination of the evolution of European declaratory policy regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict, 
see: Peters, J., "Europe and the Israel-Palestinian Peace Process: The Urgency of Now," European 
Security 19, no. 3 (2010).
’7 Aoun, E., "European Foreign Policy and the Arab-Israeli Dispute: Much Ado About Nothing?," 
European Foreign Affairs Review 8, no. 3 (2003): p. 291.
58 Hatuqa, D., "European Foreign Policy and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict," Nice, France: Institut 
Europeen Des Hautes Etudes Internationales, 2003, p. 17.
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in June 1977, the EC leaders extended their previous position by acknowledging that the 
Palestinian people had a right to a homeland, and that any negotiations should include 
Palestinian representatives.59
For the European Community, the subsequent Camp David Accords (from the 
negotiations of which their members were excluded) presented an obstacle to the Euro- 
Arab dialogue. On 22 November 1978, the EC Ministers issued a statement that 
expressed support for ‘President Sadat’s bold initiative.’60 In response, the Arab states, 
which had ended Egypt’s participation in the Arab League, suspended dialogue with the 
EC. The EC statement also strained the transatlantic relationship, as it emphasised that 
the process should include the creation of a homeland for the Palestinians, and 
advocated the inclusion of the PLO in Israeli-Palestinian dialogue.61
This form of European declaratory politics continued with the 1980 Venice Declaration, 
in which the European Council leaders, despite resistance from Israel and the United 
States, stated that the goal of negotiations should be the establishment of two separate 
states, Israel and Palestine. The declaration also asserted that the EC would ‘not accept 
any unilateral initiative designed to change the status of Jerusalem,’ and that the Israeli 
settlements on Arab territory in the West Bank were ‘illegal.’63
Thus, during the Cold War period, European powers laid the foundations for the 
formation of the European Union, and established, through an emerging pattern of 
declarations, a common position in regard to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In a 
continuation of this process, the post Cold War period saw the solidification of 
European political structures, and the development of common foreign policy 
mechanisms.
The 1992 Maastricht Treaty transformed the European Community into the European 
Union, and included the creation of its three central pillars: the European Community 
(EC) pillar, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) pillar, and the Justice and 
Home Affairs (JHA) pillar. Broadly speaking, the CFSP placed responsibility for
59 Gianniou, M. "The Policies of the Mediterranean EU Countries towards the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: 
Leaders or Followers?" The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP): Perspectives from the 
Mediterranean EU countries, Rethimnon, Crete, 25-27 October 2007.
60 Hatuqa, "European Foreign Policy and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict," p. 18.
61 Aoun, "European Foreign Policy and the Arab-Israeli Dispute: Much Ado About Nothing?," p. 291.
62 Hatuqa, "European Foreign Policy and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict," p. 18.
63 Ibid.
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common European external relations under the control of the European Council, 
composed of representatives of the Union’s member governments. However, despite 
ceding certain aspects of sovereignty as part of membership, each state in the European 
Union remained free to be an independent and distinct foreign policy actor. In an 
attempt to harmonise the policies of the member states, the post of High Representative 
(HR) for the CSFP was created by the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997.64
The official role of the HR was to represent and assist the Presidency of the European 
Council, which rotated every six months. However, tensions over jurisdiction existed 
not only between the HR and the EU Presidency, but also between the European 
Council and the European Commission.65 While this process was streamlined later,66 
throughout the 1990s, the European Union sought to play a more active political role in 
the Middle East, and stressed the primary importance that a peaceful settlement of the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict would have for the political evolution, security policies and 
economic development of the wider region. Without an adequate strategy to address this 
conflict, the Europeans argued there would be little chance of dealing with other 
problems in the Middle East.67
In 1996, the new post of ‘Special European Envoy to the Middle East peace process’ 
was created, and Miguel Moratinos was appointed to fill the position. The special envoy 
was mandated to:
...establish and maintain close contact with all the parties to the peace process; to 
observe peace negotiations between the parties if and when requested; to monitor the 
implementation of international agreements reached between the parties; and to 
monitor actions by either side which may prejudice the outcome of permanent status 
negotiations.68
At the same time, the EU continued to develop a broader strategy for resolving the 
conflict that combined strong declarations with more concrete financial and economic
64 Crowe, B., "A Common European Foreign Policy after Iraq?," International Affairs 79, no. 3 (2003): p. 
533.
65 Ibid.: p. 541.
66 The 2007 treaty of Lisbon amalgamated the HR for CFSP and the European Commissioner for External 
Relations into a single position, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security 
Policy. This development is discussed further in Chapter Three: The Formation of the Quartet. For an 
overview of European institutional development in relation to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, see: Siniver, 
A., "The EU and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict," in The European Union as a Global Conflict Manager, 
ed. Richard G. Whitman and Stefan W olff (New York: Routledge, 2012).
67 Perthes, V., "America's "Greater Middle East" and Europe: Key Issues for Dialogue," Middle East 
Policy 11, no. 3 (2004): p. 92.
68 Hatuqa, "European Foreign Policy and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict," p. 30.
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assistance. In the period 1993 — 2000, the EU and its member states were the largest 
donors of financial and technical aid to the Palestinian Authority (PA) as well as to the 
MEPP in general.69 While this period saw Europe emerge as a more coherent strategic 
actor in relation to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, US primacy within this context 
remained unchallenged. As Dannreuther argued:
Europe cannot realistically be expected to supplant the role of the United States, which 
has the political and military capabilities that Europe lacks. However, conversely, the 
strengths that Europe possesses, such as greater economic penetration and its more 
intensive relations with some of the Arab parties to the dispute, make it a partner that 
the United States has increasingly come to realize it cannot ignore and marginalize as 
it did during the Cold War.70
As the subsequent chapter demonstrates, the European role in the Quartet exemplified 
this development.
The Role of the United Nations Secretary General 
The Arab-Israeli conflict both shaped and paralysed the United Nations. Former 
Undersecretary General of the UN, Brian Urquhart, argued that the role of the UN in 
critical situations was pioneered in Palestine, where the organisation was shaped by 
efforts to ‘contain and limit conflict, to help the victims of conflict and to create 
conditions for a settlement.’ For example, the United Nations Relief and Works 
Agency for Palestinian Refugees (UNRWA)72 was created prior to the UN High 
Commission on Refugees (UNHCR), and the UN’s first peacekeeping force, the United 
Nations Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO), was formed in May 1948 to monitor 
ceasefires and support the armistice agreement of 1949. Furthermore, the United 
Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) was formed during the Suez Crisis as a way to 
prevent the regional conflict from triggering a confrontation between East and West.
69 Asseburg, M., "The EU and the Middle East Conflict: Tackling the Main Obstacle to Euro- 
Mediterranean Partnership," Mediterranean Politics 8, no. 2 (2003): p. 175.
70 Dannreuther, R., "The Middle East: Toward a Substantive European Role in the Peace Process?," in 
European Union Foreign and Security Policy: Towards a Neighbourhood Strategy, ed. Roland 
Dannreuther (London; New York: Routledge, 2004), p. 153.
71 Urquhart, B., "The United Nations in the Middle East: A 50-Year Retrospective," Middle East Journal 
49, no. 4 (1995): p .573.
72 For an in-depth analysis of the Palestinian refugee issue, including the role of UNRWA, see: Bowker, 
R., Palestinian Refugees: Mythology, Identity, and the Search for Peace (Boulder; London: Lynne 
Rienner, 2003).
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The removal of these forces, and the war that ensued, prompted reflection on the role of 
United Nations peacekeeping forces.
In the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the United Nations is not a unitary 
actor. As Thakur argues:
There is no such thing as the United Nations. Instead, there are several United 
Nations, each with its own balance of composition and political interests. The UN 
Security Council, the General Assembly and the International Court of Justice are the 
geopolitical, normative and legal centres of gravity respectively. The political masters 
are member states, not UN officials, not even the SG.74
Throughout the Cold War, in the Security Council in particular, US-Soviet competition 
stymied efforts to reach consensus on issues of global security -  including the 
Palestinian question. ‘ Between 1946 and 1995, the United States used its veto 70 times, 
while the Soviet Union used its veto 121 times.
The Cold War polarisation of the United Nations decision-making bodies contributed to 
the development of the role of the United Nations Secretary General. Within this policy 
vacuum, successive Secretaries General sought to enhance their involvement with 
peacekeeping and mediation efforts, and to create a global network of envoys and 
special representatives under the undefined auspices of the UNSG’s ‘good offices’ 
role. This process resulted in the Office of the Secretary General having Tittle power, 
but considerable influence.’78
The end of the Cold War produced a rapid expansion in the field of conflict resolution 
within the United Nations. In particular, it led to the emergence of numerous improvised
73 According to Urquhart, the removal o f the UNEF forces by Egypt made two things clear: ‘The first was 
that the presence of a small, lightly armed peace-keeping force of some 1,200 effectives on a 300-mile 
front was far more important to peace in the Middle East than anyone had realized. The second was that a 
peace-keeping force, based on the consent of the host countries and with no military mandate or capacity, 
can easily be brushed aside by a determined government.’ Urquhart, "The United Nations in the Middle 
East: A 50-Year Retrospective," p. 577.
74 Thakur, R. C., The United Nations, Peace and Security: From Collective Security to the Responsibility 
to Protect (Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 321.
73 In 1982, with the Israeli siege of Beirut continuing unabated, a UN Security Council resolution calling 
on Israel to let pass humanitarian supplies was vetoed by the United States on the grounds that it was 
‘unbalanced.’ Said, E. W., "Reflections on Twenty Years of Palestinian History," Journal of Palestine 
Studies 20, no. 4 (1991): p. 11.
76 Sarsar, "The Question of Palestine and United States Behavior at the United Nations," p. 460.
77 The good offices role of the UNSG empowers the Secretary General to use ‘other peaceful means of 
their own choice’ to achieve the peaceful settlement of conflicts. As Thakur argues, for the Secretary 
General, this can ‘very helpfully mean almost anything.’ Thakur, The United Nations, Peace and 
Security: From Collective Security to the Responsibility to Protect, p. 21.
78 Ibid., p. 320.
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ad hoc diplomatic arrangements that sought to address persistent conflicts across the 
globe.79 As Whitfield summarises:
Between 1987 and 1994 the number of conflicts in which the United Nations was 
actively involved in peacemaking nearly trebled, the resolutions passed by the 
Security Council on an annual basis quadrupled, and peacekeeping operations jumped 
from five to seventeen. Troop deployment increased from fewer than 10,000 to more 
than 73,000, and the annual budget for peacekeeping rose from $230 million to $3.6 
billion.80
Within this context, the UNSG utilised the provisions of Article 99 of the UN charter, 
which allowed the Secretary General to bring to the attention of the Security Council 
‘any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace
o  1
and security.’ In order to establish what exactly constituted such a threat, the Secretary 
General was authorised to use broad discretion, including the formation of fact finding 
missions, and the use of informal diplomatic activity.
Consequently, during the early 1990s, Secretary General Boutrous Ghali began to 
establish groupings that would later come to be known as ‘friends of the Secretary 
General.’ These groups involved regional actors meeting regularly and collaborating 
with the UN Secretary General on a particular issue in order to reach common
o o
agreement within an informal structure.
The operational assumption of such groups was that the Secretary General would help 
to legitimise any decisions that emerged, and act as an unofficial leader and go-between. 
As Boutrous Ghali explained:
79 Whitfield, T., Friends Indeed?: The United Nations, Groups of Friends, and the Resolution of Conflict 
(Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2007), p. 48.
80 Ibid., p. 30.
81 The Charter of the United Nations was signed on 26 June 1945, and can be accessed at 
http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/ [Last accessed 4 January 2014]
s: de Soto, A., Former United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process, interview 
with the author, New York City, October, 2011.
87 Credited with coining the term, and for establishing the first friends of the SC groups in El Salvador, 
former United Nations Special Coordinator for the peace process Alvaro de Soto explained the emerging 
phenomena: ‘What I did was extrapolate a long standing practice, with which I was very familiar as a 
Peruvian diplomat at the UN, which is that frequently the President of the General Assembly, or the 
chairman of one of the committees, when faced with an intractable situation that he wants to defuse, or 
with a big issue, he gathers around the table, informally, without any written terms of reference, a group 
of what he calls ‘friends’, and tells them that “you’re my friends, you’re in an individual capacity, and 
you don’t necessarily speak on behalf of your respective organisations.” Now everybody understands that 
there are limits to this arrangement, diplomats aren’t bipolar, and that they continue to represent their 
government. But still, they go along with this fiction, in order to see whether you can tease out some sort 
of common ground.’ Ibid.
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The Secretary General has the mandate from the relevant inter-governmental body and 
must remain in the lead. The members of the ‘Friends’ group have agreed to support 
the Secretary General at his request. If they take initiatives not requested by the 
Secretary General there is a risk of duplication or overlapping of efforts which can be 
exploited by recalcitrant parties.84
Despite the freedoms afforded by Article 99, the Secretary General does not have the 
luxury to act in isolation from the power dynamics of world politics, especially as the 
representative of an organisation based on the principle of state sovereignty. As the next 
chapter demonstrates, the role of the Secretary General within the Quartet exemplified 
the collision between an active and politically motivated Secretary General, and the 
political realities of US dominance within the global system.
Crucially, as the role of the Secretary General, and the UN more broadly, shifted after 
the Cold War, the Israelis and Palestinians remained ambivalent toward the 
organisation. For the Palestinians, despite having majority support in the large 
intergovernmental forums, the inaction of the Security Council stemming from 
unwavering American support for Israel continued to frustrate their attempts to pass 
substantive resolutions. For the Israelis, despite the protection of United States within 
the Security Council, the series of resolutions (perceived to be anti-Israeli) passed in the 
General Assembly during the Cold War had soured their relations with the UN. As a 
UN official noted, ‘each side basically felt a victim of the UN’s impotence, and neither
o  c
of them thought the UN could actually solve their conflict.’
The Post-Cold War Peace Process
There is no precedent for a successful start-to-finish American effort to bring about 
peace in the Middle East. All such endeavors that came to something initially were 
rooted in local dynamics that the US could influence but did not produce. Nor are 
there notable examples of the US forcing an Israeli government to take sustained 
action that it believes to be fundamentally at odds with its core interests.
- Robert Malley and Hussein Agha.86
The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union affected each of the 
Quartet members differently. It also shifted the strategic calculations of both the Israelis 
and Palestinians, and produced challenges and opportunities in the peace process. For 
the United States, the removal of the Soviet Union as a counteracting global rival
84Boutrous Ghali, B., "Supplement to the Agenda for Peace," Position Paper of the Secretary General on 
the Occassion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations: 3 January, 1995.
8:1 UN official. Interview with the author, Jerusalem, November, 2011.
86 Malley, R. and Agha, H., "Who's Afraid of the Palestinians? ," The New York Review o f Books, 10 
February, 2011.
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allowed for greater freedom of action and influence in the Middle East, and cemented 
US hegemony. Within the United Nations, the easing of the polarisation of the Security 
Council produced a period in which ad hoc conflict resolution mechanisms flourished. 
For the European powers, the period following the end of the Cold War coincided with 
moves to solidify the European Community into a more structured and all- 
encompassing union, including the creation of collective foreign policy. From an Israeli 
perspective, the collapse of the Soviet Union represented the removal of an often 
obstructive and destabilising force in the Middle East, and diminished the support for 
Arab extremism and rejectionism. For the Palestinians and other Arab states, however, 
the departure of the Soviet Union allowed the strategic and military balance in the 
region to shift even further towards the United States and, by virtue of the closeness of 
the relationship, to Israel. These dynamics underpinned the Middle East peace process 
in the subsequent period.
The Madrid Multilaterals
The Madrid Multilaterals began with a conference in Madrid in October 1991, co­
sponsored by the United States and the Soviet Union, which was followed by a series of 
discussions on the bilateral and multilateral levels in the subsequent period. As Peters 
notes:
The aim was to bring together Israel, its immediate Arab neighbours and the wider 
circle of Arab states in the Gulf and the Maghreb to discuss issues of regional concern 
within a framework for dealing with issues of mutual interest which might also serve 
as confidence-building measures and facilitate progress on the bilateral level.88
President George H. W. Bush and US Secretary of State James Baker sought to 
capitalise on the patterns of cooperation with the Arab states forged during the recent 
Gulf conflict, and recognised that the Jordanians and Palestinians were more amenable 
to political pressure after their support for Saddam Hussein had led to diplomatic 
isolation.89 As Aaron David Miller argues, the challenge for Bush and Baker was to ‘put 
together a conference that had enough symbolism for the Arabs but not too much
87 Dannreuther, The Soviet Union and the PLO, p. 175.
88 Peters, Pathways to Peace: The Multilateral Arab-lsraeli Peace Talks.
89 Quandt, Peace process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-lsraeli Conflict Since 1967 - Revised 
Edition, p. 396.
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substance for the Israelis,’ and to ‘come up with a fix to a problem that had eluded all of 
his predecessors: how to get “non-PLO” Palestinians to sit at the table with Israel.’90
The conference established two tracks of negotiations: the bilateral and the multilateral. 
The bilateral track involved negotiations between Israel and its immediate neighbours; 
namely the Palestinians, the Jordanians, the Syrians and the Lebanese. However, the 
Palestinians were represented as part of a joint delegation with Jordan, and Yasser 
Arafat and other leading figures in the PLO were excluded from participation after 
strong Israeli objections to their attendance.91
The multilateral track included five working groups, overseen by a steering committee, 
which focused on key issues of general concern for the region -  water, the environment, 
arms control, refugees and economic development. As Hudson argues:
The broader regional focus appealed to the Israelis, and drew in countries like Saudi 
Arabia which could influence the Arab parties to the bilateral talks. The Madrid 
process, in short, was designed for band wagoning, or developing a centrifugal 
momentum to create a new Middle East, with Israel playing a central role in it.92
For the European Union, exclusion from the bilateral track, and relegation to 
participation in the steering committee of the multilateral groups, represented a clear 
message that Washington was the sole power broker in the region. Consequently, in 
the period following the breakdown of the multilaterals, EU officials ‘became 
increasingly careful to present themselves as only attempting to back and complement 
American policies rather than compete with them.’94
It was no coincidence that the first Quartet statement was delivered in Madrid. In 
choosing this location, the Quartet principals sought to draw connections between their 
efforts in 2001 and the efforts of members of the international community during the 
multilaterals process. UN Secretary General Kofi Annan made this connection explicit 
when, in remarks delivered before the official Quartet statement, he declared that:
9(1 Miller, A. D., The Much Too Promised Land: America's Elusive Search for Arab-Israeli Peace (New 
York: Bantam Books, 2008), p. 218.
91 Andoni, L., "The PLO at the Crossroads," Journal of Palestine Studies 21, no. 1 (1991): p. 62.
92 Hudson, "To Play the Hegemon: Fifty Years of US Policy toward the Middle East," p. 335.
93 Hatuqa, "European Foreign Policy and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict," p. 24.
94 Aoun, "European Foreign Policy and the Arab-Israeli Dispute: Much Ado About Nothing?," p. 297.
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I would like to thank the government of Spain for hosting us today in Madrid just over 
10 years since the Madrid Conference set out the essential principles for a 
comprehensive peace in the Middle East9:1
While there were circumstantial parallels between the two events,96 the extent to which 
the Madrid Multilaterals functioned as a precedent to the eventual creation of the 
Quartet was negligible.97 While the Quartet and the Madrid process both shared 
multilateral characteristics, the logical underpinning of the Quartet was that it excluded 
the parties to the conflict. Furthermore, the multilateral process involved the input of 
key regional actors (again in contrast to the Quartet) and was sidelined ultimately by 
developments in the Israeli-Palestinian bilateral track. As Kurtzer noted:
The members who joined the steering group at the Madrid Multilaterals wanted it to 
be the cross-over point to the bilateral, but it never became that. So it’s hard to say that 
10 years later [by creating the Quartet] we revived something that didn’t exist in the 
first place, to now play this role.98
Despite the importance of the Madrid Multilaterals within the context of the peace 
process, the key catalysts for the formation of the Quartet were the al-Aqsa intifada, and 
the 9/11 terrorist attacks.99
The disintegration of the Madrid framework has been well documented, with several 
causes attributing to the breakdown.100 These included the failure of the Bush 
Administration to build a strong domestic coalition to support its strategy,101 the 
disinterest of the Israeli Prime Minister at that time in making peace with the 
Palestinians,102 the exclusion of the PLO leadership from bilateral negotiations, the
95 US Department of State, "Remarks with Foreign Minister of Spain Josep Pique, United Nations 
Secretary General Kofi Annan, Foreign Minister of Russia Igor Ivanov and European Union Senior 
Official Javier Solana."
96 The Madrid Multilaterals, similar to the formation of the Quartet, were partly a reaction to a breakdown 
in relations between the Israelis and Palestinians that had manifested into an intifada. In both cases, the 
escalation of violence produced pressure on policymakers across the globe to be seen to be seeking 
resolution. Furthermore, both events involved collaboration between global powers within the context of 
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and were underpinned by the logic that the parties to the conflict were 
incapable of resolving their issues in the absence of third party intervention.
97 For an author who places a greater emphasis on this connection, see: Musu, C. "The Madrid Quartet:
An Effective Instrument of Multilateralism?" International Studies Association 48th Annual Convention, 
Chicago, USA, 28 February 2007.
9X Kurtzer. Interview with the author, Princeton, NJ, October, 2011.
99 These developments are discussed in Chapter Three: The Formation of the Quartet.
100 See in particular: Quandt, Peace process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict Since 
1967 - Revised Edition, pp. 396-415.
101 Kurtzer, D. and Lasensky, S., Negotiating Arab-Israeli Peace: American Leadership in the Middle 
East (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2007), p. 16.
102 Shamir’s disinterest in the proceedings of the conference was illustrated by Aaron David Miller’s 
account of a conversation between Shlomo Ben-Ami and Yitzhak Shamir: ‘When Ben-Ami asked the 
Prime Minister what he thought of Gorbachev’s speech, Shamir, honest to a fault, replied, “I don’t know,
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upsurge in violence occurring on the Israel-Lebanon border, and the incitement and 
violent attacks conducted by Hamas and other Palestinian activists in the Gaza Strip.
The symbolic and practical achievements of the Madrid negotiations, however, should 
not be downplayed. The conference presented an opportunity for Israeli and Arab 
officials to meet face to face for the first time since 1973, and progress on the Israeli- 
Jordanian bilateral track culminated in a peace treaty between the two in 1994. 
Furthermore, the exclusion of the PLO from the bilateral process resulted in the 
commencement of secret talks between Israeli and Palestinian officials that eventually 
lead to recognition between the two sides, and the beginning of the Oslo process.
The Oslo Process
The Clinton Administration inherited an ideal strategic environment for peacemaking. 
The United States was the sole superpower and had successfully conducted the 1991 
Gulf War, building an Arab coalition to support it. The Madrid conference was an 
impetus to peacemaking, including the multilateral process that brought Arab states 
into the negotiations. Finally, Israel had a new prime minister in Yitzhak Rabin, 
replacing Shamir, who admitted later that he never intended to negotiate peace 
seriously with Palestinians.
- Daniel Kurtzer and Scott Lasensky.104
In 1992, political leadership in both the United States and Israel underwent important 
change. Labour’s Yitzhak Rabin replaced Likud’s Yitzhak Shamir, and Democrat Bill 
Clinton replaced George H.W. Bush as the US President.105 Concurrent with these 
developments was the initiation of secret talks between Israeli and PLO officials in 
Oslo, under Norwegian auspices. The Oslo negotiations aimed to address the missing 
element of all previous talks: a direct agreement between Israelis and Palestinians, 
represented by the PLO.106
Beginning with historic mutual recognition between the PLO and Israel, the Oslo 
process was an incremental series of confidence building measures, negotiations and 
agreements that spanned the next seven years, before breaking down by the beginning
I fell asleep.” Miller, The Much Too Promised Land: America's Elusive Search for Arab-Israeli Peace, p. 
230.
103 Freedman, "Israeli-Russian Relations since the Collapse of the Soviet Union," p. 239.
104 Kurtzer and Lasensky, Negotiating Arab-Israeli Peace: American Leadership in the Middle East, p.
17.
105 For comprehensive analysis of the Clinton Administration’s approach to the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict, see: Sturkey, D., The Limits of American Power: Prosecuting a Middle East Peace (Cheltenham, 
UK: Edward Elgar, 2007).
106 For expansive analysis on this process, see: Parsens, N., The Politics o f the Palestinian Authority: 
From Oslo to al-Aqsa (New York: Routledge, 2005), pp. 83-125.
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of the second Palestinian intifada. Numerous accounts have analysed and debated the 
causes of the successes and failures of this multifaceted process.107 What follows is 
limited to a brief examination of the key ways in which the Oslo process acted as a 
catalyst for the creation of the Quartet in 2001, including the subsequent approaches 
adopted by the Quartet members.
The 1993 ‘Declaration of Principles’ signed on the White House lawn by PLO 
Chairman Yasser Arafat and Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin outlined the agenda 
for the subsequent negotiations process, established a timeline for the discussion of final 
status issues, and also established a framework for Palestinian administrative control in 
the occupied territories.
The central tenet of the Oslo process was sequentialism; a mutually reinforcing series of 
steps, at least implicitly toward Palestinian self-determination, in which compliance 
from one party would promote reciprocal steps from the other. This process was 
designed to build confidence between the parties that would underpin future dialogue 
regarding the core elements of the conflict. It allowed for the gradual accommodation of 
both parties to the realities of an eventual settlement, while building cooperation in 
areas such as security and public administration.
The sequentialist approach had two central flaws. Firstly, by delaying discussion of 
the final status issues, the Oslo process failed to prohibit the construction of Israeli 
settlements in the occupied territories during the negotiations process. Secondly, the end 
goals of the Oslo process were never established explicitly, and neither the Israelis nor 
the Palestinians could provide guarantees to their domestic constituencies that the 
process would culminate in a mutually-agreeable solution which those constituencies 
could accept. When progress on the bilateral negotiations stalled, and settlement
107 See: Clinton, B., My Life (New York: Knopf, 2004). Indyk, M., Innocent Abroad: An Intimate Account 
of American Peace Diplomacy in the Middle East (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2009). Miller, The 
Much Too Promised Land: America's Elusive Search for Arab-Israeli Peace. Kurtzer and Lasensky, 
Negotiating Arab-Israeli Peace: American Leadership in the Middle East. Bregman, A., Elusive Peace: 
How the Holy Land Defeated America (London; New York: Penguin, 2005). Ross, D., The Missing 
Peace: The Inside Story of the Fight for Middle East Peace (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2005). 
ios These flaws were established later by the Sharm el-Sheikh Fact Finding Committee Report, also 
known as the Mitchell Report. This report was a key driving force for the creation of the Quartet, and is 
discussed further in the next chapter.
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construction and armed resistance continued, the deficiencies in the Oslo process fuelled 
popular dissatisfaction.109
For the European Union, the Oslo period coincided with the growth of Euro- 
Mediterranean economic policies, including an Association Agreement with Israel in 
1993, and one with the Palestinians in 1997.110 The European Commission granted the 
Palestinians approximately EU500 million for the 1994-1998 period, and additional aid 
was also allocated for Palestinian infrastructural projects such as the Gaza Airport.* 111
Within this context, the ongoing exclusion of European officials from the US-led 
political process between the Israelis and Palestinians became a source of frustration in 
Brussels. With the creation of its envoy to the peace process in 1996, the EU sought to 
challenge the moniker of ‘payer not player,’ and to orchestrate European participation in 
the negotiations process. For US officials working within the Oslo process, European 
involvement was seen as an unnecessary complication. As former State Department 
official Martin Indyk recounted:
The EU desperately wanted to be involved in the negotiations. They’d appointed 
Moratinos as the special envoy and with clear instructions to ‘get yourself involved in 
the negotiations.’ He pushed and shoved, and he did whatever he could, always taking 
advantage of Arafat’s willingness to try to play off the Europeans against the US. He 
was just a damn nuisance to us. He was always screwing things up, and for us it just 
underscored the basic premise, that if you’re involved actively, if you’re trying to 
broker a deal between the two sides, which we were for the 8 years of the Clinton 
Administration, the last thing you want is another mediator coming in and offering one 
side or the other a better deal. Or simply confusing the messages between the two 
sides, trying to act as an alternative go-between and just getting in our way. We were 
furious about it.112
For the Clinton Administration, the need to ‘keep the process alive’ became the mantra 
throughout the Oslo years, often at the expense of taking strong positions when the 
parties did not fulfil their commitments.113 Ultimately, despite considerable political and 
personal investment, President Clinton was unable to facilitate final agreement between
109 The second intifada is discussed in greater detail in Chapter Three: The Formation o f the Quartet.
110 Aoun, "European Foreign Policy and the Arab-Israeli Dispute: Much Ado About Nothing?," p. 301.
111 Ibid.
112 Indyk, M., Former United States Ambassador to Israel, interview with the author, Washington, DC, 
November, 2011.
113 Kurtzer and Lasensky, Negotiating Arab-Israeli Peace: American Leadership in the Middle East, p. 
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Barak and Arafat during the Camp David II Summit, and the Israeli-Palestinian bilateral 
relationship disintegrated.114
For the Quartet members, the experience of the Oslo period was a driving force for the 
early work of the grouping, especially the Roadmap document.115 Specifically, the 
Quartet members sought to address the structural deficiencies of the Oslo process, and 
to introduce input from actors who had been excluded historically from the political 
process. As UNSG Kofi Annan noted, the breakdown in the Oslo process ‘showed the 
limits of US-only peace-making and increased calls in the region for more players to be 
at the Middle East peace table.’116
The next chapter presents the second Palestinian intifada and the 9/11 terrorist attacks 
as the main catalysts for the formation of the Quartet, and contextualises the decisions 
of each of the Quartet members to form the group as continuations of the historical 
trends outlined in this chapter.
114 For an analysis of the Oslo period, including the Camp David Summit, see: Ben Ami, S., Scars of War, 
Wounds of Peace: The Israeli-Arab Tragedy (New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 
201-85.
115 The authorship of the Roadmap document and its connections to the Oslo process are discussed in 
Chapter Five: The Roadmap Process.
116 United Nations Security Council, "Report of the Secretary General on the Middle East," United 
Nations: S/2006/956: 11 December, 2006.
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Chapter Three: The Formation of the Quartet
The Quartet was a vehicle with four wheels, but the engine was inevitably ‘Made in 
America.’ This carried risks for my position in particular. But I hoped at least that I 
could have a hand on the steering wheel, and quite often I did.
- Kofi Annan, United Nations Secretary General (1997-2006).'
I didn’t blame Clinton for the failure at Camp David or the violence that followed. I 
blamed Arafat.
- George W. Bush, United States President (2001-2009).1 2 3
Introduction
The Quartet has no birth certificate. As an informal mechanism, it was proposed and 
created during a series of private meetings six months before its members released the 
first statement in April 2002. In mid-October 2001, Terje Roed-Larsen and UNSG Kofi 
Annan held a private meeting at UN headquarters in New York to discuss the Israeli- 
Palestinian conflict. The annual UN General Assembly meeting had been postponed in 
the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, and the breakdown in relations between the 
Israelis and Palestinians that had led to a second intifada. According to Roed-Larsen, he 
and Annan discussed strategies for ending the violence and helping the parties to return 
to negotiations, and it was during this meeting that he pitched the idea of forming a 
grouping dedicated to furthering these goals.4 The original proposal was for a formation 
including representatives from the European Union, the United Nations, the United 
States and Russia, as well as representatives from Jordan and Egypt.5 According to 
Roed-Larsen, while Annan was supportive of the idea in principle, he felt that the 
inclusion of Jordan and Egypt would make the arrangement ‘too complicated,’ and 
suggested that the group be reduced to four members and called ‘the Quartet.’6
After this meeting, Annan wrote to each of the other proposed Quartet principals, 
inviting them to convene the following day. The four representatives met, discussed the 
grouping and agreed to membership.7
1 Annan, K., Interventions: A Life in War and Peace (New York: Penguin Press, 2012), p. 274.
2 Bush, G. W., Decision Points, 1st ed. (New York: Crown Publishers, 2010), p. 399.
3 Roed-Larsen, T., Former United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East peace process, 
interview with the author, New York City, October, 2011.
4 Ibid.
? Roed-Larsen described the logic behind the ‘Sextet’ as a way to include input from the two Arab states 
that had peace treaties with Israel. Ibid.
6 Ibid.
7 Annan, Interventions: A Life in War and Peace, p. 274.
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For Annan, consideration of a collaborative effort between the US, the EU, Russia and 
the United Nations in the Middle East dated back to at least January 2001. According to 
the Secretary General, before his trip to the region during the violence early that year, 
he had suggested to US Secretary of State Colin Powell that ‘he and I, along with [EU 
High Representative for Common Foreign Policy] Solana and Russian Foreign Minister 
Igor Ivanov, should visit the region to pull the parties back from the brink.’8 At that time 
the arrangement didn’t eventuate, ostensibly because ‘Powell could not sell the idea to 
Washington.’9 However, Annan’s logic was that ‘our representatives were already 
working closely together on the ground,’ and that ‘it was time to take it up a notch.’10
While the meeting in October was the moment in which the Quartet principals first 
formally discussed the group and agreed to coordinate their work in the region, their 
diplomatic envoys had already been operating, in an unspoken way, as a foursome in the 
Middle East. Roed-Larsen described this tacit collaboration as a ‘milieu of special 
envoys working very closely together,’ and by the time of the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 
the United States, the envoys were discussing making the cooperation more 
systematic.* 11 In an account relayed by European External Action Service (EEAS) 
Advisor Christian Jouret, the envoys of the Quartet powers approached Yasser Arafat as 
a collective immediately after 9/11 in order to convince him to issue a statement 
distancing himself from al-Qaeda. After eventually convincing Arafat to deliver an 
address -  albeit several days after the attacks -  the envoys determined that they should 
‘continue to act together.’13
So well formed were the working relationships between the Quartet envoys in the 
region during this period that only days after the principals were convened by Annan in 
New York to discuss forming the grouping, they were working collaboratively and 
calling themselves the Quartet. The first example of this quick coordination took place 
after the 17 October 2001 assassination of Rehavam Ze’evi, the Israeli Minister of 
Tourism. The Quartet envoys, identifying themselves as such, worked closely with the 
US Ambassador to Israel, Daniel Kurtzer, to gain information on the incident from the
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid.
11 Roed-Larsen. Interview with the author, New York City, October, 2011.
12 Jouret, C., Middle East Advisor, European External Action Service (EEAS), interview with the author, 
Brussels, November, 2011.
13 Ibid.
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Israelis, and to seek a commitment from Arafat to arrest the alleged perpetrators.14 On 
25 October 2001, the Quartet envoys issued a public statement outlining the nature of 
their consultations in the region, and urging the parties to the conflict to ‘bring a rapid 
end to the current crisis.’15 While not identified officially as the first Quartet statement, 
the 25 October envoys’ statement was a blueprint for the structure of future public 
statements, and established the envoys as the driving force within the grouping. Since 
issuing their first joint statement in Madrid six months later, the Quartet has continued 
to meet at the principal and envoy level, even as its constituent representatives have 
changed and the circumstances in the region have shifted.
Why Did the Quartet Form?
As discussed previously, because the members of the Quartet have not sought to 
formalise their collaborative efforts, there are no official records of the formation of the 
Quartet or the explicit reasoning of its members for creating the group. By its nature, 
this chapter relies heavily on autobiographical accounts and on anecdotal evidence 
collected during interviews between the author and individuals familiar with the 
member organisations of the Quartet and with the Quartet itself.
The Quartet emerged from the interplay between several overlapping factors in late 
2001. Each of these factors partially -  not necessarily equally -  explains the emergence 
of the grouping, although they are deeply interconnected and cannot be regarded in 
isolation from each other. In summary, it will be suggested that the Quartet evolved 
from the professional relationships that already existed between diplomats working on 
the Middle East peace process in 2001. The regional context in which these individuals 
operated, however, affected their approaches to their work. This chapter argues that the 
Quartet was a reaction to a specific set of regional circumstances that made the 
formation of a loose international coalition particularly useful at that time. In essence, 
the Quartet was a response to not only the al-Aqsa intifada, but also to the perceived 
failings of the Middle East peace process at that date. Inseparable from the above were 
the early responses to the breakdown in the peace process by the Bush Administration, 
which contributed to the perception that it had ‘disengaged’ from the issue. In that 
respect, the Quartet was intended to address simultaneously not only the perceived
14 Kurtzer, D., Former United States Ambassador to Israel, interview with the author, Princeton, NJ, 
October, 2011.
15 United Nations Department of Public Information, "Statement Read by Mr. Terje Roed-Larsen," New 
York City: 25 October, 2001.
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failures resulting from the US dominance of the peace process, but also the perception 
that the Bush Administration had ‘parked’ the problem. Finally, this chapter argues that 
the Quartet was also a means through which its members sought to pursue their own 
organisational and political goals in the region.
The Interpersonal Context: The Quartet Envoys as a Driving Force 
Professional relationships contributed strongly to the composition and formation of the 
Quartet, as well as the way in which it went on to function. The envoys established 
patterns of cooperation based on mutual interest and then sought to solidify these 
patterns into a more stable and regular form of collaboration. This is explained partly by 
the often personal nature of diplomacy. As one UN official noted:
When an envoy has established good, collegial, effective, trusting relations, then they 
can have honest discussions where they disagree. They get more space to do things 
that they wish to do. That’s how it works. 16
As Terje Roed-Larsen noted, ‘personalities matter,’ adding that in the period leading up 
to the formation of the Quartet, there was ‘very good rapport’ and ‘amazing chemistry’
i n
between the envoys representing the EU, the UN, the US and Russia.
Former US Ambassador to Israel, Daniel Kurtzer, recounted that before the official 
formation of the Quartet, there were already well established associations between the 
envoys, especially when dealing with US representatives:
Whenever the envoys would come in they would stop by and we would chat.
American ambassadors tend to know stuff, so they wanted to pick my brain. And we 
also wanted to influence what they were doing and how they conducted themselves. 18
In addition to reflecting political realities -  such as the need for good relations with the 
United States -  the working relationships between the Quartet envoys were also affected 
by geography. As former UN envoy to the Quartet, Alvaro de Soto, recalled:
It was essentially likeminded people in the field, who lived near each other. Terje 
Roed-Larsen lived in Tel Aviv, a very short distance away from the Russian envoy, 
Andrei Vdovin, also not that far from the US Ambassador [Martin Indyk]. Miguel 
Moratinos -  who was the EU envoy -  lived in Lamaca in Cyprus, and he used to 
commute, but he spent a lot of time in Tel Aviv too. They used to see a lot of each
16 UN official. Interview with the author, Jerusalem, November, 2011.
17 Roed-Larsen. Interview with the author, New York City, October, 2011.
18 Kurtzer. Interview with the author, Princeton, NJ, October, 2011.
51
Chapter Three: The Formation of the Quartet
other. It was first the Russian, Moratinos, and Larsen, and then Martin Indyk was sort 
of dragged in.19
This account was confirmed by Indyk, who recalled a meeting with the envoys that took 
place in early 2001, during the transition period between the Clinton Administration and 
Bush Administration. In it, Indyk discussed the approach of the incoming Bush 
Administration, and advised the European, Russian and UN envoys that:
This Administration is just not going to get involved. I can tell you with authority. I 
can quote Colin Powell. They’re not going to involve themselves. So if you guys want 
to do something, this is your opportunity because you’re not going to be able to get the 
US involved.20
Importantly, and as subsequent sections demonstrate, the perception of US 
‘disengagement’ factored heavily into the calculations of the non-US envoys to the 
Quartet. According to Indyk, it was after outlining the Bush Administration’s reticence 
to involve itself in the peace process that Roed-Larsen replied that ‘we should all form a 
group.’21 As detailed above, Roed-Larsen then approached UNSG Annan with the idea, 
who convened the other principals, and cemented the grouping in late 2001.
Thus the Quartet formed from the bottom up. The importance of the envoys as a driving 
force within the grouping was enforced further during subsequent meetings, in which 
the envoys were said to operate as ‘sherpas,’ who ‘thrashed out the agendas’ and 
produced the draft statements, to be sent up to the principal level for approval.-2 This 
does not mean that the principals were uninvolved or disinterested (as Roed-Larsen 
argues the principals still had to ‘muster the courage to either refute the text, accept it or 
to modify it’), but only that the envoys ‘hammered out the proposals’ and left brackets 
in areas of disagreement for the principals to decide. In essence, the envoys 
underpinned and drove the formation of the Quartet, and laid the foundations for the 
work of the principals. Practically speaking, this arrangement made sensible use of the 
time constraints that affected the members of the Quartet, as the work of the envoys was 
focused entirely on the region, whereas the work of the principals was spread across the 
globe.
19 de Soto, A., Former United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process, interview 
with the author, New York City, October, 2011.
2()Indyk, M., Former United States Ambassador to Israel, interview with the author, Washington, DC, 
November, 2011.
2 ‘ I b i d -
22 UN official. Interview with the author, Jerusalem, November, 2011.
23 Roed-Larsen. Interview with the author, New York City, October, 2011.
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With that said, the decision of the Quartet envoys to pursue the formation of the 
grouping occurred within a regional context which, to them, necessitated a new 
approach to the Middle East peace process. To explain why the Quartet formed, 
therefore, it is important to examine why it was thought to be necessary by those who 
proposed it.
The Regional Context: The Breakdown in Relations and the al-Aqsa Intifada
In the 1990s, it was suggested that the Arab-Israeli peace process was progressive -  
that is, that advances were irreversible. But events since 2000 have challenged that 
notion. The process is far more fragile than was previously believed. The clock can 
indeed be turned back.
- Daniel Kurtzer, United States Ambassador to Israel (2001- 
2005).24
A driving force for the formation of the Quartet was the dramatic disintegration of the 
peace process that began in late 2000, which had its roots in the deficiencies of the Oslo 
period. As a response to the second intifada, the Quartet was, therefore, also a response 
to the perceived failings of the peace process that had produced it.2?
After the July 2000 Camp David II Summit ended in failure, the subsequent political 
narrative -  rightly or wrongly -  became one of Ehud Barak’s historical concessions, and 
of Arafat squandering his opportunity to make peace.26 Later, Clinton reinforced this 
impression in his memoir, when he recounted a conversation that took place with Yasser 
Arafat as he left office in early 2001:
Arafat, in one of our last conversations, thanked me for all my efforts and told me 
what a great man I was. “Mr Chairman,” I replied, “I am not a great man. I am a 
failure, and you have made me one.” I warned Arafat that he was single-handedly 
electing Sharon and that he would reap the whirlwind.27
24 Kurtzer, D. and Lasensky, S., Negotiating Arab-Israeli Peace: American Leadership in the Middle East 
(Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2007), p. 5.
25 It should be noted that while this section is a discussion of the period in which the Quartet formed that 
examines the impacts o f the second intifada, it is not intended to be a comprehensive account o f the 
development and evolution of the intifada itself. For such accounts, see: Bregman, A., Elusive Peace:
How the Holy Land Defeated America (London; New York: Penguin, 2005)., Rabinovich, I., Waging 
Peace: Israel and the Arabs, 1948-2003 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2004)., Enderlin, C., 
Shattered Dreams: The Failure of the Peace Process in the Middle East, 1995-2002 (New York: Other 
Press, 2003).
26 The refutation of this narrative simplification was the central focus of Malley, R. and Agha, H., "Camp 
David: The Tragedy of Errors," New York Review of Books, 9 August, 2001.
27 Clinton, B „My Life (New York: Knopf, 2004), p .944.
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For the Palestinians, grievances with the Camp David Summit were compounded by the 
fact that Oslo itself was already viewed as a historic compromise. As Agha and Malley 
argue, during the Oslo period:
The notion that Israel was ‘offering’ land, being ‘generous,’ or ‘making concessions’ 
seemed to them to be doubly wrong — in a single stroke both affirming Israel’s right 
and denying the Palestinians’. For the Palestinians, land was not given but given 
back.28
On 28 September 2000, when Likud opposition leader Ariel Sharon visited the Haram 
al-Sharif/Temple Mount in Jerusalem accompanied by 1,000 Israeli police officers, the 
subsequent Palestinian protests were met with deadly force. This event sparked intense 
confrontations between Palestinians and Israelis that escalated into a series of deadly 
reprisals and counter reprisals, which formed the basis of the second intifada. Sharon’s 
provocative act ignited the underlying Palestinian frustrations with the terms of the Oslo 
process, and the ongoing realities of life under occupation, which had been exacerbated 
by the recent failure of the talks at Camp David.29 Seeking to explain the outbreak of 
violence, the Sharm el-Sheikh fact finding committee later concluded that:
The roots of the current violence extend much deeper than an inconclusive summit 
conference. Both sides have made clear a profound disillusionment with the behaviour 
of the other in failing to meet the expectations arising from the peace process launched 
in Madrid in 1991 and then in Oslo in 1993. Each side has accused the other of 
violating specific undertakings and undermining the spirit of their commitment to 
resolving their political differences peacefully.30
The fact finding committee emerged from the 16 October 2000 Sharm el-Sheikh 
Summit, and its findings and composition were an important precursor to the formation 
of the Quartet. Firstly, the Summit itself might not have gone ahead had it not been for 
the involvement of the UN Secretary General, who flew to the region in early October, 
despite being warned by Israeli government officials that his plane would not be 
allowed to land at Ben Gurion Airport.31 As Annan recalled:
2S Malley and Agha, "Camp David: The Tragedy of Errors."
29 Usher, G., "Facing Defeat: The Intifada Two Years On," Journal of Palestine Studies 32, no. 2 (2003):
p. 22.
30 US Department of State, "Sharm El-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee Report," Washington, DC: 30 
April, 2001, p. 14.
31 Terje Roed-Larsen relayed to Annan that ‘The [Israeli] Prime Minister has told me in the most 
emotional way that Israel will prevent the UN plane from landing at Ben Gurion Airport.’ Annan called 
their bluff and landed on October 8,2000. See: Annan, Interventions: A Life in War and Peace, p. 268.
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In my ten years in office, the subsequent ten days of shuttling between Arafat and 
Barak were among the most improvised, uncertain and dramatic.32
Annan’s role, as he saw it, was to convince a reluctant Arafat to attend the Summit, and 
when he succeeded in doing so, he was invited by Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak to 
attend himself, along with Javier Solana, the EU High Representative for Common 
Foreign and Security Policy. The invitation was an important achievement not only for 
Annan personally, but also for the office of the Secretary General:
Thus I received my invitation to Sharm, underlining the UN’s place at the centre of 
Middle East diplomacy. Solana thought it was historic: ‘This is the first time in the 
history of this part of the world that the Secretary General of the United Nations has 
been allowed to play a role,’ he told me. ‘We have a long life and we need the UN.’33
Annan’s involvement in the Summit proved pivotal to the process of designing its 
associated fact finding committee, whose role was to investigate the outbreak of 
violence, and determine how its recurrence could be avoided. After Sharon’s 
provocation, Arafat’s first response had been to demand the formation of an 
international committee to investigate the causes of the violence, in particular the 
disproportionate nature of the Israeli security response to civilian protests.34 As Annan 
recounted later, during the Sharm el-Sheikh Summit:
Barak did not want a committee at all and could only contemplate a US committee; 
Arafat wanted a committee under UN auspices, partly to counteract US exclusive 
ownership of the peace process as a whole.3:1
The eventual compromise reached was that Clinton would appoint the committee in 
consultation with the Secretary General. As Annan saw it, the arrangement was a 
reflection of the power realities at the time, where ‘the US role remained central, but the 
UN was now at the table.’36 Consequently, the composition of the committee reflected 
its international character, and included Suleyman Demirel, the former President of the 
Republic of Turkey, Thorbjoem Jagland, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Norway, 
George Mitchell (as Chairman), a former member and majority Leader of the United 
States Senate, Warren B. Rudman, a former member of the United States Senate, and 
Javier Solana. However, between the formation of the committee, in October 2000,
32 Ibid., p.269.
33 Ibid., p. 270.
34 Usher, "Facing Defeat: The Intifada Two Years On," p. 25.
35 Annan, Interventions: A Life in War and Peace, p. 271.
36 Ibid.
37 US Department of State, "Sharm El-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee Report."
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and the release of its final recommendations in April 2001, the political landscape 
shifted dramatically.
On 10 December 2000, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak resigned, undermining 
Clinton’s last ditch efforts later that month to have his ‘parameters on the core issues’
o o
accepted by the parties. Similarly, follow-up negotiations at Taba, in late January 
2001, between PLO and Israeli officials broke off as the Israeli elections neared, and 
Clinton’s term ended. On 20 January 2001, President Clinton was replaced by 
President Bush, whose Administration declared promptly that it was not bound by the 
parameters of its predecessor, and on 6 February Ariel Sharon was elected as the Israeli 
Prime Minister leading a conservative Likud governing coalition.40
Sharon’s early priorities in relation to the intifada were made clear when he visited 
Washington in March, and declared that ‘the first thing, and the most important one, is 
to bring security to the citizens of Israel.. .that is the first thing that we have to 
accomplish.’41 When Sharon returned to Israel, he told reporters that President Bush had 
agreed with his assessment that the approach of Barak and Clinton ‘was not realistic.’42
Arafat, meanwhile, had been struggling to maintain control over the splintering factions 
within the Palestinian polity.4’ After endorsing tacitly the formation of grass-roots 
militias to defend Palestinian-controlled towns and villages from Israeli army incursions 
and settler violence, Arafat counterbalanced this approach with a careful avoidance of 
statements referring to Israel as the enemy or giving orders to fire on the Israeli army.44 
Arafat’s equivocation frustrated supporters of the Palestinian cause. Annan, for 
example, felt that ‘Arafat was not doing enough to stop the atrocious attacks’, and that 
‘the apparatus he headed was sometimes complicit in them.’45 Irrespective of whether 
Arafat was actually able to control the various factions contributing to the uprising, for
38 Kurtzer and Lasensky, Negotiating Arab-Israeli Peace: American Leadership in the Middle East.
39 As discussed previously, during the Taba talks European officials issued their own solution for bridging 
the gaps between the Israelis and Palestinians. Of relevance to the Quartet, the document was authored by 
Miguel Moratinos (Javier Solana’s envoy to the region), who later became a Quartet envoy.
40 Usher, "Facing Defeat: The Intifada Two Years On," p. 26.
41 US Department of State, "Remarks by the President and Prime Minister Ariel Sharon of Israel in Photo 
Opportunity," The Oval Office, The White House: 20 March, 2001.
42 Bregman, Elusive Peace: How the Holy Land Defeated America, p. 155.
43 For discussion of this process, see: Bowker, R., Palestinian Refugees: Mythology, Identity, and the 
Search for Peace (Boulder; London: Lynne Rienner, 2003), pp. 155-81.
44 Mansour, C., "The Impact of 11 September on the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict," Journal of Palestine 
Studies 31, no. 2 (2002): p . 11.
4> Annan, Interventions: A Life in War and Peace, p. 252.
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the Israelis, the Palestinian leadership’s ambiguity enabled them to position him as 
either being irresponsible, or irrelevant.46
It was in this political context that, on 30 April 2001, the Sharm el-Sheikh fact finding 
committee released their recommendations. This report, also referred to as the Mitchell 
Report, called for simultaneous actions from both parties, designed to halt the violence 
and promote a return to negotiations. It is important to note that this report introduced, 
for the first time in the post-Oslo period, the notion of parallelism. By calling for its 
recommendations to be addressed simultaneously by the parties, the Mitchell Report 
was, in essence, a counter-argument to the notion of sequentialism that underpinned the 
Oslo period. The report recommended that:
The Palestinian Authority should make clear through concrete action to Palestinians 
and Israelis alike that terrorism is reprehensible and unacceptable, and that the 
Palestinian Authority will make a 100 percent effort to prevent terrorist operations and 
to punish perpetrators. This effort should include immediate steps to apprehend and 
incarcerate terrorists operating within the Palestinian Authority's jurisdiction.47
In addition, and importantly for the eventual formation of the Quartet,48 the report also 
recommended that:
The Government of Israel should freeze all settlement activity, including the ‘natural 
growth’ of existing settlements 49
For Palestinians, the growth of Israeli settlements in the territories occupied since 1967 
had become a key rallying cry of the political movements underpinning the second 
intifada. Between the signing of the Oslo accord in September 1993 and September 
2000, settlement construction in the occupied territories increased by 52 percent, 
contributing an additional 75,000 settlers to the West Bank and Gaza, and an additional 
27,000 to East Jerusalem.50 This brought the total settler population in the occupied 
territories to approximately 380,000.51 Thus, the fact finding committee’s 
recommendation for a settlement freeze reflected the dual aim of reducing (but not
46 Mansour, "The Impact of 11 September on the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict," p. 11.
47 US Department of State, "Sharm El-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee Report," p. 5.
48 As is discussed in Chapter Five: The Roadmap Process, a total settlement freeze was a core component 
of the Quartet’s ‘Roadmap’ document.
49 US Department of State, "Sharm El-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee Report," p. 5.
50 B'Tselem, "Land Grab: Israel's Settlement Policy in the West Bank," Israel Information Center for 
Human Rights in the Occupied Territories, March 2002. As cited by Usher, "Facing Defeat: The Intifada 
Two Years On," p. 22.
51 B'Tselem, "Land Grab: Israel's Settlement Policy in the West Bank." As cited by Usher, "Facing 
Defeat: The Intifada Two Years On," p. 22.
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removing) what was deemed to be a central cause of the continuing Palestinian 
violence, as well as addressing a deficiency of the Oslo period.
While both parties agreed to the recommendations of the fact finding committee, they 
each chose to situate their acceptance within a framework that suited their immediate 
political needs. Arafat, after publicly accepting the recommendations ‘ 100 percent’, 
began to champion an idea ruled out by the Mitchell Report, that an international 
observer force be sent to the occupied territories to monitor the cease-fire and protect 
Palestinian civilians. Unsurprisingly, international monitoring forces were a non­
starter for Israel, but the strategy for the Palestinian leadership reflected a demand from 
factional leaders to ‘return the Palestinian struggle from the tutelage of the United States 
and Israel,’ and to move it toward ‘international legitimacy and the forum of the United 
Nations and Arab world.04
Sharon took a two-pronged approach to the report. Firstly, he offered his interpretation 
of a ‘settlement freeze’ as being restricted to the establishment of new settlements, and 
not inclusive of ‘natural growth’ in existing ones.55 Secondly, he framed the Israeli 
execution of the committee’s recommendations as being contingent on a cease-fire with 
the Palestinians, including, for example, ‘total calm’ on the Palestinian side for seven 
full days.56 By making Israeli adherence to the recommendations of the report subject to 
Palestinian ‘quiet’, Sharon effectively allowed for violent factions within the Palestinian 
polity to disrupt the process at any moment. When Sharon’s interpretation of Israel’s 
responsibilities was endorsed by US Secretary of State Colin Powell, it was considered 
by Palestinian analysts as an indication that the ‘Mitchell [Report] was dead before it 
was bom.’57
The so-called Tenet ceasefire plan, which emerged from the Bush Administration’s 
response to the Mitchell Report, and was named after CIA director George Tenet, 
posited that before the recommendations of the fact finding committee could be 
implemented, the parties to the conflict must first re-establish security cooperation and
2 See attachments of Sharm el-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee Report for copies of both the Israeli and 
Palestinian responses to the findings. US Department of State, "Sharm El-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee 
Report," pp. 51,59.
53 Usher, "Facing Defeat: The Intifada Two Years On," p. 28.
54 Ibid.: p. 24.
55 This was despite the Mitchell Report stating clearly that ‘natural growth’ should be included in the 
freeze. Mansour, "The Impact of 11 September on the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict," p. 8.
56 Ibid.
Usher, "Facing Defeat: The Intifada Two Years On," p. 29.
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enact a cease-fire.58 This shifted the discourse from one addressing the underlying 
causes of the intifada to one focussing on the immediate security situation on the 
ground, and sidelined the Mitchell Report.
For the international community, (especially the envoys of the Quartet powers) the 
failed implementation of the Report was a missed opportunity.59 At the July 2001 
meeting of the G8 in Rome, the leaders of the G8 countries issued a statement labelling 
the Mitchell Report as ‘...the only way forward to break the deadlock, to stop the 
escalation and to resume a political process.’60 The statement, in an attempt to address 
the Tenet plan, also called for the ‘cooling off period’ to begin as soon as possible, and 
affirmed the need for ‘third-party monitoring accepted by both parties.’61
Any possibility for calm was lost on 27 August 2000, when an Israeli helicopter gunship 
fired two missiles into the office building of the Popular Front for the Liberation of 
Palestine (PFLP) in Ramallah, killing Abu Ali Mustafa, the faction’s Secretary 
General. The attack produced an immediate escalation in the violence between both 
sides. The PFLP responded by assassinating the Israeli cabinet minister, Rehavam 
Ze’evi, on 17 October 2000, and Israeli forces reacted by re-taking Bethlehem, Jenin, 
Qalqilya, Ramallah, and Tulkarm -  five of the eight West Bank towns ceded to ‘full’
COPA control during the Oslo process.
Thus, at the time of the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States, the situation in Israel 
and Palestine had spiraled out of control, and individuals working on the issue had 
begun to push for a new approach that could attempt to address the intifada as well as 
its root causes. Specifically, an approach was required that could tackle the construction 
of Israeli settlements in occupied territory as well as Palestinian incitement, while also 
challenging the notion of sequentialism that had underpinned Oslo and the absence of 
effective monitoring practices. Furthermore, this approach also needed to address 
simultaneously the perception of US dominance of the peace process during the Oslo
58 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Palestinian-Israeli Security Implementation Work Plan: Tenet 
cease-fire plan," Jerusalem: 14 June, 2001.
59 UN official. Interview with the author, Jerusalem, November, 2011.
60 US Department of State, "Statement on Middle East: Conclusions of the meeting of the G8 Foreign 
Ministers' Meeting," Rome, Italy: 19 July, 2001.
61 Ibid.
62 Bregman, Elusive Peace: How the Holy Land Defeated America, p. 157.
63 Usher, "Facing Defeat: The Intifada Two Years On," p. 29.
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period, while drawing a reticent Bush Administration into more concrete engagement 
with the peace process.
While these issues eventually became the central tenets of the ‘Roadmap’ document in 
late 2002,64 the members of the Quartet made these goals clear in May 2002, when they 
called for ‘a restoration of security, security from terror and violence for Israelis and 
Palestinians,’ the need for ‘strong, accountable, democratic and market-oriented 
institutions for Palestinians,’ and ‘serious and accelerated negotiations toward a 
settlement.’63 Finally, at the same event, when US Secretary of State Colin Powell was 
asked to comment on the Israeli settlements, he said:
The issue of settlements is a very real one, and it will have to be dealt with. There will 
have to be a cessation of new settlements, and something will have to be done about 
the settlements that are there now. And that has always been part of the various 
negotiating efforts that have been underway.66
While the extent to which the Quartet was able to make progress on these issues is the 
subject of the subsequent chapters, it is clear, both in its composition and its early 
statements, that the Quartet members sought to address the perceived deficiencies of the 
Oslo period that were seen to have led to the outbreak of the intifada.
The US Context: Disengagement or Disinterest?
If his predecessors had faced Arab and Israeli leaders who seemed ready to do serious 
business, Bush looked at a landscape hardened by confrontation and driven by angry 
and fearful publics and leaders who reflected their mood.
- Aaron David Miller, senior advisor on Arab-Israeli 
negotiations to United States Secretary of State Colin Powell 
(2001-2003).67
A key driving force for the formation of the Quartet was the widely held perception that 
the Bush Administration had disengaged from the Middle East peace process. In this 
context, the Quartet served a dual purpose, in that it was both an attempt to encourage 
and legitimise re-engagement from the Bush Administration, as well as a way to fill the 
political vacuum created by US inactivity. This section deals primarily with the latter,
64 The authorship and implementation processes of the Roadmap document are the central focuses of 
Chapter Five: The Roadmap Process, 2002-2003.
65 US Department of State, "Remarks by US Secretary of State Colin Powell and UN Secretary-General 
Kofi Annan on "Madrid Quartet" Initiative to Convene a Regional Peace Conference in the Middle East," 
Washington, DC: 2 May, 2002.
66 Ibid.
67 Miller, A. D., The Much Too Promised Land: America's Elusive Search for Arab-Israeli Peace (New  
York: Bantam Books, 2008), p. 322.
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while the subsequent section (focussing on the organisational objectives of the Quartet) 
explores the former.68
In early 2001, newly-appointed US Secretary of State Colin Powell made a trip to the 
Middle East, where he met with the outgoing US Ambassador to Israel, and key Clinton 
advisor, Martin Indyk. According to Indyk, it was during this meeting that Powell 
indicated that the Bush Administration intended to ‘park’ the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, 
to which Indyk replied ‘you can’t park it, it’s on a hill.’69 When Indy spoke later with 
President Bush about this approach, Bush reportedly told him that ‘there’s no Nobel 
Peace Prize to be won here.’ Indyk went on to relay this information during a meeting 
between envoys from Russia, the European Union, and the United Nations, telling them
71‘if you want to do something, this is your opportunity.’
The Bush Administration’s ‘minimalist approach’ was outlined publicly in March 2001 
when Powell, in a speech delivered to the American Israel Public Affairs Committee 
(AIPAC), announced that the United States stood ready to ‘assist, not insist,’ in attempts 
to restart a Palestinian-Israeli dialogue, and avoided all use of the term ‘peace 
process.’72 Later in the same month, the United States vetoed a Security Council 
resolution calling for an UN observer force to monitor the situation in the occupied 
territories.72 It should be noted, however, that US protection of Israel in the United 
Nations Security Council was not a new phenomenon, and Clinton, after leaving office, 
observed that:
The Israelis depended on the United States to veto such measures, which we normally 
did. That enabled us to maintain our influence with them, but weakened our claim to 
be an honest broker with the Palestinians.74
Here a distinction should be made between disinterest and disengagement. That is, the 
difference between an Administration that had de-prioritised the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict, and one that had made the judgement that there was nothing to be gained from 
active involvement. Former Bush Administration National Security advisor, and later
68 In particular, it discusses the notion that the divide between the Powell State Department and Bush 
White House was a driving force behind Powell’s involvement in the Quartet.
69 Indyk. Interview with the author, Washington, DC, November, 2011.
70 Ibid.
71 Ibid.
72 Christison, K., '"All Those Old Issues': George W. Bush and the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict," Journal 
of Palestine Studies 33, no. 2 (2004): p. 47.
72 Zunes, S., "The United States and the breakdown of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process," Middle East 
Policy 8, no. 4 (2001): p. 77.
74 Clinton, My Life, p. 748.
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Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice argued that the latter explained the Bush 
Administration’s early reticence:
It became fashionable during the Bush team’s eight years in office to say that we did 
not come to power committed to the peace process and that we should have pursued 
the understandings at Camp David. It simply flies in the face of reality to believe that 
there was any room for negotiations between Palestinians and Israelis in 2001 or for 
some time afterward. Yasser Arafat had demonstrated that he would not or could not 
make peace. Ariel Sharon came to power to defeat the Palestinian resistance, not to 
negotiate ,7'7
Firstly, it should be noted that Rice’s distinction related to the cause of the Bush 
Administration’s disengagement, and was not a refutation of the notion that it was, in 
fact, disengaged. Nevertheless, one aspect of this disengagement appears to have been a 
response to the active engagement of Bush’s predecessor, Bill Clinton. As one Israeli 
academic noted, the difficulties of the Clinton Administration had enhanced in Bush the 
‘natural instinct’ of any new political Administration ‘to do the opposite of what its 
predecessor has done,’ which in this case was compounded by the sense that the Middle 
East peace process was ‘not a promising enterprise that would reward the investment of 
political capital.’77 Reinforcing the Bush Administration’s initial inclination to avoid the 
missteps of the Clinton Administration was Bush’s deep antipathy towards Yasser 
Arafat. As Rice later recounted:
The President placed the blame for the failure of the Camp David negotiations on 
Arafat. He believed that Arafat was corrupt and unwilling to make difficult choices for
78peace.
When Bush was confronted by Prince Bandar bin Sultan, the Saudi Arabian 
Ambassador to the United States early in his term about his inaction regarding the 
intifada, Bush replied that ‘Arafat is a liar,’ and that he was impossible to work with or
75 Rice, C., No Higher Honor: A Memoir of My Years in Washington, 1st ed. (New York: Crown 
Publishers, 2011), p. 53.
76 In their study o f US leadership in the Middle East, Kurtzer and Lasensky consulted with members of 
the Clinton team and concluded that Clinton’s willingness to take every phone call from Israeli Prime 
Minister Barak -  at times on an almost daily basis -  ‘devalued the president’s latent power and denied 
Clinton the critical distance that a president often must have when dealing with detailed and nuanced 
policy problems.’ See: Kurtzer and Lasensky, Negotiating Arab-Israeli Peace: American Leadership in 
the Middle East, pp. 47-51.
77 Heller, M., Principal Research Associate at the Institute for National Security Studies, Tel Aviv 
University, interview with the author, Tel Aviv, November, 2011.
7X Rice, No Higher Honor: A Memoir of My Years in Washington, p. 136.
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trust.79 Prince Bandar replied that the problem was larger than one man, and that the 
‘region is boiling, and it’s building and building.’80
Going beyond his concerns regarding Arafat’s ability or inclination to make peace,
Bush appeared to have also had a strong personal dislike for the Palestinian leader. In an 
account relayed by Annan in his autobiography, he was hosting a heads of state lunch 
during the General Assembly of 2001 when:
Javier Solana somewhat courageously wandered over to where Bush and I were 
seated, and casually dropped the suggestion that President Bush take this opportunity 
to shake Yasser Arafat’s hand. Tell him to shake his own hand,’ was the inimitable 
Texan reply. That was that.81
From a foreign policy standpoint, Bush’s feelings toward Arafat led arguably to 
disinterest in testing whether possible openings could be exploited to create diplomatic 
opportunities,82 an example of which was the failure of the Administration to build upon 
the findings of the Mitchell Report.83 Furthermore, Bush’s outlook also affected the way 
in which he viewed the conflict more broadly. As Rice recounted:
I talked to the President every day, and I knew where he stood. The constant violence 
against Israeli civilians and Arafat’s prevarication and unwillingness to break with 
terrorism led the President to tilt toward Tel Aviv.84
While active US engagement in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was not guaranteed to 
produce success, the absence of a peace process arguably carried a far greater cost. As 
Ross argued:
With only very limited American diplomacy between Israelis and Palestinians, the 
intifada was transformed into a war, with a vast escalation in the suffering on both 
sides. For Israelis and Palestinians alike, the price they paid for having no peace 
process was extraordinarily high.85
In addition to the impact on the parties, and importantly for the Quartet, the lack of 
engagement of the Bush Administration also eroded US regional standing.86 By late 
2001, allies of the United States were searching for ways to draw the Bush
79 Woodward, B., State of Denial, 1st Simon & Schuster trade pbk. ed. (New York: Simon & Schuster 
Paperbacks, 2007), p. 30.
80 Ibid.
81 Annan, Interventions: A Life in War and Peace, p. 273.
82 Kurtzer and Lasensky, Negotiating Arab-lsraeli Peace: American Leadership in the Middle East, p. 36.
83 Ross, D., The Missing Peace: The Inside Story of the Fight for Middle East Peace (New York: Farrar, 
Straus and Giroux, 2005), p. 785.
84 Rice, No Higher Honor: A Memoir of My Years in Washington, p. 55.
8SRoss, The Missing Peace: The Inside Story of the Fight for Middle East Peace, p. 781.
86 Kurtzer and Lasensky, Negotiating Arab-lsraeli Peace: American Leadership in the Middle East, p. 21.
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Administration into a real commitment to the peace process. For the US-Saudi 
relationship in particular, Bush’s continued isolation of Arafat projected an implicit 
support for the policies of Sharon, and led to a diplomatic crisis in August 2001. Prince 
Bandar bin Sultan visited Bush on 27 August, carrying a message from the leadership in 
Saudi Arabia. According to Bob Woodward’s account of the meeting, Prince Bandar 
relayed that the Crown Prince had ‘tried to find many excuses for this Administration,’ 
but had ultimately come to the conclusion that the President had let Ariel Sharon 
‘determine everything in the Middle East.’87 Consequently, the Prince stated that:
The Crown Prince will not communicate in any form, type or shape with you, and 
Saudi Arabia will make all its political, economic and security decisions based on how 
it sees its own interest in the region without taking into account American interests 
anymore, because it is obvious that the United States has taken a strategic decision 
adopting Sharon’s policy.88
Bush immediately sought to re-assure the Saudis that the United States had not 
abandoned the Palestinians. In a letter sent to Riyadh two days later, Bush stated his 
firm belief that:
The Palestinian people have a right to self-determination and to live peacefully and 
securely in their own state, in their own homeland, just as the Israelis have the right to 
live peacefully and safely in their own state.89
From a declaratory standpoint, Bush’s private letter was the first time that a sitting US 
president had endorsed the creation of a Palestinian state. The reply from Riyadh on 6 
September urged Bush to declare his position publicly, noting that such a declaration 
would ‘eliminate the common impression prevailing in the region of a US bias towards 
Israel.’90 Bush agreed, and, according to Woodward, made preparations to announce his 
position during his upcoming speech to the UN General Assembly in September 2001.
Former US Ambassador Daniel Kurtzer, during an interview with the author, argued 
that the letters exchanged between President Bush and the Saudis, just days before the 
attacks of 9/11, was a moment in which the trajectory of US involvement in the peace 
process may have changed, a ‘what if?’ moment:
87 Woodward, State of Denial, p. 75.
88 Ibid., pp. 75-6.
89 Ibid., p. 76.
90 Ibid.
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Had there not been 9/11, would the Administration have actually activated their 
approach on the peace process? The answer is I don’t know.91
For the Bush Administration, the 9/11 attacks crystallised the approach it would take 
towards both domestic security and the protection of US interests in the Middle East, an 
approach that increasingly saw those issues as being intertwined. As Bush later noted,
‘in a single morning, the purpose of my presidency had grown clear: to protect our 
people and defend our freedom that had come under attack.’92 As Bush saw it, the best 
way to protect US citizens was to:
...force nations to choose whether they would fight the terrorists or share in their fate. 
And we had to wage this war on the offense, by attacking the terrorists overseas before 
they could attack us again at home.93
In terms of the Administration’s approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the new 
paradigm that emerged after 9/11 reinforced Bush’s inclination to view Arafat as an 
obstacle to peace, and to further disengage from Arab-Israeli issues. According to 
Miller, Powell echoed this point at the time of the attacks, noting that they:
...changed the whole frame of reference in that we now, within a week, are engaged 
in a global war against terrorists, all terrorists...Hamas is a terrorist; Arafat’s a 
terrorist. And if there’s any doubt in our mind, Sharon will remind us on a regular 
basis that he is.94
This proved to be the case when, in the days that immediately followed 9/11, the Israel 
Defense Forces (IDF) made incursions into Jericho, Jenin, Rafah and Ramallah, and 
Sharon began referring to Arafat as ‘Israel’s Bin Laden.’95 The Bush Administration did 
not discourage this association, and even linked the ‘War on Terror’ to Israel’s fight 
against Palestinian extremism when Condoleezza Rice declared that ‘you can’t 
condemn al-Qaeda and hug Hamas.’96 For Bush, the 9/11 attacks reinforced his 
inclination to see the Middle East as the centre of a global ideological struggle and, 
importantly for Sharon, this led him to conclude that ‘if the United States had the right
Q 7to defend itself and prevent future attacks, other democracies had those rights too.’
91 Kurtzer. Interview with the author, Princeton, NJ, October, 2011.
92 Bush, Decision Points, p. 129.
93 Ibid., p. 137.
94 Miller, The Much Too Promised Land: America's Elusive Search for Arab-Israeli Peace, p. 335.
95 Mansour, "The Impact of 11 September on the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict," p. 13.
96 Rice, No Higher Honor: A Memoir of My Years in Washington, p. 134.
97 Bush, Decision Points, p. 400.
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In spite of this, when Bush delivered his postponed address to the UN General 
Assembly in November 2001 he kept his promise to the Saudi Crown Prince, and 
explicitly recognised the need for a Palestinian state:
The American government also stands by its commitment to a just peace in the Middle 
East. We are working toward the day when two states -  Israel and Palestine -  live 
peacefully together within secure and recognised borders as called for by the Security 
Council resolutions.98
The fact that Bush’s views on Arafat remained unchanged was made clear, however, 
when he went on to state that ‘peace will only come when all have sworn off forever 
incitement, violence and t e r r o r . T h u s ,  in the post 9/11 period, the notion of 
Palestinian reform became closely linked to calls for Palestinian statehood, and by early 
the following year, Bush was calling explicitly for Arafat’s removal.100
While the Bush Administration had called for the creation of a Palestinian state in 
November 2001, this had not addressed the pressing humanitarian concerns of the 
intifada, nor had it presented a US plan for de-escalating the violence and re­
establishing dialogue between the parties.101 The reaction of the Arab community to 
Bush’s speech at the time, therefore, was lukewarm. For the Administration, this 
reinforced the perception that US involvement in the peace process at this time would 
not be worth the necessary investment of political capital. As Rice later noted:
The President’s speech was not exactly front-page news in the Arab press. Egypt, 
Jordan, and Saudi Arabia were so focused on the ‘peace process’ that they seemingly 
failed to notice that the President of the United States had called for the establishment 
of a State of Palestine. Years later, the Arabs would acknowledge the importance of 
what the president had done. But in this initial failure to credit the President’s stance 
was an important lesson too: whatever you do for peace in the Middle East, it is never 
enough for the Arab parties.102
UNSG Annan was particularly troubled by the Bush Administration’s approach, and 
sought to revive the dormant political process:
98 US Department of State, "US President Bush's Speech to the United Nations General Assembly," 
United Nations Headquarters, New York City: November 10 2001.
99 Ibid.
100 The so-called ‘Rose Garden Speech’ of 24 June 2002 is discussed in Chapter Five: The Roadmap 
Process, 2002-2003.
101 By the time of Bush’s speech at the UN, the Quartet had already formed and begun acting collectively 
in the region. Thus, while the early focus of the Quartet members would be an attempt to build upon 
Bush’s speech by proposing a framework for moving towards Palestinian statehood, the speech itself did 
not impact on the formation of the group.
102 Rice, No Higher Honor: A Memoir o f My Years in Washington, p. 135.
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It was no secret that President George W. Bush was not going to continue the hands- 
on engagement of Clinton, but I was taken aback by just how hands-off he chose to be. 
As the conflict of the second intifada raged in 2001, tearing up so much that had been 
so doggedly built over the past seven years, he basically watched.103
The disengagement of the Bush Administration, therefore, created both an opening and 
an incentive for the inclusion of actors whose traditional role had been sidelined by US 
dominance of the peace process. As Indyk argued, a central requirement of active 
Quartet engagement in the peace process, as well as a driving force in its creation, was 
US disengagement:
The Quartet only ever comes into its own, and in fact was created, when the United 
States pulls back from active engagement in the peace process. At any other time that 
the US is actively involved, the entire role of the remaining Quartet members is to act 
as a kind of rubber stamp. When the United States pulls back from active engagement, 
that’s when the Quartet has an opportunity to get more actively involved.104
While Indyk’s assessment is largely confirmed in the subsequent chapters of this thesis, 
a key point to clarify is that the other members of the Quartet did not enter the grouping 
in order to constrain the United States, nor were they under the impression that within 
the Quartet, the role of the United States would be equalised by the other members. US 
power both within and outside the Quartet was explicitly understood and accepted by 
the other Quartet members. Indeed, one of the central reasons for the formation of the 
Quartet, and a core principle of its work since forming, was the idea that the Quartet 
existed as a buffer between the parties to the conflict, and the ‘abyss.’ As a European 
official explained:
For the United States, it’s convenient to know that if they step back that there isn’t 
going to be a void, that there is going to be somebody to step in to fill in that void, and 
also that they’re still involved in that step.105
This raises the question, however, of how a grouping that included the United States 
could be a solution to the disengagement of the United States. In order to address this 
paradox, it is necessary to examine the divide between the Bush White House and 
Powell State Department in regard to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
The Organisational Context: The Secondary Logic of the Quartet for its Members 
Leaving aside the case of the United States for a moment, it was clear that each of the 
Quartet members also sought, through membership, to amplify the individual political
103 Annan, Interventions: A Life in War and Peace, p. 273.
104 Indyk. Interview with the author, Washington, DC, November, 2011.
105 EEAS Official. Interview with the author, Brussels, November, 2011.
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role that their respective organisations played within the peace process. The 
organisational needs and interests of the Quartet members operated as a secondary set of 
motivational factors for the formation, and continuation, of the grouping.
When asked to account for the longevity of the Quartet despite numerous setbacks for 
the grouping within the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Terje Roed-Larsen 
replied that it had been ‘useful for the parties within the Quartet, but not necessarily 
useful for the parties to the conflict.’106 This section seeks to explain why.
The US State Department and the White House 
According to National Security Director Condoleezza Rice, when the Bush 
Administration took office in January 2001:
The differences in the administration between the decidedly pro-Israel bent of the 
White House and the State Department’s more traditional pro-Arab view percolated 
beneath the surface.107
While Secretary of State Colin Powell began his appointment by outlining the new 
Administration’s ‘minimalist’ approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, throughout 
2001, and even more so later, a divide grew during his tenure between the approach of 
the State Department and that of the White House. This division extended to the point 
that when Powell resigned at the end of the first Bush term, the President was relieved:
I admired Colin, but it sometimes seemed like the State Department he led wasn’t 
fully on board with my philosophy and policies. It was important to me that there be 
no daylight between the President and the Secretary of State.108
The ‘daylight’ between the Secretary of State and the President began to emerge in the 
Bush Administration’s approach to Yasser Arafat. According to Rice, the President was 
‘disgusted’ by who he saw to be a ‘terrorist and a crook,’ and argued that the United 
States should ‘support Israel’s right to defend itself’ and ‘focus on what the nature of a 
Palestinian state would be.’109 The State Department, on the other hand, argued that 
Arafat was, ‘despite all his failings, the leader of the Palestinian people and the key to 
any future peace.’110 According to Miller, as the violence in the Middle East escalated 
throughout 2001:
106 Roed-Larsen. Interview with the author, New York City, October, 2011.
107 Rice, No Higher Honor: A Memoir of My Years in Washington, p. 55.
II)S Bush, Decision Points, p. 90.
109 Rice, No Higher Honor: A Memoir of My Years in Washington, p. 54.
110 Ibid.
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Powell was the only advocate in the administration for doing anything on the Arab- 
Israeli issue, and he tried. But the constraints and costs of failing or going too far were 
clear.111
Furthermore, Rice, despite being ‘sympathetic’ to Powell because ‘he was on the front 
line every day,’ sought to persuade the Secretary of State that ‘...any attempt to chart a 
new course in 2001 was likely to result in an outcome that would be so pro-Israeli as to 
inflame an already bad situation.’112
Thus, Powell’s efforts to engage the US State Department in the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict in 2001 were frustrated by the White House’s sidelining of Arafat, and their 
sensitivity to Israeli security needs. Former UN envoy to the Quartet Alvaro de Soto 
argued that Powell’s involvement in the Quartet was, therefore, a ‘framework both 
diplomatically and conceptually designed to induce a reluctant US to agree to come
1 1 Tback into the process from which it had stayed away studiously.’
On this point is it important to distinguish between Powell’s involvement in the Quartet 
as a means to encourage US engagement in the peace process from  the White House, 
and US engagement despite the White House. As Kurtzer argued, if Powell sought to 
‘implicate the US’ through his involvement in the Quartet, ‘then he didn’t understand 
the White House,’114 because ‘you’re not going to persuade the President to engage in 
the peace process because the Europeans want to make peace.’115 Thus,for Powell, the 
Quartet was more likely a mechanism for the US State Department to re-engage with 
the peace process despite the reservations of the Bush White House.116 Unsurprisingly,
117within the early work of the Quartet, this dichotomy was exposed.
The Quartet formed, therefore, during a moment of mutual convenience in which the 
US Secretary of State sought to play a more active role in the MEPP, (despite the 
disengagement of the President) at the same time that actors such as the UNSG and the 
European Union sought to form an international response to the intifada. As one UN
111 Miller, The Much Too Promised Land: America's Elusive Search for Arab-Israeli Peace, p. 330.
112 Rice, No Higher Honor: A Memoir of My Years in Washington, p. 55.
113 de Soto. Interview with the author, New York City, October, 2011.
114 As Indyk remarked, ‘don’t forget who the President was...to think that the UN(!) was going to drag 
him into it?’. Indyk. Interview with the author, Washington, DC, November, 2011.
115 Kurtzer. Interview with the author, Princeton, NJ, October, 2011.
116 This is supported by the fact that the Quartet operates exclusively at a level beneath that of heads of 
state, and there has never been a ‘supra-principal’ meeting of the Quartet.
117 As is discussed in Chapter Five, Bush’s Rose Garden Speech altered dramatically the discourse in 
regard to Palestinian political reform, and effectively superseded the Quartet’s and Powell’s efforts to 
work constructively with Arafat.
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official summarised, ‘the Quartet allowed the State Department to come back in, and the 
rest of us to have a seat at the table.’118
Russian Federation Objectives
The usefulness of rallying for a unified purpose the power of the United States, the 
treasure of the European Union and Russia’s historic role in the region -  players who 
might otherwise be tempted to act at cross-purposes -  is evident.
- Alvaro de Soto, United Nations Special Coordinator for the 
Middle East Peace Process (2005-2007).119
de Soto’s characterisation above includes the oft-cited justification for Russia’s 
involvement in the Quartet as reflecting its ‘historic role’ in the Middle East. As the 
previous chapter has demonstrated, however, Russia’s traditional role in the Middle 
East, especially during the Soviet period, was as a counter balance, and challenge, to the 
power and influence of the United States in the region. Furthermore, and particularly 
within the confines of the UN Security Council, Cold War competition often stifled 
attempts to coordinate international responses to regional issues, especially the Israeli- 
Palestinian conflict. Thus, citing Russia’s ‘historic role’ as a justification for their 
inclusion in the Quartet is arguably an allusion to the fact that, as de Soto notes, if 
Russia was not included in the grouping, they could be a player that ‘might otherwise 
be tempted to act at cross purposes.’ The removal of Russia as a potential spoiler for 
Quartet initiatives, therefore, was an important factor that partly explained their 
inclusion in the grouping.
Here a clarification of Russian involvement in the Quartet is necessary, as there is a 
difference between examining why Russia was included in the Quartet, and why Russia 
accepted (and even sought) this inclusion. The latter is much less complicated than the 
former, and can be understood within the context of Russia’s post Soviet objectives of 
enhancing, or restoring, it’s political role in the Middle East.120 As Roed-Larsen noted, 
‘the Quartet is a forum where the Russians can have influence. If that forum was not 
there, Russia’s interests would be minimised.’121
1 lx UN official. Interview with the author, Jerusalem, November, 2011.
119 de Soto, A., "The Role of the United Nations in the Middle East," in Italianieuropi,2 July 2009.
120 In a 2013 profile on Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, Susan Glasser notes that: ‘Lavrov’s 
toughness comes from a very patriotic stance. He thinks there was a lost time in the ‘9 0 s ...He thought the 
‘90s were humiliation for Russia, and his ambition is to restore the profile of Russia, its Foreign policy.’ 
Glasser, S., '"The Law of Politics' According to Sergei Lavrov: An Exclusive Interview with Russia's Top 
Diplomat," Foreign Policy, 15 May, 2013.
121 Roed-Larsen. Interview with the author, New York City, October, 2011.
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For the Russians, membership in the Quartet provided the possibility of Russian 
influence in the peace process, and an opportunity to protect Russian interests, without 
any apparent cost. As a UN official noted, ‘if there’s an important multilateral body 
working on the Middle East, the Russians want to be part of it.’ " On this most basic 
level, the Quartet afforded Russia a seat at the table.123
From the perspective of the other three Quartet members, Russia’s inclusion in the 
Quartet served several purposes. Firstly, as previously stated, the inclusion of Russia 
removed a potential obstacle to Quartet initiatives, especially in the UN Security 
Council, which the Quartet members would later use to legitimise their collective 
initiatives.124 The Russian envoy to the Quartet from 2001-05, Andrey Vdovin, when 
asked about the central accomplishment of the Quartet, encapsulated this idea:
The Quartet accomplished one main important thing: possible competition between 
the main international actors ceased and cooperation emerged. This prevented many 
misunderstandings and complications.'2:1
Despite Vdovin’s assessment regarding the cessation of competition between the 
Quartet members proving to be somewhat premature, Russia’s points of differentiation 
with the other Quartet members also factored into its inclusion in the grouping. As 
argued previously, in the post-Soviet era, Russia sought to cultivate relationships, 
mostly through the sale of military technology, with ‘non-traditional’ regional actors 
such as Syria and Iran.126 Furthermore, Russia had strong historical ties to the PLO,127 
Lebanon, and Jordan, including diplomatic contact with non-state actors such as 
Hezbollah and Hamas.128 Russia’s network of regional diplomatic relationships, 
therefore, was perceived to be an asset to the work of the Quartet, especially in cases
122 UN official. Interview with the author, Jerusalem, November, 2011.
123 Glasser, S., "Minister No: Sergei Lavrov and the Blunt Logic of Russian Power," Foreign Policy, 15 
May, 2013.
124 For example, as will be discussed in the subsequent chapter, UNSCR 1397 and 1515 were both 
resolutions that affirmed the involvement of the Quartet members within the context o f the Israeli- 
Palestinian conflict.
I2;> Vdovin, A., "Coexisting Peacefully with the US: An Interview with Andrey Vdovin," Bitterlemons, 17 
July, 2003.
126 Nizameddin, T., Russia and the Middle East: Towards a New Foreign Policy (New York: St. Martin's 
Press, 1999), pp. 145-81.
127 In acknowledgement of the closeness of the Russia-PLO relationship, US secretary of state Warren 
Christopher invited Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev to the signing ceremony (despite little 
Russian involvement in the Oslo process). During his address at the event, Kozyrev noted that: ‘It should 
not be forgotten that, in the Arab world, relations with the United States have not always been positive, 
and it is important for Moscow to also lend support to new initiatives.’ Freedman, R. O., "Israeli-Russian 
Relations since the Collapse of the Soviet Union," Middle East Journal 49, no. 2 (1995): p. 242.
128 Freedman, R. O., Professor at Johns Hopkins University, interview with the author, Baltimore, USA, 
October, 2011.
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where other members of the Quartet (notably the United States and the European 
Union) were constrained in their ability to interact publicly with certain regional
129actors.
Finally, during the period in which the Quartet formed, both the Russian Foreign 
Minister, Igor Ivanov, and his envoy to the Middle East, Andrey Vdovin, had been ‘very 
active’ in the region. ' For example, the aforementioned meeting of the envoys in 
which Indyk briefed his counterparts on the new approach of the Bush Administration, 
was hosted by Michael Bogdanov, the Russian Ambassador to Israel, at his official 
residence. 131 As European Quartet envoy Marc Otte recounted, in the period directly 
before the formation of the Quartet, ‘the most used numbers in my mobile phone were 
my American colleague, my UN colleague, and my Russian colleague. ’ 132 Furthermore, 
the notion of Russian inclusion in the Quartet was bolstered by the reputation of
133Russian diplomats in the region for being well-informed, professional, and diligent.
Thus, Russia’s inclusion in the Quartet simultaneously reduced the likelihood of 
conflicting approaches to the Middle East peace process, while also adding the benefits 
of Russian diplomatic contacts and experience.
European Union Objectives
European participation in the Quartet was a means for expanding EU involvement in the 
Middle East peace process from the traditional approach, which focused on economic 
development and institution building, to one that also included visibility and influence 
within the political sphere. 134 Furthermore, in the context of the second intifada, EU 
involvement in the Quartet was a reaction to the traditionally dominant role of the 
United States within the peace process, and the growing calls in the region for the 
expansion of third-party involvement. Director of the Palestinian Authority Media 
Centre, Ghassan Khatib, argued that calls from within the region for a greater European 
political contribution reflected dissatisfaction with the US handling of the peace
129 This would prove to be the case with Hamas, though European Envoy Marc Otte argued that ‘with 
Hamas, [the Russians] always admitted that they were trying to moderate them and to make them more 
realistic, but they have always submitted that they have limited success.’ Otte, M., Former European 
Union Quartet envoy, Interview with author, Brussels, November, 2011.
130 UN official. Interview with the author, Jerusalem, November, 2011.
131 Indyk. Interview with the author, Washington, DC, November, 2011.
132 Otte. Interview with author, Brussels, November, 2011.
133de Soto. Interview with the author, New York City, October, 2011., Otte. Interview with author, 
Brussels, November, 2011.
134 Asseburg, M., "The EU and the Middle East Conflict: Tackling the Main Obstacle to Euro- 
Mediterranean Partnership," Mediterranean Politics 8, no. 2 (2003): p. 187.
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1process. ' However, It should be noted that through enhancing their own involvement, 
European officials were not aiming to replace the United States within the peace 
process, but were instead seeking to play ‘what they saw as their as their appropriate 
role on the world stage.’136 As Khatib noted, ‘the Europeans didn’t see themselves as an
1 ' l lalternative to the US, but I think they were no longer willing to be marginal.’ '
In essence, the European Union was moving towards playing an ‘active secondary 
position.’138 This was explained partly, as previously stated, by the evolution of the 
structures for the creation of European Union foreign policy. For Javier Solana, the 
EU’s first HR for CFSP, involvement in the Quartet was a means to build upon the 
political momentum from his inclusion in the Sharm el-Sheikh Summit and subsequent 
position on its fact finding committee. Furthermore, when the second intifada began to 
destroy the infrastructure and institutions that the European Union had funded during 
the Oslo period:
The European Union realized that its approach, focusing on economic development, 
regional peace-building and Palestinian state and institution building, could not be 
effective in the absence of a genuine peace process.139
Therefore, during the period in which the Quartet formed, playing a political role in any 
initiative seeking to deal with the underlying problems of the intifada became a 
European priority. When viewed as such, European involvement in the Quartet provided 
an opportunity for the HR to represent the views of the EU within the Middle East peace 
process.
In contrast to the other Quartet principals, between 2001 and 2007, the European Union 
had three principal level representatives: High Representative for Common Foreign and 
Security Policy, Javier Solana, European Commissioner for External Affairs, Chris 
Patten (followed by Benita Ferrero-Waldner) and the Foreign Affairs representative of
135 Specifically, Khatib argued that: ‘Europe was behaving on the basis that the Middle East peace process 
was an American domain. Europe used to have different views, but never imposed them. They always 
took the American position, and followed the American position, for 20 years. When will the Americans 
realise that although they were given the mandate by the international community, they failed?’ Khatib, 
G., Former Director of Palestinian Authority Media Centre, interview with the author, Ramallah, 
Palestinian Territories, November, 2011.
136 Heller. Interview with the author, Tel Aviv, November, 2011.
137 Khatib. Interview with the author, Ramallah, Palestinian Territories, November, 2011.
13x Said Aly, A., President of Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, interview with the 
author, Cairo, Egypt, November, 2011.
139 Asseburg, "The EU and the Middle East Conflict: Tackling the Main Obstacle to Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnership," p. 180.
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whichever European power held the EU Presidency at the time.140 These three 
representatives personified the division of power within the European Union, but were 
later amalgamated into a single position after the Treaty of Lisbon in 2007.141 The 
dynamics of these changes within the EU, as well as the views of the European Union’s 
most powerful members, affected the way in which the European representatives were 
able to operate within the Quartet.
The Objectives of the UN Secretary General
By initiating the creation of the Quartet, I hoped to combine the legitimacy of the UN, 
the political power of the US. the financial resources of the EU and the regional 
prestige of Russia into an amalgamated diplomatic force -  one in which I held the 
gavel and acted as the de facto chair.
- Kofi Annan, United Nations Secretary General (1997- 
2006).142
For Kofi Annan, the Quartet was the result of a cultivated effort to re-involve the office 
of the UN Secretary General in the Middle East peace process. As the previous chapter 
established, throughout the 1990s, successive Secretaries General sought to address 
regional conflicts through the formation of loose coalitions of like-minded actors.143 For 
Kofi Annan, the Quartet was the continuation of this practice applied to a conflict that, 
since the 1967 war, had excluded a political role for the Secretary General. In this sense, 
the UNSG’s membership in the Quartet, as de Soto argued, can be viewed as ‘the 
vindication and culmination of SG Annan’s risky but successful effort over several 
years to regain Israel’s confidence by helping it to be welcomed in the UN regional 
group system, and by erasing the Zionism=racism General Assembly resolution from 
the books.’144 Despite this, the remaining difficulty for Annan was that:
A Secretary General cannot simply turn up and expect to be granted the space to play 
a political role between the Israelis and Palestinians. While many other actors wish to 
see a genuine multilateral approach, the United States is possessive of the file, and 
Israel does its best to keep others at bay.145
140 Throughout this period the European Union only had a single envoy. This position was held first by 
Miguel Moratinos, and later held by Marc Otte.
141 EEAS Official. Interview with the author, Brussels, November, 2011.
142 Annan, Interventions: A Life in War and Peace, p. 309.
143 Whitfield, T., Friends Indeed?: The United Nations, Groups o f Friends, and the Resolution of Conflict 
(Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2007).
144 de Soto, A., "End of Mission Report," The Guardian, 12 June, 2007, p. 24.
145 Annan, Interventions: A Life in War and Peace, p. 254.
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For Annan, as mentioned previously, the invitation from Mubarak to attend the Sharm 
el-Sheikh Summit was the moment in which the office of the Secretary General was re­
introduced into the Middle East peace process. However, as Annan recounted:
As it turned out, I had managed to win a UN seat at the peace table just as it was being 
upended. And with Clinton’s departure, there was no US President keen to reset the 
table in a hurry.146
Indeed, Bush viewed the United Nations as ‘cumbersome, bureaucratic, and inefficient,’ 
and subsequently appointed John Bolton as the US Permanent Representative to the 
UN.147 According to Annan, ‘Bolton was a Washington figure deeply hostile to the 
UN,’ and his appointment was ‘hardly a sign of support for me or the institution.’148 
Consequently, throughout 2001, Annan cultivated a working relationship with the 
Powell State Department that, in a moment of overlapping interests, also sought to 
become more involved in efforts to revive the peace process.
For the other members, the involvement of the UNSG raised the profile of the Quartet, 
and provided a legitimising effect on the work of the grouping.149 The danger of this 
involvement, according to de Soto, was that if the Quartet adopted policies that clashed 
with the values of the United Nations, then the office of the Secretary General may be 
devalued.150
146 Ibid., p .273.
147 Bush, Decision Points, p. 336.
148 Annan, Interventions: A Life in War and Peace, p. 300.
144 Otte. Interview with author, Brussels, November, 2011.
150 de Soto. Interview with the author, New York City, October, 2011.
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Chapter Four: The General Practices of the Quartet, 2001-2011
We call on Chairman Arafat, as the recognised, elected leader of the Palestinian 
people, to undertake immediately the maximum possible effort to stop terror attacks 
against innocent Israelis.
- First Official Statement of the Quartet, April 2002.'
By the spring of 2002,1 had concluded that peace would not be possible with Arafat in 
power.
- George W. Bush, United States President (2001-2009).1 2
Introduction
The Quartet members began their work during a period of transition in the Israeli- 
Palestinian conflict. On 24 June 2002, President Bush delivered a speech in the Rose 
Garden of the White House in which he posited that the creation of a Palestinian state 
should be dependent upon the Palestinian people electing ‘new leaders’ that were ‘not 
compromised by terror.’3 Bush argued that the ‘Palestinian people live in economic 
stagnation...made worse by official corruption,’ and that the Palestinian authorities 
were ‘encouraging, not opposing, terrorism.’4 While not specifically naming Yasser 
Arafat, the speech sent a clear signal that the Bush White House had lost all faith in the 
PLO Chairman, and was seeking his immediate replacement as a prerequisite to 
progress in the peace process.
According to National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, the ‘Arabists’ in the State 
Department were ‘appalled’ by the speech, and their reaction reinforced the ‘perception 
that the professionals in the Foreign Service didn’t really back the President.’5 As Bush 
recounted, Secretary of State Powell expressed deep reservations about the content of 
the President’s address, which he argued would ‘embarrass Arafat and reduce the 
chance for a negotiated settlement.’6 The central point of differentiation between the 
approach of the White House and that of the State Department, therefore, was how to 
deal with Arafat within the context of the second intifada. In 2002 the State Department 
favoured a form of pragmatic engagement, while the White House favoured strategic
1 US Department of State, "Remarks with Foreign Minister of Spain Josep Pique, United Nations 
Secretary General Kofi Annan, Foreign Minister of Russia Igor Ivanov and European Union Senior 
Official Javier Solana," Madrid, Spain: 10 April, 2002.
2 Bush, G. W., Decision Points, 1st ed. (New York: Crown Publishers, 2010), p. 401.
3 US Department of State, "President Bush Calls for New Palestinian Leadership," Washington, DC: 24 
June,2002.
4 Ibid.
5 Rice, C., No Higher Honor: A Memoir o f My Years in Washington, 1st ed. (New York: Crown 
Publishers, 2011), p. 145.
6 Bush, Decision Points, p. 404.
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isolation and replacement. As former State Department official Aaron David Miller 
argued:
The speech reflected the tensions between a State Department that was wedded to 
traditional diplomacy and still hoped for serious engagement with Israelis and 
Palestinians and a US vision on permanent status, and a White House focused on 
transformative diplomacy, especially regime change, and democratisation.7
For Bush, a core rationale for proceeding with the speech, despite the objections of the 
State Department, was Arafat’s involvement with a shipment of arms, believed to have 
originated in Iran and to be bound for Gaza, which had been intercepted by the Israeli 
navy in January 2002. In a joint press conference with Israeli Prime Minister Ariel 
Sharon soon after the seizure of the Karine A, Bush declared that:
Mr. Arafat has heard from us. I can’t be any more clear...he must do everything in his 
power to fight terror. Obviously, we were, at first, surprised, and then extremely 
disappointed when the Karine A showed up loaded with weapons, weapons that could 
have only been intended for one thing, which was to terrorize.9
Arafat denied authorising the shipment, writing to Bush that ‘the smuggling of arms is 
in total contradiction of the Palestinian Authority’s commitment to the peace process,’ 
but Bush was unconvinced.10 Any remaining confidence he had in the PLO Chairman 
evaporated. As Bush noted, ‘Arafat had lied to me. I never trusted him again. In fact, I 
never spoke to him again.’* 11
By June of 2002, Bush’s distrust for Arafat had reached the point of no return.12 In a 
meeting with Sharon two weeks before his Rose Garden speech, Bush informed the 
Israeli Prime Minister that the United States would insist on reforms within the
7 Miller, A. D., The Much Too Promised Land: America's Elusive Search for Arab-Israeli Peace (New 
York: Bantam Books, 2008), p. 347.
8 The so called ‘Karine A ’ affair, named after the ship in question, centered around the transfer of 
weapons and ordnance to the PA, allegedly from Iranian sources, that contravened the Oslo Accord’s 
limitations on Palestinian security buildups. The shipment contained rockets with 80km ranges, 122mm 
mortars, anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles, Katyusha rockets, and explosives. For an examination of the 
affair, see: Bregman, A., Elusive Peace: How the Holy Land Defeated America (London; New York: 
Penguin, 2005), 168.
9 US Department of State, "Remarks by President George Bush and Prime Minister Ariel Sharon in Photo 
Opportunity," White House: 7 February, 2002.
10 Bush, Decision Points, p. 401.
11 Ibid.
12 The next chapter demonstrates that between the time of the Karine A affair and Bush’s 24 June speech, 
there were several instances where Bush appeared to be giving Arafat a ‘final chance’ to show leadership 
on security issues. The definitive point of no return appears to have been after the 6 May 2002 visit of 
Israeli PM Sharon to Washington, in which he reportedly presented hard evidence to the American 
president of Arafat’s involvement in the Karine A affair and other so-called terrorist activities.
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n
Palestinian Authority as a prerequisite to peace negotiations. According to Rice, this 
was ‘music to Sharon’s ears,’ and the only condition that Bush placed on the Israeli 
leader was that he should not kill Arafat.14
The subsequent Rose Garden speech offered a window into the policy mindset of the 
Bush Administration in the early post 9/11 landscape, where there was an apparent 
conflation between combating Palestinian violence against Israel and other regional 
objectives such as increasing pressure on, and continuing the isolation of, Iran and Iraq. 
As Bush stated:
Every nation actually committed to peace will stop the flow of money, equipment and 
recruits to terrorist groups seeking the destruction of Israel -  including Hamas, Islamic 
Jihad, and Hezbollah. Every nation actually committed to peace must block the 
shipment of Iranian supplies to these groups, and oppose regimes that promote terror, 
like Iraq.15
In the concluding section of the speech Bush made the linkage explicit, when he 
remarked that he could understand the deep anger and anguish of the Israeli people 
because ‘the Palestinian Authority had rejected your offer at hand and trafficked with 
terrorists.’16
For the members of the Quartet, the Rose Garden speech was a marked departure from 
the central premise of their first statement, only two months earlier, which had 
advocated engagement with Arafat and had called on him personally to ‘dismantle 
terrorist infrastructure, including terrorist financing, and to stop incitement to 
violence.’17 The Quartet members sought to apply pressure on the Palestinian leader, 
rather than to seek his replacement, as a means through which to improve the security 
situation in the region:
We call on Chairman Arafat to use the full weight of his political authority to persuade 
the Palestinian people that any and all terrorist attacks against Israelis should end 
immediately and to authorize his representatives to resume immediately security 
coordination with Israel.18
13 Rice, No Higher Honor: A Memoir o f My Years in Washington, p. 142.
14 Ibid.
15 US Department of State, "President Bush Calls for New Palestinian Leadership."
16 Ibid.
17 US Department of State, "Remarks with Foreign Minister of Spain Josep Pique, United Nations 
Secretary General Kofi Annan, Foreign Minister of Russia Igor Ivanov and European Union Senior 
Official Javier Solana."
18 Ibid.
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The fact that Bush made no mention of the Quartet in his later Rose Garden speech, and 
instead presented a contrasting approach to relations with Arafat, was illustrative of the 
difficulties faced by the members. From 2001-2011, the Quartet members were 
frequently sidelined by the parties to the conflict and by initiatives put forward by the 
United States, which remained the principal interlocutor within the context of the 
Middle East peace process. This process was compounded further by the ongoing divide 
between the White House and State Department in the first Bush Administration, which 
resulted in inconsistency in Washington and confusion between the Quartet members.
Thus, the events surrounding the 24 June Rose Garden speech exemplified the 
challenges faced by the Quartet members from 2001-2011, in that the grouping was 
frequently forced to operate in a reactive capacity to circumstances emanating from 
both the Middle East and from abroad. By exploring the complex and highly contextual 
working environment of the Quartet members from 2001-2011, especially the 
fundamental constraining factors of involvement in the Middle East peace process, the 
subsequent chapters establish that the outputs of the grouping were affected consistently 
by challenging external circumstances.
The Functioning of the Quartet: General Practices 2001-2011
Nothing can happen in the Quartet unless everyone agrees, by definition. The Quartet 
cannot do anything without consensus.
- United Nations official.19
At public briefings, the Quartet issued consensus statements, which were primarily 
driven by requirements of the United States, but I was not shy when speaking at 
Quartet press conferences in also emphasising my own independent positions as 
Secretary General.
- Kofi Annan, United Nations Secretary General (1997-2006).20
The Quartet meetings from 2001-2011 functioned as a platform for diplomacy between 
the members, and were scheduled on a largely ad hoc basis. The only trend in the timing 
of Quartet meetings was the consistency with which the principals assembled in 
conjunction with the United Nations General Assembly period, around September each 
year.21 In addition to this standing arrangement, the Quartet members also met 
frequently on the fringes of other large international gatherings, such as donor
19 UN official. Interview with the author, Jerusalem, November, 2011.
20 Annan, K., Interventions: A Life in War and Peace (New York: Penguin Press, 2012), p. 275.
21 This practice has occurred in every year of Quartet operation.
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conferences.22 When faced with scheduling constraints, the Quartet principals met via 
teleconference, especially in response to circumstances that required immediate 
discussion and action.23
While the agenda for the Quartet meetings was often set in response to particular 
developments within the context of the MEPP, in general the driving force for the 
meetings was the coordination of the Quartet envoys, who spoke much more frequently 
than the principals and who ‘constantly exchanged information’ about the evolving 
situation in the region.24 When meetings were scheduled, the envoys usually met the 
day before the principals, in order to explore options for common positions, and to
25highlight the areas of potential disagreement to be rectified at the principal level.
Generally speaking, any individual Quartet member could convene a meeting of the 
grouping, but this process was dependent on the conditions both in the region and 
beyond, and was subject to agreement from the other Quartet members. As a UN 
official involved in the Quartet noted:
There’s no consistent practice for convening meetings. The Quartet sort of lies there, 
and anyone who wants to activate it can, with the consent of the others. And every 
player is sensitive to where the others are. So in the peace process, usually if the 
Americans are in the saddle on the horse, then the Americans also guide how the 
Quartet will interact.26
Unsurprisingly, as the most powerful member of the Quartet, the United States 
frequently set the agenda for the meetings of the grouping, and it was common practice 
for US State Department officials to write the draft statement to be discussed at the 
envoy level.27 As Roed-Larsen argued, this did not mean that the other envoys accepted 
the US draft in its original form, but rather that it was often used as the starting point for 
discussions:
22 For example, the London conference on Palestinian state-building held in March 2005, and the Paris 
donor conference of December 2007.
23 For example, the teleconference that occurred between Quartet Principals on 16 June 2007 in response 
to Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas calling a state of emergency and dissolving his cabinet. See: US 
Department of State, "Statement of the Quartet," Washington, DC: 16 June, 2007.
24 Otte, M., Former European Union Quartet envoy, Interview with author, Brussels, November, 2011.
25 Some Quartet statements acknowledge the contributions of the envoys, and urge their continued 
coordination in advance of the meetings of the principals. See: US Department of State, "Joint Statement 
of the Quartet," Berlin, Germany: 30 May, 2007.
26 UN official. Interview with the author, Jerusalem, November, 2011.
27 de Soto, A., Former United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process, interview 
with the author, New York City, October, 2011.
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The Americans were the key player in the group. Most of the time, particularly when 
the meetings were in New York or in Washington, the Americans came to the envoys 
individually with a draft and we looked at it and we changed things around a little. 
Then we had a meeting about it, and we quarrelled and haggled over it.28
According to Quartet insiders, there were also numerous occasions where each Quartet 
member entered a meeting with their own draft statement, and the group then attempted 
to form a common position from the areas of agreement.29 This process was inherently 
political, and the United States consistently influenced the general direction of the 
Quartet statements.30 It should be noted, however, that no Quartet statement was ever 
published without the full agreement of each Quartet member. Thus, while the United 
States had an enhanced ability to persuade the other members of the grouping, it could 
never do so without their consent. As a UN official noted, ‘if you don’t allow yourself 
to be coerced, you won’t be coerced. If you feel it’s better to compromise in the
' l  i
situation, then you will.’
Indeed, in circumstances where the members of the Quartet were least able to reconcile 
their differing positions, the meeting either resulted in no joint statement, or in a 
statement that represented only the areas of agreement. As a European External Action
' l 'y
Service official noted, this type of statement was the ‘lowest common denominator.’ 
Ironically, therefore, the nature of consensus within the Quartet dictated that the 
grouping was usually least able to form a common position on the most contentious 
issues, where such a position might arguably have the greatest impact. Furthermore, 
when the Quartet members formed a common position on a contentious issue that later 
warranted revision, they were bound equally by the dictates of consensus to alter their 
position.33 When presented with this paradox, the same EEAS official posed a question 
in reply: ‘What would be the alternative to consensus? ’ 34
2S Roed-Larsen, T., Former United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East peace process, 
interview with the author, New York City, October, 2011.
29 In particular, this practice was described by de Soto, Roed-Larsen and Otte in interviews with the 
author.
30 Kurtzer, D., Former United States Ambassador to Israel, interview with the author, Princeton, NJ, 
October, 2011.
31 UN official. Interview with the author, Jerusalem, November, 2011.
32 Jouret, C., Middle East Advisor, European External Action Service (EEAS), interview with the author, 
Brussels, November, 2011.
33 This particular aspect of Quartet functionality exacerbated tensions within the grouping in 2006, when 
the so-called ‘Quartet conditions’ on the newly elected Hamas government proved difficult to modify or 
walk back from in the years that followed. This process is a key focus of Chapter Seven.
34 EEAS Official. Interview with the author, Brussels, November, 2011.
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For the Quartet members, therefore, the meetings were a forum for expressing and 
potentially rectifying differences of opinion, for briefing each other on individual efforts 
within the context of the MEPP, and for formulating common responses or initiatives to 
changing regional circumstances.35 The fact that these meetings frequently ended in 
disagreement or resulted in statements that represented the lowest common denominator 
between the Quartet members was reflective of both the complexities of the issues, and 
the nature of international diplomacy.36
Despite this, the pressure to produce a common position after Quartet meetings was felt 
keenly by the members, especially when the absence of a statement was interpreted by 
the media as evidence of discord. European Union official Christian Jouret argued that 
on occasions where the Quartet members were unable to issue a joint statement, the 
international media sought immediately to clarify the nature of the disagreements, and 
to pursue stories about Quartet disunity. Indeed, as the subsequent chapters demonstrate, 
many of the more revealing responses given by the Quartet members occurred during 
press conferences following Quartet statements. For this reason, Jouret argued, the 
Quartet members often issued generic statements that ‘gave them peanuts’ in order to 
avoid the need for further explanations. A UN official confirmed Jouret’s account:
Very often a statement is issued because there happens to be a meeting. Partly it’s 
because there is an event, or something which we feel we need to react to, and partly 
it’s because there’s media and we need to say something.38
In light of this practice, and in response to criticisms centred around the role of the 
UNSG within the Quartet, former Quartet envoy Alvaro de Soto argued, in his 
aforementioned End of Mission Report, that the Quartet should jettison the practice of 
issuing statements altogether. He stated that this would ‘...gradually make the Quartet a 
forum for comparing notes and consulting on policy, more like a contact group, thus 
avoiding placing its members in difficult situations. ’39
35 This practice was common during 2009 and 2010, when the US envoy to the peace process, George 
Mitchell, would frequently brief the other Quartet members on his efforts to re-start direct negotiations 
between the parties. For one example, see: US Department of State, "Quartet Statement from the June 26, 
2009 Meeting in Trieste," Trieste, Italy: 26 June, 2009.
36 In figure 2 below, the longest periods of Quartet inactivity are demonstrated to coincide with events 
that divided the Quartet members.
37 Jouret. Interview with the author, Brussels, November, 2011.
38 UN official. Interview with the author, Jerusalem, November, 2011.
de Soto, A., "End of Mission Report," The Guardian, 12 June, 2007, p. 34.
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As the central means through which the Quartet members attempt to exert normative 
influence on the parties to the conflict, the statements of the grouping have remained a 
continual occurrence. Indeed, the year in which de Soto offered this advice saw the 
Quartet members produce their greatest number of statements as a collective, and the 
practice has shown no signs of being discarded since.40 Furthermore, according to Roed- 
Larsen, the process of authoring joint statements was an important step in the early 
solidification of the Quartet as a grouping, and the practice underpins their continuing 
cooperation.41
Between April 2002 and January 2011, the Quartet members issued 47 official 
statements.42 As the subsequent chapters demonstrate, each Quartet statement was 
issued within a specific regional and organisation context. By examining the language 
employed by the members within these contexts, much can be extrapolated regarding 
the internal dynamics of the grouping. Furthermore, because the Quartet statements 
were written, first and foremost, with the parties to the conflict as the intended 
audience,43 the texts now function as both an archive of Quartet diplomatic initiatives, 
and an importance resource for analysis of the outputs of the grouping within the 
context of the MEPP.
While the specific content of the Quartet statements informs the subsequent analysis of 
the inner workings of the grouping, the frequency with which the statements were 
issued also provides insight into the flexible working patterns of the members during 
this period. Figure 1, below, presents the frequency that the Quartet members issued 
joint statements between 2002 and 2011 44
40 On average, from 2001-2011, the Quartet issued five statements per year. In 2007 the grouping issued 
11 statements. See figure 1 and 2 below for data on the frequency of Quartet statements during this 
period.
41 Roed-Larsen. Interview with the author, New York City, October, 2011.
42 Almost all Quartet statements referenced in this thesis are attributed to the US Department of State 
archive. The citation of these documents is not intended as a comment on the role of the United States 
within the Quartet. Indeed, many of these statements are also hosted online by the Israeli Department of 
Foreign Affairs, the United Nations and the European Union. The choice to attribute Quartet statements to 
the US Department of State is a matter of expediency, and consistency rather than a comment on the 
authorship of the statements. Alternatively, the United Nations database hosts all Quartet communiques in 
one location, and can be accessed at: http://unispal.un.org/unispal.nsf/sfq70penView [Last accessed 4 
January 2014]
43 Roed-Larsen. Interview with the author, New York City, October, 2011.
44 As previously stated, despite forming in 2001 the Quartet did not release its first official, principal 
level, statement until April 2002.
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Figure 1: Quartet Statement Output by Year:2002-2011
As has been established previously, the ability of the Quartet members to form a 
common position, as well as their motivation to schedule meetings, was affected heavily 
by contemporary regional circumstances. Periods of reduced Quartet activity coincide 
with regional circumstances that made common positions by the members difficult or 
unproductive. In essence, during the periods where the Quartet members issued the least 
statements, the members were either unable to meet, disinclined to meet, or did meet, 
but were unable to form even a modest common position.
From Figure 1, several limited observations regarding the output of the Quartet 
members are possible. Firstly, it is apparent that the work of the Quartet members, 
especially their production of joint statements, fluctuated over time. Secondly, in 2003, 
2004, and 2009, it is clear that the Quartet members met infrequently and were less able 
to form common positions. Finally, in 2007 the Quartet members produced a spike in 
activity, issuing more statements than in any other year. The dips in Quartet activity in 
2003 and 2004 can be attributed directly to developments centred around the decline of 
the Roadmap process, the announcement by Israeli PM Ariel Sharon of his intention to 
withdraw from the Gaza Strip and the letters of agreement exchanged between Bush and 
Sharon on the question of Israeli settlements in the West Bank. In 2009 the drop in 
Quartet activity coincided with the Israeli incursion into Gaza, ‘Operation Cast Lead’, 
the election of Benjamin Netanyahu as Prime Minister, and the election of Barack 
Obama as President. Furthermore, the relative spike in Quartet activity in 2007 can be
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attributed to a conscious process of re-energisation by the members, prescribed by 
departing UNSG Annan in his 2006 End of Mission Report.4:>
Figure 2, below, demonstrates further the reactive and context driven nature of the work 
of the Quartet members during this period. It shows the delay, in days, between each of 
the 47 Quartet statements issued from 2002-2011. While Figure 1 highlights the general 
output of the Quartet members over the period of analysis, Figure 2 demonstrates a 
steadily increasing trend of delays between Quartet statements during the early work of 
the grouping, culminating in the longest delay, between the eighth and ninth statement, 
of 220 days. This delay, between 26 September 2003 and 4 May 2004, coincided with 
the exchange of letters between Bush and Sharon.
Figure 2: Quartet Statement Timing 2002-2011
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There were two other key periods of Quartet inactivity. The first was around the 24th 
statement, specifically between 20 September 2006 and 2 February 2007, which 
coincided with violence between the key Palestinian factions, and the departure of the 
Annan from the grouping. The second period was around the 40th, 41st, and 42nd 
statements, spanning from 15 December 2008 to 24 September 2009. During this time, 
the Quartet members struggled to produce common positions within the context of the 
Israeli operation ‘Cast Lead’ in Gaza, the election of Benjamin Netanyahu and his
45 United Nations Security Council, "Report of the Secretary General on the Middle East," United 
Nations: S/2006/956: 11 December, 2006.
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controversial speech at Bar Ilan University, and the period of recalibration of US 
foreign policy following the election of Barack Obama.
While these events are discussed in greater detail in the subsequent chapters, it is 
important to emphasise the correlation between challenging circumstances in the Middle 
East and the ability of the Quartet members to form and articulate common responses to 
them. As this thesis argues, the work of the Quartet members during the period of 
analysis was a complex balancing act that was highly dependent on both regional and 
internal factors. Accordingly, the next chapter is an examination of the work of the 
Quartet in 2002 and 2003 that examines the authorship of the Roadmap document, and 
early efforts to implement the plan.
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Chapter Five: The Roadmap Process, 2002-2003
The road map was intended to re-energize the peace process by addressing the 
perceived weaknesses of Oslo while retaining its broad political outline.
- Kofi Annan, United Nations Secretary General (1997-2006).'
In the end the only real problem with the road map was that neither the Americans, the 
Israelis, nor the Palestinians were serious about implementing it.
- Aaron David Miller.1 2 3
Introduction
The early work of the Quartet members was affected by several overlapping 
developments within the context of the Middle East peace process. In particular, 2002 
saw a dramatic increase in violence associated with the second intifada, and an 
associated freeze in relations between the Bush Administration and PLO Chairman 
Yasser Arafat. For the Quartet members, this period required a strategy for addressing 
the underlying causes of the escalating violence and promoting the resumption of a 
political process while, at the same time, reconciling the divergent views among its 
members regarding Arafat’s ongoing leadership.' It was within this context that the 
formation of the Quartet was recognised by the United Nations Security Council in 
UNSCR 1397, adopted on 12 March 2002.4 The preamble read:
Welcoming and encouraging the diplomatic efforts of special envoys from the United 
States of America, the Russian Federation, the European Union and the United 
Nations Special Coordinator and others, to bring about a comprehensive, just and 
lasting peace in the Middle East.5
The resolution also called for an immediate cessation of acts of violence between the 
Israelis and Palestinians, and expressed ‘support for the efforts of the Secretary-General
1 United Nations Security Council, "Report of the Secretary General on the Middle East," United Nations: 
S/2006/956: 11 December, 2006, p. 3.
2 Miller, A. D., The Much Too Promised Land: America's Elusive Search for Arah-lsraeli Peace (New 
York: Bantam Books, 2008), p. 352.
3 As discussed previously, the Karine A affair, and the tenability of Arafat’s continued leadership 
dominated the discourse of the Middle East peace process in early 2002
4 Through the period of Quartet activity, the UN Security Council and the grouping would often mutually 
reinforce each other’s initiatives. For example, in the first Quartet statement, UNSG Annan declared that 
‘Respect for decisions of the Security Council is the most basic requirement of international legitimacy.’ 
The statement would later go on to affirm support for resolution 1397. See: US Department of State, 
"Remarks with Foreign Minister of Spain Josep Pique, United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan, 
Foreign Minister of Russia Igor Ivanov and European Union Senior Official Javier Solana," Madrid, 
Spain: 10 April, 2002.
5 United Nations Security Council, "Resolution 1397: The Situation in the Middle East, Including the 
Palestinian Question," S/RES/1397: 12 March, 2002.
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and others to assist the parties to halt the violence and to resume the peace process.’6 
Yet to issue their first statement, however, the Quartet members faced serious 
diplomatic challenges in the period following UNSCR 1397.
This chapter seeks to answer the question, what were the outputs o f the Quartet in 2002 
and 2003?
It argues that the divisions within the Bush Administration complicated the efforts of 
the non-US Quartet members to present a cohesive and persuasive front to the parties to 
the conflict, and that this process was further complicated by the continuation of the 
established US role as the primary third-party interlocutor. Furthermore, this chapter 
argues that despite the proactive involvement of the Quartet members in the authorship 
of the Roadmap document, their ability to enforce the implementation of the plan was 
severely hindered by the inherent characteristics of the grouping itself, and the 
responses of the parties to the conflict. Consequently, the Roadmap process acted as a 
catalyst for early Quartet activity, and later as an impediment to the continuation of the 
grouping.
This chapter is divided into two chronological sections. The first section examines the 
events of 2002, including the Arab Peace Initiative, the first official Quartet statement 
and President Bush’s 24 June Rose Garden speech. The second section examines the 
events of 2003, including the official launch of the Roadmap process, and the politics of 
both the Israeli and Palestinian responses to the document.
6 The Resolution was also notable for ‘Affirming a vision of a region where two States, Israel and 
Palestine, live side by side within secure and recognized borders.’ Ibid.
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2002: Palestinian Reform and the Leadership of Yasser Arafat
The Palestinian leadership must arrest, prosecute and punish the perpetrators of 
terrorist acts. The Palestinians must live up to the agreements they have made to do so. 
They must be held to account when they do not.
- Colin Powell, United States Secretary of State (2001-2005).7
I wanted to find a way to make clear to the Israeli people that the Arabs don't reject or 
despise them. But the Arab people do reject what their leadership is now doing to the 
Palestinians, which is inhumane and oppressive. And I thought of this as a possible 
signal to the Israeli people.
- Crown Prince Abdullah bin Abdul Aziz Al-Saud on the ‘Arab
Peace Initiative’.8
In February 2002, frustrated by what they saw as a lack of US engagement with the 
Middle East peace process, the Saudis signalled their intention to propose a plan to end 
the Arab-Israeli conflict.9 In the following month, the violence of the second intifada 
claimed the lives of 239 Palestinians, and, in 17 separate suicide bomb attacks, 133 
Israelis.10 In response, on 28 March 2002, the ‘Arab Peace Initiative’ (API) was 
approved unanimously by the members of the Arab League who attended the Beirut 
Summit.* 11 The initiative offered full peace and the normalisation of relations between 
each of the Arab states and Israel in exchange for a complete Israeli withdrawal from 
the territories occupied since 1967, the achievement of a ‘just solution to the Palestinian 
refugee problem to be agreed upon in accordance with U.N. General Assembly 
Resolution 194,’ and the acceptance of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza 
(with a capital in East Jerusalem). Given the lack of specificity of the API, the 
document functioned more as a diplomatic opening than as a concrete peace plan. * As 
Annan remarked later:
7 US Department of State, "United States Position on Terrorists and Peace in the Middle East," Remarks 
at the McConnell Center for Political Leadership, University of Louisville, Kentucky: 19 November, 
2001.
s Friedman, T. L., "An Intriguing Signal From the Saudi Crown Prince," The New York Times, 17 
February, 2002.
9 Ibid.
10 The month came to be known as ‘Black March.’ See: Bregman, A., Elusive Peace: How the Holy Land 
Defeated America (London; New York: Penguin, 2005), p. 176.
11 For an English translation of the API, see: "Arab Peace Initiative: Full Text," The Guardian: 29 March, 
2002.
12 Ibid.
13 Agha and Malley argue that: ‘Rather than provide the substance of an agreement, it was a roundabout 
way of inviting Israelis, Palestinians, Syrians, and Lebanese to sit down and sort out their disputes and it 
was implicitly a way of saying that whatever they can agree on will be regionally rewarded and 
protected.’ See: Malley, R. and Agha, H., "The Road From Mecca," The New York Review of Books, 10 
May, 2007.
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To this day, the Abdullah proposal remains the most compelling Arab offer on the 
table, offering the Israelis something far larger than a literal agreement with the 
PLO.14
One irony of the Arab Peace Initiative was that the same violence and mistrust between 
the Israelis and Palestinians that had motivated the Arab community to adopt the 
proposal, was also the key factor that made the implementation of the plan extremely 
difficult. In other words, the initiative made the normalisation of relations between the 
Arab states and Israel contingent upon a prior peace agreement between the Israelis and 
Palestinians, which at that time was far from likely. As Rice recounted:
It was a bold proposal and could have been an important point of departure for 
negotiations. The Saudis would later express their disappointment that we hadn’t 
responded favourably to the Crown Prince’s efforts. But the timing could not have 
been worse. Sharon had been elected to defeat the intifada—not to make peace. There 
was no trust in Arafat as a partner, an assessment we shared.15
US and Israeli trust in Arafat’s ability to combat Palestinian political violence was 
damaged further, on 29 March 2002, by the Park Hotel terrorist attack, which occurred 
the day after the release of the Arab Peace Initiative. Carried out by Hamas operative 
Abdel-Basset Odeh, the attack killed 29 and wounded 150 Israelis, who had gathered 
for a Passover celebration.16 In a press conference immediately afterwards, Secretary of 
State Powell was clear about the impact of terrorism on the peace process, stating that 
‘nothing can get started, no political process can take hold, in the presence of this kind 
of continued terrorist activity.’17 At the same time, the repercussions of the attack were 
being discussed in an emergency Security Cabinet meeting chaired by the Israeli Prime 
Minister. According to close advisor Danny Ayalon, during the meeting Sharon 
remarked that:
From now on we do not rely on Palestinian promises to fight terror, we do not rely any 
more on Palestinian steps, and we don’t expect anything from the Palestinians to stop 
terror... we have to take it upon ourselves.19
14 Annan, K., Interventions: A Life in War and Peace (New York: Penguin Press, 2012), p. 276.
15 Rice, C., No Higher Honor: A Memoir of My Years in Washington, 1st ed. (New York: Crown 
Publishers, 2011), p. 136.
16 Bregman, Elusive Peace: How the Holy Land Defeated America, p. 182.
17 US Department of State, "Briefing on Situation in the Middle East: Secretary Colin L. Powell," 
Washington DC: 29 March, 2002.
18 Powell stated in his press conference that he had spoken to Sharon briefly, but that the Israeli leader 
was still in his cabinet meeting. See: Ibid.
19 Bregman, Elusive Peace: How the Holy Land Defeated America, p. 185.
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Operation Defensive Shield
The Israeli response to the Park Hotel attack became known as ‘Operation Defensive 
Shield,’ and included a re-occupation of the major cities of the West Bank, and a siege 
on Arafat’s Muqata compound in Ramallah.20 Despite Sharon giving Bush assurances 
that he would not kill Arafat, Powell noted that he and the President were ‘gravely 
concerned’ by the situation in Ramallah. Furthermore, in a stark point of 
differentiation with the White House, Powell continued to emphasise the importance of 
Arafat to resolving the current impasse:
Chairman Arafat is the leader of the Palestinian people, and his leadership is now even 
more central to trying to find a way out of this tragic situation.22
Bush’s response to the events of March 2002 came six days later, when he announced 
that he was sending the Secretary of State to the region. Three months before his 24 
June speech, Bush’s address on 4 April was an important precursor to the coming 
policies of his Administration, as well as those of the other Quartet powers. Despite the 
violence that had followed its announcement, Bush began by praising the Arab Peace 
Initiative.24 Bush also noted his disapproval of ‘Operation Defensive Shield,’ and called 
for Israel to ‘halt incursions into Palestinian-controlled areas and begin the withdrawal 
from those cities it has recently occupied.’“' On the point of Arafat’s confinement to his 
compound in Ramallah, however, Bush’s position differed from that of the State 
Department:
The situation in which he finds himself today is largely of his own making. He's 
missed his opportunities, and thereby betrayed the hopes of the people he's supposed 
to lead. Given his failure, the Israeli government feels it must strike at terrorist 
networks that are killing its citizens.26
On 9 April 2002, Powell spoke to the press en-route to Madrid, where the Quartet 
would soon issue its first statement. He stressed the importance of staying in touch with
20 Within three weeks, 300 Palestinians and 32 IDF soldiers died as a result of Operation Defensive 
Shield. See: Miller, The Much Too Promised Land: America's Elusive Search for Arab-Israeli Peace, p. 
342.
21 US Department of State, "Briefing on Situation in the Middle East: Secretary Colin L. Powell."
22 Ibid.
23 Importantly, the speech called also for a halt in settlement construction. Bush stated that ‘consistent 
with the Mitchell plan, Israeli settlement activity in occupied territories must stop.’ See:US Department of 
State, "President to Send Secretary Powell to Middle East," The Rose Garden, Washington, DC: 4 April, 
2002.
24 Bush stated that: ‘The recent Arab League support of Crown Prince Abdullah's initiative for peace is 
promising, is hopeful, because it acknowledges Israel's right to exist. And it raises the hope of sustained, 
constructive Arab involvement in the search for peace.’ Ibid.
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid.
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97Arafat, and laid out his intention to speak with the Chairman ‘if it is at all possible.’“ 
Powell went on to emphasise that in his coming visit to the region he would make clear 
to Arafat that ‘this is the time to act with total seriousness.’28
The First Quartet Statement
The first Quartet statement, issued on 10 April 2002, was written during challenging 
regional and organisational circumstances. Arafat was physically and politically 
isolated, Israel had reoccupied much of the West Bank, and Powell had been sent to the 
region to try to reinstate calm. The Quartet statement began in similar fashion to Bush’s 
4 April 2002 speech, by praising the Arab Peace Initiative as a ‘significant contribution 
towards a comprehensive peace.’ On the topic of ‘Operation Defensive Shield’ and the 
ongoing siege on the Muqata compound, the statement was direct:
We call for an immediate, meaningful cease-fire and an immediate Israeli withdrawal 
from Palestinian cities, including Ramallah, specifically including Chairman Arafat’s 
headquarters.30
Alongside urging adherence to the Mitchell Report’s recommendations, including an 
‘end to all settlement activity,’ the first Quartet statement also included a passage that 
provided insight into the discussions of the group, and the future direction of its work:
We affirm that there must be immediate, parallel and accelerated movement towards 
near-term and tangible progress, and that there must be a defined series of steps 
leading to permanent peace involving recognition, normalisation and security between 
the sides, an end to Israeli occupation, and an end to the conflict.31
Thus, notions such as parallelism and clearly defined steps that would be the critical 
foundations of the Roadmap were present in the first work of the Quartet members. 
Concluding their first statement, the members of the Quartet affirmed their commitment 
to continue working together:
We agreed on the need to keep the situation in the Middle East under review by the 
Quartet at the principals level through regular consultations. Our Special Envoys will 
continue their efforts on the ground to assist the parties in reaching an end to 
confrontation and resumption of political negotiations.32
27 US Department of State, "Press Briefing on Board Plane," En Route, Madrid: 9 April, 2002.
28 Ibid.
29 US Department of State, "Remarks with Foreign Minister of Spain Josep Pique, United Nations 
Secretary General Kofi Annan, Foreign Minister of Russia Igor Ivanov and European Union Senior 
Official Javier Solana."
30 Ibid.
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid.
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In his subsequent visit to the Middle East, Powell divided his time equally between 
efforts to persuade Sharon to ease the siege on Arafat’s compound and attempts to 
convince Arafat to make serious headway on bringing the perpetrators of Palestinian 
terrorist attacks to justice.3'1 Ultimately he succeeded at neither. Upon his return to the 
United States, on 18 April 2002, Powell and Bush faced the media amidst increasing 
speculation that the Bush Administration had given Sharon a ‘green light’ to complete 
Israel’s military objectives in the West Bank,34 and was not being held to Bush’s calls
o c
for a more immediate withdrawal. ‘ It was during this press conference that Bush was 
asked whether he believed that Ariel Sharon was a ‘man of peace’. He replied that:
I do believe Ariel Sharon is a man of peace. I think he wants — I'm confident he wants 
Israel to be able to exist at peace with its neighbors. I mean, he's told us that here in 
the Oval Office. He has embraced the notion of two states living side by side.36
In the midst of Israeli incursions into Palestinian cities, Bush’s comments about Sharon 
created an immediate backlash in the Middle East, and exacerbated tensions between 
the White House and the State Department. In response, during a press conference 
following the visit of the Saudi Crown Prince to his Crawford ranch on 25 April 2002, 
Bush sought to put pressure on Sharon to compete his withdrawal, stating that he 
‘expected Israel to withdraw,’ and had ‘made it clear to Israel.’39 In the days that 
followed, Bush instructed both Powell and Rice to demand an end to the siege from
33 In particular, the conversations with Arafat were focused on the alleged perpetrators of the 
aforementioned murder of Israeli Tourism Minister Rehavam Ze’evi. For an in-depth account, see: 
Bregman, Elusive Peace: How the Holy Land Defeated America, pp. 196-201.
34 For specific lines of questioning, see: US Department of State, "Press Briefing on Board Plane."
35 US Department of State, "President to Send Secretary Powell to Middle East."
36 US Department of State, "President Bush and Secretary Powell Discuss the Middle East," The Oval 
Office, Washington, DC: 18 April, 2002.
37 Condoleezza Rice recounted: ‘Our diplomatic efforts were failing miserably. And when, on April ‘8, 
the President answered a question by calling the Israeli prime minister “a man of peace,” I thought w e’d 
done long-term damage to our relations in the Arab world. Colin had been sitting next to the President 
when he made the comment. After the press left, he came over to me. “Do you have any idea how this 
plays on Arab TV?” he asked. “The Israelis are just thumbing their noses at the President. Why is he 
giving Sharon a pass?” The State Department went into overdrive trying to explain what the President had 
“meant to say.”’ See: Rice, No Higher Honor: A Memoir of My Years in Washington, p. 140.
s According to Bregman, Powell said that the Crown Prince delivered an ultimatum to Bush during this 
visit, in which he said that ‘if I don’t hear something that I can use, then I might as well leave now.’ See: 
Bregman, Elusive Peace: How the Holy Land Defeated America, p. 209.
39 US Department of State, "Remarks by the President After Meeting With Crown Prince of Saudi 
Arabia," Bush Ranch, Crawford, Texas: 25 April, 2002.
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their Israeli counterparts, who eventually agreed, in exchange for a US veto40 on the UN 
investigation into events that had occurred at the Jenin refugee camp.41
Subsequently, the Israelis eased their restrictions on Arafat’s movements, and four days 
later, Bush offered what appeared to be a final chance to the PLO Chairman:
Somebody asked me one time, a while ago, they said, has he disappointed you, has he 
lost your respect? I said, well, he hasn't earned my respect yet. He must earn my 
respect by leading. And there are a lot of people, a lot of Palestinians who are 
suffering, and now is the time for him to step up.42
Arafat’s release from his Muqata compound formed the basis for the second Quartet 
statement, on 2 May 2002, which argued that he now had an ‘opportunity to show 
leadership.’43 Furthermore, for the Quartet members, Arafat’s release demonstrated the 
‘constructive role’ of international diplomacy in ‘defusing a situation that many 
predicted could only end in violence.’44 The second Quartet statement was also notable 
for demonstrating that the continuation of the grouping had clearly been on the agenda, 
and that the members had decided that:
...it was important for us to remain together, to continue the dialogue, because this is 
quite a grouping up here; and I [Powelll think it is a grouping that, working with the 
parties in the region, can produce success if we stick with it, if we show persistence 
and determination.4^
In the press conference following the Quartet statement, Powell, when questioned about 
the Bush Administration’s position regarding Arafat, was unequivocal:
He knows what is expected of him. I have had the most direct conversations possible 
to have with another person, with Mr. Arafat, with respect to what we will expect from
40 See: Bregman, Elusive Peace: How the Holy Land Defeated America, p. 211.
41 An IDF incursion into the Jenin refugee camp from 3-18 April 2002 resulted in 52 Palestinian 
casualties and 23 IDF casualties. When Annan dispatched Roed-Larsen to investigate the events that had 
occurred at Jenin, Roed-Larsen claimed he was made a ‘persona non grata’ by Sharon, and was denied 
access to the Prime Minister for the remainder of his post. According to Annan’s report on Jenin, he was 
forced to disband the eventual fact-finding team after less than two weeks ‘in the face of Israeli 
difficulties with the deployment of the team.’ See: United Nations Security Council, "Report of the 
Secretary General on the Question of Palestine," United Nations: A /57/621-S/2002/1268: 29 November, 
2002.
42 US Department of State, "Statement by the President on the Middle East," The Bush Ranch, Crawford, 
Texas: 29 April, 2002.
43 US Department of State, "Remarks by US Secretary of State Colin Powell and UN Secretary-General 
Kofi Annan on "Madrid Quartet" Initiative to Convene a Regional Peace Conference in the Middle East," 
Washington, DC: 2 May, 2002.
44 Ibid.
45 Ibid.
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him now that he is free from the Muqata. And he will either live or not live up to 
those expectations.46
From Bush’s statement on 25 April and the Quartet statement on 2 May, it is clear that 
Arafat was being given a final chance to show leadership on security issues after his 
release from Muqata. On 6 May 2002, however, Sharon visited Washington to provide 
documentation that allegedly proved beyond doubt that Arafat had been complicit in the 
Karine A affair and in other acts of terrorism.47 By the time the Israeli PM visited again 
in June 2002, the matter of Arafat’s continued leadership had been conclusively decided 
in the White House.
The Rose Garden Speech
According to Aaron David Miller, Bush’s subsequent 24 June speech was a vehicle for 
countering calls for increased US engagement with the peace process, and for 
advocating the removal of Arafat:
Tony Blair, the Europeans, the UN, and the Arab allies had been hammering the 
president from day one on the Arab-Israeli peace process. If a way could be found to 
craft a speech that people would like but at the same time shift the onus of 
responsibility onto others, primarily the Palestinians, to act, then the administration 
might have a compelling argument to make to counter the incessant calls for 
Washington’s engagement. In this sense, calling for a Palestinian state but challenging 
the Palestinians to create a new leadership to run it seemed like a perfect approach 48
Miller’s analysis was reinforced by an account presented later by former Jordanian 
Foreign Minister Marwan Muasher. According to Muasher, in late 2002 he met with 
Bush to convince the President to outline publicly his support for ‘a road map that dealt 
with security, institutions, and the humanitarian situation in the Palestinian territories,’ 
in addition to calling for Palestinian statehood.49 Reportedly, Bush replied, ‘What do the 
Palestinians want from me? I gave them a vision. What more do they want?’50
The 24 June speech also undercut the notion, advanced by the Quartet members, of 
parallel actions by the Israelis and Palestinians as the remedy to the current impasse. 
Bush posited that the withdrawal of Israeli forces was contingent upon ‘progress 
towards security,’ and that Israel’s commitment to working towards a final status
46 Ibid.
47 In a press conference following a meeting with Foreign Minister Prince Saud A1 Faisal, Powell 
described the nature of Sharon’s recent visit. See: US Department of State, "Remarks with Foreign 
Minister Prince Saud A1 Faisal of Saudi Arabia After Their Meeting," Washington, DC: 6 May, 2002.
48 Miller, The Much Too Promised Land: America's Elusive Search for Arab-Israeli Peace, p. 347.
49 Muasher, M., The Arab Center: The Promise of Moderation (New Haven: Yale University Press,
2008), p. 162.
50 Ibid.
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agreement was reliant upon the new Palestinian institutions demonstrating ‘real 
performance on security and reform.’51
The Roadmap Authorship Period
In the period immediately after Bush’s speech, the members of the Quartet (including 
the US Secretary of State)52 began to consult with regional actors in the Middle East, 
especially Jordan,53 on a performance-based plan to generate and sustain momentum in 
the peace process.54 This process built upon the notion of Palestinian reform, while 
downplaying direct calls for the removal of Arafat. It included participation by the 
members of the Quartet in the 10 July 2002 formation of the Task Force on Palestinian 
Reform, which also included representatives from Norway, Japan, the World Bank, and 
the International Monetary Fund.55 Notably, the members of the Quartet stated that the 
Task Force would operate under their ‘aegis,'06 ostensibly to ‘monitor and support 
implementation of Palestinian civil reforms, and guide the international donor 
community in its support for the Palestinians’ reform agenda.’57
Thus, in the period following Bush’s 24 June speech, the members of the Quartet chose 
to emphasise the Palestinian reform process and to deemphasise the removal of Arafat 
as a necessary precondition to progress on that front, while simultaneously encouraging 
continued US engagement in the MEPP. Accordingly, the Quartet statement of 16 July 
2002 welcomed ‘President Bush’s active leadership’ towards the goal of achieving a
?l US Department of State, "President Bush Calls for New Palestinian Leadership," Washington, DC: 24 
June,2002.
52 In his memoirs, Bush recounted that ‘Colin [Powell] took the lead in hammering out a detailed plan to 
move from my speech to a Palestinian state.’ Bush, G. W., Decision Points, 1st ed. (New York: Crown 
Publishers, 2010), p. 405.
53 According to Rice’s account of July 2002, ‘The Jordanian Foreign Minister made a proposal, reiterated 
by the King of Jordan during a visit the next month, to translate the President’s speech into a written plan 
with performance-based benchmarks. The proposal would eventually result in the Road Map for Peace.’ 
Rice, No Higher Honor: A Memoir of My Years in Washington, p. 147.
54 According to US Ambassador to Israel, Daniel Kurtzer, the early work on what would become the 
Roadmap by the Quartet members and regional actors was to ensure that ‘the President’s speech wouldn’t 
simply be a signal to walk away.’ Kurtzer, D., Former United States Ambassador to Israel, interview with 
the author, Princeton, NJ, October, 2011.
55 In 2002 the Task Force on Palestinian Reform met on 10 July in London, 22-23 August in Paris, and 15 
November in Jordan. The Task Force created seven ‘Reform Support Groups’ made up of donor 
representatives working in Gaza and the West Bank, in the areas of Civil Society, Elections, Financial 
Accountability, Judicial and Rule of Law Reform, Market Economics, Local Government, and Ministerial 
and Civil Service Reform. Each of the reform groups reported back to the Task Force on the progress of 
reform implementation and the various obstacles to achieving benchmarks on the ground. See: US 
Department of State, "Statement of the Task Force on Palestinian Reform, November 14-15," Jordan: 16 
November, 2002.
56 US Department of State, "Middle East Quartet Communique of September 17, 2002," New York City: 
17 September, 2002.
57 US Department of State, "Statement of the Task Force on Palestinian Reform, November 14-15."
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final Israeli-Palestinian settlement, encouraged the ‘strong Palestinian interest in 
fundamental reform,’ and called for ‘well-prepared, free, open and democratic’
CO #
elections; The issue of Arafat was not raised until the press conference following the 
Quartet statement, where each individual member of the grouping was asked to outline 
their stance on the PLO chairman.^9 For Powell, the need to find a balance between the 
position of the White House and the position of the State Department (and the other 
Quartet members) was apparent when he framed the issue of Arafat as a choice that 
would ultimately have to be made by the Palestinian people.60 This, he added, was 
‘about finding a way forward and not about personalities.’61 For the other members of 
the Quartet, especially the UNSG and Russian Foreign Minister, the issue of Arafat’s 
leadership was less complex. As Annan explained:
As for Arafat, we all have our respective positions. The UN still recognizes Chairman 
Arafat and we will continue to deal with him until the Palestinians decide otherwise.63
Similarly, Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov declared that Arafat was the ‘legitimately 
elected leader of Palestine,’ and that while he remained in that capacity, Russia would 
‘maintain relations with him.’64
Adding to the complexity of issues present in the Middle East, on 12 September 2002 
President Bush delivered an address to the UN General Assembly that made the case for 
an international intervention in Iraq.60 Furthermore, in the months following this speech, 
Bush Administration officials began to position the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian
58 US Department of State, "'Quartet' Joint Statement," New York City: 16 July, 2002.
59 US Department of State, "Press Availability With UN Secretary General Kofi Annan; Foreign Minister 
Igor Ivanov of the Russian Federation; Foreign Minister Per Stig Möller of Denmark in the Capacity of 
EU Presidency; and Javier Solana, High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy of the 
EU," New York City: 16 July, 2002.
60 Ibid.
61 Ibid.
62 It should be noted that the UNSG sometimes employed the practice of ‘isolating’ Arafat during this 
period as a means through which to express displeasure. As Annan recounted, ‘I had at times instructed 
my own envoys to minimise contacts with Arafat to register my displeasure at his equivocation -  not easy 
given the intimate relationship between the United Nations and the Palestinians.’ This ‘minimisation’ 
differed from the American policy of non-contact. See: Annan, Interventions: A Life in War and Peace, p. 
252.
63 US Department of State, "Press Availability With UN Secretary General Kofi Annan; Foreign Minister 
Igor Ivanov of the Russian Federation; Foreign Minister Per Stig Möller of Denmark in the Capacity of 
EU Presidency; and Javier Solana, High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy of the 
EU."
64 Ibid.
65 US Department of State, "President Bush's Remarks at the United Nations General Assembly," New 
York City: 12 September, 2002.
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conflict as being contingent upon addressing the threat of the Saddam Hussein regime.66 
The shift in focus of the Bush Administration caused concern among key US allies, 
especially the actors in the Quartet, that the MEPP would be sidelined by an enhanced 
US focus on Iraq.67 In response, five days after the speech, the Quartet members 
enunciated for the first time that they had been:
...working closely with the parties and consulting key regional actors on a concrete, 
three-phase implementation roadmap that could achieve a final settlement within three 
years.68
There were three phases presented by the Quartet members in their 17 September 2002 
statement. The first was Palestinian security and political reform coupled with Israeli 
territorial withdrawals (from positions occupied since 28 September 2000). The second 
was the creation of a Palestinian state with provisional borders, and the third was 
Israeli-Palestinian negotiations aimed at resolving the final status issues by 2005.69 
Importantly for the future work of the Quartet, the issue of progress both within and 
between the three phases of this plan was to be ‘strictly based on the parties' compliance 
with specific performance benchmarks to be monitored and assessed by the Quartet.’70
By positioning themselves as the arbiters of compliance to their plan, it is likely that the 
Quartet members sought to engineer a vehicle for their continued involvement in the 
implementation of the ‘Roadmap’, including safeguarding the process from the 
reluctance of both parties to move forward in the absence of guarantees from the other. 
Despite the Quartet’s September announcement, the discourse of the peace process 
continued to be overshadowed by discussions of the seemingly inevitable war in Iraq. 
Indeed, when Sharon met with President Bush on 16 October 2002, every question 
asked of the pair by the press was regarding the expected impacts of a conflict between
f’6 On 26 February 2003 William J. Burns, the Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, 
gave a speech that exemplified the prioritisation of the coming conflict in Iraq by the Bush 
Administration: ‘As we end the threat posed by Iraq, we cannot and will not ignore the tragic conflict 
between Israel and the Palestinians.’ See: US Department of State, "Challenges of the Middle East: 
William J. Burns, Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs," Remarks at Dickinson 
College, Carlisle, Pennsylvania: 26 February, 2003.
67 As the following section on the events of 2003 explains, British Prime Minister Tony Blair, in 
particular, urged President Bush to move forward on the Roadmap before launching an invasion in Iraq.
68 US Department of State, "Middle East Quartet Communique of September 17, 2002."
69 Ibid.
70 Ibid.
71 According to Muasher, the three non-American members of the Quartet were in favour of releasing the 
Roadmap during the 17 September meeting, but the United States strongly objected, apparently due to 
concerns that an endorsement of the Roadmap might compromise Israel’s cooperation in Iraq. See: 
Muasher, The Arab Center: The Promise of Moderation, p. 166.
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the United States and Iraq.72 Furthermore, former US Ambassador to Israel Daniel 
Kurtzer noted that during this visit, ‘almost as an afterthought,’ American officials 
presented the rough draft of the Roadmap to the visiting Israeli delegation, who
73apparently ‘didn’t treat it seriously’ and ‘never offered any feedback.’
This draft was also presented to the Palestinians, on 17 October 2002.74 Following this, 
a meeting between the Quartet principals and President Bush was scheduled for 20
75December, in which it was expected that the Roadmap would be launched officially. 
However, on 18 December the US State Department announced that it would postpone 
the release of the Roadmap until after the Israeli elections scheduled for 28 January 
2003.76 This delay almost certainly originated with Sharon, as he had made clear in his 
speech at the 4 December 2002 Herzliya Conference that his consideration of the
77Roadmap would only take place after he had formed a new coalition government. 
Furthermore, according to former Jordanian ambassador Marwan Muasher, the central 
catalyst for the Israeli calls to delay the publication of the Roadmap was the inclusion, 
at the behest of Jordan, of the Arab Peace Initiative in the terms of reference. Muasher 
stated that after it became known that the United States had accepted this inclusion into 
the terms of reference, Sharon’s close advisor, Dov Weissglass ‘immediately [flew], not 
to the State Department, but to see Condoleezza Rice at the White House, and in one
7 0
meeting he convince[d] her to postpone this whole thing.’
Despite this, the meeting between the Quartet principals and President Bush proceeded 
as planned on 20 December 2002.79 This meeting, ironically, included the first public 
endorsement of the work of the grouping by Bush, who stated that:
72 See: US Department of State, "President Bush Welcomes Prime Minister Sharon to White House; 
Question and Answer Session with the Press," The Oval Office, The White House, Washington, DC: 16 
October, 2002.
73 Kurtzer. Interview with the author, Princeton, NJ, October, 2011.
74 US Department of State, "A Performance-Based Roadmap to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the 
Israeli-Palestinian Conflict," Washington, DC: 30 April, 2003.
75 Patten, C., Not Quite the Diplomat: Home Truths About World Affairs (London; New York: Allen 
Lane, 2005), p.109.
76 "Officials: US to delay Mideast plan until after Israeli election," CNN World, 18 December, 2002. 
n Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Speech by Prime Minister Ariel Sharon at the Herzliya 
Conference," Institute of Policy and Strategy, Herzliya: 4 December, 2002.
78 Muasher, M., Former Jordanian Foreign Minister and current Vice President for studies at the Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, interview with the author, Washington, DC, October, 2011.
74 According to Bush Administration official Flynt Leverret, in an interview in Bregman, President Bush 
read the Roadmap for the first time only two days earlier, on 18 December 2002. See: Bregman, Elusive 
Peace: How the Holy Land Defeated America, p. 245.
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I appreciate so very much [the Quartet] working with us to move the Israeli- 
Palestinian issue forward to a peaceful resolution of what has been a longstanding 
conflict.80
In the subsequent statement delivered by the Quartet, the members highlighted that they 
had made substantial progress towards finalising the text of the Roadmap, that President 
Bush had expressed ‘strong support for the efforts of the Quartet and his firm 
commitment to the Quartet's roadmap’ and that they were eager to present the plan to
o  1
the parties. The Quartet members also ‘agreed to further intensive work to develop a 
credible and effective monitoring mechanism.’ Conversely, President Bush stated that 
the Roadmap was ‘not complete yet,’ but that the United States was ‘committed to its 
completion.’ Furthermore, Bush characterised the Roadmap as a continuation of the 
vision he outlined on 24 June:
I appreciate the fact that the Quartet is working on what we call a road map. I view the 
road map as a part of the vision that I described.84
2002 ended with the Quartet members eager to move forward on the implementation of 
the Roadmap but facing resistance from the White House and from Jerusalem, a process 
complicated by the uncertainty surrounding the future of Arafat’s political leadership.
80 US Department of State, "President Welcomes Quartet Principals to White House," The Oval Office, 
The White House, Washington, DC: 20 December, 2002.
81 US Department of State, "Joint Statement by the Quartet," Washington, DC: 20 December, 2002.
In particular, the UNSG chose to emphasise in the press conference following the statement that the 
Quartet hoped to present the Roadmap to the parties ‘as soon as possible’. See: US Department of State, 
"President Welcomes Quartet Principals to White House."
82 US Department of State, "Joint Statement by the Quartet."
83 US Department of State, "President Welcomes Quartet Principals to White House."
84 Ibid.
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2003: The Launch of the Roadmap to Peace in the Middle East
What really brought [the Quartet] together, as a structure built on a substantive issue, 
was the Roadmap.
- Terje Roed-Larsen, Former United Nations Special
Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process (1999-2004).83
The failure of the Quartet to insist on the basic principles of the Roadmap robbed the 
body of some of its vitality, limiting its ability to shift the dynamics between the 
parties.
- Kofi Annan, United Nations Secretary General (1997-2006).86
The Roadmap to Peace in the Middle East both solidified and divided the Quartet as a 
grouping. While the authorship process acted as a catalyst for continued Quartet 
coordination in the region, the eventual disintegration of the implementation process 
produced the opposite effect, reducing the motivation of the members to continue 
meeting and arresting the momentum of their coordination. Thus, in 2003 the work of 
the Quartet members was dominated by the diplomatic processes of pushing for the 
publication of the Roadmap document, and obtaining acceptance and pursuing 
implementation by the parties. While the release of the Roadmap document was 
contingent upon the results of the impending Israeli elections, scheduled for 28 January 
2003, there was another issue of concern for the members of the Quartet that required 
immediate attention.
A Palestinian Prime Minister
The Bush Administration made it clear that it would not present the Roadmap to the 
Palestinians until Arafat had created the position of Prime Minister.88 Effectively, this 
was a premature application of the Quartet’s approach, which called for the creation of 
the position in Phase One but not as a pre-condition to the parties being presented with
85 Roed-Larsen, T., Former United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East peace process, 
interview with the author, New York City, October, 2011.
86 Annan, Interventions: A Life in War and Peace, p. 309.
87 On 5 February 2003 Powell had made his now infamous presentation to the UNSC regarding the 
capabilities of the Iraqi regime. In the lead up to the Iraq war, the Bush Administration was less willing to 
place pressure on the Sharon government regarding the implementation of the Roadmap when 
cooperation from Israel was deemed integral to the success of coalition efforts in Iraq. As Muasher 
argued, the US specifically ‘did not want to jeopardize Israel’s cooperation in refraining from any 
retaliatory military strike on Iraq, should Iraq decide to strike Israel.’ See: Muasher, The Arab Center:
The Promise of Moderation, p. 166.
88 According to Annan, it was UN officials who proposed to the Bush Administration the notion of 
creating an ‘empowered’ Palestinian Prime Minister as a means through which to address US concerns 
about Arafat while allowing progress on the peace process. This idea was then ‘sold’ to the other Quartet 
partners. See: Annan, Interventions: A Life in War and Peace, p. 285.
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the plan, and also reflected the continuing policy of isolating Arafat pursued by the
O Q
Bush Administration.
According to Roed-Larsen, it was during January 2003 that the Quartet envoys 
representing the UN, Russia and the EU began to meet with Arafat with the express 
purpose of convincing him to appoint a Prime Minister, briefing their US colleagues 
along the way.90 Arafat also faced pressure from inside the Palestinian Authority, with 
Palestinian Minister, and close Arafat associate, Nabil Shaath, conducting extensive 
discussions with the Chairman.91 Consequently, on 23 January 2003, Arafat agreed in 
principle to the creation of the post of PM and, working through British envoy Michael 
Levy, gave a letter outlining his position to British Prime Minister Tony Blair asking 
that he present it to Bush.92 On 31 January, Blair met with Bush, and, after presenting 
the letter from Arafat, asked him to release the Roadmap to the parties. According to 
Powell’s account of the meeting, Bush told Blair that he wanted to wait until Sharon 
formed a coalition.93
Three days prior, on 28 January 2003, Ariel Sharon had been re-elected as the Israeli 
Prime Minister, but it was not until a month later that he was able to form his governing 
coalition.94 On February 20, the Quartet issued their fifth statement, welcoming ‘the 
Palestinians' decision to appoint a Prime Minister’ as a ‘significant step,’ but 
underscoring ‘the importance of appointing a credible and fully empowered Prime 
Minister.’9"^ International concerns about Arafat’s disinclination to cede true authority
x9 As is discussed in the subsequent section, Phase One of the Roadmap calls for the creation of an 
‘empowered prime minister.’ See: US Department of State, "A Performance-Based Roadmap to a 
Permanent Two-State Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict."
90 According to an official who witnessed a meeting between UN envoy Terje Roed-Larsen and Arafat 
during this period, Roed-Larsen had insisted that if Arafat did not create the position of Prime Minister he 
would ‘not see me [Larsen] again,’ nor anyone from the EU or Russia, and would instead see ‘an Israeli 
soldier coming through that door.’ See: Kessler, G., '"Road Map' Setbacks Highligh US Pattern," The 
Washington Post, 6 October, 2003.
Furthermore, US Ambassador to Israel, Daniel Kurtzer, confirmed in an interview with the author that 
while the US was part of the effort to convince Arafat to appoint a PM, the other members of the Quartet 
had done most of the ‘heavy lifting’ on the issue. Kurtzer. Interview with the author, Princeton, NJ, 
October, 2011.
91 According to Shaath, in an interview with Ahron Bregman, he emphasised to the Chairman that he 
would remain the truly elected representative of the Palestinian people, retain the ability to appoint and 
fire the Prime Minister, and continue to control the security services. See: Bregman, Elusive Peace: How 
the Holy Land Defeated America, p. 246.
92 Ibid., p.247.
93 Ibid.
94 On 28 February 2003 Sharon formed a coalition with Shinui, the National Union, and the National 
Religious Party, which delivered a governing majority of 68 seats of the 120 seat Knesset.
95 US Department of State, "Joint Statement of Quartet Envoys London," Washington, DC: 20 February, 
2003.
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were proven to be well founded on 7 March, when Arafat officially created the position 
of Palestinian Prime Minister, but declared that he would still oversee peace 
negotiations and control the security services.96
The position of Palestinian Prime Minister remained unfilled until 18 March 2003, but 
during this period the Quartet members lobbied Arafat intensely to appoint Mahmoud 
Abbas. On 14 March, four days before Abbas was officially appointed, Bush urged 
Arafat to make the Prime Minister a position of ‘real authority,’ and added that 
immediately upon confirmation of his appointment ‘the road map for peace will be 
given to the Palestinians and the Israelis.’98 Despite this assurance, Bush’s commitment 
to launching the Roadmap was reportedly still in doubt.99 According to Blair’s account, 
it was not until 16 March, in Azores, Portugal, that he ‘finally got George to commit to 
the Road Map.’100 According to Kurtzer, Blair made one of the conditions of the British 
involvement in Iraq that the Roadmap would be presented to the parties immediately 
after the initial invasion.101 For Blair, the impending coalition invasion of Iraq needed to 
be paired with simultaneous progress on the MEPP in order to allay regional concerns 
that the Israel-Palestinian conflict would be sidelined indefinitely.102 In a press 
conference at Azores, he made the connection clear:
I think the com ing appointment o f  Abu M äzen [Abbas] is so important there. It allow s  
us to take this process forward. The road map g ives us the way forward. The  
appointment o f  Abu M äzen g ives us the right partner to take this forward. And I 
believe that that w ill dem onstrate, and it's important to demonstrate, in particular at 
this tim e, that our approach to people in the M iddle East, in that troubled region is 
indeed even-handed.103
On 18 March 2003, Arafat approved a bill of amendments to the Palestinian Authority 
Basic Law to delineate and establish the position of Prime Minister, and agreed to
96 Laub, K., "Arafat Appoints New Prime Minister," The Guardian, 20 March, 2003.
97 Annan, Interventions: A Life in War and Peace, p. 286.
98 US Department of State, "Hopeful Moment for Progress Toward Middle East Peace," The White 
House, Washington DC: 14 March, 2003.
99 As Powell recounted, ‘there was still a little bit of reluctance to publicly release it because the US then 
takes on additional obligations and commitments.’ See: Bregman, Elusive Peace: How the Holy Land 
Defeated America, p. 249.
100 Blair, T., A Journey: My Political Life, 1st ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2010), p. 433.
101 Kurtzer. Interview with the author, Princeton, NJ, October, 2011.
102 Furthermore, as Bush Administration official Dennis Ross argued, ‘Arabs, Europeans, and others 
would find it easier to tolerate US military action to bring down Saddam Hussein if the administration 
could point to its making a serious effort on Israeli-Palestinian peace -  or so the thinking went.’ See: 
Ross, D., The Missing Peace: The Inside Story of the Fight for Middle East Peace (New York: Farrar, 
Straus and Giroux, 2005), p. 788.
103 US Department of State, "Press Availability with President Bush, Prime Minister Blair, President 
Aznar, and Prime Minister Barroso," Azores, Portugal: 16 March, 2003.
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appoint Mahmoud Abbas to the post. Two days later, US-led coalition forces launched 
their military operation in Iraq. In the days following the invasion, the Bush 
Administration announced that the Roadmap would not be presented to the parties until 
Abbas had been confirmed in office and had appointed a cabinet.104 For Abbas, this 
process was complicated significantly by Arafat,10:1 and it was not until 29 April 2003 
that he and his cabinet were confirmed into office by the Palestinian Legislative 
Council. The following day, Abbas was officially sworn in, and the Roadmap was 
presented to the parties and released publicly.106
Presenting the Roadmap
The presentation of the Roadmap to the parties was indicative of the challenges faced by 
the members of the Quartet during this period. In Ramallah, all four Quartet envoys 
were able to present the document to Prime Minister Abbas, whose appointment had 
allowed the US envoys to circumvent direct contact with Yasser Arafat.107 In Israel, 
however, the Roadmap document was presented to Sharon solely by US Ambassador 
Kurtzer.108 Annan remarked later that ‘such was the reality of the game,’ that the 
‘United States was often prepared to share management of the Palestinians, but insisted 
on preserving its prerogatives vis-a-vis Israel.’109
According to Kurtzer, however, upon presenting the Roadmap to Sharon, he had asked 
the Prime Minister (admittedly without approval from Washington) whether he would 
allow him to return with his Quartet colleagues and to hold a formal session. Sharon
104 US Department of State, "Remarks at the American Israel Public Affairs Committee's Annual Policy 
Conference," Washington DC: 30 March, 2003.
105 According to Abbas’ account of events, presented in Bregman’s Elusive Peace, the main point of 
contention during this period was his intention to appoint Mohammed Dahlan as Interior Minister, which 
Arafat strongly disagreed with on personal grounds. The eventual compromise made between Abbas and 
Arafat was that Abbas would become both the Prime Minister and the Interior Minister, with Dahlan 
acting in an ‘unofficial’ capacity, and Arafat maintaining control over the security services. See:
Bregman, Elusive Peace: How the Holy Land Defeated America, p. 249.
106 For Bush, support for Abbas centred on the Prime Minister’s stance on terrorism. On the day the 
Roadmap was launched, Bush stated that T believe now that we have an interlocutor from the Palestinian 
Authority that has spoken clearly about the need to fight terror, that we have a good opportunity to 
advance the peace process. And I will seize the opportunity.’ See: US Department of State, "President 
Bush and President Uribe of Colombia Comment on the Roadmap and Terrorism: Remarks at Photo 
Opportunity," Washington, DC: 30 April, 2003.
107 Roed-Larsen recounted that this episode resulted in a ‘huge fight’ within the Quartet, ostensibly 
because the Russian representatives insisted that the Roadmap should be presented to Yasser Arafat, as 
the elected leader of the Palestinian people, but Roed-Larsen and the American representatives were 
under strict instructions not to meet directly with the chairman. According to Roed-Larsen, this put the 
Europeans in a ‘very difficult situation’, and eventually a compromise was reached whereby the Quartet 
members agreed to meet with Mahmoud Abbas. Roed-Larsen. Interview with the author, New York City, 
October, 2011.
108 Kurtzer. Interview with the author, Princeton, NJ, October, 2011.
109 Annan, Interventions: A Life in War and Peace, p. 286.
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replied ‘absolutely not.’110 Thus, under the cloud of the war in Iraq, the Quartet 
members were attempting to launch a peace process between a fragile Palestinian Prime 
Minister, and an Israeli Prime Minister who refused to meet with them.
The details of the plan itself produced a host of additional challenges for both the 
approval and implementation processes. The Roadmap was written during a period in 
which several international actors were seeking a means through which to quell the 
second intifada and to resurrect the political process between the Israelis and the 
Palestinians. The document itself reflected the input of numerous sources, and while the 
personal accounts surrounding the driving forces in the authorship process vary, they 
are not necessarily incompatible.
According to Roed-Larsen, the initial idea for the Roadmap was American, and was 
presented by US State Department officials David Satterfield and William Burns during 
a dinner hosted at his residence in 2002, and then developed by the Quartet members in 
consultation with regional parties and other Bush Administration officials.* 111 
Conversely, Chris Patten, in his account of the period, argued that the Roadmap 
originated during the Danish presidency of the EU in 2002.112 It was then discussed 
among the Quartet members and, ‘after a few perfectly reasonable tweaks from the 
American side, the State Department bought it.’ Dennis Ross, in his explanation of 
the process, argued that it was the Arab leaders who initially raised the concept of the 
Roadmap to US officials in the aftermath of the President’s 24 June speech, which they 
felt ‘demanded too much from Palestinians and too little from Israelis.’114 This account 
coincides with that of Rice, who emphasised the role of Jordan in particular.115 Former 
Jordanian Foreign Minister Marwan Muasher reinforces this version of events in his 
account.116 Muasher recalls that throughout 2002 Jordan was ‘pushing very hard’ for 
principles, timelines, performance indicators, and terms of reference (especially the 
Arab Peace Initiative).117 According to Muasher, it was not until a meeting at the White
110 Kurtzer. Interview with the author, Princeton, NJ, October, 2011.
111 Roed-Larsen. Interview with the author, New York City, October, 2011.
112 The Danish Presidency lasted from July 2002 until December 2002.
113 Patten, Not Quite the Diplomat: Home Truths About World Affairs, p. 109.
114 Ross, The Missing Peace: The Inside Story of the Fight for Middle East Peace, p. 787.
115 Rice, No Higher Honor: A Memoir of My Years in Washington, p. 147.
116 See: Muasher, The Arab Center: The Promise of Moderation, pp. 134-98.
117 Muasher. Interview with the author, Washington, DC, October, 2011.
Muasher’s account was reinforced by Daniel Kurtzer, who stated that ‘The Jordanians were responsible 
for putting the API in [the Roadmap] and making sure that it was in.’ Kurtzer. Interview with the author, 
Princeton, NJ, October, 2011.
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House on 1 August 2002 that he was able to convince Bush of the merits of the 
Roadmap, in its draft form, and that after this meeting the drafting process, including 
collaboration between the US Department of State and other Quartet and regional 
actors, accelerated.118
The common theme in the accounts of the creation of the Roadmap is that process 
involved input from the Quartet members and regional actors, but from neither, in any 
direct sense, the Israelis nor the Palestinians. As Annan described it, the final document 
was ‘genuinely a product of negotiation among the Quartet members.’119 Furthermore, 
the discrepancies in the accounts regarding the origins of the idea of the Roadmap can 
be explained by the fact that, as argued in Chapter Three, several actors during this 
period were simultaneously pursuing the objective of ending the second intifada by 
systematically addressing the deficiencies of the Oslo period. The ideas underpinning 
the Roadmap simply reflected the international consensus on the current state of the 
MEPP at this time.120
Equally, it is important to establish that the key parties involved in the authorship of the 
Roadmap were not the Israelis and the Palestinians. While there were some ‘feelers’ put 
out to the parties on certain issues during this period -  particularly the Israelis -  for the 
most part the plan was developed without their input. “ As Ross explains, ‘rather than 
working out understandings with the parties, the Administration engaged in a 
negotiation with the other three members of the Quartet.’ The Israelis and 
Palestinians were ‘each offered the opportunity to make comments, but not to engage in
n r
a negotiation about its content or how it might actually be implemented.’ Roed- 
Larsen described the Quartet member’s approach to the Roadmap as a kind of 
‘multilateral unilateralism,’ because:
...it’s a multilateral informal group, who actually says ‘no, we don’t want to negotiate 
this, because these guys are impossible.’ So they negotiate between themselves and put 
it to the parties and say ‘implement.’124
IIX See: Muasher, The Arab Center: The Promise of Moderation, p. 161-3.
119 Annan, Interventions: A Life in War and Peace, p. 283.
120 As European envoy Marc Otte summarised, the Roadmap was essentially a compilation of ‘all the 
things that had been thought by a number of people working on the issue.’ Otte, M., Former European 
Union Quartet envoy, Interview with author, Brussels, November, 2011.
121 Roed-Larsen. Interview with the author, New York City, October, 2011.
122 Ross, The Missing Peace: The Inside Story of the Fight for Middle East Peace, p. 788.
123 Ibid.
124 Roed-Larsen. Interview with the author, New York City, October, 2011.
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The underlying logic of this approach was to avoid prolonged negotiations with the 
Israelis and Palestinians, especially having to deal directly with Arafat, and to build 
international consensus and momentum around the plan before launching it. As 
Kurtzer explained, creating a united international front within the context of the MEPP 
was useful because:
...when there were difficult messages that had to be delivered, both the Palestinians 
and the Israelis would always seek to find the weakest link in whoever was delivering 
the message, and then run with that. So the idea was if we presented a united front, 
there wouldn’t be an opportunity to trade us off against each other.126
The danger of this approach was that the Roadmap was indicative of consensus only 
among parties that would not be responsible for implementing its recommendations.
This meant that the Quartet members would need to gain acceptance of the plan both 
from  the parties, and between the parties. As Ross argued, progress on the Roadmap 
could ‘only materialise with clear and unambiguous understandings between the parties 
themselves on what each side would actually do, when they would do it, where they 
would do it, and how they would do it.’ Thus, the political process that followed the 
launch of the Roadmap was inherently structured around and constrained by both the 
commitments contained within the plan, and the ability of the international community 
to forge a common understanding of these commitments between the parties to the 
conflict.
The Conceptual Framework of the Roadmap 
The Roadmap was conceived by its authors as an attempt to bring about an end to the 
second intifada, and to address the deficiencies of previous peace plans within the 
context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. As Annan noted:
The Roadmap was not designed to replace a negotiated agreement between the parties.
Its purpose was to create the context for those negotiations by rebuilding the
confidence shattered by Oslo’s failure, while repairing some of Oslo’s defects.128
As is discussed in more detail below, the Roadmap as a document reflected both the 
process of its authorship and the circumstances it was designed to address. The first 
phase was an amalgamation of the Mitchell Report’s calls for parallel action on Israeli 
settlements and Palestinian terrorism, with the additional notion of Palestinian political
12:1 Kurtzer. Interview with the author, Princeton, NJ, October, 2011.
126 Ibid.
1-7 Ross, The Missing Peace: The Inside Story of the Fight for Middle East Peace, p. 788. 
138 Annan, Interventions: A Life in War and Peace, p. 283.
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reform outlined by Bush on 24 June 2002.129 The final two phases of the Roadmap 
rested upon the progress made in the first, and essentially functioned as support 
mechanisms for final status agreements reached between the parties. As EU envoy Marc 
Otte summarised:
The basic idea was for the Palestinians to stop violence and for the Israelis to stop 
settlements. That was the major deal, the rest was confidence building.130
To create favourable circumstances for the resumption of a political process that might 
resolve the conflict, the Quartet members sought to circumvent the stalemate between 
the parties (and the complications surrounding contact with Arafat), address Palestinian 
violence and Israeli settlements, provide a clear end goal and time frames to motivate 
the parties to take simultaneous action, build Palestinian institutions, and to establish a 
monitoring framework to ensure adherence to all of the above. The weaknesses of the 
document, especially the lack of specificity on the exact steps that were required by the 
parties,131 were the result of a difficult and politically charged authorship period, where 
in order to move forward, compromises on specificity were deemed necessary. In other 
words, the authors of the Roadmap employed constructive ambiguity in order reach 
agreement with each other, whereas the subsequent process was contingent upon the 
readiness of the parties directly affected to accept the broad thrust of the document, 
including agreement to manage and negotiate the specifics together. In addition, it was 
contingent upon the willingness of the international community (with the United States 
in the lead) to foster understanding between the parties and to oversee the 
implementation of their commitments.
In theory, the Roadmap differed from previous peace plans in several key ways: by 
including performance benchmarks (and calling for monitoring), by establishing the end 
goals of the process, and by calling for parallel implementation by the parties. In the 
period following the launch of the Roadmap, the work of the Quartet members was
129 According to Kurtzer, the extent to which Roadmap document was reflective of the 24 June speech 
caused arguments internally within the Bush Administration. Neoconservative administration officials 
argued that the document ‘unraveled' Bush’s speech, and State Department officials argued that the 
Roadmap captured the critical elements of the speech within a framework of parallel implementation. 
Kurtzer. Interview with the author, Princeton, NJ, October, 2011.
130 Otte. Interview with author, Brussels, November, 2011.
131 An International Crisis Group Report titled ‘A Middle East Roadmap to Where?’ argued that the 
various elements outlined in the Roadmap lacked definition, and that ‘each step is likely to give rise to 
interminable disputes between the two sides.’ Furthermore, the report heavily criticised the authors of the 
Roadmap for ‘failing to provide a detailed, fleshed out definition of a permanent status agreement.’ See: 
International Crisis Group, "A Middle East Roadmap to Where?," Crisis Group Middle East Report 14: 2 
May, 2003.
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structured largely around pursuing the acceptance and practical application of these 
innovations.
Monitored Performance
The Roadmap was designed to be performance-based. In the introduction to the 
document, progress between the three phases was said to ‘require and depend upon the 
good faith efforts of the parties, and their compliance with each of the obligations 
outlined below.’ The rationale of this approach was to ease the concerns of the parties 
regarding each other’s commitments, and to address the lack of oversight contained in 
the Oslo process. The logical extension to a performance driven plan, however, was 
the need for a monitoring process that could determine the extent to which the parties 
were implementing their commitments. The Roadmap document clearly presented the 
Quartet members as the appropriate authority to monitor Israeli and Palestinian 
compliance with their obligations:
Relying on existing mechanisms and on-the-ground resources, Quartet representatives 
begin informal monitoring and consult with the parties on establishment of a formal 
monitoring mechanism and its implementation.1 '4
Furthermore, movement between the phases of the Roadmap was to be based ‘upon the 
consensus judgment of the Quartet of whether conditions are appropriate to proceed, 
taking into account performance of both parties.’ 135 Thus, underwriting the structure of 
the Roadmap was to be a strong monitoring presence, overseen by the members of the 
Quartet. In theory, this monitoring mechanism would have ensured the viability of the 
entire Roadmap document, because without a structure to oversee implementation the 
parties would have been able to ‘wriggle out of their commitments.’ Despite this, 
after the launch of the Roadmap, the creation of a joint, formal monitoring mechanism 
was resisted by US officials, irrespective of the ‘constant pushing’ from the UN and the 
EU .137
132 US Department of State, "A Performance-Based Roadmap to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the 
Israeli-Palestinian Conflict."
133 Annan argues that the Israelis in particular were doubtful that Arafat would live up to his obligations to 
combat terrorism. See: Annan, Interventions: A Life in War and Peace, p. 284.
134 US Department of State, "A Performance-Based Roadmap to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the 
Israeli-Palestinian Conflict."
135 Ibid.
136 Annan, Interventions: A Life in War and Peace, p. 285.
137 Ibid., p .284.
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Clear End Goals
In contrast to the Oslo period, the Roadmap document established the end goal of the 
process as the creation of an ‘independent, democratic, and viable Palestinian state,’ 
including ‘an end to the occupation that began in 1967,’ based on the foundations of:
...the Madrid Conference, the principle of land for peace, UNSCRs 242, 338 and 
1397, agreements previously reached by the parties, and the initiative of Saudi Crown 
Prince Abdullah - endorsed by the Beirut Arab League Summit - calling for 
acceptance of Israel as a neighbor living in peace and security, in the context of a 
comprehensive settlement.138
The terms of reference of the Roadmap were illustrative of an attempt to shift the 
discourse of the conflict. For example, UNSCR 1397 references the recommendations 
of the Mitchell Report, the Arab Peace Initiative is centred around territorial swaps 
based on the 1967 borders, and the deficiencies of UNSCRs 242 and 338 are combated 
by the clear end goals stated in the introductory section of the Roadmap. Furthermore, 
the authors of the Roadmap coupled the presentation of end goals with a time frame for 
the implementation of the steps outlined in the plan, set to culminate in a final status
1 OQ
agreement by 2005. The inclusion of deadlines in the Roadmap was designed to both 
assure the parties that the process would not be open ended, and also to act as a 
psychological motivator for timely implementation of commitments.140 This timeline 
was not binding, however, and rather than suggesting the possibility of penalties for 
non-compliance, the Roadmap merely stated that ‘non-compliance with obligations will 
impede progress.’141 Furthermore, the delays in the launch of the Roadmap were not 
factored into the original deadlines presented in the plan.142
Parallelism
The key factor that separated the Roadmap from the Oslo process was the notion of 
parallelism, which was based on the view that the parties would be less able to avoid
138 US Department of State, "A Performance-Based Roadmap to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the 
Israeli-Palestinian Conflict."
139 In another example of the centrality of the American role in the Middle East peace process, this date 
also coincided with the end of the first Bush Administration.
140 EEAS Official. Interview with the author, Brussels, November, 2011.
141 US Department of State, "A Performance-Based Roadmap to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the 
Israeli-Palestinian Conflict."
143 Phase One of the Roadmap, Ending terror and violence, normalizing Palestinian life, and building 
Palestinian institutions, was suggested to be completed by May 2003, despite the plan being launched on 
30 April 2003.
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their responsibilities if they were expected to act in unison.143 According to Annan, the 
notion of parallel implementation by the Israelis and Palestinians was the fundamental 
feature of the Roadmap:
This was my mantra, shared by the EU and the Russians: we believed we would get 
nowhere if all Israeli actions were contingent on the Palestinians first meeting security 
benchmarks, and we cited the Mitchell Report in this regard.144
It should be noted, however, that the Roadmap was actually an amalgamation of the 
notions of parallelism and sequentialism, in that progress within phases was parallel and 
progress between phases was sequential. According to Roed-Larsen, while this 
combined approach allowed the parties to position the Roadmap as being ‘ambiguous’ 
in terms of its sequencing, it was a necessary compromise between the authors to move 
the document forward.146
Phase One
The first phase of the Roadmap called for substantial structural reforms within the 
Palestinian Authority to be coupled with an Israeli withdrawal to pre-intifada lines, and 
a complete settlement freeze (including natural growth). Specifically, the Palestinians 
were required to draft a Palestinian constitution, appoint an interim Prime Minister, 
organise PLC elections, reform the Palestinian security services,146 and declare an 
unequivocal end to violence and terrorism.147 The Israelis were required to ‘take no 
actions undermining trust,’148 take measures ‘to improve the humanitarian situation,’ 
withdraw from Palestinian areas occupied since 28 September 2000, immediately 
dismantle settlement outposts erected since March 2001, and:
143 The opening section of the document outlines that ‘the parties are expected to perform their obligations 
in parallel, unless otherwise indicated.’ See: US Department of State, "A Performance-Based Roadmap to 
a Permanent Two-State Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict."
144 Annan, Interventions: A Life in War and Peace, p. 283.
145 Roed-Larsen. Interview with the author, New York City, October, 2011.
146 These reforms included, ‘sustained, targeted, and effective operations aimed at confronting all those 
engaged in terror and dismantlement of terrorist capabilities and infrastructure.’ This also included 
‘commencing confiscation of illegal weapons and consolidation of security authority, free of association 
with terror and corruption,’ and consolidating the security organisations into three services to be overseen 
by an ‘empowered Interior Minister.’ See: US Department of State, "A Performance-Based Roadmap to a 
Permanent Two-State Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict."
147 Ibid.
I4X These actions included ‘deportations, attacks on civilians, confiscation and/or demolition of 
Palestinian homes and property as a punitive measure or to facilitate Israeli construction, and destruction 
of Palestinian institutions and infrastructure.’
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Consistent with the Mitchell Report, GOI freezes all settlement activity (including 
natural growth of settlements) . 149
The Optional Phase Two
Upon parallel and successful completion of Phase One, as judged by the Quartet 
members, the parties had the option of moving into Phase Two of the Roadmap. This 
outlined the creation of an independent Palestinian State with ‘provisional borders’ as a 
‘way-station’ to a permanent status settlement. 150 Phase Two of the Roadmap was the 
product of a compromise reached among the Quartet members after heated discussions. 
These discussions centred on the inclusion of a Palestinian provisional state in the 
Roadmap, and the eventual compromise reached between the members was the 
substitution of the term for a Palestinian state with provisional borders} 51 Although 
they accepted the wording for tactical reasons, the idea of a ‘way-station’ deeply 
displeased the Palestinians. As Annan recounted later:
I was never convinced this was a good idea, and certainly the Palestinians did not 
think so -  unless, and only unless, the details of a permanent settlement were already 
agreed, and this was merely a phase of implementation. Hence, it was referred to as an 
option. The Palestinian experience with Oslo was that the temporary tended to become 
permanent -  mirroring, I might add, the Israeli fear that a so-called permanent solution 
might one day turn out to merely be temporary. 1^ 2
Phase Three
The final phase of the Roadmap was designed to facilitate direct negotiations between 
the Israelis and Palestinians with the aim of producing a final status agreement on the 
issues of borders, Jerusalem, refugees and settlements. This agreement would be 
endorsed by an international conference convened by the Quartet, and would be based 
on the terms of reference of the Roadmap . 153 Specifically, the agreement reached in 
Phase Three would include a ‘just, fair, and realistic solution to the refugee issue,’ and a
149 US Department of State, "A Performance-Based Roadmap to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the 
Israeli-Palestinian Conflict."
150 Ibid.
151 As Roed-Larsen explained, T remember that I said “no, let’s not talk about the provisional state, let’s 
talk about a state with provisional borders, in the same way that Israel is a state with provisional borders.” 
The state with provisional borders is a state, as Israel is a state today, but a provisional state is a quasi­
state. So an agreement was reached, because we changed the terminology from a provisional state to a 
state with provisional borders.’ Roed-Larsen. Interview with the author, New York City, October, 2011.
152 Annan, Interventions: A Life in War and Peace, p. 284.
153 US Department of State, "A Performance-Based Roadmap to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the 
Israeli-Palestinian Conflict."
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‘negotiated resolution to the status of Jerusalem that takes into account the political and 
religious concerns of both sides.’154
The Launch of the Roadmap
On the day the Roadmap was launched, President Bush announced that Secretary of 
State Colin Powell would travel to the region to begin discussions with the parties about 
acceptance and implementation of the plan.15:1 The following day, on 1 May 2003, Bush 
declared that major combat operations in Iraq had ended, and that the ‘United States and 
our allies have prevailed.’156 The connection between the two events was made clear by 
Bush a week later, shortly before Powell was due to arrive in the Middle East, when he 
remarked that ‘with a liberated Iraq’ and new leadership for the Palestinian people, the 
hope of peace in the Holy Land was ‘renewed.’ Furthermore, and importantly for 
Powell’s visit, it became clear soon after the Roadmap launch that Bush did not 
subscribe to the notion of parallelism underpinning the first phase of the plan. In a 
speech on 9 May 2003, Bush presented a sequentialist interpretation of Phase One, 
when he noted that ‘as progress is made toward peace, Israel must stop settlement
158activity in the occupied territories.’
As Powell set out for the Middle East, a close advisor of Sharon, Dov Weissglass, 
visited Washington, where he met with a large group of US officials, including 
individuals from the White House (and the office of the Vice President), the Pentagon, 
and the Department of State.159 According to accounts of the meeting given to New 
Yorker journalist Connie Bruck, the Israeli delegation presented nearly one hundred
154 Ibid.
155 US Department of State, "The Middle East and the Roadmap for Peace," Washington, DC: 30 April, 
2003.
156 US Department of State, "President Bush Announces Combat Operations in Iraq Have Ended," USS 
Abraham Lincoln, At Sea Off the Coast of San Diego, California 1 May, 2003.
157 US Department of State, "President Bush Presses for Peace in the Middle East," Remarks in 
Commencement Address at the University of South Carolina, Columbia, South Carolina: 9 May, 2003. 
Sharon mirrored this sentiment after a meeting with Powell on May 11, in which he stated that ‘following 
the coalition victory in Iraq,’ a ‘window of opportunity’ had been created to ‘advance the political 
process.’ See: US Department of State, "Joint Press Briefing with Israeli Prime Minister Sharon 
Following their Meeting," Prime Minister's Residence, Jerusalem: 11 May, 2003.
I5X US Department of State, "President Bush Presses for Peace in the Middle East."
Furthermore, in Bush’s 2010 memoirs, he described the first phase of the Roadmap as follows: ‘First, 
Palestinians would stop terrorist attacks, fight corruption, reform their political system, and hold 
democratic elections. In return, Israel would withdraw from un-authorised settlements.’ [Emphasis 
added]. See: Bush, Decision Points, p. 405.
159 Bruck, C„ "Back Roads," The New Yorker, Vol. 79, no. 39 (2003).
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objections to the Roadmap, which were eventually ‘whittled’ down to a list of fourteen 
points.160
Meanwhile, despite being in the region to discuss the MEPP, Powell continued to 
boycott Arafat, which resulted in a general strike in the Palestinian territories during his 
visit.161 The irony of Arafat’s isolation was that he would be expected to play a vital 
role in the reforms of the Palestinian security services called for in the Roadmap, but he 
continued to be excluded from consultations about the plan. It was clear during this trip 
that the issue of Arafat continued to divide the members of the Quartet, with Powell 
stating that:
They [The Quartet] can make their own decisions, but we have made it clear to them 
that we believe this is the time to invest in the new leadership. And I hope that with 
the passage of time, my European and other colleagues will see the wisdom of acting 
in that way.162
As Powell met with Israeli and Palestinian leaders, their public responses to the 
Roadmap document began to emerge. The Palestinians were vocal in their support for 
the plan, with newly appointed Palestinian Prime Minister Abbas stating that despite 
having ‘some reservations about it,’ he had declared his acceptance of the Roadmap ‘as 
is . ’ 163 The notion of an ‘unchanged’ Roadmap document is important to understanding 
the Palestinian response to the plan. According to Abbas, and likely in reaction to the 
coming Israeli ‘reservations’ to the document, it was paramount that the ‘Roadmap must 
remain as it was put forward, in the interests of its proper implementation. ’ 164 
Furthermore, in his meeting with Powell, Abbas stressed that the Palestinian Authority 
expected:
...the Quartet, and particularly you, Mr. Secretary, to establish an effective monitoring 
and verification system to guarantee the balanced and accurate implementation of the 
roadmap in the political, security and other spheres.165
Thus, the Palestinians were willing to overlook their concerns regarding aspects of the 
Roadmap if it meant that the Israelis would be expected to implement the plan in full,
160 Ibid.
161 US Department of State, "Joint Press Briefing with Israeli Prime Minister Sharon Following their 
Meeting."
162 Ibid.
163 US Department of State, "Joint Press Conference: Secretary of State Colin L. Powell And Palestinian 
Prime Minister Mahmoud Abbas," Oasis Intercontinental Hotel, Jericho: 11 May, 2003.
164 Ibid.
165 Ibid.
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and in its original incarnation.166 Additionally, the more persuasive features of the 
Roadmap, such as the creation of a Palestinian state and calls for an Israeli settlement 
freeze, were enhanced by strong pressure from the Bush Administration on Palestinian 
officials to accept the plan.167 The resulting Palestinian approach was indicative of the 
lack of trust between the parties at this time, as well as Palestinian concerns about the 
Bush Administration’s intention to employ adequate diplomatic resources to the 
implementation process.168
In the face of hesitancy from both the Israelis and the Palestinians during his trip,
Powell began to urge the parties to begin implementing their Roadmap commitments 
before coming to any agreement on the specifics. In his press conference with Abbas, 
Powell stated that:
...there is sufficient goodwill, sufficient commitment that we can get started, and, as I 
have said, let’s get started now. Let’s not waste another day, let’s not waste another 
discussion session -  let’s get on with the actions required.169
Essentially, Powell was advocating a piecemeal application of the Roadmap as a means 
to sidestep the contentious issues early on, and build momentum for the subsequent 
resolution of these issues. When Powell returned to the United States, it was clear that 
the Israelis still had strong reservations about the Roadmap, and refused to accept the 
plan unless Powell and Rice stated publicly that the Bush Administration would 
‘address’ their concerns in due course.171 Consequently, on 23 May 2003, Powell and 
Rice delivered a statement explaining that the United States had received a response 
from Israel voicing ‘significant concerns’ about the Roadmap, and that:
166 As Roed-Larsen explained, the Palestinians had ‘many reservations’ with the contents of the Roadmap, 
but strategically accepted the plan as a means both to capture the ‘moral high ground’ and to put pressure 
on the Israelis to do likewise. Roed-Larsen. Interview with the author, New York City, October, 2011.
167 Khatib, G., Former Director of Palestinian Authority Media Centre, interview with the author, 
Ramallah, Palestinian Territories, November, 2011.
168 As Aaron David Miller argued, ‘Neither side believed the other was credible or serious about 
implementation; nor were they prepared to give the other the benefit of the doubt. Since the Bush 
Administration exhibited no willingness to work intensively with either side, the road map has never been 
implemented.’ See: Miller, The Much Too Promised Land: America's Elusive Search for Arab-lsraeli 
Peace, p. 73.
169 US Department of State, "Joint Press Conference: Secretary of State Colin L. Powell And Palestinian 
Prime Minister Mahmoud Abbas."
170 Powell argues that: T think it’s important not to get so hung up on a particular word or a particular 
statement that we lose the opportunity to get started, to get going. There will be more than enough time in 
the future to discuss some of the more contentious issues that will have to be dealt with.’ Ibid.
171 Bregman, Elusive Peace: How the Holy Land Defeated America, p. 253.
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The United States shares the view of the Government of Israel that these are real 
concerns, and will address them fully and seriously in the implementation of the 
roadmap to fulfil the President's vision of June 24, 2002.172
Sharon immediately released a statement that acknowledged the joint statement, and 
declared Israel’s acceptance of ‘the steps set out in the Roadmap,’ in light of the ‘US 
promise’ to address their concerns ‘fully and seriously.’ Thus, in order to secure 
Israel’s acceptance of the Roadmap document, Powell and Rice had codified two 
separate understandings of the commitments contained in the plan; with the Palestinians 
viewing it ‘as is’, and the Israelis viewing it through the prism of their fourteen 
reservations. Furthermore, Sharon’s acceptance of only the ‘steps set out in the 
Roadmap’ allowed for an Israeli interpretation of the sequencing of the plan to differ 
from both the United States and the Palestinians. The following day, Powell was 
accused by a member of the press of simply ‘kicking the can down the road’ and his 
response was illustrative:
At least we have a can on the road. It’s easy to say. why didn’t you solve this all up 
front? Because you couldn’t. You couldn’t get started. So there are difficult issues that 
are ahead, this is not going to be solved in one day or one week or one month... So the 
can is on the road now, and we will start moving it down the road, perhaps with little 
kicks as opposed to a 54-yarder.174
Thus, not only was ambiguity employed to circumvent the hurdles of the Roadmap 
authorship process, it was subsequently used in an attempt to move the ‘acceptance’ 
phase forward for the parties themselves. This ambiguity was furthered by the 
consequent publication of Israel’s fourteen reservations to the Roadmap plan, which 
were now understood by the Israelis inherently to be part of the implementation process. 
The conditionality that the Quartet members had sought specifically to avoid had now 
become enshrined into the Roadmap process.
The Fourteen Israeli Reservations
On 25 May 2003, Sharon’s cabinet ‘accepted’ the Roadmap plan, in light of the 
understanding that ‘all of Israel's comments, as addressed in the [Bush] Administration's 
statement, [would] be implemented in full during the implementation phase of the
172 US Department of State, "Statement by Secretary of State Colin L. Powell and National Security 
Advisor Condoleezza Rice," Washington, DC: 23 May, 2003.
172 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Statement from PM Sharon's Bureau," 23 May, 2003.
174 US Department of State, "Remarks En Route Andrews Air Force Base," On Board Plane: 23 May, 
2003.
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1 7SRoadmap.’ ' Before listing these ‘comments,’ the statement from the Government of 
Israel outlined further that:
...both during and subsequent to the political process, the resolution of the issue of the 
refugees will not include their entry into or settlement within the State of Israel.176
In effect, despite Phase Three of the Roadmap calling for a ‘just, fair, and realistic 
solution to the refugee issue,’ the Government of Israel underpinned their acceptance 
of the plan on the provision that no refugees would return to the state of Israel. 
Furthermore, the fourteen Israeli reservations proved to be similarly antithetical to the 
foundations of the Roadmap plan, and were illustrative of Israeli attempts to re-define
1 7Rthe text and predictive of the eventual disintegration of the implementation process.
As such, they are examined in detail below.
The first reservation called for the maintenance of ‘calm’ as a condition to the 
continuance of the Roadmap process. It stated that the Palestinians must ‘dismantle 
the existing security organisations,’ including ‘the dismantling of terrorist organizations 
(Hamas, Islamic Jihad, the Popular Front, the Democratic Front, Al-Aqsa Brigades and 
other apparatuses)’ as well as their infrastructure, and must confiscate and destroy all of 
their weaponry and stop all weapon smuggling. 180 The reservation stated that ‘there will 
be no progress to the second phase without the fulfillment of all above-mentioned 
conditions relating to the war against terror,’ but also that ‘as in the other mutual 
frameworks, the Roadmap will not state that Israel must cease violence and incitement
1 o  1
against the Palestinians.’ Thus, the first Israeli reservation to the Roadmap implanted 
Sharon’s ‘security first’ doctrine into the text, and asked the Palestinians essentially to 
deconstruct each of their militant factions with no promise of an end to Israeli 
hostilities.
175 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Government meeting about the Prime Minister's Statement on the 
Roadmap " Jerusalem: 25 May, 2003.
176 Ibid.
177 US Department of State, "A Performance-Based Roadmap to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the 
Israeli-Palestinian Conflict."
178 According to an Israeli official quoted in Bregman, when Sharon’s Cabinet members met to discuss 
the approval of the Roadmap plan, many arrived with dictionaries in hand, eager to examine the language 
of the reservations in the strictest legal sense. See: Bregman, Elusive Peace: How the Holy Land Defeated 
America, p. 253.
I7V Parallels can be seen between the first Israeli reservation to the Roadmap document and the Israeli 
response to the Mitchell Report, both of which emphasised the necessity of ‘calm’ as a precondition to 
any political process. Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Israel's Response to the Roadmap," Jerusalem: 
25 May, 2003.
180 Ibid.
181 Ibid.
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Similarly, the second Israeli reservation dismissed the notion of timelines, and insisted 
that only performance benchmarks would dictate progress both within and between 
phases of the Roadmap. 182 It positioned the first condition for progress as ‘the complete 
cessation of terror violence and incitement. ’ 183 The third reservation called for new 
leadership in the Palestinian Authority as a precondition to moving into Phase Two of 
the Roadmap, and stated that PLC elections should be held following coordination with 
Israel. 184
Importantly for the Quartet members, the fourth Israeli reservation explicitly rejected 
the notion of ‘a combined or unified mechanism’ for monitoring the implementation of 
the Roadmap. * Instead it posited that not only would the monitoring mechanism be 
‘under American management,’ but that ‘the chief verification activity’ would 
‘concentrate upon the creation of another Palestinian entity and progress in the civil 
reform process within the Palestinian Authority,’ and that ‘substantive decisions’ would
i o z :
‘remain in the hands of the parties.’ In one reservation, the Israelis had 
comprehensively ruled out a monitoring role for any of the non-US Quartet members, 
dictated the focus of such monitoring, and undercut the authority of the US monitors.187
The fifth Israeli reservation dispensed with the notion of a ‘Palestinian state with 
provisional borders’ and replaced it with the notion of a ‘Provisional Palestinian 
State.’ 188 Furthermore, this provisional state was to be ‘fully demilitarized,’ and Israel 
was to maintain ‘control over the entry and exit of all persons and cargo,’ as well as
1 RQover its ‘air space and electromagnetic spectrum.’
The sixth Israeli reservation commented further on the Palestinian refugee issue, and 
stated that the Palestinians must, in their introductory statements at the outset of the 
Roadmap process, as well as in the ‘final settlement,’ reference ‘Israel’s right to exist as
182 Ibid.
183 Ibid.
184 This reservation was, at the time of its release, redundant, as the Bush Administration had moved the 
timetable for Palestinian political reform even further forward, asking for Abbas to be appointed PM 
before launching the Roadmap.
185 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Israel's Response to the Roadmap."
186 Ibid.
187 European Union officials had previous stated that any arrangement in which responsibilities for 
monitoring were divided among the Quartet members or in which the Quartet as a ‘whole’ was not 
responsible for monitoring ‘key issues’ would be ‘unacceptable.’ See: Beatty, A., "EU Backs Down on 
Role in Mid East," EU Observer, 23 May, 2003.
188 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Israel's Response to the Roadmap."
189 Ibid.
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a Jewish state’ and waive ‘any right of return for Palestinian refugees to the State of 
Israel.’190 This reservation on the refugee issue not only required total abandonment of a 
key issue of principle from the Palestinians as a precondition to the beginning of the 
Roadmap process, but it also prejudged the final resolution of the issue in any eventual 
settlement. Perhaps as a means to reinforce the above, the seventh Israeli reservation 
stated that the end of the process would also be the end of all claims, not only the end of 
the conflict.191
While the eighth reservation positioned Bush’s 24 June 2002 speech as a frame of 
reference for the final settlement to be negotiated between the parties, the ninth 
reservation stated that there would be no ‘involvement’ with ‘issues pertaining to the 
final settlement’ during the Roadmap process. Additionally, the final status issues 
were also not to be discussed during this period, including:
...settlement in Judea, Samaria and Gaza (excluding a settlement freeze and illegal 
outposts), the status of the Palestinian Authority and its institutions in Jerusalem, and 
all other matters whose substance relates to the final settlement.193
Given the clear Israeli position on the settlements as a final status issue, and its 
acceptance of settlement expansion under the heading of ‘natural growth’, this 
reservation can be read to rule out any requirement for action (other than in accordance 
with Israeli government preferences) on settlements in the West Bank and Gaza during 
the Roadmap process, but with the caveat that these issues would not be ruled out as a 
topic of discussion.
The tenth Israeli reservation proposed amendments to the terms of reference of the 
Roadmap, specifically the removal of all references other than UNSCRs 242 and 338, 
which, even then, should only be used ‘as an outline for the conduct of future 
negotiations on a permanent settlement.’194
190 The notion of recognising Israel as a ‘Jewish State’ as a precondition to progress in the MEPP was 
employed further by Benjamin Netanyahu in 2009, after his election as Israeli Prime Minister.
191 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Israel's Response to the Roadmap."
192 Ibid.
193 Ibid.
194 Ibid.
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The eleventh reservation placed conditions on the continued Israeli transfer of 
Palestinian tax revenues, and called for the creation of a transitional Palestinian 
constitution and of a legal infrastructure.19'^
In contrast to the tenets of Phase One of the Roadmap, which called for Israel to 
withdraw from areas occupied since 28 September 2000, the twelfth Israeli reservation 
stated that such a withdrawal would be subject to ‘absolute quiet’ and would be ‘carried 
out in keeping with changes to be required by the nature of the new circumstances and 
needs created thereby.’196 The ‘security first’ doctrine continued into the thirteenth 
reservation, which stated that Israeli restoration of ‘Palestinian life to normal’ would be 
‘subject to security concerns.’197
Finally, the fourteenth reservation stated that ‘Arab states will assist the process through 
the condemnation of terrorist activity,’ and that ‘no link will be established between the
i q o
Palestinian track and other tracks (Syrian-Lebanese).’
When viewed in aggregate, the fourteen Israeli reservations completely dismantled the 
central tenets of the Roadmap. The notion of international monitoring was jettisoned 
and replaced with a limited US presence, the notion of parallelism was replaced with a 
‘security first’ doctrine requiring substantial reform and concessions from the 
Palestinians before Israeli action, and references to the end goals for the process were 
either removed or amended. Thus, the concept of Israeli ‘acceptance’ of the Roadmap in 
conjunction with their reservations was nonsensical, as the reservations altered the 
original text beyond recognition.199
19:1 Similarly to the third reservation, the eleventh called for steps which the Roadmap had already 
established, such as the creation of a Palestinian constitution.
196 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Israel's Response to the Roadmap."
197 Ibid.
198 Ibid.
199 This did not stop Ariel Sharon from presenting the 14 reservations as additional features to the 
Roadmap, instead of refutations. On 20 June 2003, he stated that ‘The State of Israel has accepted the 
steps detailed in the road map, plus the 14 points in which the Israeli government has decided.’ See: US 
Department of State, "Joint Press Conference with Israeli Prime Minister Sharon," Prime Minister's 
Office, Jerusalem: 20 June, 2003.
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In addition to their cumulative impact, the most important of the Israeli reservations was 
a modification of the conceptualisation of sequencing contained in the Roadmap .200 As 
Kurtzer explained:
The Roadmap was specifically designed for parallel and mutually reinforcing 
obligations. The Israelis hated that. Because they said ‘first the Palestinians have to 
uproot terrorism, second they have to build credible institutions, and then we will do 
the things that you want us to do.’ And the fact that that was not what the Roadmap 
called for, in a sense ruined it for them.201
By positioning Palestinian security and political reforms as prerequisites to Israeli 
action, the reservations created the potential for an indefinite prolonging of the 
Roadmap’s first phase. As Weissglass reportedly remarked at the time, his conception 
of Phase One required:
...the Palestinians to control terrorists. It asks that the Palestinians become blue-eyed 
Scandinavians. We accept! When they become blue-eyed Scandinavians, we'll move 
on to Phase Two.203
Given that the Roadmap did not deal with the creation of a Palestinian state until its 
second and third phases, with progress contingent upon the first, the notion of a delayed 
first phase was a chief concern for the Palestinians.204 These concerns were 
compounded by the scale of the Palestinian security reforms contained within Phase 
One and exacerbated by Arafat’s unwillingness to confront radical groups and Abbas’ 
limited powers as Prime Minister.2(b Despite having to ‘fight’ the Palestinians on 
security reform, Muasher argued that there was ‘no comparison’ between the 
Palestinian’s limited ability, or motivation, to combat terrorism and Israel’s Tack of 
seriousness’ about the Roadmap process as a whole:
Israel fundamentally objected to the principle of a Palestinian state, not to a detailed 
matter of security or another issue like that. So you can’t equate the two in my view.206
200 As early as 18 December 2002 Sharon had made his interpretation of the sequencing of the Roadmap 
clear: ‘the concept behind the plan is that only security will lead to peace. And in that sequence.' 
[emphasis added] See: Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Address by PM Ariel Sharon at the Fourth 
Herzliya Conference," Herzliya, Israel: 18 December, 2003.
201 Kurtzer. Interview with the author, Princeton, NJ, October, 2011.
202 The paradox of the ‘security first’ doctrine was summarised succinctly, and perhaps unintentionally, 
by Ariel Sharon at the 4 June 2003 Aqaba Summit, when he stated that ‘ultimately, permanent security 
requires peace, and permanent peace can only be obtained through security.’ See: US Department of 
State, "President Bush Meets with Leaders of Jordan, Israel and Palestinian Authority," Aqaba, Jordan: 4 
June, 2003.
203 Bruck, "Back Roads."
204 Muasher. Interview with the author, Washington, DC, October, 2011.
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According to Kurtzer, despite the misgivings on the Israeli side about the Roadmap, 
Israel felt unable at that time, especially given the context of US casualties in Iraq, to 
outright reject the plan.“ Consequently, they sought, through their reservations, to 
‘encumber it in a way that made it difficult to float,’ and to reserve their ability to deny 
later having agreed to specific commitments.208 Likewise, deniability was a key to the 
US response to the reservations. While promising to ‘address’ Israeli concerns, the Bush 
Administration continued the strategy that had underpinned Powell’s recent visit to the 
region. Specifically, this was to push for progress on the implementation of the plan, 
leaving the reservations to be resolved later on in the process, if at all. As Kurtzer noted:
...the President basically said ‘thank you very much’ and kind of set aside the 
reservations, because we never really did anything to address them, and proceeded to 
plunge into what we hoped would be the Roadmap implementation.209
The US approach severely undermined the Palestinian strategy of accepting the
Roadmap ‘as is’ under the proviso that Israel would be forced either to accept or reject
the plan in its original form. Essentially it allowed the Israelis to move forward
maintaining both positions. Muasher argued that the failure of the United States to
address the antithetical nature of the Israeli reservations at the time of their issuance
essentially nullified the Roadmap document.211 Conversely, Kurtzer argued that by
sidestepping the Israeli reservations, the United States avoided unending negotiations
that would have smothered the process before it had begun, and pursued political
212momentum that might be helpful in future efforts to resolve those differences.
The Aqaba Summit
In support of this goal, the Bush Administration convened a two day Summit in Jordan 
and Egypt to launch the Roadmap process between the parties and to encourage 
cooperation from regional actors. The two day multiple location format was a response 
to the reservations of some Arab leaders to attend a Summit in which Israeli
207 Kurtzer. Interview with the author, Princeton, NJ, October, 2011.
208 Ibid.
209 Ibid.
210 For example, in an 11 January 2004 press conference, Sharon emphasised Israeli acceptance of the 
Roadmap was inclusive of the reservations, when he stated that ‘we adopted the Roadmap, with the 14 
points our reservations [sic], and that's what the government approved.’ See: Israel Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, "Address by Prime Minister Ariel Sharon to the Foreign Press Corps in Israel," Jerusalem, Israel: 
11 January, 2004.
211 Muasher. Interview with the author, Washington, DC, October, 2011.
212 As Kurtzer argued: ‘...if the President wanted to let the Roadmap die, the Israelis have reservations, 
and you send your diplomats off to negotiate, and then it’s dead.’ Kurtzer. Interview with the author, 
Princeton, NJ, October, 2011.
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representatives would be present.213 Consequently, Bush met first with key regional 
actors at Sharm el-Sheikh on 3 June 2003,214 and then with Israelis and Palestinians at 
Aqaba, Jordan, on 4 June. Importantly, Arafat was not invited to attend meetings on 
either day, marking the first time since becoming leader that the PLO Chairman had 
been superseded by another Palestinian in negotiations with the US. Furthermore, 
despite the fact that it was meant to launch the Roadmap, members of the Quartet other 
than the United States were also excluded from the Aqaba event.
On 4 June 2003, Bush met separately with the Israeli and Palestinian delegations, and 
then hosted a joint meeting with both parties. Security was a key focus of this meeting, 
and purportedly heated discussions erupted between Mohammad Dahlan (acting as the 
‘presumptive’ Palestinian Interior Minister), Israeli Defence Minister Shaul Mofaz, and
91 SIsraeli Prime Minister Sharon. After this meeting, Bush reportedly told National 
Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice that:
We have a problem with Sharon I can see, but I like that young man [Dahlan] and I 
think their prime minister is incapable of lying. I hope that they will be successful. We 
can work with them.216
To conclude the Aqaba Summit, King Abdullah, President Bush, Prime Minister Abbas 
and Prime Minister Sharon delivered addresses to the international media. US officials 
had been working with both parties in the region, but particularly with the Palestinians, 
for weeks on the wording of the speeches, with the dual aims that Abbas would call for 
an end to the intifada and Sharon would emphasise the need for territorial contiguity in 
the future state of Palestine.217 Consequently, Abbas stated that ‘the armed intifada must 
end, and we must use and resort to peaceful means in our quest to end the occupation 
and the suffering of Palestinians and Israelis.’218
Sharon promised to ‘immediately begin to remove unauthorized outposts’ in the 
occupied territories, and also that:
213 Bregman, Elusive Peace: How the Holy Land Defeated America, p. 255.
214 Specifically, Bush met with King Abdullah II of Jordan, Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia, 
Hosni Mubarak of Egypt, King Hamad Al-Khalifa of Bahrain, and Mahmoud Abbas.
213 For an in-depth account of this meeting, see: Bregman, Elusive Peace: How the Holy Land Defeated 
America, p. 258.
216 Eldar, A., "Bush Likes Dahlan, Believes Abbas, and Has a 'Problem with Sharon'," Haaretz, 10 June, 
2003.
217 Bregman, Elusive Peace: How the Holy Land Defeated America, p. 259.
2IX US Department of State, "President Bush Meets with Leaders of Jordan, Israel and Palestinian 
Authority."
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We can also reassure our Palestinian partners that we understand the importance of 
territorial contiguity in the West Bank for a viable Palestinian state. Israeli policy in 
the territories that are subject to direct negotiations with the Palestinians will reflect 
this fact.219
While the tone and content of the speeches caused immediate concern in the Palestinian 
territories,220 for the work of the Quartet, the most important announcement at the 
Aqaba Summit was the appointment of US diplomat John Wolf, who had no prior 
experience in the Middle East, as chief of the ‘US coordination and Monitoring 
Mission’ for the Middle East peace process. Without informing their Quartet partners, 
the United States had effectively conceded to the fourth Israeli reservation to the 
Roadmap, which demanded that any monitoring presence be ‘under American 
management.’ Furthermore, active oversight of Wolf’s mission was conducted by 
Rice, a move which exacerbated tensions between the White House and the State
994Department.
After Wolf arrived in Israel on 15 June 2003, he immediately met with Israeli and 
Palestinian representatives, and began working on a security agreement to transfer 
control of the Gaza Strip and Bethlehem from the IDF to the Palestinian security 
services.22'^  Issues of security dominated the post Aqaba political process, and Sharon 
made clear on 20 June 2003 that this would continue to be the case:
220 Bregman quotes an American official involved in the preparation of the speeches who noted that ‘what 
we wanted Abu Mäzen to say probably stretched the limits more than what Sharon had to say. He stuck 
his neck out, and was widely criticized for it on the Palestinian street.’ Bregman, Elusive Peace: How the 
Holy Land Defeated America, p. 261.
221 John Wolf took leave from his position as Assistant Secretary of State for Nonproliferation in order to 
act as the American envoy to the MEPP. In a Washington Post article, Bush Administration officials 
argued that W olfs relative inexperience in the region would be an advantage, as neither party could 
accuse him of any pre-conceived bias. See: Kessler, G., "For Mideast Envoy, Rookie Status May Be an 
Advantage," The Washington Post, 22 July, 2003.
222 US Department of State, "Road Map for Peace in the Middle East: Secretary Colin L. Powell and 
National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice " Aqaba, Jordan: 4 June, 2003.
222 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Israel's Response to the Roadmap."
224 Rice recounted that: ‘I was concerned that I might be taking on too much of an operational role for a 
national security advisor. But it seemed to be one of those times when it was important to use my close 
relationship with the President to push the process forward. I felt bad that this produced press stories of a 
split between Colin and me. There was not. I kept him informed, and State supported my work. But some 
saw it as an affront to the nation’s chief diplomat.’ Rice, No Higher Honor: A Memoir of My Years in 
Washington, p. 219.
22? Wolf recounted to Bregman that ‘the Israelis just kept going on about their expectations of me, and of 
the Palestinians. I don’t think I recall them mentioning anything they had to do. They said they expected 
us to be tough with the Palestinians and make sure they comply fully with their obligations...they have to 
deal with terrorism, and if they don’t the process can’t go forward.’ Bregman, Elusive Peace: How the 
Holy Land Defeated America, p. 264.
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So long as there is terror, there will be no political process. Political processes cannot 
coincide with terror. That is why we expect the Palestinian Authority to wage a true, 
genuine struggle against terrorism, a true, genuine one. Without that, I believe we 
cannot reach peace or a political arrangement.226
President Bush made similar remarks the next month.227 Thus, during this period, Wolf 
was negotiating an agreement on security in Gaza at the same time that Abbas was 
negotiating with the Palestinian factions to declare a ceasefire. In this context, 122 days 
since their last statement, the Quartet met at the Movenpick hotel at the Dead Sea, 
Jordan, to discuss the situation. The 22 June 2003 Quartet statement was supportive of 
Abbas’ efforts, and, somewhat ironically, welcomed the mission of John Wolf, labelling 
it a:
Credible and effective structure led by the United States, in close cooperation with the 
Quartet, to coordinate, monitor, and promote implementation of the parties' 
commitments and responsibilities, as laid out in the roadmap.228
Importantly, in the press conference after the Quartet statement was issued, Annan 
asked to speak in his capacity as the UNSG, and noted that:
I would wish to say that in keeping with the approach laid out in the roadmap, the 
principle of parallelism should be maintained. We must address security, humanitarian 
and political issues at the same time...Unless the Palestinians feel a positive change in 
their daily lives, feel a change in their daily lives including movement restrictions, 
freezing settlement activities and re-establishing economic activity, I fear that there 
will not be sufficient public support to sustain peace.229
On 27 June 2003, W olf concluded negotiations on the ‘Gaza Agreement,’ which handed 
over security responsibilities from the IDF to the Palestinian security services in Gaza 
and Bethlehem. The following day, Abbas concluded his ceasefire negotiations with 
the Palestinian factions, obtaining a three month cessation of hostilities from Hamas,
99  1Islamic Jihad, and Fatah’s Tanzim (but excluding the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade).
226 US Department of State, "Joint Press Conference with Israeli Prime Minister Sharon."
227 When questioned about Israeli settlements in the occupied West Bank, President Bush stated that ‘the 
more progress there's made on terror, the more progress there will be made on difficult issues [i.e. 
settlements]. See: US Department of State, "President Bush Welcomes Prime Minister Abbas to White 
House," The Rose Garden, The White House, Washington, DC: 25 July, 2003.
228 US Department of State, "Statement by the Quartet," Movenpick, Dead Sea: 22 June, 2003.
~2t) US Department of State, "Joint Press Briefing at the World Economic Forum With United Nations 
Secretary General Kofi Annan, Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov, European Union High 
Representative Javier Solana, and Greek Foreign Minister George Papandreou," Dead Sea, Jordan: 22 
June,2003.
230 See: Bregman, Elusive Peace: How the Holy Land Defeated America, pp. 264-7.
231 Ibid., p .267.
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The West Bank Barrier
It was during the subsequent lull in violence that a major issue in the Middle East peace 
process came to the forefront, namely the construction of a barrier through the West 
Bank for the ostensible purpose of reducing Palestinian terrorist attacks in Israeli
233territory. "  Annan noted that:
The construction of the separation wall is a unilateral act not in keeping with the road 
map. Its building has involved the separation of Palestinians from their lands and from 
each other.234
The barrier created a significant hurdle for the implementation of the Roadmap, and 
during this period reports emerged that Israeli and Palestinian officials now considered 
the Quartet to be ‘dead.’235 On 25 July 2003, Abbas met with Bush at the White House 
(a privilege that had been denied to Arafat) and used the occasion to seek an 
intervention from the President on the issue of the barrier.236 When asked about their 
discussion in the press conference following their meeting, Bush stated:
I think the wall is a problem, and I discussed this with Ariel Sharon. It is very difficult 
to develop confidence between the Palestinians and Israel with a wall snaking through 
the West Bank.237
Bush welcomed Sharon’s commitment to come to Washington to discuss the barrier, 
and four days later Sharon stood with Bush to declare that ‘the security fence will 
continue to be built, with every effort to minimize the infringement on the daily life of
232 The all-encompassing term ‘barrier’ is used in this thesis to describe the construction built by Israel in 
this context, in part to neutralise the semantic discussions about the appropriateness of the terms ‘wall’ 
and ‘fence,’ and to remove loaded terms such as ‘security’ or ‘separation’. This should not be interpreted 
as a comment on the nature of the construction, which includes tall concrete walls, guard towers, and 
sections of fencing. Furthermore, discussion of the stated and unstated purposes of the barrier is included 
in this thesis, but the terminology employed in this analysis is deliberately value neutral.
233 According to Annan, when he confronted Ariel Sharon about the path and nature of the West Bank 
barrier, Sharon stated that ‘good fences make good neighbours,’ to which Annan replied ‘but only if the 
fence is not built through your neighbour’s land.’ See: Annan, Interventions: A Life in War and Peace, p. 
253.
234 United Nations Security Council, "Report of the Secretary General on the Question of Palestine," 
United Nations: A/58/416-S/2003/947: 10 October, 2003, p. 11.
235 Ward Anderson, J., "Palestinians Wary of Peace Plan Shift: Some Call New Approach One-Sided," 
Washington Post, 24 July, 2003.
236 According to an account in Bregman, Abbas presented Bush with a detailed map of the West Bank 
showing the proposed, and current, route of the barrier, and then organised for a member of the media to 
ask Bush about the wall in the press conference following their meeting. See: Bregman, Elusive Peace: 
How the Holy Land Defeated America, p. 270.
237 US Department of State, "President Bush Welcomes Prime Minister Abbas to White House."
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the Palestinian population.’238 Furthermore, Bush outlined a softened stance on the 
barrier, which he now called a ‘fence.’
The Bush Administration, including the State Department,240 had resolved to monitor 
the path of the barrier, but not to take any action that would halt its construction, 
essentially giving Sharon a green light to continue the process.241 This was confirmed 
on 14 October 2003, when the United States vetoed a United Nations Security Council 
Resolution condemning the barrier." “
Discussion of the barrier was sidelined by the violence of August 2003, which ended the 
ceasefire between the parties and derailed the already failing Roadmap process. On 14 
August 2003, the IDF killed Mohammed Seder, the head of Islamic Jihad’s militant 
wing in Hebron, and Abbas and Dahlan tried in vain to restrain Hamas from retaliating 
amid alleged interference from Arafat, who had maintained strong involvement in the 
security sector. Ultimately, neither Abbas nor Dahlan succeeded, and on 19 August 
2003 a Hamas suicide bomber, Majd Zaatri, detonated an explosives belt on a crowded 
bus in Jerusalem, killing 23 and injuring 100 others. Israel responded two days later 
with a helicopter strike in Gaza that killed Hamas official Ismail Abu Shanab.
For the Bush Administration, the perceived failure of Abbas and Dahlan to restrain the 
Palestinian factions dealt a heavy blow to the credibility of the Palestinian leaders.244
_3H US Department of State, "President Bush Discusses Middle East Peace With Prime Minister Sharon," 
The Rose Garden, The White House, Washington, DC: 29 July, 2003.
239 Bush stated: ‘But, look, the fence is a sensitive issue, I understand. And the Prime Minister made it 
very clear to me that it was a sensitive issue. And my promise to him is we’ll continue to discuss and to 
dialogue how best to make sure that the fence sends the right signal that not only is security important, 
but the ability for the Palestinians to live a normal life is important, as well.’ Ibid.
240 In an interview with Reuters, Powell stated that the barrier was an ‘area that will have to be discussed 
as we move forward,’ noting that ‘there are other phases of construction coming along and the President 
has made it clear that if the fence is constructed in a way which continues to intrude on Palestinian land — 
even if it is compensated for — in a way that makes it harder to go forward with the additional elements of 
the roadmap, especially the creation of a Palestinian state with transitional features to it on the way to a 
final solution, a permanent solution, then that is a problem.’ See: US Department of State, "Interview with 
Reuters," Washington, DC: 30 July, 2003.
241 The key to understanding this decision was the ‘security dimension’ of the barrier. As Powell 
recounted to Bregman, ‘it’s hard to argue when you're under attack that you shouldn’t protect yourself, 
and if one way to protect yourself is with a fence, that’s fine... [Sharon’s] counter argument was a fence 
can go up, a fence can come down, so we’re not making a final judgment as to where the line will be.’ 
Bregman, Elusive Peace: How the Holy Land Defeated America, p. 271.
242 United Nations Security Council, "Security Council Fails to Adopt Draft Resolution Declaring Illegal 
Israeli Construction of Wall in Occupied Territories," 4842nd Meeting, 14 October, 2003.
243 Bregman, Elusive Peace: How the Holy Land Defeated America, p. 272.
244 According to Muasher, in September 2003, during the visit of King Abdullah II of Jordan to Camp 
David, Bush remarked that he had ‘bet on Abbas, and lost the bet,’ and that Powell also expressed 
disappointment with Abbas and Dahlan. Furthermore, Bush reportedly commented on the prism through 
which he was viewing the recent violence, stating that ‘We are in a war mentality. If we fight terror there
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Also, as stated previously, the deteriorating security situation undermined the nascent 
political process. According to Wolf, after the violence of August 2003 ‘the whole 
process [of Roadmap implementation] was constipated.’245 Powell attempted to counter 
the notion of a vanishing Roadmap process, stating that:
The end of the roadmap is a cliff that both sides will fall off of, and so we have to 
understand the consequences of the end of the roadmap. So it is not the end of the 
roadmap.246
On 6 September 2003, Abbas resigned as Palestinian Prime Minister, citing interference 
from Arafat, including through the original disempowerment of Prime Ministerial 
position, and a lack of support from the United States and Israel. _For the US, this 
created a so-called ‘pause’ in the Roadmap process, as the most trusted Palestinian 
interlocutor was no longer available, and the incoming PM, Palestinian Legislative 
Council speaker Ahmed Qureia (Abu Ala), did not have a cabinet sworn in. For the 
United States in particular, the extent to which the incoming Prime Minister had 
legitimate control over the security forces was paramount for the continuation of the 
political process.249 After the attacks in August, Powell stated that:
We [The United States] pressed the Palestinians. They tried to make a play for control 
of all the security forces and Abu Mäzen couldn't pull it off, and he felt he had to 
resign.250
On 25 September 2003, in light of the deteriorating political and security situation, Wolf 
was recalled to Washington until further notice, having monitored the progress of the 
parties for three months, and without publishing any of his findings. As reported by 
Kessler, ‘the envoy, John S. Wolf, produced a multicolored matrix that documented 
how each side failed to meet agreed targets, but it was never made public to avoid
[in the occupied territories], I am prepared to gallop.’ See: Muasher, The Arab Center: The Promise o f 
Moderation, p. 195.
245 Bregman, Elusive Peace: How the Holy Land Defeated America, p. 275.
246 US Department of State, "Remarks with United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan After Their 
Meeting " New York city: 21 August, 2003.
247 Bregman, Elusive Peace: How the Holy Land Defeated America, pp. 277-8.
248 US Department of State, "Interview by the Washington Post: Secretary Colin L. Powell," Washington, 
DC: 3 October, 2003.
249 As Powell noted in the press conference following the September 26 statement, ‘That roadmap is still 
valid, and we are now waiting to see whether or not the Palestinian people are able to put in place, 
through their own system, a prime minister who will enjoy political authority and control over all the 
security forces so that we can start moving again down the path laid out by the roadmap.’ US Department 
of State, "Press Availabilty With UN Secretary General Kofi Annan; Foreign Minister Franco Frattini of 
Italy in the Capacity of European Union Presidency; European Union High Representative Javier Solana; 
and Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov of the Russian Federation," New York City: 26 September, 2003.
250 US Department of State, "Interview by the Washington Post: Secretary Colin L. Powell."
128
Chapter Five: The Roadmap Process, 2002-2003
embarrassing disclosures.’251 The following day, the Quartet members met for the first 
time in three months to issue their eighth statement. This statement reflected the 
complex and worsening circumstances surrounding the stalled implementation of the 
Roadmap and demonstrated the challenges faced by the Quartet members in this 
context.“ The statement urged the parties to the conflict to ‘simultaneously address the 
core concerns of the other,’ and condemned the ‘vicious terror attacks of August and 
September carried out by Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade.’“
In addition, it noted with dismay the resignation of Abbas, and expressed ‘great 
concern’ about the ‘actual and proposed route of Israel’s West Bank Fence.’254 
Furthermore, the Quartet members used the statement to flag the potential use of a 
UNSCR to ‘increase the authority’ of the grouping regarding enforcing implementation 
from the parties.255 The statement ended with an affirmation that the Quartet members 
intended to ‘continue to follow closely the implementation by the parties of their 
obligations,’ and to meet again prior to the end of 2003.
As was the case with many of the Quartet statements, the subtext of the 26 September 
2003 meeting was more apparent in the press conference that followed, where the issue 
of the ongoing utility of the grouping dominated the proceedings. When asked whether 
the Quartet was an exercise in futility, Annan defended the grouping, but admitted that 
the present circumstances provided few options for progress:
Each member [of the Quartet] brings something to the table. And the fact that the US 
may have a greater influence does not mean the others don't have a role. Obviously, 
the process, as I said, is in a bit of a distress, but it is the only option we have and we 
are going to press the parties to honor their commitments on the roadmap. And all of
251 Kessler, '"Road Map' Setbacks Highligh US Pattern."
252 In particular, it was evident in the press conference following the statement that the non-American 
Quartet members used the opportunity to lobby US Secretary of State Powell about increasing their 
respective involvement in the Roadmap monitoring process.
253 US Department of State, "Final Quartet Statement," New York City: 26 September, 2003.
254 Ibid.
255 Sergei Lavrov noted in the press conference following the statement that ‘we need to think about how 
to increase the powers, the authority of the Quartet so that the roadmap can be implemented in practice. It 
could be through a resolution of the Security Council.’ See: US Department of State, "Press Availabilty 
With UN Secretary General Kofi Annan; Foreign Minister Franco Frattini o f Italy in the Capacity of 
European Union Presidency; European Union High Representative Javier Solana; and Foreign Minister 
Igor Ivanov of the Russian Federation."
256 It is unclear whether the principals actually met during this period, but the records show that the next 
Quartet statement was not issued until May 2004. US Department of State, "Final Quartet Statement."
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us here on this podium have a role to play, and the importance of our influence may 
differ from time to time and differ from party to party.257
On 2 October 2003, as the security situation continued to worsen, the United States 
announced the redesignation of 25 groups as foreign terrorist organisations under US 
law, including Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine 
(with al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade already on the list). On 15 October, a US convoy was 
bombed in Gaza, killing three security personnel and seriously injuring another .2:>9 After 
the attack, the US Monitoring Mission headquarters were decommissioned, and the 
team members returned to Jerusalem. This effectively ended the official monitoring of 
the Roadmap.
The breakdown in the ceasefire and the stalled implementation of the Roadmap created 
fertile ground for the involvement of international actors in the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict. As the Quartet members had hinted in September, they attempted to re-start 
the Roadmap process through the UN Security Council, where, on 19 November 2003, 
the Roadmap was enshrined in UNSCR 1515 U 1 The resolution welcomed and 
encouraged the ‘diplomatic efforts of the international Quartet,’ endorsed the ‘Quartet 
Performance-based Roadmap to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the Israeli- 
Palestinian Conflict,’ and called on the parties to fulfill their obligations under the 
Roadmap ‘in cooperation with the Quartet’.“ “ In effect, however, UNSCR 1515 merely 
added another layer to an already complicated Roadmap process, by authorising a 
marginalised and informal grouping to oversee a stalled implementation process 
between two parties with differing interpretations of their commitments. Furthermore,
2?7 US Department of State, "Press Availabilty With UN Secretary General Kofi Annan; Foreign Minister 
Franco Frattini o f Italy in the Capacity of European Union Presidency; European Union High 
Representative Javier Solana; and Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov of the Russian Federation."
258 US Department of State, "Redesignation of Foreign Terrorist Organizations," Washington, DC: 2 
October, 2003.
259 The security personnel were accompanying the convoy visiting Gaza to conduct interviews for 
Fulbright scholarships.
260 It was during this low ebb that the Geneva Accord, a Swiss track II initiative, was signed in Jordan 
after two years of negotiations. The document offered a model o f a conclusive peace treaty on all final 
status issues negotiated between parliamentarians, academics and officials from Israel and Palestine.
261 United Nations Security Council, "Resolution 1515: The Situation in the Middle East, Including the 
Palestinian Question," S/RES/1515: 19 November, 2003.
262 Ibid.
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the resolution also elevated the text of the Roadmap from an ad hoc agreement among 
members of the international community into a form of international law.263
One month after the Roadmap process was endorsed by the UN Security Council, 
Sharon altered the discourse of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, further sidelining the 
plan. On 18 December 2003, in a speech at the Herzliya Conference, the Israeli Prime 
Minister announced his intention to unilaterally withdraw Israel Defense Forces and 
settlers from the Gaza Strip.264 Sharon positioned this policy as a response to supposed 
Palestinian inaction regarding security reform, stating that he did ‘not intend to wait for 
them indefinitely.’266 Critically, the disengagement policy outlined by Sharon was 
presented as an alternative to the Roadmap process, where it was argued that if the 
Palestinians ‘continue to disregard their part in implementing the Roadmap then Israel 
will initiate the unilateral security step of disengagement from the Palestinians.’266 
Furthermore, Sharon made it clear that through the ‘Disengagement Plan’ the 
Palestinians would ‘receive much less than they would have received through direct 
negotiations as set out in the Roadmap.’
By the end of 2003, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was at a crossroads. The Roadmap 
process, based on compromise and ambiguity, was derailed by Israeli re-interpretation, 
and was followed by an outbreak of political violence. This was exacerbated by a 
divided and permissive Bush Administration and non-US Quartet members proving 
unable to affect meaningful independent change. While the Quartet members had been 
involved in the crafting of the Roadmap document and the push for Palestinian political 
and security reform, the breakdown in the implementation process and Abbas’ 
resignation had undone the two major achievements of the grouping. Furthermore, the 
proposed unilateral Israeli disengagement came to dominate the work of the Quartet 
members in the following years. This further sidelined the Roadmap plan and, by 
extension, reduced the perceived legitimacy and importance of the grouping.
263 As a European Union official remarked, despite the Israeli reservations, the ‘Roadmap is accepted by 
the parties and has been endorsed by the Security Council, so as far as w e’re concerned, it’s international 
law.’ EU Official. Interview with the author, Brussels, Belgium, November, 2011.
264 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Address by PM Ariel Sharon at the Fourth Herzliya Conference."
265 Ibid.
266 Ibid.
267 Ibid.
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Whether we will be able to advance the Roadmap, or will have to implement the 
Disengagement Plan, experience has taught us that, together, through broad national 
consensus, we can do great things.
- Ariel Sharon, Israeli Prime Minister (2001-2006).'
The significance of the disengagement plan is the freezing of the peace process. And 
when you freeze that process, you prevent the establishment of a Palestinian state, and 
you prevent a discussion of the refugees, the borders and Jerusalem. Effectively, this 
whole package called the Palestinian state, with all that it entails, has been removed 
indefinitely from our agenda. And all this with authority and permission. All with a 
presidential blessing and the ratification of both houses of Congress.
- Dov Weissglass, senior advisor to Israeli Prime Minister Ariel 
Sharon (2001-2006).1 2 3
Introduction
The Gaza disengagement was a paradigm shift within the context of the Israeli- 
Palestinian conflict. By declaring his intention to unilaterally withdraw Israeli personnel 
from territory occupied since 1967, Prime Minister Sharon circumvented the political 
process and focused the discourse of the peace process entirely on territorial and 
security issues. For the members of the Quartet, Sharon’s plan was a challenge to both 
the viability of the Roadmap implementation process and to the continued utility of the 
grouping itself.’
Presented as an alternative to the Roadmap process, the proposed disengagement plan 
contained components that were inimical to the steps called for in the Roadmap 
document. For example, Sharon outlined in his Herzliya speech that the government of 
Israel would halt the construction of additional settlements, but stopped short of the total 
freeze within existing settlements called for in the Roadmap.4 Furthermore, while Israeli 
military personnel and settlers were to be withdrawn from inside the Gaza Strip, the 
disengagement plan also called for the parallel solidification of other large Israeli
1 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Address by PM Ariel Sharon at the Fourth Herzliya Conference," 
Herzliya, Israel: 18 December, 2003.
2 Shavit, A., "Top PM Aide: Gaza Plan Aims to Freeze the Peace Process," Haaretz, 6 October, 2004.
3 In 2004 the members of the Quartet issued only two statements; one on 4 May, and one on 23 
September. As Jordanian Foreign Minister Marwan Muasher explained, the Roadmap had elevated the 
importance of the Quartet for the Arab states, but ‘when that plan disappeared, what was there to talk to 
the Quartet about? There was no negotiations process, no plan, so the whole stature was lowered.’ 
Muasher, M., Former Jordanian Foreign Minister and current Vice President for studies at the Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, interview with the author, Washington, DC, October, 2011.
4 In the speech, Sharon stated that there would be ‘no construction beyond the existing construction line, 
no expropriation of land for construction, no special economic incentives and no construction of new 
settlements.’ See: Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Address by PM Ariel Sharon at the Fourth Herzliya 
Conference."
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settlements, predominantly within the West Bank, that were deemed likely to become 
part of Israel in any future resolution of the territorial issues.5
In essence, the disengagement plan pre-supposed the parameters of any future territorial 
resolution, and was, therefore, a unilateral pre-determination of a final status issue, 
explicitly ruled out by the Roadmap.6 Furthermore, despite the UN General Assembly 
voting on 8 December 20037 8to request an advisory opinion from the International Court
of Justice on the legal consequences of Israel’s barrier in the West Bank, Sharon
8promised also to ‘greatly accelerate the construction of the security fence.’
The use of the Quartet as a platform for shaping the disengagement process was 
complicated by the fact that, in November 2003, Sharon received tacit approval of his 
strategy from Bush Administration officials in Rome.9 For the non-US members of the 
Quartet, despite the fact that the disengagement plan sidelined the Roadmap process, it 
was difficult to oppose outright because of both US support and the politically 
appealing notion of Israeli plans to voluntarily cede territory to Palestinians. As Annan 
recounted later:
Whatever my considerable misgivings, I decided that I could not be opposed to an 
Israeli withdrawal from land that did not belong to Israel. But I was equally clear that 
this was the “right thing, done the wrong way.” 10
While the actual disengagement did not commence until 15 August 2005, discussion of 
the plan, and the coordination of efforts to facilitate its execution, dominated the 
discourse of the Middle East peace process until that date, sidelining both the Roadmap 
and the Quartet.
5 Sharon stated that: ‘Settlements which will be relocated are those which will not be included in the 
territory of the State of Israel in the framework of any possible future permanent agreement. At the same 
time, in the framework of the Disengagement Plan, Israel will strengthen its control over those same areas 
in the Land of Israel which will constitute an inseparable part of the State of Israel in any future 
agreement.’ Ibid.
6 As discussed previously, the Roadmap clearly established that territorial issues were to addressed in 
Phase Three, and to be negotiated between the Israelis and Palestinians. See: US Department of State, "A 
Performance-Based Roadmap to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict," 
Washington, DC: 30 April, 2003.
7 United Nations General Assembly, "Illegal Israeli Actions in Occupied East Jerusalem and the Rest of 
the Occupied Palestinian Territory," A/RES/ES-10/14, New York City: 8 December, 2003.
8 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Address by PM Ariel Sharon at the Fourth Herzliya Conference."
9 According to an interview with an American official presented in Elusive Peace, Sharon, accompanied 
by his Chief of Staff Dov Weissglass, met with American NSC specialist Elliott Abrams on 19 November 
in Rome to discuss the disengagement plan. See: Bregman, A., Elusive Peace: How the Holy Land 
Defeated America (London; New York: Penguin, 2005), p. 280.
10 Annan, K., Interventions: A Life in War and Peace (New York: Penguin Press, 2012), p. 289.
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This chapter seeks to answer the question, what were the outputs o f the Quartet in 2004 
and 2005?
In essence, this chapter argues that throughout 2004 and 2005 the members of the 
Quartet operated almost exclusively in a reactive capacity to developments in the 
Middle East and Washington. The disengagement plan sidelined both the Roadmap and 
the non-US members of the Quartet and changed the trajectory of the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict. Consequently, the work of the Quartet members during the disengagement 
period was constrained by circumstances outside their control or influence.
The chapter is divided into two chronological sections. The first section examines the 
events of 2004, including the exchange of letters between President Bush and Prime 
Minister Sharon, and the domestic political contest in Israel over the proposed 
disengagement plan. The second section examines the events of 2005, including the 
appointment of the Quartet envoy to the disengagement process, the politics 
surrounding the execution of the disengagement operation, and the issues surrounding 
the participation of Hamas in the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) elections.
2004: The Israeli Disengagement Plan
If you look at the history of the Quartet, it was a working mechanism that produced 
things under extremely difficult circumstances. Remember, from the Israelis there was 
a complete boycott of Arafat, and Sharon stood for, number one, sequentialism, which 
meant that absolutely nothing happened politically, and then unilateralism with Gaza. 
To be an envoy and negotiator in such a climate was extremely frustrating and 
difficult, but what carried us through that period was the Quartet.
- Terje Roed-Larsen, United Nations Special Coordinator for 
the Middle East Peace Process (1999-2004).'1
In early 2004, Sharon had yet to secure approval for the disengagement plan from the 
members of his cabinet, who were wary of the territorial concessions contained in the 
plan.12 In the period following his Herzliya speech, Sharon sought to bolster his 
domestic political campaign for disengagement by gaining political assurances from the 
Bush Administration. Specifically, the Israeli Prime Minister sought to allay domestic 
concerns that territorial concessions in Gaza would be followed by similar territorial
11 Roed-Larsen, T., Former United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East peace process, 
interview with the author, New York City, October, 2011.
12 On 6 June 2004, Sharon’s cabinet approved the disengagement plan while proposing several 
addendums. These will be discussed in a subsequent section of this chapter. See: Israel Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, "The Cabinet Resolution Regarding the Disengagement Plan," Tel Aviv, Israel: 6 June,
2004.
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concessions in the West Bank.11 This proposed assurance was to come from an 
exchange of letters between Sharon and Bush that would declare the need for the 
changes in territorial realities since 1967 to be taken into account in any future peace 
treaty.14 In other words, the Israeli disengagement from Gaza was being offered as a 
quid pro quo for the de facto legitimisation, by Washington, of the largest Israeli 
settlements in the West Bank.15 Compounding this issue was the notion, presented by 
Israeli officials such as Weissglass, of equivalence between the Gaza Strip and the West 
Bank in Israeli strategic calculations. Indeed, in the previous year Sharon had already 
begun to link the declining state of Israeli’s economy to the continuation of the 
occupation, stating that:
...the thought and idea that we can continue keeping under occupation -  we might not 
like the word, but it is an occupation -  3.5 million Palestinians, is very bad for Israel, 
the Palestinians, and Israel’s economy.'6
Furthermore, while Sharon presented the entire occupation as a burden on the Israeli 
economy, the occupation in Gaza was particularly burdensome. As Rice recounted:
The IDF no longer wanted to defend those isolated settlements, and Gaza, with its 
large, angry, and poor Palestinian population, had no future in a Jewish democratic 
state.17
The notion of reducing Israeli liabilities and ongoing financial burdens in the Gaza 
Strip (while solidifying the Israeli presence in the West Bank) was a political win-win 
for the Israelis, not a concession. As Annan argued later:
Sharon viewed the disengagement as a tool to rid Israel of a liability while 
consolidating its hold on key West Bank settlement blocs.18
In order to counteract this narrative, US officials sought to convince the Israeli Prime 
Minister to also evacuate a limited number of settlements in the West Bank. According
13 Rice recounted that: ‘To make this advance toward peace, Dubi (Weissglass) said, Sharon needed to 
assure the public that a few of the most established settlements in the West Bank would remain intact in 
any future peace agreement.’ See: Rice, C., No Higher Honor: A Memoir of My Years in Washington, 1st 
ed. (New York: Crown Publishers, 2011), p. 280.
14 In addition to these developments, Sharon also sought to weaken the Hamas leadership structure in the 
lead up to the disengagement. Consequently, on 22 March 2004, the IDF assassinated Sheikh Ahmed 
Yassin, the spiritual leader of Hamas, and on 17 April 2004 assassinated his replacement, Aziz Rantisi. 
See: Bregman, Elusive Peace: How the Holy Land Defeated America, p. 282.
15 These events were also taking place within the context of an American presidential election year, in 
which maintaining the support and cooperation of the Israeli Prime Minister was of importance for 
President Bush.
16 Bennet, J., "Sharon Laments "Occupation" and Israeli Settlers Shudder," The New York Times, 1 June, 
2003.
17 Rice, No Higher Honor: A Memoir of My Years in Washington, p. 280.
18 Annan, Interventions: A Life in War and Peace, p. 288.
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to Powell’s account, presented in Elusive Peace, he urged Sharon to ‘do something in 
the West Bank as well,’ because ‘it’s got to be seen as part of a comprehensive 
approach to the problem and not just [a withdrawal from the Gaza Strip].’ 
Consequently, the Israeli PM reportedly agreed to evacuate the small settlements of 
Kadim, Ganim, Sa-Nur and Chomesh in the northern West Bank.19
Quartet Frustrations Go Public
In January 2004, tensions between the Quartet members went public, with European 
officials admitting that the Roadmap was ‘completely paralysed’ and that the grouping 
was held ‘hostage’ by both a declining process and by US inaction.20 A senior US 
official confirmed that the non-US Quartet members had been ‘ratcheting up the heat,’ 
and that:
It's largely from the Europeans, who are threatening to stop being a silent partner in 
the peace process. But the Russians echo the same message and Kofi Annan has been 
pretty strong on the need for something to be done.21
The more proactive European approach was evident in March 2004, when the European 
Council (EC) issued a statement supporting a return to the Roadmap process that 
discouraged any modification to the 1967 borders decided outside the scope of bilateral 
relations between the Israelis and Palestinians. As negotiations continued between 
Israeli and US officials over the wording of the proposed letters, the EC statement 
declared that:
The European Union will not recognise any change to the pre-1967 borders other than 
those arrived at by agreement between the parties.23
Furthermore, the members of the EC argued that the proposed Israeli withdrawal from 
the Gaza Strip could only be considered a step towards the implementation of the 
Roadmap if it ‘did not involve a transfer of settlement activity to the West Bank,’ if 
‘there was an organized and negotiated handover of responsibility to the Palestinian 
Authority,’ and if ‘Israel facilitated the rehabilitation and reconstruction of Gaza.’24 
European concerns about the disengagement process and the proposed exchange of 
letters between Bush and Sharon were mirrored by those of Jordan’s King Abdullah
19 Bregman, Elusive Peace: How the Holy Land Defeated America, p. 283.
20 Wright, R. and Lynch, C., "US Pressed to Revive Mideast Peace Process; UN, Europe, Russia Explore 
Alternatives," Washington Post, 7 January, 2004.
2 ‘ IbkL
22 European Union Council, "Presidency Conclusions," Brussels, Belgium: 26 March, 2004.
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid.
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when he wrote to Bush on 8 April 2004. According to Jordanian Foreign Minister 
Marwan Muasher, the King told President Bush that:
...the Israeli proposal to withdraw from Gaza should be part of the Road Map leading 
to the achievement of this vision rather than a substitute for it, which would have 
dangerous negative repercussions on Jordan.25
Reportedly, the King also cautioned Bush against any ‘concessions on borders that 
would suggest any major deviation from the 1967 border arrived at through agreement 
by the two parties,’ and argued that the possibility of an agreed solution to the refugee 
problem should also not be diminished by any declarations contained within Bush’s 
letter to Sharon. According to Muasher, Powell tried to dissuade the White House 
from using the particular wording of the final version of the letter, but was ultimately
27unsuccessful.
President Bush and Prime Minister Sharon Exchange Letters 
On 14 April 2004, Bush and Sharon met in Washington DC to exchange the letters that 
had been negotiated by their representatives over the previous months. Sharon’s letter 
to Bush began with a rationalisation of the proposed disengagement. According to 
Sharon, he planned to ‘initiate a process of gradual disengagement with the hope of 
reducing friction between Israelis and Palestinians,’ ostensibly because ‘there exists no
9Q
Palestinian partner with whom to advance peacefully toward a settlement.’
Furthermore, Sharon’s letter claimed that while the disengagement plan sat outside the 
framework of the Roadmap, the two initiatives were not inconsistent; and added that 
Israel would oppose any alternative plan;
2:> Muasher, M., The Arab Center: The Promise of Moderation (New Haven: Yale University Press,
2008), p. 204.
26 Ibid.
27 According to Muasher, Powell said ‘that he had urged the White House to consider my suggestions but 
had failed to convince officials to do so...I knew that Powell agreed with the Jordanian position, and his 
frustration was palpable over the phone.’ See: Ibid., p. 205.
28 According to Rice’s account, she and Dov Weissglass led the negotiations, with input from Prime 
Minister Sharon and American officials Steve Hadley and Elliott Abrams. See: Rice, No Higher Honor: A 
Memoir of My Years in Washington, p. 281.
29 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Exchange of Letters between PM Sharon and President Bush," 
Washington, DC: 14 April, 2004.
30 Sharon’s letter stated that: ‘this initiative, which we are not undertaking under the roadmap, represents 
an independent Israeli plan, yet is not inconsistent with the roadmap.’ Ibid.
31 This particular comment was likely in relation to both the recently signed ‘Geneva Accord,’ and the EC 
statement. Sharon noted that: ‘Progress toward this goal must be anchored exclusively in the Roadmap 
and we will oppose any other plan.’ Ibid.
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The Sharon letter also included a reiteration of the Israeli position on the West Bank 
barrier, stating that it was a ‘security rather than political barrier, temporary rather than 
permanent,’ and that the path of the barrier would take into account ‘consistent with 
security needs, its impact on Palestinians not engaged in terrorist activities.’ Sharon’s 
security-centric characterisation of the Palestinians was repeated in the final section of 
the letter, which outlined the ‘responsibilities facing the state of Israel’:
These include limitations on the growth of settlements; removal of unauthorized 
outposts; and steps to increase, to the extent permitted by security needs, freedom of 
movement for Palestinians not engaged in terrorism.33
Thus, Sharon’s letter to Bush was an attempt to situate the Gaza disengagement plan 
within the notional framework of the Roadmap, to discourage the formulation of 
alternative initiatives by outside actors (i.e. Europeans), and to continue the re­
conceptualisation of Israeli commitments vis-a-vis the Palestinians through the prism of 
Sharon’s ‘security first’ doctrine.
While Bush’s letter to Sharon largely overlapped with the positions outlined by the 
Israeli leader, it also included two important additional passages regarding final status 
issues. Bush’s letter began by supporting the Gaza disengagement plan ,34 and mirroring 
Sharon’s opposition to alternative plans.35 Furthermore, Bush’s letter included a 
conditional acceptance of the Israeli position on the West Bank barrier, essentially 
granting tacit approval of continued construction on the basis of Israeli reassurances;
...your [Sharon’s] government has stated that the barrier being erected by Israel 
should be a security rather than political barrier, should be temporary rather than 
permanent, and therefore not prejudice any final status issues including final borders, 
and its route should take into account, consistent with security needs, its impact on 
Palestinians not engaged in terrorist activities 36
While these passages illustrate the closeness of the positions of the White House and 
Israel at this time, it should be noted that US support for the Israeli disengagement plan 
and inferred acceptance of the West Bank barrier were already established positions of
32 Ibid.
33 The dichotomy present in this phrasing illustrates the skewed perspective of the security-centric 
approach of the Sharon government, crudely dividing Palestinian civilians into those engaging in 
terrorism and those not engaging in terrorism. Ibid.
34 The letter stated: ‘We welcome the disengagement plan you have prepared, under which Israel would 
withdraw certain military installations and all settlements from Gaza, and withdraw certain military 
installations and settlements in the West Bank.’ Ibid.
35 The letter stated that: ‘the United States will do its utmost to prevent any attempt by anyone to impose 
any other plan.’ Ibid.
36 Ibid.
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the Bush Administration.37 Consequently, the most controversial sections of Bush’s 
letter to Sharon were the passages relating to Palestinian refugees and the 1967 borders. 
Indeed, despite US officials, including the President, consistently maintaining that the 
United States was ‘not going to prejudge the final status discussions,’ Bush’s letter to 
Sharon did just that. Firstly, Bush stated that:
The United States is strongly committed to Israel's security and well-being as a Jewish 
state. It seems clear that an agreed, just, fair and realistic framework for a solution to 
the Palestinian refugee issue as part of any final status agreement will need to be 
found through the establishment of a Palestinian state, and the settling of Palestinian 
refugees there, rather than in Israel.39
In one sentence, President Bush had altered the US declaratory position on the 
Palestinian right of return, effectively prejudging a core final status issue. According to 
Rice’s account of the negotiation process leading to Bush’s letter, she was convinced by 
Israeli politician Tzipi Livni’s presentation of Israel’s historical claims to the land:
I took a deep breath and tried to understand, and slowly I came to see what she [Livni] 
meant. Most of us thought of the creation of Israel in the context of the horrors of 
World War II and the Holocaust. But for most Israelis, their country’s birth had 
instead been the fulfilment of a long historical and religious journey to re-establish 
“the Jewish state.” The right of return for Palestinians was inconsistent with the 
conclusion of that thousands-year-old process. Despite the dissonance that it stirred in 
me, I suggested that the President include the line that made clear that Palestinian 
refugees would be expected to live in Palestine. That would allow the democratic state 
of Israel to be “Jewish.”40
Importantly, Bush’s letter to Sharon contradicted the text of the Roadmap on the refugee 
issue, which stated that the parties to the conflict should negotiate an ‘agreed, just, fair, 
and realistic solution’.41 Despite the use of the phrase ‘it seems clear’ to convey 
flexibility on the issue, the Bush letter states unequivocally that the solution to the 
refugee problem ‘will need to be’ one in which Palestinian refugees do not return to 
territory deemed to fall within the State of Israel in any future peace accord. Even 
leaving aside discussions of ‘justice’ and ‘fairness,’ to the extent that it was negotiated 
without the input of the Palestinians and undercut their future bargaining position on the 
issue, this was certainly not an ‘agreed’ solution to the refugee problem.
'7 See the remarks of Colin Powell: US Department of State, "Remarks with High Representative Javier 
Solana of the European Union," Washington, DC: 20 April, 2004. Furthermore, see President Bush: US 
Department of State, "Bush, Blair Discuss Sharon Plan; Future of Iraq in Press Conference," The White 
House, Washington, DC: 16 April, 2004.
’8 US Department of State, "Bush, Blair Discuss Sharon Plan; Future of Iraq in Press Conference."
39 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Exchange of Letters between PM Sharon and President Bush."
40 Rice, No Higher Honor: A Memoir of My Years in Washington, p. 282.
41 US Department of State, "A Performance-Based Roadmap to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the 
Israeli-Palestinian Conflict."
139
Chapter Six: The Disengagement Process, 2004-2005
Furthermore, Bush’s letter also undermined the notion of a full return to the pre-1967 
borders, as called for by UNSCR 242, by advocating the incorporation of the most 
established Israeli settlements in the West Bank into the future state of Israel:
In light of new realities on the ground, including already existing major Israeli 
populations centers, it is unrealistic to expect that the outcome of final status 
negotiations will be a full and complete return to the armistice lines of 1949 [i.e. the 
1967 borders], and all previous efforts to negotiate a two-state solution have reached 
the same conclusion. It is realistic to expect that any final status agreement will only 
be achieved on the basis of mutually agreed changes that reflect these realities.42
While the Roadmap calls for a settlement based on UNSCR 242 and an end to the 
‘occupation that began in 1967,’and does not rule out territorial swaps agreed between 
Israelis and Palestinians,43 Bush’s assertion that it would be ‘unrealistic’ to expect a full 
return to the 1967 borders severely undermined the negotiating position of the 
Palestinians on this issue, essentially taking the largest Israeli settlements ‘off the 
table.’44 Furthermore, by arguing that the most well established Israeli settlements in the 
West Bank should be included in the state of Israel in any future peace accord because 
of their size and relative permanence, Bush’s rationale encouraged further settlement 
construction in occupied territories. As Palestinian Spokesperson Ghassan Khatib 
argued, ‘thirty-five years of illegal settlement expansion have now been recognized and 
legitimated by the president of the only remaining superpower in the world.
The exchange of letters produced an immediate reaction in the Middle E as t46 with 
Jordan’s King Abdullah cancelling his planned trip to Washington until further notice, 
leaving US Secretary of State Powell on the defensive 47
42 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Exchange of Letters between PM Sharon and President Bush."
43 US Department of State, "A Performance-Based Roadmap to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the 
Israeli-Palestinian Conflict."
44 According to Rice’s account, a US concession on Israeli settlements in the West Bank was deemed 
necessary by Sharon to sell the disengagement plan to his domestic constituency. Reportedly,
‘Weissglass said that the prime minister needed to signal that those big population blocks, about 80,000 
settlers in all, would be included in Israel when the Palestinian state was created.’ See: Rice, No Higher 
Honor: A Memoir of My Years in Washington, p. 280.
45 Khatib, G., "Where is President Bush's Vision?," Bitterlemons, 26 April, 2004.
46 Khatib argued that the exchange of letters: ‘...signaled to the Arabs that the United States is ready to 
offer an extraordinary level of support for Israel even when Israel's demands contradict international 
legality, and -  most stunningly -  that American Middle East policy gives no weight at all to American 
relations with the Arab world.’ Ibid.
47 Powell argued that: ‘These are realities that previous negotiators had realized were there, and the 
president pointed them out. And that's what's gotten all of the attention. But they are realities nonetheless, 
whether they're getting a lot of attention or not. And any future negotiators would have had to deal with 
these same realities which the President made explicit.’ See: US Department of State, "Secretary of State 
Colin Powell: Interview on APTV with Barry Schweid and George Gedda," Washington, DC: 19 April, 
2004.
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The letters also sparked immediate criticism from within the EU. On 16 April 2004, an 
EU Foreign Ministers meeting in Tullamore, Ireland, reiterated that ‘the refugee 
question and the manner in which the right of return may be realized is also a final 
status issue,’ and called for an urgent meeting of the Quartet members 49 According to 
EU Commissioner Chris Patten, the exchange of letters between Bush and Sharon 
caused ‘an awful lot of damage’ that the European Union would have to help repair.50
On 18 April 2004, the Bush Administration sought to counter international criticism and 
to clarify its position on Israeli settlements through another letter, this time from Dov 
Weissglass to Condoleezza Rice. The letter contained commitments to define more 
precisely the construction line of settlements in the West Bank, to ‘prepare a list of 
unauthorized outposts with indicative dates of their removal,’ and to ‘expedite the 
rendering’ of decisions pending in Israeli courts regarding Israel’s withholding of 
Palestinian tax revenues.51 Furthermore, the letter sought to ‘assure’ the United States 
that ‘the Israeli government remains committed to the two-state solution,’ including the 
Roadmap, that it supported Palestinian reform, that the proposed disengagement was 
consistent with the Roadmap, and that the West Bank barrier ‘should not’ prejudice any 
final status issues including final borders.'
The following day, Powell attempted to return the issue of the Gaza disengagement to 
the foreground of the discussion, stating that:
I think while we are concerned about some of the language in the exchange of letters 
between the President and Prime Minister Sharon, what we really should be focusing 
on is the fact that Gaza is about to be made available to the Palestinians with the 
removal of all settlers, the removal of the IDF.53
President Bush advanced this sentiment on 21 April 2004, when he stated publicly that 
the world owed Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon a ‘thank you’ for pursuing his ‘bold 
courageous step’ of unilateral disengagement from Gaza.54
4X Muasher, The Arab Center: The Promise of Moderation, p. 206.
49 "EU/Middle East: Ministers Discuss Israel's Gaza Strip Withdrawal Plan," Europolitics, 27 April, 2004.
50 "EU Defuses Tension with US Over Mideast," China Daily, 17 April, 2004.
51 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Letter from Dov Weissglas, Chief of the PM's Bureau, to National 
Security Adviser, Dr. Condoleezza Rice," Jerusalem: 18 April, 2004.
5‘ Ibid.
53 US Department of State, "Secretary of State Colin Powell: Interview on APTV with Barry Schweid and 
George Gedda."
54 "Bush Says World Owes Sharon a "Thank You”," Ha’aretz, 21 April, 2004.
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Amidst the unfolding controversy surrounding the exchange of letters, the Quartet 
members, especially Russia and the EU,55 were pushing for a meeting of the grouping 
for the first time since 26 September 2003. On 20 April 2004, Powell met with 
European High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), Javier 
Solana, who emphasised that the final status issues could only be decided by the parties 
to the conflict, and that ‘it's very important that the Quartet meets,’ to ‘analyse the 
situation and then give a push in that direction.’56
The Quartet ‘Re-engages’
On 4 May 2004,220 days since their last meeting, the Quartet members assembled in 
New York City to discuss the unfolding situation. The statement produced during this 
meeting presented an alternative commentary on the core positions of the letters 
exchanged between Bush and Sharon ,5/ On the issue of the West Bank barrier, the 
Quartet members challenged Israeli assurances:
We note the Government of Israel's pledge that the barrier is a security rather than 
political barrier and should be temporary rather than permanent. We continue to note 
with great concern the actual and proposed route of the barrier, particularly as it 
results in confiscation of Palestinian land, cuts off the movement of people and 
groups, and undermines Palestinians' trust in the roadmap process by appearing to 
prejudge the final borders of the future Palestinian state.58
Furthermore, and directly in response to the recent controversy surrounding the final 
status issues, the Quartet members stated that:
We also note that no party should take unilateral actions that seek to predetermine 
issues that can only be resolved through negotiation and agreement between the two 
parties. Any final settlements on issues such as borders and refugees must be mutually 
agreed to by Israelis and Palestinians based on Security Council Resolutions 242, 338, 
1397 and 1515; the terms of reference of the Madrid Peace Process, previous
55 During the press conference following the 4 May 2004 Quartet meeting, Russian Foreign Minister 
Sergei Lavrov was asked whether Russia was the initiator of the meeting, to which he replied ‘Yes, the 
Quartet members were interested in this meeting taking place as soon as possible, and so I would call it a 
collective initiative, but we did actively call for this type of meeting to take place." See: US Department 
of State, "United Nations Quartet: Kofi Anna, Sergey Lavrov, Brian Cowen, Javier Solana, Chris Patten, 
and Colin L. Powell," New York: 4 May, 2004.
56 US Department of State, "Remarks with High Representative Javier Solana of the European Union."
57 Alongside recent developments, the continuing issue of Yasser Arafat was also part of the discussion. 
According to Annan’s account, during this meeting Colin Powell attempted to convince the European 
representatives to join the US in their boycott of Arafat. EU Commissioner Chris Patten reportedly 
replied ‘You give me settlements and I’ll give you Arafat,’ to which Powell noted, ‘that’s a very 
interesting offer.’ See: Annan, Interventions: A Life in War and Peace, p. 251.
58 US Department of State, "United Nations Quartet: Kofi Anna, Sergey Lavrov, Brian Cowen, Javier 
Solana, Chris Patten, and Colin L. Powell."
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agreements; and the initiative of Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah endorsed by the Beirut 
Arab League Summit. It must also be consistent with the roadmap.59
Finally, in the press conference following the meeting, Powell sought to repackage the 
Bush letter as a piece of political pragmatism, in which the President stated simply what 
had previously been considered an implicit reality:
Previous negotiations knew that these features would have to be taken into account, 
these realities would have to be taken into account, and any future negotiations would 
have to take them into account. And the President made it explicit.60
Not only was the 4 May 2004 Quartet statement a strong response by the members to 
the exchange of letters between Bush and Sharon, but it also represented what Powell 
described later as a ‘re-engagement of the grouping.’61 Furthermore, the statement, and 
the re-engagement of the Quartet, also fitted within the Bush Administration’s own 
‘rebalancing’ efforts following the controversial letters. “ Indeed, when Jordan’s King 
Abdullah met with Bush on 6 May 2004, after having previously postponed the visit in 
protest, the President was clearly seeking to clarify his views on the peace process and 
to mend relations with the Arab states. As Bush noted:
...all final status issues must be negotiated between the parties in accordance with 
U.N. Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. And the United States will not 
prejudice the outcome of those negotiations. The road map is the best path to realizing 
the two-state vision. That is why the road map is the plan endorsed by the Palestinians, 
Israel, the United Nations, the European Union, Russia, the United States and many 
other nations.63
According to Muasher, King Abdullah’s intervention and Bush’s assurances were 
designed to reverse the impression in the region that the United States ‘had changed the 
terms of reference for the process, particularly on the two issues of refugees and 
borders.’64 The consequence of Bush’s clarification, therefore, was a renewed
59 Ibid.
60 Ibid.
61 On 15 May 2004 Powell noted that ‘as a result of this change in the dynamic, and the re-engagement of 
the Quartet with a good Quartet statement out of New York last week, and a very good discussion with 
the G-8 ministers yesterday, we hope that we can get the process started again within the context of the 
Roadmap and with the help of the Quartet and other international organizations that wish to play a helpful 
role in the quest for peace.’ See: US Department of State, "Remarks With Palestinian Authority Prime 
Minister Ahmed Qurei," Amman, Jordan: 15 May, 2004.
62 US Department of State, "Remarks with the King of Jordan," Washington, DC: 6 May, 2004.
63 Ibid.
64 US Department of State, "Press Conference with Jordanian Foreign Minister Marwan Muasher," Dead 
Sea, Jordan: 16 May, 2004.
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impression that it was ‘still up to the two parties to negotiate the two-state solution,’ and 
that the United States would not ‘prejudge the outcome of these negotiations.65
In Israel, Sharon’s domestic political campaign to gamer support for his disengagement 
plan, aided by Bush’s letter to the Prime Minister, successfully concluded on 6 June 
2004, when the Israeli cabinet approved the plan 66 The publicly released text of the 
plan illustrated the fundamentals of Sharon’s approach to the Gaza disengagement, and 
was predictive of the future issues that emerged in the post-disengagement landscape. 
Consistent with Sharon’s Herzliya speech, the disengagement plan was positioned as a 
response to a leadership vacuum in the Palestinian territories:
The State of Israel has come to the conclusion that there is currently no reliable 
Palestinian partner with which it can make progress in a two-sided peace process. 
Accordingly, it has developed a plan of revised disengagement...67
Ostensibly, the Gaza disengagement was a means to break the ‘harmful’ stalemate that 
existed in the peace process, which had ‘required’ the state of Israel to ‘initiate moves 
not dependent on Palestinian cooperation.’ Thus, the disengagement plan stated that:
The State of Israel will evacuate the Gaza Strip, including all existing Israeli towns 
and villages, and will redeploy outside the Strip.69
However, and importantly for the future of Gaza’s Palestinian population, the plan 
stated that Israel would continue to ‘guard and monitor the external land perimeter of 
the Gaza Strip,’ ‘maintain exclusive authority in Gaza air space,’ ‘exercise security 
activity in the sea off the coast of the Gaza Strip,’ and continue to control ‘the entry and
70exit of goods between the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, the State of Israel and abroad.’ 
Thus, while the Israeli military and civilian personnel would leave Gaza, Israeli control 
over the territory would remain absolute. Furthermore, in relation to Israeli settlements 
in the West Bank, while the disengagement plan stipulated that there would be ‘no 
Israeli towns and villages in the Gaza Strip’ in any future permanent status arrangement, 
it also stated that:
65 Ibid.
<l6 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "The Cabinet Resolution Regarding the Disengagement Plan."
67 Ibid.
68 Ibid.
69 Ibid.
70 Ibid.
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On the other hand, it is clear that in the West Bank, there are areas which will be part 
of the State of Israel, including major Israeli population centers, cities, towns and 
villages, security areas and other places of special interest to Israel.71
Ultimately, through the disengagement plan, the Israeli government had proposed to 
withdraw from Gaza while simultaneously strengthening the Israeli presence in the 
West Bank.72
The following month, the International Court of Justice, at the behest of the United 
Nations General Assembly, issued an advisory opinion that found Israel’s construction 
of the barrier to be in contradiction of international law.73 The opinion argued that the 
government of Israel was obligated to cease construction of the wall, dismantle the 
existing construction, and to pay damages to those who had been affected adversely by 
its erection.74 The government of Israel had initially responded to the ICJ in January 
2004 with a 246 page statement questioning the jurisdiction and propriety of the court in 
examining the matter of the barrier without also investigating the matter of Palestinian 
terrorism within Israel (i.e. the Israeli justification for the wall). Similarly, after the 
ruling was released in July 2004 the government of Israel noted that construction of the 
barrier would continue, with Foreign Ministry representatives criticising the ICJ for 
failing to ‘address the essence of the problem and the very reason for building the fence 
- Palestinian terror.’76 The Israeli Finance Minister at the time, Benjamin Netanyahu, 
also condemned the ICJ ruling, stating that:
What's going to happen now is this is going to go to the UN General Assembly...They 
can decide anything there. They can say that the earth is flat. It won't make it legal, it 
won't make it true and it won't make it just.77
The Stalled Peace Process
It was within this context that the Quartet members met on the sidelines of the annual 
UN General Assembly, and issued their ninth statement. Largely a reiteration of the 4
71I b i d -
72 The Disengagement plan also reiterated the Sharon government’s position on the continued 
construction of the West Bank barrier, stating that: ‘The State of Israel will continue building the Security 
Fence, in accordance with the relevant decisions of the Government. The route will take into account 
humanitarian considerations.’ Ibid.
72 International Court of Justice, "Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territory," The Hague: 9 July, 2004.
74 Ibid.
75 See ‘Written Statements’ in: Ibid.
76 Shamir, S., Benn, A., and Yoaz, Y., "Israel Firmly Rejects ICJ Fence Ruling," Haaretz, 11 July, 2004.
77 Ibid.
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May 2004 statement, the 23 September statement was notable only for its minor 
mention of the recent ICJ ruling.78
The statement was issued within a complex regional and global environment. In the 
United States the Presidential election between George W. Bush and John Kerry was 
nearing its conclusion, leaving the non-US Quartet members unsure about the future 
direction of US policy in the Middle East. Adding to the uncertainty within the grouping 
was the fact that Powell had indicated that he would not remain in his role as Secretary 
of State if Bush was re-elected.79 In the region, construction of the West Bank barrier 
continued, and implementation of the Roadmap essentially remained ‘on hold’ until 
after the completion of the Gaza disengagement (scheduled for August 2005.) Indeed, in 
October 2004 Weissglass remarked that the disengagement plan had acted as 
‘formaldehyde’ for the peace process.80 Expanding on his statement, Weissglass noted 
that:
The peace process is the establishment of a Palestinian state with all the security risks 
that entails. The peace process is the evacuation of settlements, it's the return of 
refugees, it's the partition of Jerusalem. And all that has now been frozen.... what I 
effectively agreed to with the Americans was that part of the settlements would not be 
dealt with at all, and the rest will not be dealt with until the Palestinians turn into 
Finns. That is the significance of what we did.81
On 2 November 2004, George W. Bush was re-elected as the President of the United 
States, and nine days later PLO Chairman Arafat died in a Paris hospital. Arafat’s wish 
was to be buried in al-Haram al-Sharif'm Jerusalem’s Old City, but Sharon had 
declared before his death that ‘Arafat won’t be buried in Jerusalem as long as I’m Prime 
Minister.’ 82 The solution was for Arafat to be buried in the Muqata in soil from the 
Haram, with the hope that his remains would later be moved once Jerusalem became 
the capital of Palestine. In the aftermath of Arafat’s death, Abbas assumed the role of
78 The statement noted that: ‘The Quartet urges positive action by the Government of Israel with respect 
to the route of the barrier and reiterates its view that no party should undertake unilateral actions that 
could prejudge issues that can only be resolved through negotiations and agreement between the parties.’ 
US Department of State, "Statement by the Middle East Quartet," New York City: 23 September, 2004.
79 In Bush’s account of the period, he noted that ‘Colin Powell made it easier for me. That same spring of 
2004, he told me he was ready to move on. He had served three tough years and was naturally fatigued. 
He was also a sensitive man who had been wounded by the infighting and discouraged by the failure to 
find weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. I asked Colin to stay through the election, and I was grateful 
that he agreed. The early notification gave me plenty of time to think about a successor.’ See: Bush, G. 
W., Decision Points, 1st ed. (New York: Crown Publishers, 2010), p. 90.
80 Neilan, T., "Israeli Causes Uproar Over Status of Road Map," The New York Times, 6 October, 2004.
81 Ibid.
82 Lazaroff, T., "Sharon: 'Arafat won't be buried in Jerusalem'," Jerusalem Post, 1 November, 2004.
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PLO Chairman, and Rawhi Fattouh became the interim Palestinian Authority President 
pending an election in the Palestinian territories in January.
2004 ended with uncertainty regarding the future composition and disposition of the 
Palestinian leadership, international concern over the implementation of Israel’s 
disengagement plan, and a second Bush Administration introducing a new Secretary of 
State. As UNSG Annan noted in his report to the Security Council:
...the situation in the Middle East is characterized by a stalled peace process and 
continuing high levels of violence.83
2005: The Execution of the Gaza Disengagement
I had been authorised to create and implement an economic program. The moment I 
extended this mission, my head was cut off. I don’t think President Bush was trying to 
undermine my efforts. But whatever he had in mind, Rice and Abrams did not view 
me as their partner. Rice and Abrams were the ones implementing Bush’s policy. I 
was not useful, and I was going beyond my mandate. In the end, the Quartet was a 
necessary camouflage for U.S. initiatives.
- James Wolfensohn, Quartet envoy to the Gaza disengagement 
(2005-2006).84
Leadership changes affected the Quartet in 2005, while the discourse of the Middle East 
peace process continued to be dominated by the upcoming Israeli disengagement from 
Gaza. Bush’s re-election saw Powell replaced by Rice as US Secretary of State, 
reducing the dissonance between the White House and the State Department within the 
Quartet. Furthermore, a by-product of Rice’s involvement was the creation of a Quartet 
‘envoy’, adding another layer to the informal structure of the grouping. In the 
Palestinian territories, Arafat’s death and his replacement by Abbas provided an 
opportunity for improved relations with the United States and Israel, and opened the 
door to the international donor community, but the institutional reform process also 
offered new avenues for political participation by Hamas.85 In Israel, Sharon’s 
governing coalition fractured in the post-disengagement period, leading to the formation 
of the Kadima party, which would eventually be led by Ehud Olmert after Sharon’s
83 United Nations Security Council, "Report of the Secretary General on the Question o f Palestine,"
United Nations: A/59/574-S/2004/909: 29 November, 2004, p. 11.
84 Wolfensohn, J., A Global Life: My Journey Among Rich and Poor, from Wall Street to the World Bank 
(Pan Macmillan Australia Pty. Limited, 2009), p. 438.
8:1 An International Crisis Group report argued that Abbas’ quick ascension to the Palestinian leadership 
‘concealed the crisis’ within the PA in the aftermath of Arafat’s death. Not only had Arafat created a 
bureaucracy based around his individual leadership, but Abbas was also ‘consciously adopting a different 
approach.’ See: International Crisis Group, "Enter Hamas: The Challenges of Political Integration," Crisis 
Group Middle East Report 49: 18 January, 2006, p. 3.
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incapacitation. In the period leading up to the Israeli disengagement from Gaza, the 
members of the Quartet sought to influence both the execution and the aftermath of the 
initiative.
On 9 January 2005, Abbas was elected as Palestinian President with 62.3 percent of the 
vote, dedicating his victory to ‘the soul of Yasser Arafat.’86 While Sharon congratulated 
Abbas on his success, he emphasised that:
The Palestinians are still not fighting terrorism and Abu Mazen’s statements during 
the election campaign were not encouraging, but he will be tested by his actions after 
the elections. He will be tested by the manner in which he fights terrorism and works 
to dismantle its infrastructures.87
Sharon’s focus on, and case against, Palestinian political violence was strengthened on
13 January 2005, when Palestinian militants launched an assault on the Kami crossing,
88north of Jerusalem, resulting in six Israeli deaths and three Palestinian deaths. 
Subsequently, the Sharon cabinet froze contact between Israel and the Palestinian 
Authority, declaring that the new Palestinian leadership had not ‘begun any action 
whatsoever to halt the terrorism,’ and that:
The IDF and the security forces have been instructed to step up operational activity 
against terrorism and they will continue to do so, without restrictions, I emphasize, 
without restrictions, as long as the Palestinians are not lifting a finger.89
Relations between the Israelis and Palestinians remained frozen until 26 January 2005, 
when representatives met for the first time since the Kami attack to discuss security 
cooperation and the potential for a meeting between Sharon and Abbas.90 According to 
Israeli representatives, provisional contact with the Palestinians was resumed in light of 
‘positive developments in the Palestinian Authority and the effort to prevent 
terrorism.’91
86 "Abbas Achieves Landslide Poll Win," BBC News, 10 January, 2005.
87 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "PM Sharon Meets With US Senator Kerry," Jerusalem: 10 January, 
2005.
88 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Terror Attack at Kami Crossing," Jerusalem: 13 January, 2005.
89 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Cabinet Communique," Jerusalem: 16 January, 2005.
90 Dov Weissglass, Shalom Turgeman and Assaf Shariv attended for the Israeli side. Saeb Erekat, Hassan 
Abu Libdeh and Muhammad Dahlan attended for the Palestinian side. See: Israel Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, "Meeting between Israeli and Palestinian representatives," Jerusalem: 26 January, 2005.
91 Prime Minister Sharon noted that: ‘If the Palestinians take comprehensive action to stop the terrorism, 
violence and incitement, we will be able to move forward in contacts on implementing the Roadmap and 
it would even be possible to coordinate with them on various actions regarding the Disengagement Plan.’ 
Ibid.
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With relations warming between Abbas and Sharon, Rice travelled to the Middle East to 
speak with both leaders and to encourage a return to more formal contact between them. 
Importantly, during her first official travels as Secretary of State, Rice conveyed that 
she had the full support of her Quartet colleagues.92 Furthermore, when Rice and Abbas 
met on 7 February 2005, Abbas’ views on the Quartet were illustrative of the US 
primacy within the grouping:
Of course, we look forward to an effective and essential American role in the peace
process, especially considering that the US is the main member of the Quartet.93
It was during Rice’s visit that Sharon and Abbas announced their plans to meet, on 8 
February 2005, at Sharm el-Sheikh to discuss security cooperation.94 The Summit was 
hosted by Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak and also attended by Jordanian King 
Abdullah. During the one day event, Sharon and Abbas came to an agreement whereby 
security cooperation between the two sides would increase, including ceasefires on both 
sides, and Israel would release 500 Palestinian prisoners, establishing a joint committee 
to ‘explore future releases.’9'’
The London Donors Meeting
The death of Arafat and the election of Abbas re-energised the Palestinian institutional 
reform program, and increased security cooperation between Abbas and Sharon opened 
the door for improved international financial assistance to the Palestinian Authority. On 
1 March 2005, representatives from 23 nations and six non-government organisations 
(including the World Bank) gathered in London to discuss funding in support of 
Palestinian institutional reform.96 The ‘meeting’97 was convened by British Prime 
Minister Tony Blair, who, according to reports at time:
92 Rice stated that: ‘I have just been in London and in Berlin. I will be in Europe after this, and I can 
assure you, Minister, that our European colleagues — I also talked with Foreign Minister Lavrov of Russia 
— that our European colleagues, the members of the Quartet, stand ready to do everything that we can.’
US Department of State, "Remarks With Israeli Foreign Minister Silvan Shalom Before Meeting," 
Jerusalem: 6 February, 2005.
93 US Department of State, "Remarks With Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas After Their Meeting," 
Ramallah: 7 February, 2005.
94 US Department of State, "Remarks With Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon Before Meeting," 
Jerusalem: 6 February, 2005.
95 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Statement by PM Ariel Sharon at the Sharm el-Sheikh Sum m it" 
Sharm el-Sheikh: 8 February, 2005.
96 Reynolds, P., "Meeting to Bolster Palestinian Leadership," BBC News, 28 February, 2005.
97 According to the BBC, the term ‘meeting’ was used instead of ‘conference’ as a way to ‘keep 
expectations low .’ See: Ibid.
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...originally wanted a full-blown peace Summit but the support of the US and Israel, 
which is not attending, were lacking.98
The participants of the meeting, in a statement reportedly drafted by the members of the 
Quartet," agreed to ‘mobilise international assistance for the PA’s efforts,’ in light of 
the ‘Palestinian Authority’s sincere commitment to a viable plan to meet the 
benchmarks of good government.’100
It was within this context that the members of the Quartet issued their eleventh official 
statement, on 1 March 2005. In similar fashion to the London text, the Quartet statement 
did not mention ongoing issues of contention within the MEPP such as settlement 
construction or the West Bank barrier, and largely focussed on Palestinian political and 
economic reform.101 The one notable exception was the Quartet members’ discussion of 
the upcoming Israeli withdrawal from Gaza, and the particular emphases made in this 
statement were illustrative of the concerns within the grouping regarding Sharon’s 
initiative. Specifically, these concerns were that the Gaza disengagement would act as a 
substitute for a political resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (sidelining the 
Roadmap in the process), and that the withdrawal from Gaza would permanently erode 
the territorial contiguity of the Palestinian territories -  both through the isolation of 
Gaza and the solidification of Israeli settlements in the West Bank.102
The 1 March 2005 Quartet statement reiterated that the withdrawal from Gaza should be 
‘full and complete’ and should be undertaken in a ‘manner consistent with the
i
Roadmap.’ ' The statement also stressed that the:
Quartet members agree on the need to ensure that a new Palestinian state is truly 
viable, including with contiguous territory in the West Bank. A state of scattered 
territories will not work.104
98 "Blair Says Talks Laid Foundation for Palestinian State," The Guardian, 2 March, 2005.
99 Ibid.
100 United Nations Information System on the Question of Palestine, "Conclusions of The London 
Meeting On Supporting the Palestinian Authority," London: 2 March, 2005.
101 US Department of State, "Joint Statement by the Quartet," London, England: 1 March, 2005.
102 For an in-depth critique of the disengagement process see: de Soto, A., "End of Mission Report," The 
Guardian, 12 June, 2007.
For further examples of the use of the word ‘contiguous’ by US officials in statements pertaining to the 
Gaza disengagement, see: US Department of State, "Remarks With Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon," 
Crawford, Texas: 11 April, 2005.
103 United Nations Information System on the Question of Palestine, "Conclusions of The London 
Meeting On Supporting the Palestinian Authority."
104 US Department of State, "Joint Statement by the Quartet."
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Simultaneous to preparations for Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza during this period, 
President Abbas sought to bolster his domestic political reform process by holding 
elections for the Palestinian Legislative Council in both Gaza and the West Bank.105 
Central to the legitimacy of this process was the integration of the various factions of 
the Palestinian polity into the democratic process, and on 17 March 2005, in Cairo, 
these parties reached an agreement.
The Cairo Declaration
The Cairo Declaration was the product of three days of discussions held between 13 
Palestinian factions from 15-17 March 2005, and signed on 19 March.106 The 
declaration had six components: First, that those gathered ‘confirmed their adherence to 
Palestinian constants,’ such as Palestinian resistance to occupation, the establishment of 
a Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital, and the right of return of Palestinian 
refugees; second, that the Palestinians factions would continue an ‘atmosphere of calm’ 
(i.e. a ceasefire) throughout 2005 in return for Israeli reciprocity; third, that the 
continued construction of Israeli settlements and the West Bank barrier were defined as 
‘explosive issues’; fourth, that the composition of the Palestinian Legislative Council 
reflect both constituent and proportional representation; fifth, that an executive 
committee would be formed to restructure the PLO to be more reflective of factional 
power bases; and finally, that all domestic inter-factional disputes be settled with 
dialogue, rather than through violent means.107
In essence, the Cairo Declaration was an agreement between Palestinian factions to 
reduce violence both internally and externally, and to encourage a more pluralistic form 
of political representation within the Palestinian Legislative Council. According to 
former Quartet UN envoy Alvaro de Soto, Abbas’ logic in ‘co-opting’ the Palestinian 
factions into the mainstream was that ‘without them he could not hope to control 
violence against Israel and restart negotiations.’ Furthermore, according to Annan:
[Abbas] told us [the Quartet] he could not disarm Hamas forcibly; instead he wanted 
to approach the matter politically, with Hamas inside the Parliament, bound by the 
laws set by the majority, and confronted with the contradictions of its own position.109
105 United Nations Information System on the Question of Palestine, "Conclusions of The London 
Meeting On Supporting the Palestinian Authority."
106 Usher, G., "The Calm Before the Storm?," Al-Ahram, Issue No. 735 (2005).
107 Ibid.
108 de Soto, A., "The Role of the United Nations in the Middle East," in Italianieuropi,2 July 2009.
109 Annan, Interventions: A Life in War and Peace, p. 291.
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Through the agreement reached at Cairo, the Palestinian president was attempting to 
facilitate both the resumption of the political process with the Israelis and the de­
militarisation and normalisation of his main domestic competitors.110 Notably, the Cairo 
Declaration did not require Palestinian militant organisations to disarm as a prerequisite 
for participation in the political process, but instead (albeit implicitly) aimed to achieve 
this goal through gradual normalisation.* 111 For the Israelis, this was of paramount 
importance, and Sharon noted immediately that the Cairo Declaration could function as 
an ‘arrangement for an interim period only,’ ostensibly because:
...in order to move forward in the diplomatic process, the terrorist organizations will 
be unable to continue existing as armed organizations and certainly not as terrorist 
organizations.112
Furthermore, Abbas’ strategy relied heavily on Fatah retaining control of the PLC in the 
upcoming elections, with the more militant factions effectively reduced to minor actors 
in a coalition style government. In order to increase the likelihood of this eventuality, 
Abbas delayed the PLC elections by six months to January 2006, when it was expected 
that improved conditions in the Palestinian territories stemming from the Israeli 
disengagement and an influx of international funding would benefit Fatah politically.113 
In hindsight, these calculations were proven to have been mistaken. Hamas became 
more organised and popular over time, and Fatah emerged from the disengagement 
fractured and weakened.114
The Quartet Envoy to the Disengagement Process 
The first ‘Quartet envoy’ was intended originally to be solely a US representative. In 
early April 2005, as James Wolfensohn prepared to vacate his position as President of 
the World Bank, he was contacted by Condoleezza Rice and offered the role of ‘special 
envoy of the Quartet’ responsible for ‘leading, overseeing and coordinating the 
international community’s efforts in support of the disengagement initiative.’115 Before
110 A senior Palestinian Authority official noted at the time that: ‘We cannot crack down right away, but
as our security forces are bolstered, and as Hamas subjects itself to our laws, we will be in a far better 
position to keep them in line and in check.’ See: International Crisis Group, "Enter Hamas: The 
Challenges of Political Integration," p. 4.
111 According to insider accounts, de-militarisation was a central sticking point between the factions, and 
Abbas was unable to forge an agreement on that issue. See: Ibid.
112 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Prime Minister Sharon Speaks With Egyptian President Mubarak," 
Jerusalem: 17 March, 2005.
113 International Crisis Group, "Enter Hamas: The Challenges of Political Integration."
114 Chapter Seven: The Palestinian Divide discusses these developments in-depth.
115 Wolfensohn, A Global Life: My Journey Among Rich and Poor, from Wall Street to the World Bank, p. 
399.
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this offer had been made, however, Rice contacted Annan to discuss the appointment of 
Wolfensohn as an exclusively American envoy to the disengagement process.
According to Annan, ‘I leaped at the suggestion and urged that he be an envoy not of 
the US but of the Quartet as a whole.’116
The importance of distinguishing the source of Wolfensohn’s authority as envoy was 
illustrative of the power imbalance within the Quartet. Essentially, had Wolfensohn 
acted as a US envoy but been responsible for overseeing the ‘international community’s 
efforts,’ it would have made too explicit the US dominance within the grouping, 
diminishing the role of the other members in the process. According to de Soto, even 
after re-labelling Wolfensohn’s position, this was unavoidable, as:
...his involvement had the effect of at least partially eclipsing and somewhat 
diminishing the role of the other envoys to the Quartet, since none of the Quartet 
members agreed to give up their own envoys.117
Despite the semantic issues surrounding his appointment, Wolfensohn’s selection was 
based on his understanding of the region, and his experiences in the World Bank with
1 1 Rdeveloping economies. As Kurtzer noted:
As a former World Bank president, James Wolfensohn commanded the attention and 
respect of the parties, key international actors, congress, and the US government.'19
Crucially, as Annan argued, Wolfensohn’s list of global contacts also allowed him 
‘unrivalled reach into the pockets of donors.’120 Thus, on 14 April 2005, US Secretary 
of State Rice announced the appointment of Wolfensohn as ‘special envoy for Gaza 
disengagement,’ declaring that he would focus his efforts on ‘Palestinian-Israeli
116 Annan, Interventions: A Life in War and Peace, p. 290.
117 de Soto, "End of Mission Report," p. 6.
IIS An alternative analysis was suggested to Wolfensohn by his colleague and friend Martin Indyk. In 
Wolfensohn’s account of the conversation, he was told by Indyk that: ‘I was being used by the United 
States and Israel, and behind my back, Bush and Elliott Abrams made fun of me. The access I was given 
to the White House and the encouragement and the apparently serious discussions I had with the 
president, the vice president, and their cabinet colleagues were all a show. I was never a serious player. 
This cynical view extended to my relations with Sharon. It was said that he had zero interest in a deal 
with the Palestinians and was open with discussions with me simply to show “progress”, feeling that 
events on the ground -  and the efforts of his Defense Minister Mofaz -  would ensure that none of my 
ideas would be implemented.’ In an interview with the author, Indyk confirmed this account of the 
conversation, and reiterated his view that Wolfensohn was ‘wallpaper’ for a cynical Bush Administration. 
Irrespectively, Wolfensohn concluded that ‘Perhaps this view of my role is correct, and because it was 
given to me by a friend with an inside view, I recount it for the record. But at the time, I was convinced 
that I was making a real contribution to the process of peace.’ See: Wolfensohn, A Global Life: My 
Journey Among Rich and Poor, from Wall Street to the World Bank, p. 407.
114 Kurtzer, D. and Lasensky, S., Negotiating Arab-Israeli Peace: American Leadership in the Middle 
East (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2007), p. 63.
120 Annan, Interventions: A Life in War and Peace, p. 290.
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coordination concerning the non-military aspects of the withdrawal, including the 
disposition of the assets that will be left behind,’ and ‘the revival of the Palestinian 
economy in the wake of the withdrawal.’121 After meeting briefly with Bush,122 
Wolfensohn started to assemble his team, with a budget covered by the members of the 
Quartet.123 He negotiated with Rice to limit his assignment to seven months (ending in 
December 2005), so that ‘if the mission was not working, this allowed either of us to 
call it off without the appearance of a problem.’124
‘Re-energising’ the Roadmap
In April 2005, US officials began to characterise the upcoming Israeli disengagement 
from Gaza as a means to ‘re-energise’ the Roadmap process. ~ In essence, this was an 
attempt to re-conceptualise the disengagement process as a way to accelerate progress 
within the political sphere, rather than as a way to sidestep it. Consequently, the 9 May 
2005 Quartet statement noted that:
The Quartet strongly reiterated its commitment to the two-state solution, and to Israeli 
withdrawal as a way to re-energize the Roadmap.126
The statement also commented once again on the need for a ‘contiguous’ and ‘viable’ 
Palestinian state, noting that ‘a state of scattered territories’ would not work, and 
emphasising that no party ‘should take unilateral actions that prejudge final status
121 US Department of State, "Remarks on the Appointment of James Wolfensohn as Special Envoy for 
Gaza Disengagement," Washington, DC: 14 April, 2005.
122 According to Wolfensohn’s account of his meeting with the President ‘He [Bush] went on to say that I 
would have his total support at all times, and might well need it to bring the Israelis along. “If they do not 
agree with you, tell them they will lose the support of George Bush,” he said. “Mr. President, if I’m going 
to tell them that, I will tell you first,” I replied. “If you have time,” he shot back.’ See: Wolfensohn, A 
Global Life: My Journey Among Rich and Poor, from Wall Street to the World Bank, p. 406.
123 Wolfensohn’s team was comprised of representatives from each of the four Quartet powers, including 
US ambassador Bill Taylor, Christian Berger from the European commission, Lynn Hastings from the 
United Nations, and Nikolai Makarov from the Russian Armed Forces (later replaced by his colleague 
Leonid Barkovsky). The team also included Nicholas Krafft from the World Bank, Alexei Monsarrat 
from the US State Department, Stefano Mocci from the World Bank, and Katiana Orluc from the EC.
See: Ibid., p. 414.
124 Ibid., p. 406.
125 In a meeting with Ariel Sharon on 11 April 2005 President Bush stated that ‘the Prime Minister and I 
share a desire to see the disengagement from Gaza and part of the West Bank serve to re-energize 
progress along the road map.’ In similar fashion, Sharon noted that the disengagement plan had the 
‘potential’ of ‘paving the way toward the road map,’ but was careful to note that this could only occur 
‘after the Palestinians fulfil their obligations, primarily a real fight against terrorism and the dismantling 
of its infrastructure.’ See: US Department of State, "Remarks With Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon."
126 Sidestepping the issue of the Israeli reservations to the Roadmap, the statement also noted that ‘the 
Roadmap has been endorsed by Israel and the Palestinian Authority and remains the objective of the 
international community,’ and urged ‘both parties to take steps to fulfill all their obligations under the 
Roadmap.’ US Department of State, "Quartet Statement," Moscow, Russia: 9 May, 2005.
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issues.’127 As a Quartet representative noted in the press conference following this 
statement, the two central challenges for the members of the grouping at this time were 
to ensure the success of both the withdrawal from Gaza and the upcoming Palestinian 
Legislative Council elections, which were deemed to be ‘another vital step forward
1 99on the path towards building a reformed and accountable Palestinian Authority.’
It should be noted that ensuring ‘success’ in such complex and unpredictable 
circumstances meant overcoming significant obstacles. For the disengagement process, 
the central concern of both the international community and the Palestinians was 
ensuring that the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza did not lead to both a de facto 
colonisation of the West Bank, and an indefinite freeze on the political process.130 As 
Abbas stated in a meeting with Bush on 26 May 2005:
We see this evacuation as a part of ending the occupation, and it should not be at the 
expense of the West Bank.131
1 99These concerns were proven later to be prescient, and Bush’s response to Abbas at 
the time could be interpreted as an attempt to both reassure the Palestinian leader and to 
send a signal to the Israeli Prime Minister:
Any final status agreement must be reached between the two parties, and changes to 
the 1949 Armistice lines [i.e. 1967 borders] must be mutually agreed to. A viable two- 
state solution must ensure contiguity of the West Bank, and a state of scattered 
territories will not work. There must also be meaningful linkages between the West 
Bank and Gaza. This is the position of the United States today, it will be the position 
of the United States at the time of final status negotiations.133
The looming obstacle in the Palestinian elections was the participation of Hamas, which 
brought to a head two competing international demands of the Palestinians: that they
127 While this was not the first time this particular wording had been used, it was especially relevant in 
light of Sharon’s recent declaration that ‘It is the Israeli position that the major Israeli population centers 
will remain in Israel's hands under any future final status agreement with all related consequences.’ See: 
US Department of State, "Remarks With Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon."
I2S US Department of State, "Remarks With Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, United Nations 
Secretary General Kofi Annan, and European Union President Jean Asselborn After Their Quartet 
Meeting " Moscow, Russia: 9 May, 2005.
129 US Department of State, "Quartet Statement."
130 As Annan recounted, the diplomatic mantra at the time of the disengagement was ‘Gaza first, not Gaza 
last.’ See: Annan, Interventions: A Life in War and Peace, p.289.
131 US Department of State, "President Bush Meets With Palestinian President Abbas," Washington, DC: 
26 May, 2005.
132 In 2006, the year following the Gaza disengagement, the Israeli settler population in the West Bank 
grew by 3,000 more people than the total number of settlers that had evacuated Gaza. See: United Nations 
Security Council, "Report of the Secretary General on the Middle East," United Nations: S/2006/956: 11 
December, 2006, p. 5.
133 US Department of State, "President Bush Meets With Palestinian President Abbas."
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reform their democratic institutions through free elections, and that they combat 
terrorism and political violence. The conflicting nature of these demands was 
summarised by Bush, when he stated that:
Our position on Hamas is very clear, it's a well-known position and it hasn't changed 
about Hamas: Hamas is a terrorist group, it's on a terrorist list for a reason. As the 
elections go forward, of course, we want everybody to participate in the vote. There is 
something healthy about people campaigning, saying, this is what I'm for...[but] I don't 
think they're going to get elected, because I think Palestinian moms want their children 
to grow up in peace just like American moms want their children to grow up in peace. 
As a matter of fact, I think the people that campaign for peace will win.134
Bush’s position walked the fine line between supporting democratic principles in the 
Palestinian territories and maintaining his strong stance against so-called terrorist 
organisations, both of which were fundamental to US foreign policy in the Middle East 
at that time. Importantly, however, these two positions could only be maintained in the 
event that Hamas was unsuccessful in the upcoming PLC elections. As the Israeli 
disengagement and the Palestinian elections approached, the international community, 
including the Quartet members, remained apprehensive but largely powerless to dictate 
the outcomes of either process. Consequently, the twelfth Quartet statement, on 23 June
1 TS2005, was simply a reiteration of the central tenets of the previous two statements. 
Indeed, it was in 2005 that the Quartet members began employing a form of rhetorical 
shorthand in their statements, often simply repeating or referencing previous 
statements.136
The Israeli Disengagement from Gaza
Uncertainty as to Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's intentions has been fuelled by 
his hawkish past and contradictory statements. He has sought to convince the 
international community that evacuating Gaza was the first in a series of moves, while 
indicating to members of his right-wing constituency that it was the last of them.
- Aaron David Miller and Robert Malley, former US State 
Department Officials.137
While the preparations for the Israeli disengagement from Gaza had been taking place 
since December 2003, the disengagement proper did not begin officially until 15 August
134 Ibid.
135 US Department of State, "Quartet Statement on Middle East Peace," London, UK: 23 June, 2005.
136 This practice was especially prevalent in the period following the release of the Quartet’s so-called 
‘principles’ for the inclusion of Hamas into the political mainstream. See: US Department of State, 
"Quartet Statement on the Agreement to Form a Palestinian National Unity Government," Washington, 
DC: 9 February, 2007.
137 Miller, A. D. and Malley, R., "The Road After Gaza," The Washington Post, 24 August, 2005.
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2005.138 The withdrawal included the removal of approximately 8000 Israeli civilians 
from 21 settlements in the Gaza Strip,139 with all civilians evacuated by 22 August and 
all military personnel evacuated by 12 September 2005.140 Importantly, the IDF was 
redeployed outside of the Gaza Strip, along ‘security lines’ deemed to provide the best 
‘security to the Israeli civilians living in the region and throughout Israel.’141 By 20 
September, all military and civilian personnel had also been evacuated from the four 
northern West Bank settlements included in the disengagement plan.142 Overall, despite 
token resistance from some Israeli settlers,143 the operational aspect of the 
disengagement from Gaza was considered to have been efficient and professional.144 
According to de Soto, the smoothness of the process was explained by three factors:
...first because of Sharon’s larger than life stature in Israeli politics — essentially he 
said what he was going to do and asked the people to trust him — second by the 
smoothness of the Israel Defence Forces’ operation on the ground, and third by 
effective coordination between Israel and the Palestinians and the restraint of 
Palestinian militant groups.145
More important than the execution of the evacuation, however, would be the nature of 
the commercial, military and civilian interactions between the parties after the 
disengagement had been completed. Indeed, negotiations between the Israelis and 
Palestinians on these matters had been in progress since April 2005, and it was within 
this context that the Quartet members, through Wolfensohn, attempted to shape the 
post-disengagement landscape. According to Wolfensohn, while he remained uncertain 
whether he had the full support of Rice:
l3s Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Prime Minister Ariel Sharon Addresses the Nation on the Day of 
the Implementation of the Disengagement Plan," Jerusalem: 15 August, 2005.
139 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Evacuation of Civilians from the Gaza Strip Completed," 
Jerusalem: 22 August, 2005.
140 United Nations Security Council, "Report of the Secretary General on the Question of Palestine," 
United Nations: A/60/539-S/2005/701: 7 November, 2005.
141 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Evacuation of Civilians from the Gaza Strip Completed."
142 The towns of Ganim, Kadim, Sa-Nur and Homesh had been included into the disengagement plan after 
the intervention of American officials. These settlements contained roughly 1300 Israeli settlers, and IDF 
personnel faced strong resistance and protests when carrying out the evacuation. See: Israel Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, "Evacuation of Northern West Bank," Jerusalem: 23 August, 2005.
143 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Evacuation of Civilians from the Gaza Strip Completed." 
l440ne notable exception to the success of the evacuation operation was the widely televised destruction 
of abandoned synagogues by Palestinian extremists. As Annan argued, the Palestinian Authority had 
expected the IDF to destroy the places of worship during the withdrawal, and was consequently ‘not in a 
position to protect them’ afterward. See: United Nations Security Council, "Report of the Secretary 
General on the Question o f Palestine."
143 de Soto, "End of Mission Report," p. 7.
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I was encouraged by my colleagues in the UN, the European Union, and Russia. The 
fact was that I was their only hope to be participants in the process that historically 
had been run almost entirely by the United States.146
Wolfensohn’s official remit147 was to coordinate between Israel and the Palestinians on 
the non-military aspects of the pullout, specifically ‘the disposition of assets left behind 
by the Israeli settlers, and the revival of the Palestinian economy.’ After forming his 
team and meeting with representatives from both sides, Wolfensohn established a six- 
point agenda for the disengagement, and a three point agenda for reviving the 
Palestinian economy.149 More pressing of the two was his disengagement agenda, in 
which Wolfensohn argued that any agreement between the two sides needed to 
accomplish several goals. The first was to ensure access for goods and personnel from 
Gaza into Israel, the West Bank, and abroad. It also needed to ease restrictions on the 
movement of goods and personnel within the West Bank, move forward on the 
construction of a Palestinian port and an airport in Gaza, and finalise the strategy for 
dealing with evacuated settler housing.160 Finally, the agreement needed to facilitate the 
transfer of the Israeli greenhouses that had underpinned the settler economy to the 
Palestinians.161
The last point was of paramount importance to Wolfensohn, as the greenhouses, 
comprising 100 acres of land and including packing sheds and storage facilities, 
accounted for around $100 million in produce per year.162 The sticking point in 
negotiations over the issue was the need to pay compensation to Israeli settlers vacating 
the greenhouses, which, the Palestinians argued (if sourced from international bodies) 
would legitimise and reward the settlement enterprise. Demonstrating his personal
146 Wolfensohn, A Global Life: My Journey Among Rich and Poor, from Wall Street to the World Bank, p. 
407.
147 The remit itself was a single page document that formed the basis for the statement in which 
Wolfensohn’s position was announced on 14 April 2005. See: US Department of State, "Remarks on the 
Appointment of James Wolfensohn as Special Envoy for Gaza Disengagement."
148 Wolfensohn, A Global Life: My Journey Among Rich and Poor, from Wall Street to the World Bank, p. 
406.
149 In order to revive the floundering Palestinian economy, Wolfensohn argued that the Palestinian 
Authority must: include a ‘fiscal stablisation plan’ in its 2006 budget, create a ‘general development plan’ 
for 2006-2008, and design ‘quick-impact economic programs that would respond to pressures for short­
term employment generation.’ United Nations Security Council, "Report of the Secretary General on the 
Question of Palestine," p. 10.
150 According to Wolfensohn, it was agreed between the Israelis and Palestinians that the housing should 
be demolished, rather than passed on to new occupants. See: Wolfensohn, A Global Life: My Journey 
Among Rich and Poor, from Wall Street to the World Bank, p. 418.
151 Ibid., p. 415.
152 Ibid.
153 Ibid., p. 418.
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commitment to the issue and deep connections with the international donor community, 
Wolfensohn was able to raise $14.5 million in a matter of days from private sources, 
including his own savings.154 Securing ownership of the greenhouse infrastructure for 
the Palestinians, however, did not ensure that they would be able to export the produce 
grown in them. Thus, in the lead up to, and in the aftermath of, the Israeli 
disengagement, negotiations over movement and access dominated the agenda of the 
Quartet envoy and his team.155
These negotiations were given greater urgency when, on 28 August 2005, two suicide 
bombers from Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade and Palestinian Islamic Jihad launched an 
attack on Beersheba bus station, injuring 21 civilians.156 As Wolfensohn recounted, the 
Palestinian violence immediately following the Israeli disengagement led to ‘total or at 
least partial closure of the crossings, with even more dramatic consequences for the 
Gazan population than we had anticipated.’ ' As the process threatened to unravel, 
Wolfensohn pushed for an understanding on how the main border passages between 
Israel and the Palestinian Authority would operate.158
The Agreement on Movement and Access (AMA)
By November 2005, Wolfensohn was convinced that elections in Israel and the 
Palestinian territories would soon sidetrack the process, and sought to utilise a planned 
visit to the region by Rice as a means to finalise the negotiations.154 Rice arrived in 
Israel on 13 November 2005 to attend a commemoration of assassinated Israeli leader 
Yitzhak Rabin the following day. According to Wolfensohn, Israeli, Palestinian and 
Quartet officials had arranged to meet with Rice before the ceremony on 14 November,
154 At the time of the donations, the largest contributor ($10 million) to Wolfensohn’s fundraising 
remained anonymous, but was later revealed by other sources to be the Bill and Melinda Gates 
Foundation. Ibid.
155 The effect of Wolfensohn’s focus on movement and access, according to de Soto, was that he 
‘contributed greatly to highlighting the notion first put forward by the World Bank that the Israeli closure 
system was the determining factor in the decline of the Palestinian economy.’de Soto, "End of Mission 
Report," p. 9.
156 Meddings, S., "Officials: Suicide Bomber Injures 21 in Israel," CNN, 29 August, 2005.
187 Wolfensohn, A Global Life: My Journey Among Rich and Poor, from Wall Street to the World Bank, p. 
424.
178 According to Wolfensohn, the key Israeli officials involved in the negotiations were Prime Minister 
Sharon, Dov Weissglass, the Defense Minister, Shaul Mofaz, and Shimon Peres. On the Palestinian side 
was President Abbas, Prime Minister Ahmed Qurei, Finance Minister Salam Fayyad and Minister of Civil 
Affairs, Mohammad Dahlan. See: Ibid., p. 409.
159 As Wolfensohn recounted, ‘Secretary Rice’s impending visit offered a major opportunity for 
agreements to be brokered before the Israeli election season would take its toll.’ See: Ibid., p. 424.
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in an attempt to finalise the agreement that they had been negotiating for months.160 On 
that morning, Wolfensohn recounted:
My distinguished and very able friend Javier Solana, the European Union’s high 
representative, and I both expected to be part of the talks as we were part of the 
Quartet structure. But neither he nor I had heard anything about the arrangements from 
the Israeli side or from the Americans. Finally, I heard from my Palestinian friends 
that a negotiation between Palestinian and Israeli teams and Secretary Rice was under 
way at the King David Citadel hotel. I was dumbstruck. I had spent seven months 
working tirelessly to put a deal together, and neither I nor the Europeans were being 
included in the meeting to negotiate this deal.161
Wolfensohn chose not intervene at that time, and when the parties were unable to 
finalise the deal before their afternoon deadline, more negotiations were scheduled for 
the evening of 14 November to conclude the agreement (again without Wolfensohn or 
Solana). According to Wolfensohn, when he went to the King David hotel that evening 
seeking an explanation:
. . .through an open door, I saw my Palestinian friends in a smoke filled room. They 
were on their own. The Israelis and Americans were negotiating in another meeting 
room. The Palestinian team immediately invited me into the room. I saw that Dahlan 
was ready to leave and the whole team was exhausted and angry.. .162
At that time, the separate negotiation between the Israelis and Americans was being led 
by US official Elliott Abrams, who Wolfensohn asked to speak to in private, reportedly 
saying:
Look Elliott, I think you are a son of a bitch. I have made ten trips over here and 
negotiated this deal for seven months. My team has been working on the agreement 
day and night. I suggested that Secretary Rice come visit, and she came for the Rabin 
event. You have been negotiating all day. No one has had the courtesy to tell me one 
word about what is going on in there...So I just want you to know before I resign why 
I’m resigning and what I think about your behaviour.163
According to Wolfensohn, when Rice learned of his encounter with Abrams, she sought
to assure him that he was, indeed, a ‘trusted advisor,’ to which he replied:
I’m seventy-two years old. I have been negotiating at a reasonably high level for forty 
years. I know when I am in, and I know when I am out, so please don’t tell me that I 
am in. Don’t tell me that I’m a trusted advisor.164
160 Ibid., p.425.
161 Ibid.
162 Ibid., p.427.
163 Ibid.
164 Ibid., p. 428.
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In Wolfensohn’s account, Rice chose not to argue the point, and remarked that she and 
he should just ‘get on with it’, after which they both negotiated with the parties until the 
early morning, when they finally secured an agreement.165 Crucially, this agreement 
differed from the original text negotiated by Wolfensohn’s team in the lead up to 
November by shifting responsibility for the implementation process away from the 
Quartet members and onto the US. According to Wolfensohn, ‘all that was left for the 
Quartet team to do was to publish, every two weeks, a report taking stock of the 
implementation of the agreements.’166
According to Annan, this episode demonstrated ‘the unhealthy possessiveness that 
Washington has over the Arab-Israeli peace process, and its reluctance to share it 
meaningfully with others -  even those working toward the same ends.’167 This 
sentiment was echoed in Wolfensohn's final analysis, which noted that:
Rice and Abrams were trying to make it clear that intervention in peace negotiations 
was not part of my job description. I was working on behalf of the Quartet for 
economic development, not as part of an American peace initiative, and the Quartet 
was not seen as a player -  it was only the United States that counted.168
In Rice’s account of the negotiations surrounding the AMA period, no mention is made 
of Wolfensohn’s role in the lead up to 15 November 2005, or of his involvement in the 
overnight talks that ended in success.169 According to Rice’s account, Solana and 
Wolfensohn’s role was simply to facilitate international support for the agreement:
Javier Solana, the European Union’s high representative for foreign affairs (essentially 
its Foreign Minister), and Jim Wolfensohn were in Jerusalem, and I asked them to 
come over and join me for the press conference. Making the agreement stick would 
require a lot of international support. They needed to share in this rare moment of 
achievement.170
It should be noted that without a properly established mechanism for enforcing the 
commitments made by the parties in the AMA, the central tenets of the agreement were 
more likely to be ignored or contravened by the parties to the conflict.
Notwithstanding this, the text of the agreement reached on 15 November 2005 covered
165 Reportedly, Rice still reserved the right to negotiate with the Israelis in private as they neared an 
agreement, which Wolfensohn did not dispute. See: Ibid.
166 Ibid., p.429.
167 Annan, Interventions: A Life in War and Peace, p. 290.
168 Wolfensohn, A Global Life: My Journey Among Rich and Poor, from Wall Street to the World Bank, p. 
429.
169 See: Rice, No Higher Honor: A Memoir o f My Years in Washington, pp. 408-10.
170 Ibid., p. 409.
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general principles of movement and access into and out of Gaza, and specific conditions
1 71governing the Rafah crossing.
The agreement stated that Israel would open the crossing points out of Gaza 
‘continuously,’ facilitating the ‘speedy exit’ of Palestinian agricultural produce ‘so that
1 *70
quality and freshness can be maintained.’ It was also agreed that a transport channel 
between Gaza and the West Bank would be opened, establishing bus convoys by 15 
December 2005, and truck convoys by 15 January 2006. ' Furthermore, under the 
AM A, the system of Israeli roadblocks and checkpoints in the West Bank was to be 
reviewed, and a plan developed ‘to reduce them to the maximum extent possible’ by 31 
December 2005.174 The AM A also approved the commencement of two important 
infrastructural projects in the Gaza Strip, the construction of a seaport and the 
construction of an airport. With the projects expected to take years to complete, the 
parties agreed to continue to develop ‘security and other relevant arrangements’ under a
17c
US-led committee in the meantime.
Finally, the AMA outlined the functioning of the Rafah crossing, which was to be 
jointly operated by the Egyptians and the Palestinian Authority, while being monitored 
by the European Union. Notably, the arrangement at the Rafah crossing allowed 
monitoring by Israeli officials through CCTV, but did not allow them to intervene or 
prevent individuals or cargo from entering or exiting.177 As Palestinian official Saeb 
Erekat noted at the time of the agreement, ‘this is the first time in history we will run an 
international passage by ourselves, and it's the first time Israel does not have a veto over
1 7Rour ability to do so.’
The situation at Rafah was complicated by the fact that European monitors were not 
permitted by Israeli officials to be billeted in either Egypt or Gaza, and the crossing was 
not permitted to operate without EU officials present. Thus, the Rafah crossing was 
frequently closed for extended periods of time when European officials were prevented
171 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Agreed documents on Movement and Access From and to Gaza," 
Jerusalem: 15 November, 2005.
172 Ibid.
173 Ibid.
174 Ibid.
175 Ibid.
176 Ibid.
177 Wright, R. and Wilson, S., "Rice Negotiates Deal to Open Gaza Crossings," The Washington Post, 16 
November, 2005.
178 Ibid.
179 de Soto, "End of Mission Report," p. 9.
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180by Israeli border officials from leaving Israel in response to alleged security concerns. 
Similarly, closures and delays on security grounds at the Kami crossing between Gaza 
and Israel resulted in the operational output falling well short of the levels agreed in the 
AMA, which had a devastating effect on the economy in Gaza.
Indeed, the reports issued by Wolfensohn as part of his role as Quartet envoy document
the steady decline in numbers passing through Israeli checkpoints, the demise of the
Palestinian seaport and airport projects, and the non-existence of the corridor between
Gaza and the West Bank.183 Wolfensohn eventually cited the failures of the AMA
implementation process as the primary reason for his decision to resign from the
position of Quartet envoy in 2006. For the Palestinians, the post-disengagement
reality in Gaza was akin to ‘an open air prison controlled directly by Israel on all
borders.’183 According to de Soto, ‘the only thing that has really changed is that there
186are no settlers and no more Israeli boots on the ground — at least not based there.’
Furthermore, Ghassan Khatib, the Palestinian planning minister at the time of the 
disengagement, argued that the lack of economic progress in the Gaza Strip following 
the Israeli withdrawal was playing into the hands of the ‘only alternative to the 
Palestinian Authority,’ Hamas.187 Indeed, the contest for control of the Palestinian 
authority between Fatah and Hamas occurred simultaneously to the disengagement 
process in 2005. The way in which the members of the Quartet responded to these 
developments greatly impacted the future of the peace process.
The Quartet Members Outline Approach to Hamas 
In the midst of the Israeli disengagement from Gaza, an important event occurred within 
the Quartet that would significantly shape the future output and impacts of the grouping. 
In September 2005, on the fringes of the UN General Assembly, the Quartet members
18U Ibid.
1X1 As part of the AMA, Israel agreed to allow approximately 150 trucks through the crossing per day. In 
September 2005,406 truckloads total were allowed through Kami, and by October 2005 the number had 
dropped to 182. See: Wright and Wilson, "Rice Negotiates Deal to Open Gaza Crossings."
1X2 According to Wolfensohn, by January 2006 the Palestinian agricultural industry was estimated to be 
losing $120,000 a day because of the closures. See: Wolfensohn, A Global Life: My Journey Among Rich 
and Poor, from Wall Street to the World Bank, p. 430.
1X3 Office of the Special Envoy for Disengagement, "Fourth Report on the Implementation of the 
Agreement on Movement and Access," Jerusalem: 10 January, 2006.
1X4 This period will be discussed in the subsequent chapter. See: Wolfensohn, J., "A Global Life," The 
7.30 Report with Kerry O'Brien, ABC, Sydney, 28 October 2010.
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de Soto, "End of Mission Report," p. 10. 
Ibid.
Wright and Wilson, "Rice Negotiates Deal to Open Gaza Crossings."
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began to formulate their approach to the January 2006 PLC elections. Specifically, the 
members negotiated a common position that discouraged the participation of armed 
groups in the elections (i.e. Hamas), but also offered implicit support for Abbas’ co- 
option strategy. In essence, the Quartet members were attempting to be officially 
against the inclusion of an armed Hamas, but unofficially encouraging of attempts to 
soften them through democratic participation.189 According to de Soto, it was decided 
among the members that the text of the Quartet statement would be used to achieve the 
former, and the press conference following the statement would be used to achieve the 
latter.190
Consequently, while the 20 September 2005 Quartet statement also commented on the 
ongoing issues within the Middle East peace process,191 the most important section 
focused on armed groups and the political process:
Ultimately, those who want to be part of the political process should not engage in 
armed group or militia activities, for there is a fundamental contradiction between 
such activities and the building of a democratic State.l9~
Thus, the official Quartet position was that Hamas should either disarm, or not 
participate in the PLC elections. In the press conference following the statement, 
however, Rice added an important, and pre-formulated, caveat:
We understand that this is a transition, and I think everybody understands this 
transitional process. This is going to be a Palestinian process, and I think we have to 
give the Palestinians some room for the evolution of their political process.193
In effect, this was a tacit approval of Abbas’ co-option strategy, allowing for the 
inclusion of armed groups in the democratic process to be viewed as a ‘stage’ in the 
Palestinian evolution toward democracy, despite the ‘fundamental contradiction’ 
between the possession of militias and electoral participation. It is important to note, 
however, that the Quartet’s official response to Hamas was the more strongly held view
188 de Soto, A., Former United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process, interview 
with the author, New York City, October, 2011.
189 According to de Soto, the members of the Quartet consulted with President Abbas via teleconference 
about their dual approach, who gave his approval, de Soto, "End of Mission Report," p. 16.
190 de Soto. Interview with the author, New York City, October, 2011.
191 The statement urged the ‘easing of the system of movement restrictions’ in the West Bank, called for a 
revived focus on the Roadmap, and stressed the importance of Palestinian territorial contiguity. See: US 
Department of State, "Quartet Statement on the Middle East Peace Process," New York City: 20 
September, 2005.
192 Ibid.
193 United Nations Department of Public Information, "Transcript of Press Conference on Middle East,
By Secretary-General Kofi Annan, Quartet Foreign Ministers, at United Nations Headquarters," New 
York City: 20 September, 2005.
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among the members. According to Rice, the Quartet members had originally agreed to 
insist on disarmament as a prerequisite to political participation, but had been dissuaded 
from doing so by Abbas:
I’d asked David [Welch] and Elliott [Abrams] to call Abbas just to let him know what 
we were about to say. He demurred, saying that such a statement would be seen as an 
effort to exclude Hamas. Only the participation of all Palestinians would make the 
election legitimate, he argued. So everyone was on the same page: the elections should 
proceed, and Hamas should participate. But failure is an orphan, and when the results 
were announced, the finger-pointing began.194
The inclusion of Hamas was also endorsed by Bush. According to Indyk’s account of 
the period, as the elections loomed and Hamas appeared likely to secure a major 
proportion of the seats, Abbas considered delaying the election further.193 Sharon was 
supportive of the measure, and offered to ban Hamas candidates from running in East 
Jerusalem in order to allow Abbas to justify an additional delay, provided that he was 
not criticised subsequently by the US President.196 According to Indyk, Bush was 
against the plan, and argued that Hamas should be given the opportunity to participate:
According to two of the senior American officials who discussed the issue with Bush, 
the president believed that it would be good for Hamas to participate in the elections 
because it would make them accountable to the people.197
Despite the Quartet support for Abbas’ strategy regarding Hamas, in November 2005 
the Israeli Prime Minister remained against the participation of the group, stating that 
while he supported Abbas’ democratisation efforts he would ‘not help Hamas.’198 
Crucially, Sharon also stressed that:
Hamas’s participation could lead to the end of the Roadmap, if there is a situation in 
which an armed terrorist organization is a political partner in the Palestinian 
administration.199
For Sharon, fundamental opposition to Hamas was a core political platform that was 
reinforced constantly by acts of political violence.200 Importantly, this period also saw
194 Rice, No Higher Honor: A Memoir of My Years in Washington, p. 415.
193 Indyk, M., Innocent Abroad: An Intimate Account of American Peace Diplomacy in the Middle East 
(New York: Simon & Schuster, 2009), p. 382.
196 Ibid.
197 Ibid.
198 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "PM Sharon meets with US Secy of State Condoleezza Rice," 
Jerusalem: 14 November, 2005.
199 Ibid.
200 On 28 October 2005 a suicide bomber killed five and wounded 55 in a market place in Hadera. On 5 
December 2005 another suicide attack killed five and wounded 40 in Netanya. Both events were 
condemned by Quartet statements at the time. See: US Department of State, "Quartet Statement on the
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the Israeli Prime Minister break with the Likud party in order to form his own political 
movement, calling elections for early 2006.201 The Kadima (‘forward’) party aimed to 
unite the centrist factions of the Israeli political spectrum on a dual platform of political 
progress with the Palestinians and domestic reforms. According to Indyk, Sharon’s 
move was akin to a ‘political earthquake,’ and he argued that the Israeli leader was 
seeking to ‘create a large center bloc that would give him the basis for making some 
political decisions vis-a-vis the Palestinians.’ ' Indeed, in the aftermath of the move, 
Sharon was able to recruit key Labour leaders such as Shimon Peres and Haim Ramon, 
as well as bringing along Likud’s Ehud Olmert and Tzipi Livni.
However, the electoral prospects of the Kadima party took a hit on 18 December 2005 
when Ariel Sharon suffered a ‘mild stroke’ and was hospitalised.204 Not only did 
Sharon’s health issues cast doubt on his ability to lead the party to the next election, but 
the drama surrounding his defection and hospitalisation contributed to the further de­
prioritisation of issues surrounding movement and access into and out of Gaza.205
As elections in both Israel and the Palestinian territories neared, the Quartet members 
met on 28 December 2005, and issued a statement that amended their previously 
ambiguous position on Hamas. The statement called for ‘all participants [in the PLC 
elections] to renounce violence, recognize Israel’s right to exist, and disarm.’206 
Furthermore, the Quartet members demanded that such steps should be codified in 
Palestinian law 207
The modification of the Quartet position was likely in response to a series of local 
election victories for Hamas that had occurred in October, September, and December
Middle East," New York City: 28 October, 2005. And: US Department of State, "Quartet Statement on 
Middle East Peace."
201 Reportedly, the decision reflected the level o f internal dissent among the Likud members regarding the 
disengagement from Gaza, including notable cabinet resignations. See: Medding, S., "Sharon Shakes Up 
Israeli Politics," CNN, 22 November, 2005.
202 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Prime Minister Sharon Announces New Party and Calls for 
Elections," Jerusalem: 21 November, 2005.
203 Medding, "Sharon Shakes Up Israeli Politics."
204 Myre, G., "A Mild Stroke Sends Sharon to the Hospital," The New York Times, 19 December, 2005.
205 Wolfensohn, "A Global Life."
20(1 US Department of State, "Quartet Statement on Palestinian Legislative Council Elections," 
Washington, DC: 28 December, 2005.
207 The Quartet members noted that: ‘The Palestinian Authority should take additional steps to ensure the 
democratic process remains untainted by violence, by prohibiting political parties from pursuing their 
aims through violent means, and by moving expeditiously to codify this as Palestinian law. In particular, 
the Quartet expressed its view that a future Palestinian Authority Cabinet should include no member who 
has not committed to the principles of Israel's right to exist in peace and security and an unequivocal end 
to violence and terrorism.’ Ibid.
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2005, establishing the strong prospects of a Hamas victory in the January 2006 PLC 
elections.208 Importantly, the 28 December 2005 Quartet statement presaged the coming 
‘Quartet conditions’ that would be announced following the Hamas victory, and would 
define the work of the Quartet throughout the following years. The ramifications of the 
Quartet approach to Hamas are the focus of the next chapter.
:ox International Crisis Group, "Enter Hamas: The Challenges of Political Integration," p. 8.
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Until 25 January 2006 Hamas had been a target for co-optation and inclusion, to be 
lured into the system so as to become a partner for peace. On that date, having won, 
they were relegated to what they had been before: a target in the Global War on 
Terror.
- Alvaro de Soto, United Nations envoy to the Quartet (2005- 
2007).1
Few issues in UN Middle East diplomacy caused more controversy than my 
participation in 2006 in a Quartet position that effectively isolated the newly elected 
Hamas-led Palestinian Authority government.
- Kofi Annan, United Nations Secretary General (1997-2006).2
Introduction
The Quartet’s response to the Hamas election victory had far reaching consequences 
that came to define the work of the grouping. The so-called ‘Quartet conditions’, issued 
on 30 January 2006 in reaction to the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) election 
results, shaped the international response to the Hamas-led government, and were a 
contributing factor to the Palestinian fiscal crisis that followed. After advocating 
Palestinian political and institutional reform, the members of the Quartet chose to exert 
immediate normative and financial pressure on the democratically elected Hamas 
government in the post election period, undermining President Abbas’ co-option 
strategy in the process. The ramifications of this decision shaped the outputs of the 
Quartet from 2006 onwards.
This chapter seeks to answer the question, what were the outputs o f the Quartet in 2006 
and 2007?
It argues that the Quartet response to the Hamas election victory was the catalyst for 
several overlapping and interrelated developments within the Middle East peace process 
that continue to resonate. The Quartet members were unable to prevent the Hamas 
election victory without compromising their support for both Palestinian democratic 
reform and President Abbas’ co-option strategy. In the immediate aftermath of the PLC 
elections, the relationship between the Hamas-controlled Palestinian Authority and the 
international donor community was severed. Leading this isolation strategy were the 
members of the Quartet, with the United States acting as the driving force within the 
grouping.
1 de Soto, A., "The Role of the United Nations in the Middle East," in Italianieuropi,2 July 2009, p. 14.
2 Annan, K., Interventions: A Life in War and Peace (New York: Penguin Press, 2012), p. 290.
168
Chapter Seven: The Palestinian Divide, 2006-2007
During this period, the members of the Quartet discouraged inter-Palestinian 
reconciliation attempts in favour of efforts to unseat Hamas from power through 
diplomatic and economic sanctions. This strategy saw the intensification of the domestic 
political divide between Fatah and Hamas, which led ultimately to an all-out conflict in 
Gaza, and years of unsuccessful attempts to forge a unity agreement between the 
factions. Specifically, the 2007 breakdown of the Palestinian National Unity 
Government (NUG) resulted in the dichotomisation of the Palestinian government and 
territory along factional lines. While this facilitated the re-establishment of international 
ties to President Abbas’ West Bank administration, championed by the members of the 
Quartet, the Hamas-controlled Gaza Strip faced increasing isolation and a humanitarian 
crisis.
Ironically, the quarantine of the Hamas government allowed for the restoration and 
acceleration of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. While the catalyst for this process was 
the productive working relationship between Israeli Prime Minister Olmert and 
President Abbas, US Secretary of State Rice sought to spearhead the international 
efforts to bolster President Abbas’ West Bank government, and to offer financial and 
technical support to the state-building project led by Salam Fayyad. During this period, 
the non-US members of the Quartet operated in a largely supportive capacity, endorsing 
the efforts of Rice, Olmert and Abbas, and legitimising the Annapolis process.
This chapter is divided into two chronological sections that explore the outputs of the 
Quartet members within the context of the Middle East peace process in 2006 and 2007. 
The 2006 section examines the key causal factors of the Hamas election victory, and the 
politics and consequences of the Quartet response. The 2007 section examines the role 
played by the Quartet members, in particular the United States, in the breakdown of the 
Palestinian NUG, and the subsequent efforts to fast track Israeli-Palestinian 
negotiations.
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2006: The Hamas Election Victory
He was, in a bizarre sense (bizarre because it appears counterintuitive), a true idealist.
I remember at the time of the Palestinian elections in January 2006 when many people 
thought they should be postponed, George [Bush] was all for them going ahead. He 
didn’t ignore or fail to comprehend the advice that this might give a Hamas victory; he 
simply said: ‘If that’s what people think, let’s find it out.’
- Tony Blair, British Prime Minister (1997-2007).3
... We had to accept the outcome of the election: it had been free and fair, even if we 
didn’t like the victor. But it was one thing to acknowledge that Hamas had won and 
quite another to accept its program. We had a choice: as long as the terrorist 
organisation refused to renounce violence and accept the agreements that the PLO 
under Arafat had made with Israel, we did not have to give it international legitimacy 
or foreign assistance.
- Condoleezza Rice, United States Secretary of State (2005- 
2009).4
January 2006 was characterised by political uncertainty in both Israel and the 
Palestinian territories. On 3 January, Ariel Sharon gave an interview in which he noted 
that he felt ‘well’ and reiterated his belief that Jerusalem should ‘forever be the 
undivided capital of Israel.’5 The following day, Sharon suffered a massive stroke, and 
fell into a coma.6 While Ehud Olmert was sworn in as acting Israeli Prime Minister on 5 
January, scheduling elections for March 2006, he remained hopeful that Sharon might 
recover and return to the Kadima leadership.7 The imminent Palestinian Legislative 
Council elections added to the uncertainty in the region, as a string of local election 
victories demonstrated the likelihood of a strong showing by Hamas in January.
While the members of the Quartet still expected Hamas to fall short of victory, they met
o
on 13 January 2006 to discuss their potential responses to such an eventuality. 
According to de Soto’s account of the meeting, he proposed a ‘common but 
differentiated’ approach to dealing with Hamas. In essence, de Soto argued that the 
flexibility of Russia and the United Nations regarding contact with members of Hamas 
could counterbalance the legislatively constrained US and EU, and could be utilised by
3 Blair, T ,,A Journey: My Political Life, 1st ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2010), p. 507.
4 Rice, C., No Higher Honor: A Memoir of My Years in Washington, 1st ed. (New York: Crown 
Publishers, 2011), p. 418.
5 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Interview by Prime Minister Sharon to Nikkei," Jerusalem: 3 
January, 2006.
6 Sharon remained comatose until his death, on 11 January 2014.
7 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Acting PM Olmert's Remarks at the Start of Special Cabinet 
Meeting," Jerusalem: 5 January, 2006.
s US Department of State, "Remarks en Route London, United Kingdom," En Route to London, UK: 29 
January, 2006.
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the Quartet as a channel for diplomacy in the election aftermath.9 Despite the United 
States being ‘not entirely averse to the approach,’ de Soto concluded that Washington 
had clearly decided who the ‘bad guys’ were, and his proposal gained no traction.10
The Palestinian Legislative Council Elections 
On 25 January 2006, Palestinian Legislative Council elections were held in the West 
Bank and the Gaza Strip in a manner that was deemed to be ‘free and fair’ by 
international observers.* 11 On 26 January 2006, as the votes continued to be counted, the 
Quartet members issued a statement congratulating the Palestinian people on the 
success of the election, but reiterating that:
A two-state solution to the conflict requires all participants in the democratic process 
to renounce violence and terror, accept Israel's right to exist, and disarm, as outlined in 
the Roadmap.12
Through this statement, the Quartet members had outlined the nature of their likely 
response to a Hamas-led PLC. The language used mirrored that of 28 December 2005 
with the inclusion of a reference to the ‘Roadmap,’ ‘ and the statement continued to 
develop the trend of conditionality being presented by the Quartet members.14 Later that 
evening, the PLC election results were announced. Hamas had won 74 of the 132 seats 
in the Legislative Council, allowing them to form a majority government, with Fatah 
winning only 45 .15
This result was a reflection of several interrelated causal factors. Chief among these 
factors, as mentioned previously, was that electoral support for Fatah had been in 
decline for years, and was generally linked to both the lack of progress on the Israeli-
9 de Soto, A., "End of Mission Report," The Guardian, 12 June, 2007, p. 17.
10 Ibid.
11 The European Parliament appointed a team of observers to monitor the situation on the ground both in 
the months leading to the election and on polling day. See: European Union External Action Service, "EU 
Parliament - M.E.P.s Oversee Historic Palestinian Election," Brussels, Belgium: 30 January, 2006.
12 US Department of State, "Quartet Statement on Palestinian Legislative Council Elections,"
Washington, DC: 26 January, 2006.
13 It should be noted that the sections of the Roadmap concerning the renunciation of violence and 
recognition of Israel were framed within the context o f Israeli-Palestinian negotiations during the second 
intifada, and were primarily in reference to the need for reforms within the PA security apparatuses under 
Yasser Arafat. Their application in this context, especially when the Roadmap also strongly encouraged 
Palestinian elections and urged an end to Israeli settlement construction, was problematic at best.
14 This trend reached its apex in the 30 January 2006 Quartet statement, when the members linked the 
notion of future funding for the Palestinian Authority to the disarmament and reform of Hamas.
15 Erlanger, S., "Hamas Routes Ruling Faction, Casting Pall on Peace Process," The New York Times, 27 
January, 2006.
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Palestinian front and to the popular perception of the group as corrupt and inefficient.16 
Fatah officials compounded this issue by running multiple candidates in many 
electorates, which splintered the secular vote and diluted the remaining support for the 
party.17
The popular dissatisfaction with Fatah was harnessed expertly by Hamas candidates, 
who adopted a highly consultative, disciplined and energetic campaign style, and ran on 
a ‘change and reform’ platform, rather than on an ‘anti-Israel’ platform. Essentially, 
Hamas turned the PLC election into a referendum on the legacy of Fatah, which allowed 
them to capitalise on the perceived arrogance and corruption of the latter, and to present 
the entrenchment of the Israeli occupation and the stalemate in the peace process as 
evidence of Fatah’s failure to protect the interests of the Palestinian people. Critical to 
this narrative was Hamas’ success in rebranding the Israeli disengagement from Gaza as 
a product of ‘four years of resistance,’ rather than ‘ten years of negotiations.’19
Ironically, the level of sophistication present in the Hamas campaign was a by-product 
of both the delayed timing of the PLC election, and the staggering of the local elections, 
both of which had been designed by Fatah officials as a means to stave off a Hamas 
election victory. According to an International Crisis Group (ICG) report issued after 
the PLC elections, between mid-2005 and early 2006 Hamas had honed its political 
operation to the point where it was regarded as ‘the most professional, disciplined and 
calculating electoral team in the Palestinian territories.’ Furthermore, in addition to its 
anti-Fatah campaign,Hamas candidates also ran on a platform of moral purity and 
freedom from corruption, highlighting the charitable work carried out by the 
organisation through its network of orphanages, clinics and schools. This message was 
strengthened by the virtual monopoly that Hamas had on campaigning in mosques.22 
Thus, while Fatah had splintered the secular vote, Hamas had an uncontested hold on 
the Islamic vote.
16 Khatib, G., "The Collapse of the Peace Process and the Rise of Hamas " Durham University: School of 
Government and International Affairs Working Paper Series (December, 2007).
17 International Crisis Group, "Enter Hamas: The Challenges of Political Integration," Crisis Group 
Middle East Report 49: 18 January, 2006, p. 9.
18 For an in-depth analysis of the dynamics of the 2006 PLC elections, including the strategies adopted by 
both Fatah and Hamas within this context, see: Schwarze, E., "Public Opinion, Polling and the Conduct of 
Palestinian Political Leadership" (Doctoral Thesis, Australian National University: Centre for Arab and 
Islamic Studies, 2011).
19 International Crisis Group, "Enter Hamas: The Challenges of Political Integration," p. 7.
20 Ibid., p. 8.
21 Rice, No Higher Honor: A Memoir of My Years in Washington, p. 417.
22 International Crisis Group, "Enter Hamas: The Challenges of Political Integration," p. 8.
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Despite all of these factors, the final result defied exit polling conducted on Election 
Day,23 and reportedly came as a surprise to key US figures involved in the peace 
process. As Rice remarked after the announcement:
I don't know anyone who wasn't caught off guard by Hamas's strong showing...Some 
say that Hamas itself was caught off guard by its strong showing.24
As Rice admitted, this oversight did ‘say something about us perhaps not having had a 
good enough pulse on the Palestinian population, as opposed to elites in Ramallah and 
the like.’25 However, Rice’s surprise in this instance was itself surprising, as the 
potential for an anti-Fatah backlash resulting in a Hamas victory was clearly understood 
by the international community in the months leading up to the elections. As the 
previous chapter demonstrated, since mid-2005 there were numerous indications that 
popular support was shifting from Fatah to Hamas, and the members of the Quartet had 
signalled through their evolving positions on the matter that they considered a Hamas 
victory to be possible. Indeed, in the lead up to the elections, US officials had sought to 
persuade Abbas to either further delay the polling day, or to force disarmament onto 
Hamas, both of which reflected concerns that a Hamas victory was possible, if not 
likely.26 In the election aftermath, the discourse turned immediately toward the ‘failure’ 
of US officials, and of Abbas, to avert the electoral success of Hamas, but several 
factors made further delays or disarmament unfeasible at that time.
Firstly, Abbas was both politically and practically constrained. According to a US 
official, Bush had appealed to Abbas in October 2005 to disarm Hamas before the 
elections, but Abbas had said that he ‘wouldn’t do it’ because he ‘couldn’t do it.’ As 
the ICG observed, not only was this type of security crackdown beyond Abbas’ security 
force’s capabilities, but it was also politically untenable at the time:
There is also a growing realisation that Hamas is a reality to be reckoned with, and 
Abu Mäzen [Abbas] is not about to try to forcibly disarm it. This is all the more patent 
given the lack of progress on the diplomatic front: no Palestinian leader can be 
expected to crack down on fellow Palestinians when there is no peace process, let
23 Erlanger, "Hamas Routes Ruling Faction, Casting Pall on Peace Process."
24 Weissman, S., "Rice Admits US Underestimated Hamas Strength," The New York Times, 30 January, 
2006.
25 US Department of State, "Remarks en Route London, United Kingdom."
26 Rose, D., "The Gaza Bombshell," Vanity Fair, April, 2008.
27 US Department of State, "Remarks en Route London, United Kingdom."
28 Weissman, "Rice Admits US Underestimated Hamas Strength."
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alone when Israeli restrictions and settlement activity -  especially around Jerusalem -  
are increasing.29
Secondly, with Abbas’ options limited and with an agreement already reached between 
Fatah and Hamas on electoral participation; the United States was unwilling to impose 
disarmament preconditions on the Palestinians. Arguably, any such move would have 
been viewed as an attempt to thwart democracy, and could have jeopardised the
o  i
ceasefire. Furthermore, any politically costly delays were not guaranteed to produce 
an electoral difference. As Rice remarked after the election:
I just don't understand the argument that it somehow would have gotten better the 
longer it went on. What became clear, I think, from this is that you had a lot of pent-up 
frustration, a lot of pent-up anger, and I don't think that was going to dissipate in four 
or five or six months. And so you ask yourself, "Are you going to then support a 
policy of denying the Palestinians elections that had been promised to them at a 
certain point in time because people were fearful of the outcome?" And I just don't 
think you can support democracy and then say, well, we have to do this because of the 
outcome.32
Finally, even if US officials had decided that the political cost of forcing delays on the 
Palestinians was worthwhile, Bush was not in favour of any such delays. Indeed, 
according to Palestinian official Mohammad Dahlan, after warning his colleagues in the 
Bush Administration that Fatah was likely to be defeated by Hamas, he had discovered 
that ‘everyone [within the Administration] was against the elections,’ except Bush. ' As 
Dahlan recounted:
Bush decided, ‘I need an election. I want elections in the Palestinian Authority.’ 
Everyone is following him in the American administration, and everyone is nagging 
Abbas, telling him, ‘The president wants elections.’ Fine. For what purpose?34
While some criticised Bush after the election for this position ,35 Abbas’ constraints 
regarding the enactment of further delays or disarmament had clearly reduced the 
options for US policy within this context.
29 International Crisis Group, "Enter Hamas: The Challenges of Political Integration," p. 10.
30 As discussed in the previous chapter, the 19 March 2005 ‘Cairo Declaration’ was the centerpiece of 
President Abbas’ co-option strategy, whereby Hamas was granted access to the electoral process in 
exchange for reducing inter-factional violence. By including Hamas in the process without forcing them 
to disarm, Abbas had hoped to ‘normalise’ the group through legislative constraints in the election 
aftermath, in which it was expected that Fatah would prevail.
31 International Crisis Group, "Enter Hamas: The Challenges of Political Integration," p. 30.
32 US Department of State, "Remarks en Route London, United Kingdom."
33 Rose, "The Gaza Bombshell."
34 Ibid.
35 Indyk noted at the time that there was ‘a lot of blame to go around’, referring to the failings of Fatah, 
but ‘on the American side, the conceptual failure that contributed to disaster was the President’s belief
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Thus, while members of the international community, in particular the United States, 
had sought to prevent the Hamas election victory, for a number of domestic and 
international factors this goal had proven to be politically and practically unattainable at 
the time. The members of the Quartet had proposed and promoted an agenda of 
Palestinian political reform that had rested upon the holding of PLC elections, and after 
Abbas had adopted the strategy of co-option to draw Hamas into this process the 
eventual outcome became almost unavoidable.
The Hamas election victory was a watershed moment for the Israeli-Palestinian 
relationship, for the evolution of Palestinian democracy, and for the relationship 
between the Palestinian Authority and the international community. As the following 
sections demonstrate, in all three of these areas, the period following the PLC elections 
was characterised by regression.
The 30 January 2006 Quartet Meeting
I was used to divisions in the Quartet, but never before had the divisions been so stark. 
The US and the EU were the major donors to the Palestinian authority and viewed 
Hamas as a terrorist group. Russia and the UN did not have these restrictions, and the 
UN had an overall humanitarian responsibility for the welfare of the Palestinians. We 
tried to secure Quartet agreement on a “common but differentiated” approach -  those 
without restrictions could be the agents for dealing with Hamas as necessary, while 
those with restrictions could apply pressure. Rice would have none of it.
- Kofi Annan, United Nations Secretary General (1997-2006), 
on the 30 January 2006 Quartet meeting.36
While the statement produced by the Quartet members during the 30 January 2006 
meeting largely came to define the legacy of the grouping within the peace process, the 
internal politics of the meeting itself exemplified the difficulties that the members faced 
in formulating common positions in times of crisis. The Hamas election victory was a 
multifaceted predicament for the Quartet members. The key challenge, especially for 
the European Union and the United States, was how to reconcile the two seemingly 
incompatible goals of combating terrorism and political violence globally, and 
continuing to provide financial assistance to a Palestinian Authority led by Hamas. As 
de Soto argued, the failure of the Bush Administration to distinguish sufficiently 
between Hamas and al-Qaeda within this context led to a missed opportunity for a more 
nuanced approach to the post election reality in the Palestinian territories:
that democracy and elections solve everything.’ See: Weissman, "Rice Admits US Underestimated 
Hamas Strength."
36 Annan, Interventions: A Life in War and Peace, p. 292.
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The US saw the dilemma through the prism of the Global War on Terror which 
blurred the crucial difference between the feral, nihilist, pre-Westphalians of al-Qaeda 
and Hamas, which is a grievance-based organization with a strong popular base. Given 
the choice between fighting uncompromisingly with a group on its list of terrorist 
organizations, no matter its nature or the enormous differences that separated it from 
the 9/11 attackers, on the one hand, and promoting democratization and negotiations 
with a broadly-based Palestinian interlocutor, on the other, the latter was summarily 
jettisoned.37
Viewed through this prism, fundamental change was required in either the nature of 
international assistance to Palestinian institutions, or to the governing principles of 
Hamas as a political actor.38 As de Soto argued, this was a ‘malleable moment’ in the 
history of the Middle East peace process, but the question of how best to address these
39challenges sharply divided the Quartet members on 30 January 2006.
Wolfensohn stated that Hamas officials indicated immediately after the PLC elections 
that they wanted to establish a dialogue with the Quartet members.40 While he argued in 
favour of such a move at the 30 January meeting, he later acknowledged that the 
proposal ‘never received even momentary consideration’ from the US representatives to 
the Quartet.41 Indeed, the US position on Hamas at this time was unwavering, and even 
before the Quartet members arrived in London to meet and discuss the situation, on 30 
January 2006, a strongly- worded US draft of the Quartet statement had already been 
circulated 42
Rice noted that the argument put forward by the United States at that time was simple: 
‘you can’t fund terrorists.’43 However, in order to be effective, this position required 
support from the EU (which provided more direct aid to the Palestinians than the United
37 de Soto, "The Role of the United Nations in the Middle East."
38 Rice summarised the US viewpoint en route to the Quartet meeting in London: ‘...the United States is 
not prepared to fund an organization that advocates the destruction of Israel, that advocates violence and 
that refuses its obligations under the roadmap to which everyone is committed. We do understand that the 
Palestinian people may have some humanitarian needs and I think we will have to look at that on a kind 
of case-by-case basis in terms of humanitarian needs, but we are going to review all of our assistance 
programs, the bedrock principle here is we can't have funding for an organization that holds those views 
just because it is in government.’ See: US Department of State, "Remarks en Route London, United 
Kingdom."
39 de Soto, A., Former United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process, interview 
with the author, New York City, October, 2011.
40 Wolfensohn, J., A Global Life: My Journey Among Rich and Poor, from Wall Street to the World Bank 
(Pan Macmillan Australia Pty. Limited, 2009), p. 434.
4' Ibid.
42 This draft called for the cessation of economic assistance to the Hamas-led PA should the group refuse 
to disarm completely, recognise Israel and adhere to all previous agreements signed by the PLO, 
including the Roadmap. According to de Soto, and as this section will discuss, the key difference between 
the US draft and the eventual statement was the sharpness and directness of the language, which de Soto 
claims credit for softening. See: de Soto, "End of Mission Report," p. 18.
43 Rice, No Higher Honor: A Memoir of My Years in Washington, p. 419.
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States), and benefited from both the appearance of multilateralism and the sense of 
international legitimacy conveyed by a unanimous Quartet position on the matter. 
Essentially, in seeking to isolate Hamas, the United States did not prefer, either 
politically or practically, to go it alone. Thus, the US representatives to the Quartet 
applied strong pressure to the other members during the 30 January meeting to forge a 
common position that supported their own. The main sources of opposition to the US 
position during this meeting came from the UN and Russian representatives 
respectively.
According to de Soto, the meeting of envoys that preceded the 30 January principals’ 
meeting was ‘agonising.’44 As the representative for the UNSG, the only non-donor 
member of the Quartet, the issue of denying Hamas funding was extremely problematic 
for de Soto. Indeed, in this meeting he again argued for a ‘common but differentiated 
approach’ to dealing with Hamas, suggesting that ‘either the reference to the review of 
assistance should be deleted altogether or the decision should be taken only by the 
donor members of the Quartet.’45 The alternative formation proposed by de Soto at that 
time was for the Quartet members to encourage the moderate factions within Hamas, 
which had argued for the ceasefire and for participation in the political process, by 
tailoring international support for the PA in a way that promoted further movement 
toward normalisation.46 Reportedly, this approach was met with a ‘heavy barrage’ from 
US representatives David Welch and Elliott Abrams, including:
...ominous innuendo to the effect that if the Secretary-General didn’t encourage a
review of projects of UN agencies and programmes it could have repercussions when
UN budget deliberations took place on Capitol Hill.47
While the impasse was eventually overcome by amendments to the precise wording of 
the statement,48 the rift between the United States and the office of the UNSG during 
this meeting was illustrative of the unbalanced nature of power within the Quartet. 
Indeed, as Annan argued subsequently, had he chosen to maintain his contact with
44 de Soto. Interview with the author, New York City, October, 2011.
4:1 de Soto, "End of Mission Report," p. 18.
46 de Soto argued to his colleagues at the time that: ‘We need to work with these people. We need to 
continue bringing them in. For God’s sake, don’t slam the door in their noses.’ de Soto. Interview with 
the author, New York City, October, 2011.
47 de Soto, "End of Mission Report," p. 18.
48 Rather than calling directly for an end to assistance to the Hamas-led PA, the final version of the 
Quartet statement only ‘concluded’ that a review of such assistance would be ‘inevitable.’ de Soto argues 
that without his intervention, the wording of the statement would have been much more severe, de Soto. 
Interview with the author, New York City, October, 2011.
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members of Hamas after the PLC election, there would have been serious repercussions 
for his continued role within the peace process:
A high-level political dialogue with a Hamas government at that time would have shut 
the UN out with many constituencies. Israel would almost certainly have refused to 
see my envoy, and the United States warned us in no uncertain terms of where it 
stood.49
Exacerbating the inherently weak bargaining position of the UN within the Quartet was 
de Soto’s isolation during the envoys’ meeting, where he was reportedly ‘weakened by 
the willingness expressed by both my EU and Russian colleague, at the outset, to accept 
the language proposed by the United States.’50 In Rice’s account, however, at the 
principals’ level meeting the Russian representative to the Quartet, Sergei Lavrov, was 
much less willing to compromise Russia’s ongoing relationship with Hamas.51 
Reportedly, the argument between Rice and Lavrov was ‘vociferous,’ and, ultimately, 
agreement was only reached between the two when the issue of isolating Hamas was re­
framed to include Israel’s likely response:
[Lavrovl understood that the Israelis would sit on the sidelines and refuse to negotiate 
if they were forced to accept Hamas as a part of the Palestinian political landscape.
The isolation of Hamas was a bitter pill for Moscow but a sacrifice worth making to 
keep the peace process alive.52
The fact that the Quartet members reached agreement on common language for their 30 
January 2006 statement was testament to the steadfastness and persuasiveness of the
53United States on this issue, and the relative weakness of the other dissenting parties. 
However, as argued previously, the United States lacked the authority to force any other 
member to adopt a position within the Quartet with which they disagreed, and 
ultimately each member was responsible for approving the final position. The language
49 Annan, Interventions: A Life in War and Peace, p. 294.
50 de Soto, "End of Mission Report," p. 19.
51 Rice, No Higher Honor: A Memoir of My Years in Washington, p. 419.
52 Ibid.
53 The exact nature of ongoing contact between Russian representatives and members Hamas remained 
ambiguous at the time of the 30 January Quartet statement. As EEAS official Christian Jouret explained, 
‘Russian diplomats meet with Hamas on a regular basis...but they don’t meet ‘Hamas’, they meet people 
belonging to Hamas. They don’t deal with Hamas, but they have a lot of contact with people working for 
Hamas. It’s an ambiguous situation.’ Jouret, C., Middle East Advisor, European External Action Service 
(EEAS), interview with the author, Brussels, November, 2011.
As the subsequent sections demonstrate, Russian officials gradually became more vocal about their 
ongoing diplomatic ties with Hamas, even urging the other Quartet members to consider lifting their 
diplomatic embargo. See: US Department of State, "Press Availability with UN Secretary-General Ban 
Ki-moon; Russian FM Sergei Lavrov; European High Representative Javier Solana; German FM Frank- 
Walter Steinmeier; EU Commissioner Benita Ferrero-Waldner," Washington, DC: 2 February, 2007.
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of the statement itself, considered by Rice to be a ‘direct shot at Hamas,’ is the subject 
of the next section.54
The Quartet Reaction to the Hamas Election Victory
[The 30 January statement] effectively transformed the Quartet from a negotiation- 
promoting foursome guided by a common document (the Road Map) into a body that 
was all-but imposing sanctions on a freely elected government of a people under 
occupation as well as setting unattainable preconditions for dialogue.
- Alvaro de Soto, United Nations envoy to the Quartet (2005- 
2007).55
The image of both the EU and the UN has suffered substantially among Palestinians as 
a result of the Quartet's apparent support for economic isolation, under the direction of 
the United States...In these circumstances both bodies should seriously consider 
whether it is in the best interests of peace and human rights in the region for them to 
seek to find a peaceful solution through the medium of the Quartet.
- John Dugard, United Nations Special Rapporteur on the 
situation of human rights in the Occupied Palestinian Territory 
(2001-2009).56
Through the 30 January 2006 statement, the Quartet members imposed three conditions 
on the newly elected Palestinian government, and outlined a short window in which 
these conditions needed to be met. The cumulative effect of these demands was 
antithetical to Hamas, and the fiscal crisis in the Palestinian territories that followed can 
be traced back to the uncompromising position taken in January. Furthermore, the 
Quartet position undermined Abbas’ normalisation strategy, and facilitated the creation 
of an isolated and politically unaccountable ‘pariah’ government in the Palestinian 
territories. For the United States, at least, the isolation strategy was intended to remove 
Hamas from power.57
54 Rice, No Higher Honor: A Memoir of My Years in Washington, p. 419.
55 de Soto, "End of Mission Report," p. 19.
56 United Nations Department of Public Information, "UN Rights Expert Paints Dire Picture of Situation 
in Occupied Palestinian Territory," UN News Centre: 22 June, 2006.
57 As noted by the International Crisis Group, the Quartet’s strategy was based on containment, 
‘frustrating Hamas’s government while avoiding a humanitarian crisis, and simultaneously preparing the 
ground for a popular backlash and/or reversal of the electoral outcome.’ See: International Crisis Group, 
"Palestinians, Israel, and the Quartet: Pulling Back From the Brink," Crisis Group Middle East Report 54: 
13 June,2 0 0 6 ,p .2.
Similarly, US Secretary of State Rice noted on 7 April 2006 when she announced that the US was 
suspending all aid to the Hamas government, that government aid would be restored if Hamas accepted 
the Quartet principles, ‘or a new government comes to power that accepts them.’ See: US Department of 
State, "Statement on Palestinian Assistance," Washington, DC: 7 April, 2006.
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The central issue for the members of the Quartet was the nature of international 
assistance to the Palestinian authority in the aftermath of the Hamas election victory.
The 30 January statement made the Quartet position clear:
...the Quartet concluded that it was inevitable that future assistance to any new 
government would be reviewed by donors against that government's commitment to 
the principles of nonviolence, recognition of Israel, and acceptance of previous 
agreements and obligations, including the Roadmap.58
By so publicly situating continued international funding to the Palestinian Authority as 
dependent on these three conditions, the Quartet members had prescribed a 
confrontation from which neither Hamas nor the international donor community were 
able to extricate themselves. The inevitability of this confrontation was determined by 
both the nature of the conditions themselves, and by the rigidity with which the 
members of the Quartet had imposed them. The stringency of the Quartet position 
reflected the US influence on authorship process, which led to a statement that deviated 
in important ways from an EU Council statement released earlier on the same day.59
Despite the European Union and the United States agreeing on the need to impose 
conditions on the Hamas government, there were important differences between these 
actors on the key issue of conditionality60 The contrast between the Quartet statement 
and the EU Council statement on this issue was the immediate focus of the international 
media present at the Quartet press conference, who argued that daylight between the EU 
and the US exposed the US dominance within the grouping.61 Given the processes by 
which statements are constructed within the Quartet, it can be assumed that the 
European representatives to the grouping entered the 30 January Quartet meeting with a 
draft statement closely matching the one issued by the EU Council.62 Thus, the 
differences between the Quartet statement and the EU Council statement were
5X US Department of State, "Quartet Statement on the Situation in the Middle East," London, England: 30 
January, 2006.
59 See: European Union Council, "EU Council Conclusions - Middle-East Peace Process," Brussels, 
Belgium: 30 January, 2006.
60 As discussed previously, the Russian and UN representatives were inclined to soften the Quartet 
position during this meeting.
61 See: US Department of State, "Press Availability with Quartet Members," London, England: 30 
January, 2006.
62 As discussed in Chapters Three and Four, each member to the grouping negotiated the wording of the 
common statements based on their organisational position on the matter at hand. During the Quartet 
meeting on 30 January 2006, there were three European principal representatives: Austrian Foreign 
Minister Ursula Plassnik (Austria held the European Presidency at the time), High Representative for 
European Common Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana, and European Commissioner for External 
Relations Benita Ferrero-Waldner.
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illustrative of the extent to which European officials were persuaded to accept changes 
in response to US pressure.
While the European and US representatives to the Quartet argued that the two 
statements shared the same principles, despite semantic distinctions,63 the European 
Council statement was more ambiguous concerning the relationship between the reform 
of Hamas and the future of funding for the Palestinian Authority, especially concerning 
the linkage to recognition of Israel’s right to exist. While the EU Council statement 
‘urged Hamas and all other factions to renounce violence, to recognise Israel's right to 
exist, and to disarm,’ these issues were not explicitly tied to the notion of funding for 
the Palestinian Authority.64 The difference between the two statements, therefore, was 
the extent to which reform within Hamas was presented as a condition for continued 
international funding of the Palestinian Authority.65 Consequently, the 30 January 2006 
Quartet statement became a turning point in EU-US relations within the grouping. In the 
subsequent period, further differences developed between these actors on this issue.
In addition to the rigidity of the Quartet position, timing was also a key aspect. The 
Quartet members specified the timeframe for action on their conditions when they 
called for the ‘newly elected PLC to support the formation of a government committed 
to these principles as well as the rule of law, tolerance, reform and sound fiscal 
management.’66 Thus, with the Palestinian Authority in caretaker mode, and Abbas 
remaining as President, the deadline for Hamas’ adherence to the Quartet conditions 
was to be the formation of the Hamas-led cabinet. Consequently, according to 
Wolfensohn:
63 For the European response, see: US Department of State, "Press Availability with Quartet Members." 
For Rice’s response, see: US Department of State, "Remarks en Route Washington, DC," Washington, 
DC: 31 January, 2006.
64 On the issue of funding, the EU Commission statement read: ‘The Council expects the newly elected 
PLC to support the formation of a government committed to a peaceful and negotiated solution of the 
conflict with Israel based on existing agreements and the Roadmap as well as to the rule of law, reform 
and sound fiscal management. On this basis the European Union stands ready to continue to support 
Palestinian economic development and democratic state building.’ See: European Union Council, "EU 
Council Conclusions - Middle-East Peace Process."
65 With this in mind, it was no surprise that the eventual implementation of the Temporary International 
Mechanism (TIM), designed to ease the Palestinian fiscal crisis, was under European auspices.
66 US Department o f State, "Quartet Statement on the Situation in the Middle East."
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Abbas agreed to hold off on cabinet selection until after the Israeli elections on March 
28. This, I calculated, would give us two months to engage with the Hamas leaders 
over their stated position, which sought the destruction of Israel 67
In essence, the Quartet members were demanding immediate and radical change from
z: o
Hamas, a grouping with a complex decision-making process, directly after it had won 
a convincing electoral victory.69 As a senior Hamas official argued, these circumstances 
made compromise from Hamas nearly impossible:
The Palestinian public would not understand or forgive us if we changed positions 
overnight, after campaigning on a different platform, in response to outside pressure. 
They did not elect us to pursue the policies of those we defeated and which produced 
nothing after ten years. They elected us to stand for what we believe and to stand 
firm.70
Central to Hamas’ inability to meet the Quartet conditions was the lack of distinction 
made by the grouping between the Palestinian Authority as a government body headed 
by Hamas, and Hamas as a separate political organisation. According to a UN official, 
the respective members of the Quartet interpreted the language of the Quartet statement 
differently. For the UN, the use of the term ‘government’ allowed room for the PA to 
continue as a partner of the international community, even if Hamas as the party leading 
the PA had not entirely reformed. Conversely, for the United States the same language 
meant that ‘no matter who you are, and no matter what, we want this.’' 1
This distinction was especially important when it came to the Quartet’s demand for the 
recognition of Israel. Palestinian representative Ghassan Khatib argued that this demand 
was inconsistent with the treatment of Israeli political organisations within the Knesset, 
and placed an unrealistic demand on Hamas:
67 Wolfensohn, A Global Life: My Journey Among Rich and Poor, from Wall Street to the World Bank, p. 
434.
68 Decision-making within Hamas takes into account the viewpoints of the four key power centres of the 
group. These include the external members of the Political bureau (i.e. those in exile), the Gaza Strip 
steering committee, the West Bank political leadership, and the prison leadership. If any three of these 
groups endorse a decision, it becomes the position of the movement. For an in-depth analysis of the 
authority structure within Hamas, see: Gunning, J., Hamas in Politics: Democracy, Religion, Violence 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), pp. 95-143.
See: International Crisis Group, "Dealing With Hamas," Crisis Group Middle East Report 21: 26 January, 
2 0 0 4 ,p p .10-13.
69 As Daniel Kurtzer argued, by not allowing the Hamas leadership time to evolve their positions 
gradually, the situation was reminiscent of the conditions placed on the PLO in 1975: ‘...there are those 
who’d argue that without those conditions the PLO would have never changed. There are others who say 
that because of those conditions, it took 13 years or 14 years for the PLO to change. But that’s why there 
should have been some time built in [re: Hamas] to try to figure this out, and there wasn’t.’ Kurtzer, D., 
Former United States Ambassador to Israel, interview with the author, Princeton, NJ, October, 2011.
70 International Crisis Group, "Palestinians, Israel, and the Quartet: Pulling Back From the Brink," p. 6.
71 UN official. Interview with the author, Jerusalem, November, 2011.
182
Chapter Seven: The Palestinian Divide, 2006-2007
Expecting the Hamas-led government to respect the signed agreements makes sense, 
but expecting ‘Hamas’ rather than the Hamas-led government, to recognise Israel, is 
an unreasonable condition that complicated the situation, and is an example of the 
double standard. In Israel there has always been a difference between the positions of 
the parties, and the position of the governments, even under the leadership of these 
same parties. One example is the position of the Likud party vis-ä-vis the Oslo 
agreement. They never supported the Oslo agreements, but the Likud-led government 
continued the government’s commitment to the Oslo agreements. Why not apply the 
same understanding to the Palestinians? Why does Hamas have to recognise Israel, as 
opposed to the government that is led by Hamas?72
Furthermore, even the notion of Hamas recognising Israel through the Palestinian 
Authority was contested in the aftermath of the Quartet statement. Hamas officials 
argued that ‘recognition is an act conferred by states, not movements or governments, 
and Palestine is not a state.’ Furthermore, for the Hamas leadership, recognition of 
Israel’s right to exist contradicted the fundamental ethos of the group, which advocated 
violent resistance to the Israeli occupation and the rejection of Israeli claims to a 
historical homeland in that territory.74 Any concession by Hamas on this issue would 
therefore be organisationally problematic, especially when it was being asked to 
recognise Israel in the absence of a peace agreement.75 As Hamas official, and eventual 
Palestinian Prime Minister, Ismail Haniya remarked, ‘we do not provide political 
positions free of charge.’76
In summary, by placing such an unrealistic demand on Hamas in the post election 
period, the 30 January Quartet statement made the consequent financial isolation of the 
Hamas-led Palestinian Authority unavoidable. Crucially, this isolation allowed Hamas 
to evade the responsibilities of regular government that President Abbas’ normalisation 
strategy relied upon, instead creating a pariah government that was exempt from the 
everyday pressures of governance. In essence, Hamas had come to power through an 
election, and President Abbas preferred to remove them through another election. As a 
Fatah official remarked:
72 Khatib, G., Former Director of Palestinian Authority Media Centre, interview with the author, 
Ramallah, Palestinian Territories, November, 2011.
73 International Crisis Group, "Palestinians, Israel, and the Quartet: Pulling Back From the Brink."
74 See: International Crisis Group, "Dealing With Hamas," p. 10-16.
73 However, Hamas Parliamentarian Riad Mustafa outlined that Hamas’ program called for ‘the end of the 
occupation, not the destruction of Israel,’ and that Hamas had proposed, in lieu of recognition, a ‘long 
term truce’ to bring peace to the region. See: International Crisis Group, "Palestinians, Israel, and the 
Quartet: Pulling Back From the Brink," p. 3.
76 Ibid.
77 Ghassan Khatib argued that ‘...the strategy of the international community, which was about denying 
the Hamas government the chance to govern, contradicted with Fatah’s opposition strategy, which was 
meant to give Hamas the opportunity to govern and stumble on the same hardships.’ See: Khatib, "The 
Collapse of the Peace Process and the Rise of Hamas ": p. 4.
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‘...I want [Hamas] to fail. And I want them to fail because of themselves, not because 
of conspiracies involving the US, EU, and Olmert that don’t give them an opportunity 
to govern, but because they failed to govern despite the opportunity to do so.’ 78
By denying the Hamas government the opportunity to govern, the Quartet also 
diminished the prospects of achieving electoral accountability in the future.
As the deadline for the formation of the Hamas cabinet approached, Abbas’ 
normalisation strategy and the Quartet’s isolation strategy found common ground in 
Fatah’s refusal to take part in a Hamas-led coalition government. Soon after the 
elections, Hamas had outlined its intention to form a broad-based coalition government, 
including both Fatah and Hamas cabinet members.79 This proposal was met with strong 
resistance from both Fatah and US officials.
For the United States, any ‘blurring of the line’ between Hamas and other, more 
palatable, Palestinian factions within the Palestinian Authority weakened the quarantine 
of a purely ‘Hamas government.’ As such, US officials urged Fatah officials to decline 
the invitation to join the Hamas government, and pressured independents to do
O 1
likewise. The ‘Hamas only’ character of the Palestinian Authority was also important 
for the Palestinian normalisation strategy. The Fatah Central Committee concluded that 
Fatah’s participation in the Hamas-led PA would provide political cover for Hamas in 
government, and suggested that Fatah should go into opposition.82 Fatah’s strategy, 
therefore, was to allow Hamas to face the same hurdles that had contributed to its own 
decline in popularity throughout its years of governing, a tactic that Hamas itself had 
used effectively against it while in opposition.83
The decisions taken by Fatah and the Quartet in the aftermath of the Hamas election 
victory resulted in a paradox. While Fatah and the Quartet members were unified in 
their desire to remove Hamas from government, the means through which they 
attempted to achieve this outcome were incompatible. The Quartet strategy was to 
isolate Hamas politically and financially, arguably in the hope of forcing either the 
collapse or popular overthrow of the Hamas government. The Fatah strategy sought to
78 See: International Crisis Group, "Palestinians, Israel, and the Quartet: Pulling Back From the Brink," p. 
10 .
79 Erlanger, "Hamas Routes Ruling Faction, Casting Pall on Peace Process."
80 de Soto, "End of Mission Report," p. 21.
81 Ibid.
82 Erlanger, "Hamas Routes Ruling Faction, Casting Pall on Peace Process."
82 Khatib, "The Collapse of the Peace Process and the Rise of Hamas ": p. 3.
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remove Hamas electorally after the failures of governing had tarnished the reputation of 
the group in the eyes of the Palestinian public. In essence, the normalisation strategy 
relied on Hamas governing and failing, whereas the isolation strategy relied on Hamas 
being prevented from governing effectively. As the following section demonstrates, the 
latter strategy directly undermined the former, with lasting consequences.
The Hamas Government and the Palestinian Fiscal Crisis
The steps taken by the international community with the presumed purpose of 
bringing about a Palestinian entity that will live in peace with its neighbour Israel have 
had precisely the opposite effect.
- Alvaro de Soto, United Nations envoy to the Quartet (2005- 
2007).84
It's like a meeting with a dietician. We have to make them much thinner, but not 
enough to die.
- Dov Weissglass, senior advisor to Israeli Prime Minister Ariel 
Sharon (2001-2005), on Israel’s economic boycott of the Hamas 
government.85
The international isolation of the Hamas government had far reaching political, 
economic and humanitarian ramifications. Within the context of the peace process, the 
dichotomisation of the Palestinian leadership, and the subsequent division of Palestinian 
territory based on this dichotomy, added another layer of complexity to the lsraeli- 
Palestinian relationship. The paradox of Palestinian disunity was that only through the 
exclusion of Hamas could an Israeli-Palestinian dialogue emerge, but any products of 
this dialogue would eventually rely upon the cooperation of Hamas in the 
implementation stage. Thus, while Abbas continued to function as the main Palestinian 
representative in negotiations, his ability to speak for all Palestinians had been 
diminished significantly. As Ehud Olmert remarked after succeeding in the 28 March 
2006 Israeli elections, ‘this guy [Abbas] is actually unable to even exercise his 
authority. What shall I negotiate with him about?’86
The fiscal crisis in the Palestinian territories complicated this situation further. The 
Palestinian state-building project deteriorated amid internecine political warfare 
between Hamas and Fatah and a fiscal blockade imposed by the global donor 
community. According to UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in the Occupied
84 de Soto, "End of Mission Report," p. 19.
85 Benn, A., "US Backs Israel on Aid For Humanitarian Groups, Not Hamas," Haaretz, 16 February, 
2006.
86 International Crisis Group, "Palestinians, Israel, and the Quartet: Pulling Back From the Brink," p. 18.
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Territories John Dugard, the cut-off of international aid to the Palestinian Authority 
following the formation of the Hamas government was the first time that an occupied 
people had been subjected to economic sanctions.87 However, neither economic nor 
political isolation resulted in the removal of Hamas from the Palestinian political 
equation, and for the remainder of 2006 the Middle East peace process stagnated.
It should be noted that the fiscal crisis in the Palestinian territories was not an 
unexpected consequence of the Quartet’s ‘conditions’ on the Hamas government. 
According to Quartet envoy James Wolfensohn, he warned the Quartet principals during 
the 30 January meeting that the Palestinian Authority was already ‘basically bankrupt’,
oo
and that any further reduction in external funding would be disastrous. By this stage, 
however, Wolfensohn had already been diplomatically ‘cut off’ by US representatives, 
and in February 2006 he was informed that the office of the Quartet representative 
would soon be shut down. Wolfensohn was ‘furious’, and he noted that the office of 
the Quartet representative had recently received ample funding to remain in operation.90 
He continued to stay in touch with the non-US members of the Quartet, but concluded 
that the ‘Americans had effectively cut me off at the knees.’91
Wolfensohn was not the only representative within the Quartet that was against the 
imposition of an economic boycott. As the deadline for the formation of the Hamas 
government approached, UN Secretary General Annan sought to re-visit the Quartet 
position vis-ä-vis the Hamas government with the other Quartet members, but his 
suggestion was summarily dismissed by Secretary of State Rice. When he proposed that 
the Quartet reconvene on 28 March 2006, Rice told him that ‘the fact is we are split and 
we can’t hide that,’ adding that T am always happy to see you all, but I am not sure
87 United Nations Department of Public Information, "UN Rights Expert Paints Dire Picture of Situation 
in Occupied Palestinian Territory."
88 As Wolfensohn argued, ‘If funding were to be provided for salaries to be paid in full, with only 
minimum operating costs covered, the PA would still face a monthly deficit o f $60-70 million, despite the 
inclusion of the agreed-upon contributions already announced by some donors. At the very least, the PA 
needed $500 million in funding to stay afloat through September.’ See: Wolfensohn, A Global Life: My 
Journey Among Rich and Poor, from Wall Street to the World Bank, p. 433.
89 According to Wolfensohn, by this stage he was ‘privy to the Secretary of State’s movements and to the 
odd readout from the State Department,’ but only ‘nominally being kept informed by US officials.’ He 
concluded that ‘In the end, the State Department’s unwillingness to involve the Quartet office any further 
led to its slow shutdown. The US representative to the Quartet mission, Ambassador Bill Taylor, had been 
prematurely withdrawn from Jerusalem at the end of January. Although the United States agreed that we 
could continue our work until just after the results of the Israeli election in March, part o f my staff left 
before then. The office was finally closed at the end of April.’ See: Ibid., p. 435.
90 Russia had recently donated a million dollars to Wolfensohn’s team, which could have funded it until 
the latter half of 2006. See: Ibid.
91 Ibid., p .436.
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there is anything further to discuss in the Quartet.’ " With the United States resisting 
any such alterations, the Quartet position vis-a-vis Hamas was difficult to revise in the 
years that followed.
On 29 March 2006, the Hamas government was installed, and Hamas official Ismail 
Haniya was named Palestinian Prime Minister. This resulted in a system of dual power 
in the Palestinian territories, with Hamas controlling the PA government and 
parliament, and Fatah controlling the PA Presidency and the PLO. Crucially, in addition 
to his institutional powers as President, Abbas maintained his control of the Palestinian 
security forces, which were almost exclusively composed of Fatah supporters.93 
Furthermore, as head of the PLO he remained the primary Palestinian representative in 
the conduct of relations with Israel, a position that Hamas officials did not dispute.94
The international reaction was immediate. Despite there being no mention of diplomatic 
ties in the 30 January Quartet statement, the United States, the European Union and, 
surprisingly, the office of the UN Secretary General immediately cut off all levels of 
contact with the Hamas government.9^  After a discussion via teleconference on 30 
March 2006, the Quartet members deemed, as they were bound to do, that the new 
Hamas government had not met the conditions set on 30 January 2006. The statement 
issued by the Quartet members ‘welcomed President Abbas' call for the new Palestinian 
government to commit to a platform of peace,’ but noted with ‘grave concern’ that in 
light of the Hamas government’s failure to adhere to the Quartet conditions there would 
‘inevitably be an effect on direct assistance to that government and its ministries.’96 
Tellingly, the statement also noted that the Quartet members ‘encouraged continued
92 Annan, Interventions: A Life in War and Peace, p. 292.
93 International Crisis Group, "Palestinians, Israel, and the Quartet: Pulling Back From the Brink," p. 11.
94 According to Hamas Parliamentarian Riad Mustafa, the Hamas government ‘recognised President 
Abbas’ right to conduct political negotiations with Israel. If he were to produce a peace agreement, and if 
this agreement was endorsed by our national institutions and a popular referendum, then -  even if it 
includes Palestinian recognition of Israel -  we would of course accept their verdict. Because respecting 
the will of the people and their democratic choice is also one of our principles.’ See: Ibid.
95 It appears that in hindsight, UN Secretary General Annan came to regard this decision as unrealistic. In 
a discussion of the negotiations surrounding the release of captured Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit, in which 
German negotiators played a valuable role in liaising with Hamas, Kofi Annan reflected that ‘that slogans 
about never talking to terrorists do not survive encounters in the real world -  in the Middle East or 
elsewhere.’ Annan, Interventions: A Life in War and Peace, p. 307.
Russian contacts with Hamas officials continued, despite the Quartet conditions. On 9 May 2006 Russian 
Foreign Minister Lavrov noted that for Russian representatives, maintaining contact with the Hamas 
government was ‘essential’. See: US Department of State, "Quartet Press Conference," New York City: 9 
May, 2006.
96 US Department of State, "Quartet Statement on Middle East Peace," New York City: 20 September, 
2006.
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humanitarian assistance to meet the basic needs of the Palestinian people.’97 In the 
months that followed this statement, the nature of international financial support for the 
Palestinians shifted from developmental aid designed to bolster Palestinian Authority 
institutions, to purely humanitarian aid designed to avert a health crisis.98
Thus, on 7 April 2006, Rice announced that the United States would increase its 
humanitarian aid while suspending all funding to the Hamas government’s cabinet and 
ministries.99 The NGOs tasked with delivering this humanitarian aid to the Palestinian 
people, however, faced significant legal constraints from the US government concerning 
contacts with the Palestinian Authority.100 Furthermore, the United States applied 
similar pressure on the international banking sector, threatening to blacklist any bank 
that did business with the Hamas government.101 With the United States taking a strong 
public stance on this issue, other nations and organisations followed. The European 
Union severed all political and financial links with the Hamas government and 
ministries, and neighboring Arab countries such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia (while not 
publicly supporting the Quartet conditions) were also convinced by US officials to tailor 
their aid so that it could not reach Hamas.102
The sanction that had the most devastating impact on the Palestinian economy, 
however, came from Israel. On 19 February 2006, acting Prime Minister Olmert 
declared that:
It is clear that in light of the Hamas majority in the PLC and the instructions to form a 
new government that were given to the head of Hamas, the PA is - in practice - 
becoming a terrorist authority.104
97 Ibid.
9S According to a senior UN official, interviewed by the International Crisis Group, the sentiment in 
Washington at the time was that the Palestinians should ‘survive, not thrive.’ See: International Crisis 
Group, "Palestinians, Israel, and the Quartet: Pulling Back From the Brink," p. 26.
99 Rice noted that ‘basic humanitarian assistance -  including health, food, and education -  will increase 
by 57 percent, for a total of $245 million. The United States will also provide $42 million to strengthen 
civil society and independent institutions. Assistance will be administered through the United Nations 
Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) and non-Palestinian Authority actors, including local and 
international NGOs.’ See: US Department o f State, "Statement on Palestinian Assistance."
100 The need for developing a new mechanism for delivering aid to the Palestinians while bypassing the 
Palestinian Authority eventually led to the creation of the EU-Temporary International Mechanism, to be 
discussed subsequently.
101 International Crisis Group, "After Mecca: Engaging Hamas," Crisis Group Middle East Report 62: 28 
February, 2007, p. 2.
102 Rice, No Higher Honor: A Memoir of My Years in Washington, p. 420.
103 The World Bank, "The Impending Palestinian Fiscal Crisis, Potential Remedies," 7 May, 2006.
104 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Cabinet Communique," Jerusalem: 19 February, 2006.
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The Israeli government considered the 18 February swearing in of the Palestinian 
Parliament, rather than the formation of the Palestinian cabinet, to be the official start of 
the Hamas government. Consequently, the Olmert cabinet declared that from 19 
February onwards, the government of Israeli would withhold the transfer of all tax 
revenue collected on behalf of the Palestinian Authority.105 The consequences for the 
Palestinian economy were severe. According to an EU position paper in April 2006:
The looming crisis is not the result of suspension of [donor] aid -  nor will the crisis be 
averted by a resumption of direct aid. The key underlying factor is the continued 
freeze in Israeli transfers of PA fiscal revenue and the strict Israeli policy on closures 
and other restrictions. 106
Wolfensohn calculated that the taxes being withheld by Israel amounted to a $60 
million per month reduction in Palestinian revenue, which was compounded by the pre­
existing monthly shortfalls of approximately $80 million.107 Effectively, by withholding 
such substantial Palestinian tax revenue, the government of Israel had the ability to ‘turn 
the Palestinian economy on and off.’ For the Quartet members, this Israeli decision 
exposed the divisions within the grouping. As de Soto noted:
Israel’s cut-off of the main source of income of the PA was never intended by three of 
the Quartet members. The UN (myself) was the first to call on Israel not to do this, the 
very day that the decision was communicated to international representatives. The EU 
has since repeatedly called on Israel to resume transfer; the sums withheld surely add 
up to the high hundreds of millions of dollars by now. However, the Quartet has been 
prevented from pronouncing on this because the US, as its representatives have 
intimated to us, does not wish Israel to transfer these funds to the PA . 109
105 Ibid.
Palestinian tax revenue has been collected and then transferred by Israel since 1994 when the ‘Protocol on 
Economic Relations Between the Government of the State of Israel and the PLO’ was signed by both 
parties. Since then, there have been numerous occasions on which the government of Israel has frozen the 
transfer of this revenue as a punitive measure in response to circumstances in the Palestinian territories. 
For one such example, see the policy of the government of Israel after the inclusion of Palestine into 
UNESCO: Sherwood, H., "Israel Unfreezes Palestinian Authority Tax Millions," The Guardian, 1 
December, 2011.
106 ‘EC Assistance for the Palestinians’, European Commission draft position paper dated 27 April 2006, 
as cited by: International Crisis Group, "Palestinians, Israel, and the Quartet: Pulling Back From the 
Brink."
107 In an interview with International Crisis Group, Wolfensohn noted that: ‘The PA has recurring 
monthly operating costs of approximately $165 million, amounting to between $1.8 and $2.0 billion a 
year. Before the current fiscal crisis, only about 21 percent of this amount (roughly $35 million monthly) 
was raised directly by the PA in the form of taxes and income. Of the remaining $130 million, $50 
million to $60 million consisted of taxes, tariffs and other fees collected by Israel on the PA’s behalf and 
transferred to it on a monthly basis. The monthly shortfall of some $70 million to $80 million -  42 
percent to 48 percent of the total required -  had to be made up from other sources.’ Ibid. p.22.
I()S International Crisis Group, "Palestinians, Israel, and the Quartet: Pulling Back From the Brink," p. 24. 
109 de Soto, "End of Mission Report," p. 20.
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The cumulative effect of both the donor boycott and the Israeli transfers freeze was a 
fiscal crisis in the Palestinian territories. The Palestinian economy declined from a six 
percent growth rate in 2005 to a five percent negative growth rate by the end of 2006.110 
According to a report by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency:
The PA fiscal crisis resulted in an estimated decline of more than USD 500 million in 
oPt [occupied Palestinian territories] household income in first-half 2006. As a result, 
real per capita consumption levels (including external assistance) declined by about 
12 percent, with food consumption down by 8 percent and non-food consumption 
down 13 percent relative to second-half 2005. This increased the number o f deep poor 
from an average o f650,800 in second-half2005 to an average of 1,069,200 in first- 
half 2006—a 64.3 percent increase. The individual deep poverty rate climbed from 
17.3 to 27.5 percent as between these two periods.* 111
In summary, the Palestinian Authority government led by Hamas had no control over its 
borders or security services, no access to natural resources or regular tax receipts, and 
no means to alleviate the situation short of capitulation to the antithetical demands of 
the international community led by the Quartet. Income insecurity undermined the 
capacity of the Palestinian security services to maintain law and order and prevent 
attacks against Israel,112 and the tightening of the Israeli closure system limited the 
economic mobility of Palestinians further.113 The situation worsened, and on 4 May 
2006, Ehud Olmert was sworn in as the Israeli Prime Minister. This ruled out the return 
of Ariel Sharon.114
The Resignation of James Wolfensohn
I think the Quartet itself must continue, but the role of a disenfranchised leader of that 
Quartet doesn’t seem to me to be a particularly attractive thing to spend your life 
doing.
- James Wolfensohn, Quartet envoy to the Gaza disengagement 
(2005-2006).115
It was within this context that Quartet envoy James Wolfensohn resigned. His term as 
Quartet representative was scheduled to end on 30 April 2006, but from February
110 Elgindy, K., "The Middle East Quartet: A Post Mortem," The Saban Center for Middle East Policy,
Brookings Institute, 25 (2012): p. 21.
111 United Nations Relief and Works Agency, "Prolonged Crisis in the Occupied Palestinian Territories: 
Socio-Economic Impacts of the New Phase on Refugees and Non-refugees," November, 2006, p. iii. 
(emphasis in original)
112 de Soto, "End of Mission Report," p. 20.
113 The World Bank, "Movement and Access Restrictions in the West Bank: Uncertainty and Inefficiency 
in the Palestinian Economy," 9 May, 2007, p. 1.
114 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Address to the Knesset by PM Olmert on Presentation of 31st 
Government," Jerusalem: 4 May, 2006.
115 United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, "Hearing Before the 109th Congress: Post- 
Palestinian Election Challenges in the Middle East," S. HRG. 109-903: 15 March, 2006.
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onwards he had encountered increasing diplomatic isolation. When Russian 
representatives asked him to extend his mission in order to attend the July 2006 G8 
meeting, he declined on the grounds that he had ‘no vote, no office, and no 
information.’116 On 1 May 2006, Wolfensohn and Rice held a press conference to 
explain his departure. At the time, Wolfensohn said that he was resigning because the 
political developments of recent months were above his ‘pay grade,’ and that current 
circumstances made any independent arrangements regarding Gaza or the West Bank 
near impossible.117 While these circumstances certainly played a role, Wolfensohn later 
made clear that the central problem he faced was a lack of authority:
The Quartet had the authority, and within the Quartet it was the Americans who had 
the authority. It was not a Quartet decision to close the office. There was never a 
desire on the part of the Americans to give up control of the negotiations, and I would 
doubt that in the eyes of Elliott Abrams and the State Department team, I was ever 
anything but a nuisance.m
Wolfensohn concluded that Rice had always seen his appointment as a ‘double edged 
sword’; on the one hand his standing demonstrated her seriousness, on the other, his 
powerful connections were threatening.119 Seeking closure on his assignment, in August 
2006 Wolfensohn met with Bush at the White House. During this meeting he 
emphasised to Bush that ‘there would be no peace between Israel and the Palestinians 
unless we went back to the November plan [Agreement on Movement and Access], 
agreed on by Secretary Rice, the Israelis and the Palestinians, in my presence.’ “ The 
key to peace was giving economic hope to the Palestinians, but ultimately his mission 
failed ‘due to a circumscribed mandate and lack of support from Washington.’ As
Wolfensohn admitted, he felt ‘stupid for not reading the small print,’ because he was
122‘never given a mandate to negotiate the peace.’
This lesson informed Wolfensohn’s response to an unlikely offer in September 2006. 
During the 20 September 2006 Quartet meeting, the principals (led by Annan) discussed 
the re-appointment of Wolfensohn as Quartet envoy to ‘report on the situation on the
116 Wolfensohn, A Global Life: My Journey Among Rich and Poor, from Wall Street to the World Bank, p. 
436.
117 US Department of State, "Remarks After Meeting With Special Envoy for Gaza Disengagement James 
Wolfensohn," Washington, DC: 1 May, 2006.
1 lx Smooha, S., "All the Dreams We Had Are Now Gone," Haaretz, 19 July, 2007.
119 Wolfensohn, A Global Life: My Journey Among Rich and Poor, from Wall Street to the World Bank, p. 
438.
120 Ibid., p.437.
121 Kurtzer, D. and Lasensky, S., Negotiating Arab-Israeli Peace: American Leadership in the Middle 
East (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2007), p. 63.
122 Smooha, "All the Dreams We Had Are Now Gone."
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ground.’123 When Annan called Wolfensohn to discuss the offer, he immediately asked 
whether Rice had supported his appointment, to which Annan replied that she had.124 
Informed by his previous experience, Wolfensohn contacted Rice to clarify two 
important issues. Firstly, he asked whether he would again be protected by US security 
personnel while in the region, to which Rice replied that he would not, and to seek 
security from the Europeans. Secondly, and more importantly, he asked whether US 
representatives Elliott Abrams and David Welch would keep him informed on the state 
of negotiations between the United States and Israel. Rice replied that this would be 
‘difficult.’ This was unsatisfactory to Wolfensohn, who argued later that:
...after the previous experience it was very clear to me that there was a direct dialogue 
between the United States and the Israelis. And if you weren't part of that, you really 
had no chance of being central to what was going on.127
Consequently, Wolfensohn called Annan to decline the offer, noting that he would not 
accept an appointment that he ‘could not carry out.’128 As he made clear later, by this 
stage Wolfensohn had concluded that the United States did not take the Quartet 
seriously, and used the grouping as camouflage for their direct negotiations with the 
Israelis.129
The Temporary International Mechanism
.. .1 am concerned that the divisions which have often paralyzed the United Nations 
itself now also increasingly inhibit the capacity of the Quartet (and its regional 
partners) to play the beneficial role which it could do were it to act with determination 
and consistency. We therefore find ourselves at a crossroads, with increasing 
frustration — both in the region and in the international community at large — at the 
Quartet’s regrettably limited effectiveness, matched by the apparent lack of any 
alternative mechanism at present.
- Kofi Annan, United Nations Secretary General (1997- 
2006).130
On 9 May 2006, the Quartet members expressed their ‘appreciation for the service of 
James Wolfensohn,’ noting in particular the ‘central role’ he played in the conclusion of
123 US Department of State, "Quartet Statement on Middle East Peace."
124 Wolfensohn, A Global Life: My Journey Among Rich and Poor, from Wall Street to the World Bank, p. 
438.
125 Ibid.
126 Ibid.
127 Wolfensohn, J., "A Global Life," The 7.30 Report with Kerry O'Brien, ABC, Sydney, 28 October 
2010.
1-8 Wolfensohn, A Global Life: My Journey Among Rich and Poor, from Wall Street to the World Bank, p. 
438.
129 Wolfensohn, "A Global Life."
130 United Nations Security Council, "Report of the Secretary General on the Middle East," United 
Nations: S/2006/956: 11 December, 2006, p. 12.
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the AMA and the ‘promulgation of an agenda for Palestinian economic recovery.’
The topic of the Palestinian economy had been high on the agenda during this meeting, 
which had included the input of Egyptian, Jordanian, and Saudi representatives. In 
the context of a worsening fiscal climate in the Palestinian territories, the Quartet 
members had sought to ease regional concerns about an impending humanitarian crisis
i n ' l
by announcing the formation of a new funding mechanism.
According to the Quartet members, a ‘Temporary International Mechanism’ (TIM) 
would be developed by the European Union, and would be a ‘transparent, accountable’ 
and ‘direct’ means of delivering assistance to the Palestinian people.134 In other words, 
the TIM would allow the international community to increase humanitarian assistance 
to the Palestinians, and funding for the office of the Palestinian President, while also 
continuing the economic isolation of the Hamas government. Indeed, the TIM was 
designed to ‘pool donor funding,’ using the Palestinian presidency as an ‘interface 
between the international community and the Palestinian Authority,’ which would then 
be passed on directly to Palestinian humanitarian organisations.136 Essentially, the TIM 
was an internationally managed trust fund which would be accessible only by President 
Abbas.137
For the European Commissioner, Benita Ferrero-Waldner, the task of developing the 
TIM led to increased tensions in US-EU relations. According to Quartet insiders, a 
Quartet teleconference scheduled for 7 June 2006 was cancelled amid strong 
disagreements between US and EU officials over an EU proposal for the TIM to cover 
the salaries of health sector workers in the PA. US officials reportedly told European
131 US Department of State, "Quartet Statement on Middle East Peace."
132 These representatives were Egyptian Foreign Minister Ahmed Aboul Gheit, Jordanian Foreign 
Minister Abdelelah al-Khatib and Saudi Arabian Foreign Minister Saud Al-Faisal.
133 EU Foreign Minister Ursula Plassnik made this connection clear when she stated that ‘We do care for 
the Palestinians. We do care for the Palestinian population and their needs and we are ready to take 
concrete practical steps.’ See: US Department of State, "Quartet Press Conference."
134 US Department of State, "Quartet Statement on Middle East Peace."
135 In the press conference following the 9 May Quartet statement, Russian FM Sergei Lavrov made clear 
that the Russian representatives continued to meet with Hamas, noting that ‘only through joint efforts and 
through a joint involvement of Hamas can we achieve results. Isolation will not help us reach the goal we 
all wish to reach.’ See: US Department of State, "Quartet Press Conference."
136 According to an EU official interviewed by the International Crisis Group: International Crisis Group, 
"Palestinians, Israel, and the Quartet: Pulling Back From the Brink," p. 28.
137 Ironically, after years of calling for financial transparency and institutional reform under the 
Presidency o f Yasser Arafat, the Quartet members had bestowed upon President Abbas total 
responsibility for public finances and spending.
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representatives to ‘go back to the drawing board,’ ostensibly because the US did not 
want the TIM to cover any public sector salaries, including health services .138
As work continued in Europe on the TIM, Israeli Prime Minister-elect Olmert stated 
publicly that he was interested in resuming Israeli-Palestinian negotiations with 
President Abbas. While Olmert conceded that Abbas may still be ‘too weak’ to conduct 
negotiations on behalf of all Palestinians, he noted that:
If the Palestinians will be ready, again, I’d more than be happy to negotiate with them 
because I want to have another side accountable, with a clear address, that I can charge 
with responsibility for events that may take place in the future.139
On 17 June, the TIM was approved for a period of three months by the Quartet 
members, who expressed ‘hope that other donors, international organizations, and the 
State of Israel would consider participation in this mechanism.’140 Ironically, in the 
midst of economic sanctions, the TIM mechanism eventually accounted for a 27 percent 
increase in the total level of assistance from the European Union to the Palestinians, 
with funds totalling EU651 million in 2006.141 The TIM included allocations for the 
overdue payroll of around 80 percent of the civilian employees of the PA, but excluded 
funding for the security services.142 This decision was partially in reaction to 
international concerns about the stockpiling and security build-up that Hamas and Fatah 
had been engaging in since early 2006, in anticipation of an outbreak of intra- 
Palestinian violence.143 Indeed, in the months that followed, violence became the 
centerpiece of regional developments.
Talk of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations evaporated when, on 25 June 2006, a group of 
Palestinian fighters (including Hamas operatives) tunnelled 650m into Israeli territory, 
killed two IDF soldiers, and kidnapped another.144 The IDF responded by closing the 
Rafah border crossing, and destroying the only Palestinian-owned power plant in
138 International Crisis Group, "Palestinians, Israel, and the Quartet: Pulling Back From the Brink," p. 31.
139 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Excerpts from interview by PM Olmert," Jerusalem: 9 June, 2006.
140 US Department of State, "Quartet Statement," Washington, DC: 17 June, 2006.
141 United Nations Department of Public Information, "Temporary International Mechanism (TIM) Makes 
Fifth Payment From European Funds to Public Service Providers and Pensioners," 2 February, 2007.
142 Ibid.
143 For an in-depth examination of the power dynamics within the competing Palestinian security services 
during this period, see: International Crisis Group, "After Mecca: Engaging Hamas," pp. 9-16.
144 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Two Soldiers Killed, One Missing in Kerem Shalom Terror 
Attack," 25 June, 2006.
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Gaza.145 Calls for the release of the kidnapped Israeli soldier, twenty year-old Corporal 
Gilad Shalit, were unanimous, and throughout the subsequent five years of captivity his 
situation was a frequent focus of Quartet statements.146
The Israeli-Palestinian issue was sidelined further by the events of July and August 
2006. On 12 July, eight IDF soldiers were killed and two kidnapped by Hezbollah 
operatives on the Israel-Lebanon border.147 In response, Olmert ordered airstrikes and 
artillery fire on Lebanese targets, and initiated a ground invasion of southern Lebanon 
that lasted for 34 days.148 Known as the Second Lebanon War, this conflict was later 
deemed to have been strategically and politically misguided, and the Winograd 
Committee Report, published in January 2008, specifically called into question Olmert’s 
personal judgement.149
In the Palestinian territories, following the implementation of the TIM, a growing public 
sector rebellion continued to undermine movements towards Palestinian unity. In May 
2006, a ‘National Conciliation Document’ was authored by a group of political 
prisoners representing each of the Palestinian factions. The so-called ‘Prisoner’s 
Initiative’ was a document that aimed to bridge the Palestinian political divide by 
softening Hamas’ stance and hardening Fatah’s in regard to the use of political violence 
and recognition of Israel. Abbas immediately endorsed the document, seeing its 
potential for normalising Hamas through legal constraints. For this reason, Hamas 
officials were sceptical of the initiative and refused to agree to it without amendments. 
Seeking to push the issue, Abbas threatened to call a national referendum on the 
document, which Hamas strongly resisted on legal grounds. As the political battle over
145 For the details of the immediate Israeli military response to the abduction of Gilad Shalit, ‘Operation 
Summer Rain,’ see: Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Israeli Defence Force Strikes at Targets in Gaza," 
28 June, 2006., and Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Operation Summer Rain: IDF Enters Southern 
Gaza Strip to Secure Release of Abducted Soldier," 28 June, 2006.
146 The longer Shalit’s captivity continued the more frequent calls for his release became in Quartet 
statements. The phrasing rarely varied from that of 26 September 2008, in which ‘The Quartet called for 
the immediate and unconditional release of Israeli Corporal Gilad Shalit.’ See: US Department of State, 
"Quartet Statement," New York City: 26 September, 2008.
147 For details of the subsequent Israeli death toll and the number of rockets fired into Israel during this 
period, see: Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "The Second Lebanon War (2006)," Jerusalem: 12 July, 
2006.
148 Ibid.
149 The Winograd Committee, led by Judge Eliyahu Winograd, was appointed in September 2006. For an 
English summary of the committee’s findings, see: Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Winograd 
Committee Submits Final Report," Jerusalem: 30 January, 2008.
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the ‘Prisoner’s Initiative’ continued into June and July of 2006, violence and the public 
sector rebellion ultimately shelved the plan.150
The TIM had failed to alleviate the Palestinian fiscal crisis in part because Israel had 
continued to withhold tax revenue, and also because Hamas had been unable to govern 
with a hostile Palestinian public service.151 Indeed, on 2 September 2006 the Union of 
Public Service Employees (UPSE) began an open ended strike that lasted until 14 
January 2007. This strike had a crippling effect on the functioning of the Hamas 
government, and, because of the UPSE’s strong ties to Fatah, further exacerbated inter- 
Palestinian tensions.152
Compounding this situation were rumours that the United States was using regional 
proxies to help bolster Abbas’ security services in preparation for open conflict with 
Hamas. According to David Rose:
Beginning in the latter part of 2006, Rice initiated several rounds of phone calls and 
personal meetings with leaders of four Arab nations -  Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, 
and the United Arab Emirates. She asked them to bolster Fatah by providing military 
training and by pledging funds to buy its forces lethal weapons. The money was to be 
paid directly into accounts controlled by President Abbas. 153
On 20 September 2006, the Quartet members issued their final statement of the year on 
the margins of the UN General Assembly meeting. The statement endorsed the 
continuation of the TIM for a further three months, and offered support for Abbas’ 
efforts.154 This statement was notable for the inclusion of a minor amendment to 
language regarding the potential formation of a Palestinian unity government:
The Quartet welcomed the efforts of Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas to form a 
Government of National Unity, in the hope that the platform of such a Government 
would reflect Quartet principles and allow for early engagement.155
According to European officials at the time, the use of the term ‘reflect’ was intended to 
soften the Quartet’s conditions on a potential unity government that could end the
150 International Crisis Group, "Palestinians, Israel, and the Quartet: Pulling Back From the Brink," pp. 
16-21. Some aspects of the initiative would reappear in the Mecca agreement reached between Fatah and 
Hamas in early 2007.
151 Ibid., p. 28.
152 International Crisis Group, "After Mecca: Engaging Hamas," p. 7.
153 See: Rose, "The Gaza Bombshell."
154 US Department of State, "Quartet Statement on Middle East Peace."
155 Ibid.
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destructive Palestinian impasse.156 US officials denied this interpretation of the 
language, however, and the term did not reappear in subsequent Quartet statements.157
As inter-Palestinian violence increased, the situation presented a limited number of 
options for the Quartet members. A Palestinian unity government would require support 
from the international community, and potentially a softening of the Quartet’s 
conditions regarding the recognition of Israel. However, such a government might 
endanger the TIM, and would certainly face strong resistance from Israel, making 
negotiations politically unlikely. Conversely, the continued isolation of the Hamas 
government, exacerbated by US support for Fatah, made the potential for violent 
conflict between the two Palestinian factions increasingly likely. With the isolation 
strategy showing limited effectiveness in removing the Hamas government from power, 
US officials applied strong pressure on Abbas to dissolve the Haniya government and to 
call for fresh elections. According to a leaked US memo, as reported by Rose, US 
officials had provided assurances to Abbas that if the conflict with Hamas escalated, 
that the United States would provide ‘political and material support.’ ' In the event of 
open conflict, however, only a Fatah victory had the potential to re-establish both 
international funding and Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. Such a victory was far from 
assured.
Formulating an effective and common position within such a complex regional 
environment divided and stymied the Quartet members. The period between the 20 
September 2006 and the 2 February 2007 Quartet statements was one of the key periods 
of Quartet inactivity, due largely to internal paralysis over the aforementioned issues.
On 11 December 2006, departing UN Secretary General Annan released his End of 
Mission Report, reflecting on his time in the role and offering an assessment of the work 
of the Quartet. The report offered far-reaching conclusions on both the nature and 
history of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and the work of the Quartet within that 
context. Annan emphasised that the actions of both the Israelis and Palestinians had 
contributed to the failures of past peace initiatives. In particular, Annan focused on the 
failures of Palestinian security sector reforms in the past, and the corruption and 
inefficiencies of Arafat’s period of leadership. On the Israeli side, Annan emphasised
156 International Crisis Group, "After Mecca: Engaging Hamas," p. 21.
157 Ibid.
|SK Rose, "The Gaza Bombshell."
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that the Israeli settlement movement, the unproductive and heavy-handed IDF responses 
to Palestinian violence, and the nature of the Israeli closure system in the West Bank 
had all contributed to the failure of the Middle East peace process to date.159
Ultimately, Annan concluded that the Quartet members had failed to emphasise the 
aspects of the Roadmap process that differentiated it from the Oslo period, namely 
parallelism, monitoring and clear end goals. For Annan, the lack of monitoring was the 
key to the Quartet’s failure to exert robust pressure on the parties to the conflict, which 
undermined the effectiveness of the grouping within the context of the MEPP. In 
particular, Annan urged the Quartet members to increase their level of consultation with 
regional actors, as well as the parties to the conflict, and to take a more proactive 
approach to the present developments:
To retain its validity, the Quartet also needs to be open to new ideas and initiatives 
from within the region and outside it, and from State and non-State actors alike. 
Equally, it has to match the responsibility entrusted to it to oversee this process with a 
method of work that is systematic, even-handed and proactive rather than reactive, and 
ensures common messaging to the parties.160
While Annan’s broad conclusions regarding the effectiveness of the Quartet are 
discussed further in Chapter Nine: Conclusion -  The Outcomes o f the Quartet, some of 
his recommendations had an immediate effect on the functioning of the grouping in 
2007. In the year that followed Annan’s report, the Quartet members met and issued 
statements with more frequency than in any other period. In total, the Quartet issued 11 
statements in 2007 (the next highest period of Quartet output was 2005, with seven 
statements issued).161 The members made this connection clear in their 2 February 2007 
statement, in which they noted that:
The Quartet undertook to give active follow-up to these meetings and to remain 
closely engaged at this moment of increased activity and dialogue. The Quartet 
reaffirmed its commitment to meet regularly at both the principals and envoys level 
according to an agreed calendar, including with the parties and other regional partners,
159 United Nations Security Council, "Report of the Secretary General on the Middle East," United 
Nations: S/2006/956: 11 December, 2006.
160 United Nations Security Council, "Report of the Secretary General on the Middle East," p. 12.
161 Secretary of State Rice noted on 19 June 2007: ‘...the Quartet is very active and I think that is only as 
it should be because the Quartet is really the international mechanism for pressing forward for 
implementation of the Roadmap, for implementation of a successful movement toward a two-state 
solution and for implementation of a broader comprehensive peace.’ See: US Department of State, "Press 
Availability with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, High 
Representative for European Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana, German Foreign Minister Frank- 
Walter Steinmeier, and European Commissioner for External Relations Benita Ferrero-Waldner," Berlin, 
Germany: 30 May, 2007.
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to monitor developments and actions taken by the parties and to discuss the way 
ahead.162
Crucially, the Quartet members had linked their ongoing ‘credibility,’ as a participant in 
the Middle East peace process to their re-engaged and proactive approach to both 
meeting and issuing statements. ~ However, the extent to which this represented 
genuine change to the outputs of the Quartet, or signalled change in the outcomes it 
achieved amidst the dramatic events in the Palestinian territories of 2007, are the focus 
of the next section.
2007: Palestinian Division and the Annapolis Conference
First of all, we recognize the President of all the Palestinian people, and that's 
President Abu Mäzen. He was elected; he's the President. Secondly, we recognize that 
it was Hamas that attacked the unity government. They made a choice of violence. It 
was their decision that has caused there to be this current situation in the Middle East, 
about which we'll be spending some time discussing.
- George W. Bush, United States President (2001-2009).164
The US and Israeli governments will be tempted to ignore the change, persisting in 
their attempts to isolate Hamas and deal only with non-Islamist members of the 
government. But it is only a matter of time before such fantasies come crashing down. 
One of the goals of the US and Israel may be to bolster Abbas, yet nothing has 
weakened the Palestinian president more than misplaced international attempts to 
strengthen him.
- Hussein Agha and Robert Malley.16''
In 2007, inter-Palestinian violence led to the entrenchment of physical and political 
divisions within Palestinian society that have proven extremely difficult to reverse or 
overcome. The breakdown in the National Unity Government ignited a violent 
confrontation that both Fatah and Hamas had been preparing for, but which neither side 
truly wanted. While the resulting bifurcation of Palestinian territory facilitated the re­
establishment of diplomatic and economic ties between President Abbas’ West Bank 
government and the international community, the situation in the Hamas-controlled 
Gaza Strip deteriorated. The by-product of this Palestinian division was the acceleration 
of bilateral negotiations between Olmert and Abbas that eventually led to the Annapolis 
process. Ironically, however, Abbas found himself with an eager Israeli counterpart at
162 US Department of State, "Quartet Statement," Washington, DC: 2 February, 2007.
163 See: US Department of State, "Press Availability with UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon; Russian 
FM Sergei Lavrov; European High Representative Javier Solana; German FM Frank-Walter Steinmeier; 
EU Commissioner Benita Ferrero-Waldner."
164 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Press Conference: Prime Minister Olmert Meets with US President 
Bush," Washington: 19 June, 2007.
165 Malley, R. and Agha, H., "The Road From Mecca," The New York Review of Books, 10 May, 2007.
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the same moment in which his ability to deliver on behalf of all Palestinians had been 
seriously eroded.
In 2007, the members of the Quartet declared their intention to play a more ‘proactive’ 
and consultative role in the context of the Middle East peace process. According to 
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, this decision was taken during the 20 
September 2006 Quartet meeting, which was the last for outgoing Secretary General 
Annan. As Lavrov noted in May 2007:
We need a comprehensive solution of the Middle East conflict, and in order to achieve 
that we've tried even last September where we agreed to have a more active approach 
by everybody concerned together with the Palestinians. And secondly, we've also 
advocated cooperation with countries in the region which are also able to make a 
contribution so that together we can achieve something.166
Central to this process were the efforts of the members to reinstate the Roadmap 
document as the key frame of reference for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.167 While 
these efforts culminated in an Annapolis process underpinned by the Roadmap 
framework, the conceptual and practical deficiencies inherent in the Roadmap document 
remained unresolved. Thus, while the Quartet member’s ‘proactive’ approach resulted 
in an increased output of statements and meetings, substantively the members largely 
sustained the positions they had previously held, especially vis-ä-vis Hamas.
In the aftermath of the Palestinian confrontation, the Quartet members acted mainly in 
support of efforts to bolster President Abbas in the West Bank, and promoted the 
bilateral process that had been initiated by Olmert and Abbas. With the US Secretary of 
State active in the region, the other Quartet members were kept informed, but rarely 
operated in more than a supportive capacity. Finally, the resurrection of the Office of 
the Quartet Representative and the appointment of former British Prime Minister Tony 
Blair to the position of ‘Quartet Envoy’ yet again demonstrated the ability of the United
166 US Department of State, "Press Availability with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, UN 
Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, High Representative for European Foreign and Security Policy Javier 
Solana, German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier, and European Commissioner for External 
Relations Benita Ferrero-Waldner."
167 The Roadmap provided an important frame of reference for the Annapolis process, especially for 
Israeli Prime Minister Olmert. Importantly, the process of bolstering the Roadmap document was 
inclusive of US Secretary of State Rice. In the press conference following the 2 February 2007 Quartet 
statement, she noted that: ‘...the roadmap is an international document, so anybody who stands outside 
of the roadmap or anybody who stands outside of support for a process that tries to accelerate the 
roadmap is not in opposition to the United States, not in opposition to the Israelis and Palestinians, but in 
opposition to the entire international community.’ See: US Department of State, "Press Availability with 
UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon; Russian FM Sergei Lavrov; European High Representative Javier 
Solana; German FM Frank-Walter Steinmeier; EU Commissioner Benita Ferrero-Waldner."
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States to overcome internal objections within the grouping in pursuit of its own 
initiatives.
The Mecca Agreement
We tried to deal with [recognition of Israel] in the Mecca Agreement and the platform 
of the Hamas led national unity government. The platform showed commitment to 
signed agreements, to international legality, and to the Arab Peace Initiative, which 
recognised Israel, but that was not good enough for the United States and the Quartet, 
because they wanted ‘Hamas’ to recognise Israel. That’s not fair, from the view of the 
Palestinian leadership, and myself as well.
- Ghassan Khatib, Palestinian Authority Planning Minister 
(2005-2006).168
On 23 December 2006, Olmert and Abbas met for the first time, over dinner at Olmert’s 
private residence.169 After the meeting, and in response to the political divisions 
plaguing Abbas’ presidency, Olmert immediately sought to ‘strengthen moderate 
elements’ by releasing a portion of Palestinian tax revenue for humanitarian projects, 
and easing some restrictions on movement in the West Bank. From this meeting 
onwards, the two leaders established and developed a close working relationship that 
formed the basis for a renewed peace process throughout 2007 and 2008.
On 1 January 2007, South Korean diplomat Ban Ki-Moon assumed the role of United 
Nations Secretary General. Inheriting his predecessor’s position within the Quartet, and 
conscious of Annan’s recent critique of the grouping, Moon was keen to project the 
notion of a ‘re-energised’ Quartet throughout 2007.171 Thus, the 2 February 2007 
Quartet statement welcomed the incoming Secretary General to the grouping and, in an 
effort to address one of Annan’s central concerns, ‘affirmed the primacy of the 
Roadmap and welcomed US efforts to accelerate progress on the Roadmap.’172 Central 
to this progress was the ‘renewed dialogue between Israeli and Palestinian leaders,’ for
173which the Quartet members noted their support.
168 Khatib. Interview with the author, Ramallah, Palestinian Territories, November, 2011.
169 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Prime Minister Olmert meets with Palestinian Authority President 
Abbas," Jerusalem: 24 December, 2006.
170 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "PM Olmert Orders Implementation of Steps to Ease Restrictions 
on Palestinians in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip," Jerusalem: 25 December, 2006.
171 Of the Quartet Principals, UNSG Moon used the term ‘re-energised’ most frequently. For one such 
example, see: United Nations Security Council, "Report of the Secretary General on the Question of 
Palestine," United Nations: A/62/344-S/2007/553: 20 September, 2007, p. 16.
172 US Department of State, "Quartet Statement."
173 Ibid.
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On the topic of inter-Palestinian conflict, however, the members presented a 
contradictory message. While expressing ‘concern’ about the violence that had marked 
the end of 2006 and calling for Palestinian ‘unity,’ the Quartet members made clear that 
the principles outlined on 30 January continued to ‘endure.’174 Essentially, the isolation 
of Hamas would persist unless a future unity government endorsed the Quartet 
‘conditions,’ a position immediately supported by the Israeli government.175 In essence, 
the 2 February 2006 Quartet statement established that support for Palestinian unity was 
superseded by continued efforts to isolate or remove Hamas from power. However, 
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov noted that the Quartet had already proved itself 
unable to influence the positions of Hamas in the absence of diplomatic ties. In a press 
conference following the Quartet statement, Lavrov noted that:
...I can only repeat that [Russia is] convinced that it is necessary to work with Hamas 
to try to influence their position so that Hamas would accept those principles that were 
formulated by the Quartet. If those principles remain on paper and we just hope that 
they would magically be implemented and would become part of Hamas' position, this 
is hardly realistic. In order for this to happen, what is necessary is to conduct 
persistent work with Hamas, and Russia is doing that. I cannot speak on behalf of 
other Quartet participants. Not all of them have relations -- established relations with 
Hamas. But what we are doing is aimed at the implementation of the Quartet's 
collective platform.176
Furthermore, this approach sat uneasily with the Quartet’s public support for President 
Abbas, a central figure in the efforts to forge a unity government, especially as it limited 
his scope for reconciliation with Hamas. According to Palestinian official Ghassan 
Khatib, who was present during the negotiations between the Palestinians, the Quartet’s 
conditions were a frequent topic of discussion which ‘narrowed the room for 
manoeuvring for Abbas’ in his attempts to reconcile with Hamas. As Khatib recounted:
...on many occasions, Hamas posed this very logical question: ‘Suppose we agree 
with you, are there any guarantees that the international community led by the US will 
allow such an agreement between us to be implemented? And are there any guarantees 
that Israel would allow such agreement to be implemented, or such a unity 
government to be able to function?’ And in one of the occasions, the factions asked 
Egypt to try to check with the United States. And Omar Suleiman, the head of 
Egyptian intelligence, who was heading the Egyptian team in the peace efforts, while 
we were in Cairo, travelled to the US in order to get us answers to these questions.
174 Ibid.
17:1 Israeli Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni noted that: ‘Taking a firm stand 
against the extremists while reinforcing the moderates are measures that complement one another and 
represent the correct course of action.’ See: Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Response of Foreign 
Minister Livni to the Quartet Statement," Jerusalem: 4 February, 2007.
176 US Department of State, "Press Availability with UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon; Russian FM 
Sergei Lavrov; European High Representative Javier Solana; German FM Frank-Walter Steinmeier; EU 
Commissioner Benita Ferrero-Waldner."
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And he came back with negative answers. The answers of Washington were, no matter 
what kind of agreements, as long as Hamas is not abiding by the three Quartet 
conditions, we will not be cooperative with any outcome of these dialogues...177
Unsurprisingly, the negotiations between the Palestinian factions surrounding the 
formation of a National Unity Government (NUG) did not include input from the 
members of the Quartet. Indeed, multiple failed rounds of negotiations between these
1 *70
factions over the preceding months led to Saudi intervention in February 2007. US 
officials were kept in the dark about these talks, and learned of the Mecca Agreement 
only through media reports.179
The agreement reached at Mecca on 8 February 2007 between Fatah and Hamas 
reflected the difficult situation faced by both parties at that time. Namely, neither could 
fully defeat the other, continued violence might escalate beyond control, and the public
i o/v
was turning against them both. According to Malley and Agha, the Saudis had 
similarly concluded that ‘a stable Israeli-Palestinian peace cannot be built on the ruins 
of an inter-Palestinian war.’181
Thus, over two days of negotiations, the Hamas delegation, led by Damascus-based 
Khaled Meshal, and the Fatah delegation, led by President Abbas, negotiated a 
reconciliation document that sought to bridge the divides not only between the two 
factions, but also between the international community and the Hamas-led Palestinian 
Authority. The deal reached by these leaders called for a new cabinet to be formed, with 
nine Hamas appointees, six Fatah appointees, and five independents, but crucially left 
the specifics of these appointments to be arranged later. “ The Mecca agreement also 
put forward compromise language on the issue of recognising previous peace accords, 
noting that the new government would ‘respect’ these agreements.183 Importantly, the
177 Khatib. Interview with the author, Ramallah, Palestinian Territories, November, 2011.
178 President Abbas and Prime Minister Haniya met in November 2006, and Abbas met Hamas leader 
Khaled Mashal in January 2007. The breakdown of these talks led to further rounds of fighting in January 
and February: International Crisis Group, "After Mecca: Engaging Hamas," p. 16.
179 According to a US official interviewed by the International Crisis Group: ‘We learned of the Saudi 
initiative through the media. This was something King Abdallah personally wanted to do in order to assert 
Saudi Arabia’s role in the region. It had more to do with Saudi-Iranian relations than with anything else. 
We were not kept informed of developments either. We expressed our view that any agreement had to 
meet the Quartet conditions, but we only heard of the outcome when it was announced.’ See: Ibid., p. 22. 
According to another insider account, after being taken by surprise by Saudi officials, US Secretary of 
State Rice was ‘apoplectic.’ See: Rose, "The Gaza Bombshell."
180 International Crisis Group, "After Mecca: Engaging Hamas," p. i.
181 Malley and Agha, "The Road From Mecca."
182 Fattah, H., "Hamas and Fatah Reach Deal in Mecca," The New York Times, 8 February, 2007.
183 The exact phrasing of this clause was as follows: ‘The government shall abide to protect the higher 
national interests of the Palestinian people and protect their rights and preserve and develop their
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logical extension of ‘respecting’ previous agreements was an implied recognition of 
Israel as the legitimate party with whom these agreements were reached. Finally, the 
agreement proposed amendments to the distribution of power within the PLO, and 
called for a total ceasefire between the rival Palestinian factions. While it is arguable 
that the Mecca Agreement reflected a willingness on the part of the Palestinian factions 
to address their differences constructively, the specifics were mostly missing from the 
document. For example, the agreement called for Hamas to be integrated into the PLO, 
but did not specify how exactly this would take place. Furthermore, and crucially, the 
future of the Palestinian Authority and Hamas security forces was also not addressed by 
the Mecca Agreement. These issues in particular foreshadowed the eventual breakdown 
of the NUG.
The Quartet response to the Mecca Agreement was both lukewarm and ambiguous. 
Because the Mecca Agreement left the specific appointments for each cabinet position 
until a further date, the Quartet members chose to reserve final judgement until after 
that process had taken place. As Rice noted:
Talking about recognising or not recognising the government [is premature].. .There 
isn't one yet. When there is one, the United States will make a determination.185
Crucially, while the Quartet statement noted that the members would await the 
formation of the new Palestinian government, it also ‘reaffirmed’ the 2 February 
statement concerning the expectations of such a government. As Rice stated in a 
subsequent interview:
...to say it's a welcome step is not to say that you're going to embrace the government. 
To say that it's a welcome step is to say it's a good thing that the Palestinians are not 
fighting among themselves.187
accomplishments and work on achieving their national goals as ratified by the resolutions of the PNC 
meetings and the Articles o f the Basic Law and the national conciliation document and the resolutions of 
the Arab summits and based on this, the government shall respect the international legitimacy resolutions 
and the agreements that were signed by the PLO.’ See: Khatib, "The Collapse of the Peace Process and 
the Rise of Hamas ".
1X4 As Malley and Agha point out, had the Mecca Agreement eventually been implemented, it would have 
amounted to a political revolution in the Palestinian territories, and the agreement itself was a ‘test of 
whether genuine power-sharing can work in a system that has never before known anything of the sort.’ 
See: Malley and Agha, "The Road From Mecca."
1Xx US Department of State, "Print Roundtable: Secretary Condoleezza Rice," Washington, DC: 15 
February, 2007.
1X6 US Department of State, "Quartet Statement on the Agreement to Form a Palestinian National Unity 
Government," Washington, DC: 9 February, 2007.
1X7 US Department of State, "Print Roundtable: Secretary Condoleezza Rice."
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The tepid Quartet reaction to the Mecca Agreement led to further divisions between the 
Quartet members, in particular between Russia and the United States. However, the 
Quartet’s ‘wait and see’ approach to the formation of the NUG allowed for the 
continuation of the Israeli-Palestinian track in the meantime. Indeed, and tellingly, the 
negotiations to determine the Palestinian cabinet appointments were protracted, and a 
deal was not reached until five weeks later, on 17 March 2007. During this prolonged 
negotiations period, Olmert, Abbas and Rice met trilaterally on 19 February 2007. This 
meeting exemplified the multiple developments occurring within the context of the 
peace process during this period.
Firstly, Olmert made clear to Abbas that Israel would not recognise a NUG that did not
i o n
adhere to the Quartet ‘conditions.’ For Olmert, the ‘only possible channel’ between 
Israel and the Palestinian Authority would be through Abbas, ostensibly because he was 
‘directly elected by the public and, therefore, does not derive his authority from this or 
that agreement.’190 Accordingly, Abbas emphasised that the Quartet conditions were 
also ‘his conditions,’ and that the portions of the Palestinian Authority controlled by 
him would adhere to them.191
Secondly, during this meeting Rice emphasised the importance of the Roadmap 
document not only to the fulfilment of the Quartet conditions, but to the continuation of 
the negotiations process between Abbas and Olmert. Importantly, Rice, Olmert and
lsx A statement from the Russian Foreign Ministry on 9 February 2007 called for the lifting of the 
blockade on the Palestinian territories in response to the Mecca Agreement. When questioned about the 
differing positions of Russia and the US, Secretary of State Rice’s answer was illustrative of the differing 
interpretations regarding what constitutes a Quartet position: ‘Well, I think maybe Lavrov said it best. 
There can be individual or unilateral views, but then there is an international organization and an 
international instrument called the Quartet which has a view that I think has very strong bearing on how 
the international community will behave. And Russia is a part of that Quartet and you saw the statement 
coming out of the Quartet.’ See: Ibid.
189 As Olmert noted after the meeting: ‘We made it clear, as simply and as plainly as possible, it being 
completely evident that our demand, like that of the international community and the US, is that a 
Palestinian government that accepts the Quartet principles thereby recognizes all of the agreements that 
have been signed between the State of Israel and the PA, and will carry them out... I also added that we 
will not recognize any government that does not honor these commitments. Neither will we cooperate 
with it or its ministers.’ See: Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Prime Minister Olmert Addresses 
Kadima Knesset Faction After Trilateral Meeting," Jerusalem: 19 Feburary, 2007.
190 Ibid.
191 In her press conference following the trilateral, US Secretary of State Rice noted that: The President 
helped to broker this and so the — so President Abbas was able to talk again about how committed he was 
to the Quartet principles, how the Quartet principles are, in fact, his principles. He doesn't call them the 
Quartet principles; he says those are my principles because I think they're right.’ See: US Department of 
State, "Roundtable With Traveling Press," Jerusalem: 19 February, 2007.
l9'The linkage between the Quartet conditions and the Roadmap, as discussed previously, was tenuous at 
best. Irrespectively, Rice noted after the trilateral that: T think that the roadmap and just about every other 
plan or guide to the establishment of a Palestinian state understands or assumes that if there's going to be
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Abbas had found a means through which to relate their ongoing negotiations back to the 
Roadmap framework, and to sidestep the Palestinian division in the process. This 
process relied upon a new interpretation of the sequencing of the Roadmap document.
As Rice noted:
...the sequence of the roadmap doesn't preclude talking about the destination. And for 
a while, we were stuck in the notion that you couldn't talk about the destination until 
you've fulfilled all the phases of the roadmap.193
In essence, Rice, Olmert and Abbas had found a way to continue discussing the final 
status issues in the absence of the completion of Phase One of the Roadmap, and within 
the context of a divided Palestinian polity that made implementation of any agreement 
in the short term extremely difficult.194 Crucially, this logic later underpinned the 
Annapolis process.195
On 17 March 2007, the inter-factional Palestinian NUG was established, with Prime 
Minister Haniyah and President Abbas retaining their leadership positions and with the 
important introduction of Salam Fayyad as the Palestinian Finance Minister.196 
Furthermore, the structure of the NUG maintained Abbas’ role as the key Palestinian 
representative to the international community, including in negotiations with the 
Israelis. Consequently, Abbas embarked on a campaign to convince the international 
community to support the NUG, arguing that this would be the only path to moderation, 
and that the alternative would be civil war. While there were some early successes for
a Palestinian state, it's going to have to be on the basis of what we've now called the Quartet principles. 
The Quartet principles, of course, are enshrined in the roadmap.’ Ibid.
193 Ibid.
194 By this stage, discussion of the Roadmap centered mainly on Phases One and Two, in response to 
Abbas’ declaration in early 2007 that the Palestinians would explicitly forgo the ‘transitional’ Phase Two 
of the Roadmap. Specifically, he stated that: ‘We have also noted to Minister Rice our decision to end any 
temporary or transitional solutions including a state with temporary borders because we do not believe it 
to be a realistic choice that can be built upon.’ See: US Department of State, "Press Availability With 
Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas," Ramallah: 14 January, 2007.
195 Unsurprisingly, the members of the Quartet released a statement in support of the efforts of Secretary 
of State Rice after being briefed by her in Berlin. See: US Department of State, "Statement of the Middle 
East Quartet," Berlin, Germany: 21 February, 2007.
196 In the years that followed, Fayyad became a central conduit for international assistance to the 
Palestinian state-building project.
197 Hamas officials noted that ‘the negotiations file is in the hands of Abbas, representing all of us. This is 
something we did not give even to Arafat. And the movement has committed itself to accepting the 
implementation of a political agreement that is properly ratified by Palestinian national institutions or a 
popular referendum, even where such an agreement does not reflect Hamas’s own political vision.’ See: 
International Crisis Group, "After Gaza," Crisis Group Middle East Report 68: 2 August, 2007, p. 4.
I9S Khatib, "The Collapse of the Peace Process and the Rise of Hamas ": p. 6.
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the NUG, especially those facilitated by Finance Minister Fayyad,199 overall the 
international community, and the Quartet in particular, was not openly supportive.
Indeed, the Quartet reaction to the formation of the NUG stated that the ‘conditions’ 
remained, and that international assistance to the new Palestinian government would not 
be forthcoming.200 Specifically, the Quartet members ‘reaffirmed’ their previous 
statements regarding the conditions placed on the Palestinian government, and funhe- 
noted that:
The Quartet agreed that the commitment of the new government in this regard wiling 
measured not only on the basis of its composition and platform, but also its actions 
The Quartet expressed its expectation that the unity government will act responsibly 
demonstrate clear and credible commitment to the Quartet principles, and suppot tie 
efforts of President Abbas to pursue a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict...201
Thus, at the very moment in which the Palestinians had sought to overcome, through the 
creation of a National Unity Government, what had arguably been a ‘wasted year,’20" 
pressure continued from the Quartet to negate their reconciliation. Ultimately, de Sot> 
concluded that the Quartet ‘conditions’ on Hamas had delayed the eventual formatioi of 
the NUG unnecessarily, and had resulted in a year of Palestinian suffering.203 As dj 
Soto noted:
...a National Unity Government with a compromise platform along the lines of Vle:ca 
might have been achieved soon after the election, in February or March 2006, hid tie 
US not led the Quartet to set impossible demands, and opposed a NUG in principle204
According to de Soto, during this period, US officials were still pushing for an oubigit 
confrontation between Fatah and Hamas, and noting privately that inter-Palestiniai
199 According to the International Crisis Group, Fayyad persuaded US officials to provide him funo? 
through a PLO account that he controlled. Throughout the next three months, Fayyad secured a $U>1( 
million contribution from Norway, and funding from Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the UAE that amouned o 
$US150 million. See: International Crisis Group, "After Gaza," p. 3.
200 In this regard, the Quartet members noted that they endorsed a further three month extension to he 
TIM while they ‘evaluate the situation.’ See: US Department of State, "Statement of the Middle Ea;t 
Quartet."
201 Ibid.
202 International Crisis Group, "After Mecca: Engaging Hamas," p. i.
203 de Soto implored his readers to: ‘Please remember this next time someone argues that the Mecc; 
agreement, to the extent that it showed progress, proved that a year of pressure “worked”, and we sioid 
keep the isolation going. On the contrary, the same result might have been achieved much earlier wth<ut 
the year in between in which so much damage was done to Palestinian institutions, and so much sufemg 
brought to the people of the occupied territory, in pursuit of a policy that didn’t work, which many >f 
believed from the outset wouldn’t work, and which, I have no doubt, is at best extremely short-sighed 
de Soto, "End of Mission Report," p. 21.
204 Ibid.
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90Sviolence was a welcome prelude to this eventuality.“ ' Effectively, the Quartet 
members, in their efforts to isolate and remove Hamas from power, had not only created 
the need for a NUG, but they had also delayed its formation and contributed to its 
eventual collapse.
The Collapse of the National Unity Government and the Battle for Gaza
We differentiate between the situation in Gaza, which is being controlled by a terrorist 
organization, and the situation in Judea and Samaria, where there is a new, legitimate 
government that accepts the terms of the international community and goes along with 
the principle that the final goal is the formation of two nation states.
- Tzipi Livni, Israeli Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign 
Minister (2006-2009).206
...the Israelis were uncomfortable with the idea of an international gathering 
(conference, meeting, whatever). Olmert had a long-scheduled meeting in Washington 
on June 19. Fortuitously, the Palestinian unity government, which had brought 
together Fatah and Hamas, collapsed less than a week earlier. With Fatah’s temporary 
partnership with Hamas over, Olmert had fewer reasons to object to an international 
meeting, as long as it wasn’t expected to accomplish much.
- Condoleezza Rice, United States Secretary of State (2005- 
2009).207
The collapse of the National Unity Government led to an unprecedented outbreak of 
inter-Palestinian violence, and ultimately resulted in the Hamas takeover of Gaza. As 
the previous section demonstrated, both the Mecca Agreement and the NUG were the 
products of challenging political circumstances, and both only partly addressed the 
unresolved issues between the Palestinian factions. Essentially, the failure to redress the 
absence of genuine political or security power-sharing between the factions eventually 
contributed to the NUG’s disintegration. Exacerbated by an unaccommodating 
international response, the problems within the National Unity Government proved 
insurmountable for the Palestinians.
The internal battle for control over the Palestinian security services precipitated the 
breakdown of the NUG. Hamas sought to bring the Palestinian security forces under the 
control of the government, rather than the office of the President, and to include the
205 As de Soto noted in his ‘End of Mission Report’: ‘...a week before Mecca, the US envoy declared 
twice in an envoys meeting in Washington how much “I like this violence”, referring to the near-civil war 
that was erupting in Gaza in which civilians were being regularly killed and injured, because “it means 
that other Palestinians are resisting Hamas.’” See: Ibid.
206 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Remarks by Foreign Minister Livni in the Knesset on the Political 
Process with the Palestinians," Jerusalem: 4 September, 2007.
207 Rice, No Higher Honor: A Memoir of My Years in Washington, p. 602.
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208newly created, Hamas-controlled, Executive Support Forces under this umbrella.
After the formation of the NUG, when Abbas appointed Mohammed Dahlan as his 
National Security Advisor,209 a position with expanded powers, it was seen by Hamas
910
officials as an indication that the Fatah was not interested in genuine power sharing.
US funding for the Palestinian security forces controlled by Abbas exacerbated the 
dichotomy that had developed between the competing factions. Indeed, in January 2007, 
the Bush Administration approved an $85 million ‘train and equip’ program for these 
forces.211 According to a US official, the logic of this program was to act as a 
counterbalance to the rapid expansion of Hamas’ security capabilities, especially in 
Gaza. Unsurprisingly, Hamas used the source of Fatah’s funding to justify their own 
reinforcements, with assistance from Iran, which quickly became more organised and 
formidable than those of Fatah.214 Aware of this imbalance, and adding further to the 
cycle of escalation, Dahlan sought to use his power and image in Gaza to exaggerate 
Fatah’s security capabilities:
I made a lot of activities to give Hamas the impression that we were still strong and 
we had the capacity to face them. But I knew in my heart it wasn’t true.215
Adding to the inter-Palestinian security tensions was the deteriorating fiscal situation in 
the Palestinian territories. With Israel still withholding tax revenue,216 and international 
humanitarian assistance flowing only through the office of the Palestinian President, the
20H These forces were created in March 2006 by the newly formed Haniya government. International 
Crisis Group, "After Gaza," p. 7.
209 Dahlan was a vocal opponent of the NUG and of cooperation with Hamas in general. When open 
conflict broke out in Gaza in June 2007, Dahlan’s private residence was one of the first buildings to be 
looted and set alight. See: Ibid., p. 12.
210 Ibid.
211 US Department of State, "Press Availability With Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas."
212 As the official noted in an interview with the International Crisis Group, ‘It’s not a question of helping 
Fatah defeat Hamas; it’s a question of preventing Hamas from defeating Fatah.’ See: International Crisis 
Group, "After Gaza," p. 8.
213 A Hamas official estimated that in 2007 Iran provided the Hamas security forces with approximately 
$120 million in funding. See: Rose, "The Gaza Bombshell."
214 As an Israeli official noted in an interview with the International Crisis Group, ‘The reality in the Gaza 
Strip is that there is no way to overcome Hamas by supporting Fatah. Whatever assistance Fatah gets 
from the U.S. and Dayton or Israel will not change the balance of forces because Fatah lacks motivation, 
is disorganised, fragmented and corrupt.’ See: International Crisis Group, "After Gaza," p. 22.
215 Rose, "The Gaza Bombshell."
216 The 30 May 2007 Quartet statement noted that ‘the resumption of transfers of tax and customs 
revenues collected by Israel on behalf of the Palestinian Authority would have a significant impact on the 
Palestinian economy,’ and ‘encouraged Israel and the Palestinian Authority to consider resumption of 
such transfers’ via the TIM. See: US Department of State, "Joint Statement of the Quartet," Berlin, 
Germany: 30 May, 2007.
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917NUG faced a deficit of about 30 percent of its Gross National Product.“ The fiscal 
crisis contributed further to tensions between the Palestinian factions.
In response, on 30 May 2007, the Quartet members expressed their ‘deep concern over 
recent factional violence in Gaza,’ and ‘strongly condemned the continued firing of 
Qassam rockets into Southern Israel,’ as well as the ‘build-up of arms by Hamas and 
other terrorist groups in Gaza.’218 Notably, during this period Israeli authorities had also 
begun to arrest Hamas parliamentarians on security grounds. In their 30 May statement, 
the Quartet members noted that ‘the detention of elected members of the Palestinian 
government and legislature raises particular concerns,’ and called for them to be 
released. By June 2007, as tensions mounted in both Israel and the Palestinian 
territories, the stage was set for violent confrontation.
The spark that ignited the open conflict between Fatah and Hamas came on 10 June 
2007, when Fatah security forces assassinated Muhammad al-Rifati, a prominent Imam 
from one of Gaza’s largest mosques. ~ Hamas used the death of a cleric as a rallying 
cry for its forces and during the next four days fierce clashes erupted throughout Gaza. 
Once the violence escalated, events quickly spiralled out of control, and neither group 
was able to reign in their fighters on the ground.221 By 14 June 2007, Fatah’s security 
forces in Gaza had been defeated methodically and comprehensively by Hamas forces, 
who demonstrated thorough pre-planning.222
Consequently, President Abbas dissolved the NUG, and immediately appointed an 
‘emergency government,’ with Salam Fayyad filling the position of Palestinian Prime 
Minister. Crucial to Abbas’ strategy was the rebranding of the Gaza conflict as an 
attempted coup by Hamas affiliates. Addressing the PLO Central Council on 18 July, 
Abbas stated that:
...even the devil cannot match [Hamas’s] lies...Nothing can justify the crime of the 
coup they committed. Hamas is committing capital crimes, bloody crimes against our
217 United Nations Security Council, "Report of the Secretary General on the Question of Palestine," p. 
15.
218 US Department of State, "Joint Statement of the Quartet."
219 Ibid.
220 International Crisis Group, "After Gaza," p. 11.
221 Ibid.
222 Ibid., p. 13.
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people every day, every minute, every hour. There will be no dialogue until they 
return Gaza to what it was before.223
Incongruously, Fatah’s security forces immediately engaged in a series of reprisals 
against Hamas officials and groups throughout the West Bank, in a move designed to 
consolidate Fatah’s hold on that territory.224 The international community was quick to 
condemn Hamas, and to support the new Abbas-Fayyad government. On 16 June 2007, 
after a teleconference, the Quartet members stated that:
The Quartet expressed understanding and support for President Abbas' decisions to 
dissolve the Cabinet and declare an emergency, given the grave circumstances. The 
Quartet recognized the necessity and legitimacy of these decisions, taken under 
Palestinian law, and welcomed President Abbas' stated intention to consult the 
Palestinian people at the appropriate time. The Quartet noted its continuing support for 
other legitimate Palestinian institutions.225
By 18 June, the European Union had labelled the violence in Gaza a ‘violent coup 
perpetrated by Hamas militias,’226 and both it and the United States vowed to re­
establish financial assistance with the emergency government.227 According to Rice, in 
Abbas and Fayyad, the United States had found ‘leaders who will take a responsible 
course,’ and who ‘need a way to deal with the unfortunate circumstances that were left 
by the fact that the international community could not deal with the last government.’
Crucially, the new Palestinian government in the West Bank was met with approval and 
support from the Israeli government.229 A week later, on 25 June 2007, Abbas and 
Olmert met for discussions at Sharm el-Sheikh, where the two leaders determined to 
continue to meet fortnightly.230 After this meeting, Olmert declared that the Government 
of Israel would re-establish security cooperation with the Abbas government, resume 
transfer of Palestinian taxes receipts, and ease movement restrictions in the West
223 "Abbas Denounces Hamas, Tells P.L.O. He Will Seek Early Elections," Haaretz, 18 July, 2007.
224 International Crisis Group, "After Gaza," p. 16.
225 US Department of State, "Statement of the Quartet," Washington, DC: 16 June, 2007.
226 European Union Council, "Press Release: External Relations," Luxembourg,: 18 June, 2007.
227 In a press conference following the dissolution of the NUG, Rice stated that: ‘We intend to lift our 
financial restrictions on the Palestinian Government, which has accepted previous agreements with Israel 
and rejects the path of violence. This will enable the American people and American financial institutions 
to resume normal economic and commercial ties with the Palestinian Government.’ See: US Department 
of State, "Special Briefing by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice," Washington, DC: 18 June, 2007.
228 Ibid.
2-9 Israeli Prime Minister Olmert made his position on continued bilateral relations between himself and 
Abbas clear on 18 June when he noted that ‘there’s no question that I want to talk to the President of the 
Palestinian community, Mr. Abbas. I will be talking to him. The teams of both sides meet regularly every 
week and discuss on the matters.’229
230 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Statement by Prime Minister Ehud Olmert at the Sharm el-Sheikh 
Summit," Sharm el-Sheikh: 25 June, 2007.
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Bank.231 Furthermore, the following month, Israel approved the release of 225 prisoners
9^2from Israeli jails, many of whom were members of Fatah.“
While the international community reinstated diplomatic and economic ties with Abbas’ 
West Bank government, the opposite trend occurred in the Hamas-controlled Gaza 
Strip, where diplomatic and economic isolation increased. This situation was 
compounded when, on 19 September 2007, the Israeli government, in response to 
continuing rocket fire originating in Gaza, re-designated the Gaza Strip as ‘enemy 
territory.’ Consequently, the IDF began to impose an even stricter series of controls 
on goods entering Gaza, and halted exports entirely. The so-called ‘closure system’ 
resulted in the number of truck-loads of basic goods entering Gaza per month declining 
from 7,000 in June 2007 to 2,000 by November 2007.234 Consequently, unemployment 
in the Gaza Strip skyrocketed.““
In the aftermath of the collapse of the NUG, and within the context of the solidification 
of the Gaza-West Bank divide, the Quartet members announced the appointment of 
former British Prime Minister Tony Blair as the new Quartet envoy. The politics 
surrounding the nature and the timing of this appointment are the focus of the next 
section.
The Appointment of Tony Blair as Quartet Representative
The day he left Downing Street, Tony Blair accepted a post as special envoy to help 
the Palestinians build the institutions of a democratic state. It wasn’t glamorous work, 
but it was necessary. Tf I win the Nobel Peace Prize,’ Tony joked, ‘you will know I 
have failed.’
- George W. Bush. United States President (2001-2009).236 
On 27 June 2007, at his own request, former British Prime Minister Tony Blair was
9 0 7
appointed as the second Quartet representative. ' According to Rice, as Blair’s time as
231 Ibid.
232 International Crisis Group, "After Gaza," p. 30.
233 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Security Cabinet Declares Gaza Hostile Territory," Jerusalem: 19 
September, 2007.
234 International Crisis Group, "Ruling Palestine I: Gaza Under Hamas," Crisis Group Middle East Report 
73: 19 March, 2008, p. 1.
235 A World Bank report issued in December 2007 estimated that unemployment in Gaza was 
approximately 33 percent, as opposed to approximately 19 percent in the West Bank. See: The World 
Bank, "Investing in Palestinian Economic Reform and Development," Paris: 17 December, 2007.
236 Bush, G. W., Decision Points, 1st ed. (New York: Crown Publishers, 2010), p. 409.
237 Rice, No Higher Honor: A Memoir of My Years in Washington, p. 582.
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Prime Minister was coming to an end, he wrote to President Bush asking that the 
position be created for him:
Blair sent a private note to the President and asked him to share it with me. It asked 
whether the US would support the creation of a position for him as the Quartet’s 
special representative for Middle East affairs.
‘Tony wants to do this, but he doesn’t want to step on your toes,’ the President told 
me, standing at his desk in the Oval. I read Blair’s letter, which laid out an agenda of 
strengthening Palestinian institutions. He explained to the President that the United 
States would have to deliver the negotiated solution. ‘It’s fine,’ I told the President. T 
think we can work together and he can go places and do things that I can’t.’
‘Like what?’ the President asked.
‘Go to Gaza,’ I answered. The other quartet members quickly came on board with the 
idea, and Blair was named to the post.238
Rice’s account is illustrative of the dynamics surrounding Blair’s appointment. First, 
Blair’s deference to Washington on political matters was an important aspect of his 
selection. Second, Rice’s authority within the Bush Administration on matters 
pertaining to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was a key factor in the way in which the 
United States engaged with the peace process from 2005-2009. Third, the fact that 
Blair’s appointment was decided in Washington and then cleared by the Quartet 
members speaks volumes about the power dynamics within the grouping.
Tony Blair’s mandate as Quartet representative was spelled out by the Quartet members 
on 27 June 2007. According to this statement, Blair’s remit was confined to mobilising 
international assistance to the Palestinians, supporting institutional reforms within the 
Palestinian government, developing plans to promote Palestinian economic recovery 
(importantly including ‘private sector partnerships’), building on previously agreed
'J ' i q
frameworks such as the AM A , ' and liaising with other countries ‘as appropriate in
239 The mention of the AMA in this context was arguably in response to the criticisms of the AMA 
process put forward by both former Quartet envoy James Wolfensohn and former Secretary General Kofi 
Annan in 2006. By 2007 it was clear that the AMA had not been implemented, a point that UNSG Ban 
Ki-Moon made clear on 20 September 2007: ‘It remains a source of great concern that the Agreement on 
Movement and Access of November 2005 has not been implemented. Exports from Gaza have totalled 
only a fraction of the agreed targets. Even before the more severe closure of Gaza crossings following the 
Hamas takeover, many factories had closed and farmers were unable to export crops. No progress has 
been reported on bus or truck convoys between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, nor on plans to rebuild 
the Gaza seaport and airport. The number of the internal closures imposed by the Israeli authorities in the 
West Bank increased from approximately 400 at the time of the Agreement on Movement and Access, to 
532 in August 2007, severely impeding normal economic activity.’ See: United Nations Security Council, 
"Report of the Secretary General on the Question of Palestine," p. 15.
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support of the agreed Quartet objectives.’240 The Quartet statement also authorised the 
creation of an ‘Office of the Quartet Representative,’ to be staffed by a ‘small team of 
experts,’ and to be seconded by ‘partner countries and institutions.’241
Importantly, Blair’s appointment occurred within the context of a renewed Palestinian 
state-building project under the supervision of PM Salam Fayyad. In the years that 
followed, Blair’s work, and the work of the Office of the Quartet Representative (OQR), 
was structured largely around supporting Fayyad’s institutional development project in 
the West Bank.24’ Indeed, despite Rice’s surmise at the time of his appointment, Blair 
did not visit Gaza until 2009.244
While Blair’s stated preference for working mainly on institutional reform was striking 
coming from such a high profile politician 245 the decision demonstrated an 
understanding of the strong US preference for remaining the primary political 
interlocutor within the context of the MEPP. Considering that Blair was warned by 
Wolfensohn about the restrictions he would face without a political mandate, his 
decision to limit his own portfolio is explained more by pragmatism than a lack of 
ambition.246 Indeed, according to Khatib, after Blair’s appointment, Washington made 
clear to the Palestinians that he should not be involved in political matters:
240 US Department of State, "Quartet Representative - Quartet Statement," Washington, DC: 27 June, 
2007.
241 Ibid.
242 The 23 September 2007 Quartet statement encouraged Blair to ‘work closely with the Palestinian 
Authority government in developing a multi-year agenda for institutional and economic development.’ 
See: US Department of State, "Remarks With United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon, High 
Representative for European Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana, European Union Commissioner 
for External Relations Benita Ferrero-Waldner, Portuguese Foreign Minister Luis Amado, Russian 
Foreign Minster Sergey Lavrov, and Quartet Representative Tony Blair," UN Headquarters, New York 
City: 23 September, 2007.
244 The OQR was staffed by representatives from the Quartet members, the World Bank, and even staff 
from non-Quartet members such as Australia. The office also included Palestinian and Israeli staff, and 
the Head of Mission for the OQR has traditionally been a US diplomat. The funding for the OQR comes 
from a variety of sources, including UN organisations, the Quartet members, and British taxpayers. See: 
Abunimah, A., "Why the UN Must Abolish the 'Quartet'," Al Jazeera English, 5 October, 2011., and 
Walker, K., "Blair’s £400,000-a-year Bill to Taxpayers: Multi-Millionaire ex-P.M. Enjoys Perks and 
Pension," Daily Mail, 23 August, 2012.
244 McCarthy, R., "Tony Blair Urges Israel to Lift Economic Blockade of Gaza," The Guardian, 2 March, 
2009.
245 European envoy Marc Otte considered Blair’s ‘non-political’ mandate an unrealistic expectation:
‘Well what do you expect a former Prime Minister to do if he’s appointed in that position...that he would 
continuously or slowly go on and remove roadblocks... or improve the passage of people at crossings? 
That’s not something that a former Prime Minister intends to do. Everybody knew that.’ Otte, M., Former 
European Union Quartet envoy, Interview with author, Brussels, November, 2011.
246 Wolfensohn, "A Global Life."
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When Tony Blair was appointed, he read a few of the records that were written and 
submitted by Jim Wolfensohn in evaluating his own mission, and one of 
Wolfensohn’s conclusions was that the next envoy should combine the political and 
the developmental missions. The Americans were strongly against that and I 
remember that at that point in time, President Bush personally made a phone call to 
President Abbas, and among other things, told him ‘we insist that the political 
mediation should remain in the hands of the of the Secretary of State,’ and that the 
Quartet envoy shouldn’t deal with the same kinds of things.247
Thus, Blair’s appointment as the Quartet envoy was contingent upon his avoidance of 
involvement in the peace process, and his focus on economic and institutional matters. 
Notably, he would later be criticised by Palestinian officials for too closely following 
this mandate.248
However, while Blair’s restrictions concerning the peace process might have seemed a 
hindrance, they did not prevent him from using his political clout in the region to affect 
outcomes both within the context of his Quartet role, and also, controversially, within 
the pursuit of his personal business interests. Regarding the former, as the next chapter 
demonstrates, Blair used his personal connections with Israeli Prime Minister 
Netanyahu to affect changes in the Israeli blockade of the Gaza Strip after a flotilla of 
protestors was met with deadly force by the IDF.249 Regarding the latter, it should be 
noted that Blair’s role as Quartet representative was but one of several roles that he took 
on after his Prime Ministership, including the formation of the ‘Tony Blair Foundation,’ 
and the formation of an investment consultancy firm named ‘Tony Blair and 
Associates.’250 Notably, these differing and somewhat conflicting interests were brought 
into the public spotlight in 2011, when a letter from Blair to Libyan dictator Muammar
247 Khatib. Interview with the author, Ramallah, Palestinian Territories, November, 2011.
24S In 2011, in the midst of the Palestinian United Nations statehood bid, Palestinian official Nabil Shaath 
labeled Tony Blair an ‘Israeli parrot,’ and declared that he had not lived up to initial expectations: ‘When 
he took on the role of Quartet envoy, we thought he would be a real support to the Palestinians. But he 
gradually reduced his role to that of asking the Israelis to take down a barrier here or a barrier there... He 
really escaped all the political requirements of his job as representative of the Quartet.’ See: Sherwood, 
H., "Palestinian Leaders Renew Attack on Tony Blair Over Israel," The Guardian, 2 October, 2011.
249 According to a UN official, Blair's personal connections with Netanyahu in particular made him a 
valuable asset for the Quartet members throughout the Obama Administration, when the relationship 
between Washington and Jerusalem cooled substantially. UN official. Interview with the author, 
Jerusalem, November, 2011.
250 For an in-depth critique of Tony Blair’s post-Prime Ministerial business dealings, including the extent 
to which they constituted conflicts of interest, see: Cook, J., "Tony Blair's Tangled Web: The Quartet 
Representative and the Peace Process," Journal of Palestine Studies 42, no. 2 (2013).
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Gaddafi concerning investment opportunities was found to have used the ‘Office of the 
Quartet Representative’ letterhead.251
At the time of Tony Blair’s appointment, however, these issues were of less concern for 
the non-US members of the Quartet than his involvement in the wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan. Indeed, according to European envoy Marc Otte, Blair’s appointment was 
done ‘above the heads of the Foreign Ministers of the EU,’ and was a deeply unpopular 
choice among European representatives to the Quartet.252 As former Jordanian Foreign 
Minister Marwan Muasher explained, Blair was ‘pushed down the throat’ of the Quartet 
by the US representatives and the EU representatives were ‘not enthusiastic’ because:
They had a high representative, they had Solana, they had Otte, they had the 
Commissioner, they had the rotating President, and they didn’t need another 
European! And certainly they did not want Blair personally, because of his role in 
Iraq, which was very unpopular in Europe. So no-one in the European part of the 
Quartet was happy.253
While the source of Blair’s unpopularity after Iraq may partially explain his motivation 
to involve himself in the work of the Quartet,254 the fact that such an internally 
unpopular Quartet representative was subsequently endorsed by the Quartet members 
was testament to the influence of the United States within the grouping. Furthermore, 
unlike Wolfensohn, while Blair’s appointment was to be ‘guided’ by the Quartet ‘as 
necessary,’ his appointment was essentially open-ended.255
251 These documents were uncovered in the aftermath of Gaddafi’s popular overthrow in 2011. See: 
Bloxham, A., "Tony Blair Wrote to Gaddafi 'To Suggest Investment Projects'," The Telegraph, 20 
September, 2011.
252 Otte. Interview with author, Brussels, November, 2011.
253 Muasher, M., Former Jordanian Foreign Minister and current Vice President for studies at the 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, interview with the author, Washington, DC, October, 2011.
254 While it is beyond the scope of this thesis to comment on Tony Blair’s personal motives in seeking 
this appointment, Blair himself draws a connection between his work within the context of the MEPP and 
his involvement in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan: ‘Even out of office, playing now a wholly different 
role, I am still engaged in the same struggle that gave rise to the events I shall describe. When I say I 
think about Iraq and Afghanistan and their consequences and their victims every day of my life, it is true; 
but more than that, I use that reflection to recommit to a sense of purpose in the bigger affair, a business 
yet unfinished. I cannot, by any expression of regret, bring to life those who died; but I can dedicate a 
large part of the life left to me to that wider struggle, to try to charge it with meaning, purpose and 
resolution, and keep my responsibility intact and functioning, in however small or large way. I can’t say 
sorry in words; I can only hope to redeem something from the tragedy of death, in the actions of a life, my 
life, that continues still.’ See: Blair, A Journey: My Political Life, p. 373.
255 US Department of State, "Quartet Representative - Quartet Statement."
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The Annapolis Process
The prospect of an international meeting on Middle East peace was wildly popular 
with my colleagues in the Middle East Quartet -  both the Russians and the Europeans. 
My biggest problem was to prevent them from running to the microphones before the 
President could announce his own meeting. I knew that in preparing the meeting I’d 
have little trouble with these colleagues. The Arabs would be somewhat harder.
- Condoleezza Rice, United States Secretary of State (2005- 
2009).256
The collapse of the Palestinian National Unity Government facilitated the launch of the 
Annapolis process. In a speech on 16 July 2007, President Bush outlined the three­
pronged US response to the breakdown of the NUG, designed to ‘strengthen the forces 
of moderation and peace among the Palestinian people.’257 First, the United States had
o c o
re-established diplomatic and economic ties with the West Bank government."' Second, 
the United States had committed to the revitalisation of the political process between 
Israel and the Palestinians and the continuation of international pressure on Hamas.259 
Third, the United States had strengthened its commitment to the Palestinian institutional 
reform project helmed by Salam Fayyad, and supported by Quartet representative Tony 
Blair. In light of these developments, Bush announced that:
...I will call together an international meeting this fall of representatives from nations 
that support a two-state solution, reject violence, recognize Israel's right to exist, and 
commit to all previous agreements between the parties. The key participants in this 
meeting will be the Israelis, the Palestinians, and their neighbors in the region. 
Secretary Rice will chair the meeting. She and her counterparts will review the 
progress that has been made toward building Palestinian institutions.261
Thus, Bush had authorised Rice to capitalise on the new dynamic in the Palestinian 
territories by spearheading a political process between the Israelis and the West Bank 
government that would be bolstered by support from the international community.
256 Rice, No Higher Honor: A Memoir o f My Years in Washington, p. 602.
257 US Department of State, "President Bush Discusses the Middle East," Washington, DC: 16 July, 2007.
258 According to Bush, after ‘President Abbas expelled Hamas from the Palestinian government’ the US 
had promised to provide the new Palestinian government with $190 million of economic and 
humanitarian assistance, authorised international banks to approved $228 million of loans to the new 
government, and schedule a further $80 million of funding for the Palestinian security services. See: Ibid.
259 Bush noted that: ‘...we will continue to deliver a firm message to Hamas: You must stop Gaza from 
being a safe haven for attacks against Israel. You must accept the legitimate Palestinian government, 
permit humanitarian aid in Gaza, and dismantle militias. And you must reject violence, and recognize 
Israel's right to exist, and commit to all previous agreements between the parties.’ See: Ibid.
260 Ibid.
261 Ibid.
262 An anecdote relayed by Rice in No Higher Honor illustrates the authority bestowed upon her by 
President Bush to lead the Annapolis process: ‘Finally, on Sunday night, I got the pieces into place, and 
on Monday the president sent the invitation. Olmert hit the roof when he saw it, saying that there were 
references to the Saudi Peace initiative that he hadn’t approved. He called the President, who didn’t want
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The key to this international support was the cooperation of the other members of the 
Quartet, and of regional actors. Indeed, despite the Annapolis process being led by the 
United States, the non-US members were frequently briefed by Rice, and were publicly 
supportive of her efforts.263
Nevertheless, at the time of Bush’s announcement, the exact format and goals of 
Annapolis were yet to be determined, with US officials only certain that it would be a 
‘meeting,’ rather than a ‘conference.’264 According to Rice, in the months following the 
16 July speech:
...there was little agreement about what [Annapolis] would do, and we were 
determined not to send out any invitations until everyone had privately agreed to 
come. Several times the whole thing seemed in danger of coming apart.265
The regional context fuelled concerns among the Annapolis organisers and attendees 
alike that the meeting may end in a public failure that would be difficult to recover 
from.266 Indeed, Prime Minister Olmert and President Abbas both faced difficult 
domestic situations that made political concessions at Annapolis extremely problematic.
For Olmert, the failures of the 2006 Lebanon war had been politically costly, and 
maintaining control over the Kadima party in the absence of the unifying figure of 
Sharon had proved difficult. In the lead-up to the Annapolis conference, two key 
partners in his governing coalition threatened to withdraw their support for Olmert if he 
made concessions at the meeting on issues such as Jerusalem or the Palestinian 
refugees.267 For Abbas, the breakdown in the NUG and the division of both the 
Palestinian government and territory had left him presiding over a dysfunctional and
to undermine me. “Talk to Condi,” the President told him.’ See: Rice, No Higher Honor: A Memoir of My 
Years in Washington, p. 605.
262 The 20 July 2007 Quartet statement noted: ‘The Quartet welcomed President Bush's July 16 statement 
renewing U.S. commitment to a negotiated two-state solution, and supported President Bush's call for an 
international meeting in the fall. The Quartet looks forward to consultations as the meeting is prepared. 
The Quartet agreed that such a meeting should provide diplomatic support for the parties in their bilateral 
discussions and negotiations in order to move forward on a successful path to a Palestinian state.’ See: US 
Department of State, "Quartet Statement Following July 19 Meeting," Washington, DC: 20 July, 2007.
264 According to Rice, as she and Steve Hadley began to discuss the Annapolis process with President 
Bush, he noted his preference that it be called a meeting, rather than a conference. Ostensibly, this 
semantic distinction would help the gathering sound ‘less grandiose.’ See: Rice, No Higher Honor: A 
Memoir of My Years in Washington, p. 601.
265 Ibid., p. 603.
266 According to Rice, Saudi officials relayed their concerns that if Annapolis were to fail, there might be 
a similar outbreak of violence to the one that followed the Camp David. See: Ibid., p. 604.
267 These parties were ‘Israel Our Home’ (Yisrael Beitenu), and the ultra-orthodox ‘Shas’ party. With total 
members in the Knesset of 11 and 12 members respectively, the withdrawal of these parties from 
Olmert’s government would have been disastrous. See: International Crisis Group, "The Israeli- 
Palestinian Conflict: Annapolis and After," Middle East Briefing 22: 20 November, 2007, p. 7.
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bankrupt government.26* Central to Abbas’ strategy to combat Hamas in the aftermath 
of the NUG collapse was the notion that he remained the only Palestinian leader capable 
of delivering a negotiated agreement with the Israelis, even if the implementation 
process for any such agreement remained uncertain.269 Adding to Abbas’ domestic 
problems was the awkward reality that he was now willing to negotiate with the Israelis, 
but not with his fellow Palestinians.270 Thus, while Abbas and Olmert were compelled 
to secure diplomatic victories at Annapolis, both also faced serious political 
consequences should the meeting fail.
Despite these challenges, Olmert and Abbas continued their bilateral meetings, and 
by November 2007 they had come to an arrangement with Rice over the format of what 
was by that stage being called a ‘conference.’'1' Unsurprisingly, as the first international 
peace conference since Madrid, many actors on the international scene lobbied the Bush 
Administration for an invitation to Annapolis, and by the time the invitations were
274sent out, the conference had over 50 attendees.
The conference as Annapolis, Maryland took place over three days, and the format of 
the event reflected the Bush Administration’s strategy of gamering international support 
for a process of bilateral negotiations mediated by the United States. As Rice noted, 
Annapolis would:
...discipline the Europeans and Arabs by highlighting bilateral negotiations, but 
giving these other players some pride of ownership and some responsibility. We could 
pursue increased support for building the institutions of a Palestinian state, particularly 
from the Arabs.276
26S While donors continued to provide funding to the West Bank government through the TIM. more 
institutionalised funding mechanisms had yet to be re-established. In an effort to address the ongoing 
fiscal crisis in the West Bank, an international donor’s conference was convened in Paris following the 
Annapolis meeting.
269 International Crisis Group, "The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: Annapolis and After," p. 4.
270 As former Quartet envoy James Wolfensohn noted: ‘...we have an added difficulty in that we don't 
have two parties now, we have three. And one with whom neither of the other two wishes to deal.’ See: 
Smooha, "All the Dreams We Had Are Now Gone."
271 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "PM Olmert Meets With P.A. President Mahmoud Abbas," 
Jerusalem: 10 September, 2007.
272 See: US Department of State, "Announcement of Annapolis Conference," Washington, DC: 20 
November, 2007.
273 Rice, No Higher Honor: A Memoir of My Years in Washington, p. 616.
274 US Department of State, "Announcement of Annapolis Conference."
275 The opening of the conference was preceded by the Israeli announcement that 450 Palestinian political 
prisoners would soon be released. See: Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Notification in Respect to the 
Release of Palestinian Prisoners," Jerusalem: 20 November, 2007.
276 [Emphasis in original] Rice, No Higher Honor: A Memoir of My Years in Washington, p. 601.
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Consequently, on 26 November, Bush hosted Olmert and Abbas for separate bilateral 
meetings (after which Rice briefed her colleagues in the Quartet), before a dinner to 
which all attendees were invited.277 On 27 November, Bush, Olmert and Abbas opened 
the ‘official’ proceedings of the conference, and a formal lunch was followed by several 
plenary sessions that involved speeches from the various attendees, and ended with the 
parties announcing that they had reached a ‘joint understanding.’ On the final day of 
the conference, Bush hosted Abbas and Olmert for a second round of bilateral meetings 
at the White House.
The joint understanding reflected the nature of the political constraints faced by both 
Olmert and Abbas, and was essentially an agreement to engage in further negotiations. 
These negotiations would continue to take place fortnightly, with the aim to conclude a 
final status agreement before the end of 2008. Importantly, the joint understanding 
included a commitment by the parties to ‘immediately implement their respective 
obligations under the performance-based road map,’ with the success of this process to
9 o n
be ‘judged by the United States.’ Thus, the accommodation reached at Annapolis 
between Abbas and Olmert was to negotiate a ‘shelf agreement,’ which dealt with the 
final status issues but which would not be implemented until each side had completed 
their Phase One Roadmap obligations. The logic of this approach was that each side 
could make compromises within the negotiations, knowing that any agreement reached 
would not become valid until the conditions of the Roadmap had been met. 
Furthermore, if an agreement could be reached, the prospect of a final resolution to the 
conflict could be used by both sides to motivate their constituencies to meet their 
Roadmap commitments. As Olmert explained:
The most important thing in the joint statement... is that any future arrangement and 
agreement will be operationally subject to fulfilling all of the Roadmap commitments, 
including all of its stages and outlines. In other words, Israel will not have to carry out
277 The Quartet statement released on the evening of 26 November 2007 simply expressed support for the 
Annapolis conference, and urged the international community to provide ‘robust support’ for the parties 
to the conflict. See: US Department of State, "Quartet Statement."
278 US Department of State, "Joint Understanding Read by President Bush at Annapolis Conference," 
Annapolis, Maryland: 27 November, 2007.
279 Notably, this date coincided with the end of the second Bush Administration. Rice stated that: ‘If the 
parties didn’t conclude an agreement, everyone would talk about failure. But as I told anyone who asked, 
the Bush Administration had a deadline anyway. Within a year there would be a new President of the 
United States, whether an Israeli-Palestinian peace had been brokered or not.’ See: Rice, No Higher 
Honor: A Memoir of My Years in Washington, p. 613.
280 US Department of State, "Joint Understanding Read by President Bush at Annapolis Conference."
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any commitment stemming from the agreement before all of the Roadmap 
commitments are met.281
The danger of the approach adopted at Annapolis, however, was that it relied on both 
parties having a shared understanding of what was expected in Phase One of the 
Roadmap, as well as the extent to which each had fulfilled their commitments.
According to the International Crisis Group:
Palestinian Authority officials claim they have implemented some 90 percent of their 
phase one obligations, pointing to steps they have taken to disarm militias, fight 
Hamas, rebuild security institutions and so forth. U.S. counterparts consider this a 
significant exaggeration but nonetheless point out that while the PA has begun a 
process of implementation, Israel has done virtually nothing. ‘You can say the 
Palestinians are in a grey zone. But Israel’s obligations are black and white: did they 
reopen Palestinian institutions in East Jerusalem? No. Did they dismantle unauthorised 
outposts? No. Did they freeze settlement activity? No’. 282
The key to this process, as in the original Roadmap implementation period, was 
effective monitoring. With the United States having taken on the role of ‘official 
monitor’ in the post-Annapolis period (despite the Roadmap calling for Quartet 
monitoring) the question was whether the Bush Administration could overcome the 
obstacles of Israeli hesitance and Palestinian division. Furthermore, this strategy relied 
upon the ability of Olmert and Abbas, two weakened leaders, to reach an agreement on 
the final status issues within this difficult context.
To aid Abbas and Fayyad in this task, on 17 December 2007, an international donor’s 
conference was convened in Paris. Funding was pledged in support of Prime Minister 
Fayyad’s ‘Palestinian Reform and Development Plan’ ' by members of the 
international community over a three year period, with the United States pledging $555
9 0 4
million, and the European Union pledging EU650 million."
Ultimately, the Annapolis process was built on the ruins of the Palestinian National 
Unity Government. As such, both the renewal of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations and the
281 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "PM Olmert and FM Livni Report to Cabinet on Annapolis 
Conference," Jerusalem: 2 December, 2007.
282 See: International Crisis Group, "The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: Annapolis and After," p. 6.
283 Fayyad’s plan had six key components: garnering international support and legitimacy for the West 
Bank government; restoring the security services; improving the West Bank economic conditions; 
reducing Israeli security measures; rebuilding Palestinian institutions (while bypassing those controlled 
by Hamas in Gaza), and; reviving a credible peace process. See: International Crisis Group, "After Gaza,"
p. 16.
284 The total pledges amounted to $7.7 billion over three years, which was $2.1 billion more than the 
Palestinians requested. International Crisis Group, "Ruling Palestine II: The West Bank Model?," Crisis 
Group Middle East Report 79: 17 July, 2008.
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international efforts to bolster the West Bank government led by Abbas only served to 
further entrench the political and geographic divisions in the Palestinian territories. 
Consequently for Abbas, future efforts to reconcile the Palestinian factions jeopardised 
both the state-building project, and the continuation of bilateral relations with Israel. As 
a UN official noted:
No-one has yet come up with a way to have a peace process where the United States, 
Israel, the Palestinian Authority and Hamas are all in it. Basically the choices are: the 
US, Israel and the PA, or the PA and Hamas and not the others.285
Equally, the continuation of the bifurcated system of government in the Palestinian 
territories undermined the credibility of the Palestinian national movement, and 
violence between Israel and militants in Gaza was both distracting and destabilising.
Ultimately, this predicament can be traced back to the international response, led by the 
Quartet members, to the Hamas election victory in 2006. While the Quartet members 
were unable to affect the outcome of the PLC elections, their subsequent decision to 
seek the removal of Hamas through a strategy of isolation and de-legitimisation scuttled 
both Abbas’ normalisation agenda, and his later attempts to form a unity government. 
Furthermore, when the Palestinian factions sought to de-escalate their mounting 
tensions and to end the Palestinian fiscal crisis through the formation of the NUG, the 
Quartet members were unsupportive of their efforts, still preferring the removal of 
Hamas to its co-option.
In the end, not even open conflict between the Palestinian factions resulted in the 
removal of Hamas from the Palestinian equation. The physical quarantine of the 
movement in the Gaza Strip remedied neither the causes of the Palestinian division, nor 
the fundamental issues separating the Israelis and the Palestinians. In the period that 
followed, efforts to negotiate a final status agreement between the Israelis and the 
Palestinians were scuttled by the continuation of the factors that had marked the events 
of 2006 and 2007. Establishing the role of the Quartet members within the attempts to 
overcome these factors from 2008-2011 is the focus of the next chapter.
285 UN official. Interview with the author, Jerusalem, November, 2011.
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Well, clearly, since Hamas took control of the Gaza Strip, we adopted a dual strategy. 
And when I say ‘we,’ I mean the international community and, of course, the United 
States of America, Israel, and the pragmatic leaders in the Palestinian Authority. The 
idea is to work with diplomatic leaders, to try and reach a peace treaty with them, 
while simultaneously working in order to delegitimize Hamas as a terrorist 
organization and to find an answer to these terror attacks coming from the Gaza Strip 
to Israel.
- Tzipi Livni, Israeli Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign 
Minister (2006-2009).1
As long as Hamas is shunned, as long as peace talks are intended to further 
marginalize it, Hamas will perceive an alliance between Abbas and Israel as a mortal 
threat and react accordingly.
- Robert Malley and Hussein Agha.2
Introduction
The post-Annapolis period was marked by the deterioration of Israeli-Palestinian 
negotiations and the entrenchment of the Palestinian political and geographic divide.
For the members of the Quartet, this period was largely characterised by unsuccessful 
efforts to reverse both of these interrelated trends. The period began with international 
support for the conclusion of a final status agreement between the Israelis and 
Palestinians, and ended with efforts merely to re-establish bilateral contact between 
these same parties. Ultimately neither the parties to the conflict nor the members of the 
Quartet were able to escape the adverse conditions for peace making created in the 
preceding period, and the prospects for negotiated solution to the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict diminished further. Consequently, so too did the outputs of the Quartet.
This chapter seeks to answer the question, what were the outputs o f the Quartet in 2008, 
2009 and 2010?
It argues that in the post-Annapolis period, the members of the Quartet acted largely in 
support of US efforts to advance Israeli-Palestinian bilateral relations, but that the 
prevailing political and economic circumstances in both Israel and the Palestinian 
territories ultimately reduced the efficacy of these efforts. Specifically, this chapter 
argues that the geographic and political division of the Palestinian territories resulted in 
an ‘extra-constitutional’ situation that undermined the credibility of both the Palestinian
1 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Joint Press Conference With FM Livni and US Secretary of State 
Rice," Jerusalem: 5 March, 2008.
2 Malley, R. and Agha, H., "Into the Lion's Den," The New York Review o f Books, 1 May, 2008.
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institutional reform process and the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations process.
Furthermore, security crackdowns and structural changes in Gaza and the West Bank 
cemented the dichotomisation of the Palestinian government structure, and reduced the 
incentives for Palestinian re-unification moving forward.
Despite the efforts of both President Abbas and Prime Minister Olmert to insulate their 
bilateral track from the deteriorating security situation in Gaza, by the end of 2008 both 
the negotiations process and the fragile Israeli-Hamas ceasefire crumbled. The 
subsequent Israeli bombardment and incursion into Gaza known as ‘Operation Cast 
Lead’ paralysed the members of the Quartet, who were unable to form a common 
position.
The beginning of new political administrations in both Israel and the United States 
further compounded this situation. While the Obama Administration came into office 
intent on engaging with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the Netanyahu government 
immediately distanced itself from the post-Annapolis process. Indeed, both 
administrations sought to differentiate themselves from the efforts of their predecessors, 
but this took them in opposite directions. Furthermore, US efforts to return the Israelis 
to a negotiations framework were met with Palestinian resistance, and from 2008 
onwards both parties were either unwilling or unable to resume meaningful bilateral 
negotiations.
Throughout this period, the Quartet members continued their efforts to isolate the 
Hamas government in Gaza and to promote the West Bank government headed by 
Abbas and Prime Minister Fayyad. This included support for the Israeli-Palestinian 
bilateral process, and for the Palestinian state-building project. Ultimately, even when 
the Quartet members acted in support of an engaged US Administration in promotion of 
these processes, the constraints arising from regional circumstances that had been 
created in the preceding years proved to be inescapable.
This chapter is divided into three chronological sections that explore the outputs of the 
Quartet members within the context of the Middle East peace process in 2008,2009 and 
2010. The 2008 section examines the entrenchment of the Palestinian division, and the 
circumstances that led to the breakdown in both the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations 
process and the Hamas-Israel ceasefire. The 2009 section examines the fallout from 
operation ‘Cast Dead,’ and explores the changing political dynamics within the context
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of the Middle East peace process that emerged after the beginning of the Netanyahu and 
Obama Administrations respectively. Finally, the 2010 section discusses the US 
attempts to re-establish Israeli-Palestinian negotiations through intensive ‘shuttle 
diplomacy,’ and explores the emerging trend towards an internationalised Palestinian 
national strategy.
2008: The Post-Annapolis Negotiations
There is a constant dynamic which is very difficult. How do you pacify and manage 
the situation in Gaza, ensure that the civilian population there can lead a normal life, 
and maintain security between Israel and Gaza, without treating Hamas as a legitimate 
separate government of a separate entity? And how can you do this without 
undermining the Palestinian Authority, and without removing the incentives for 
Palestinian reconciliation on positive terms? That’s a constant dilemma that the 
international community faces, whether it’s the Quartet or anyone else.
- United Nations official.3
The post-Annapolis political process between Olmert and Abbas was designed to 
produce a negotiated ‘shelf agreement’ between the parties by the end of 2008. 
According to the joint agreement reached at Annapolis, this process was to be bolstered 
by both Palestinian economic and institutional reform in the West Bank, and by the 
implementation by both parties of their Phase One Roadmap commitments, as 
determined by US monitors.4 Accordingly, on 10 January 2008, the White House 
announced the appointment of General William Fraser to the post of Roadmap monitor, 
where he would coordinate a trilateral information sharing process with the parties to 
the conflict.5 Crucially, Fraser’s findings concerning Israeli and Palestinian adherence to 
their Roadmap commitments were not to be shared publically, essentially reducing his 
role in the region to that of a ‘prodding agent.’6 Furthermore, by linking only the 
implementation of any peace agreement to the fulfilment of the Phase One Roadmap 
commitments, the Annapolis agreement freed the parties from the constraints of meeting
3 UN official. Interview with the author, Jerusalem, November, 2011.
4 As President Bush noted at the Annapolis conference, ‘Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, 
implementation of the future peace treaty will be subject to the implementation of the road map.’ See: US 
Department of State, "Joint Understanding Read by President Bush at Annapolis Conference," Annapolis, 
Maryland: 27 November, 2007.
5 The White House, "Press Briefing by National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley on Israeli-Palestinian 
Peace Process " Dan Panarama Hotel, Jerusalem: 10 January, 2009.
6 According to White House National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley, General Fraser’s mission was to 
be ‘another prodding agent, if you will, on the ground. See: "Bush Names General to Monitor Mideast 
'Road Map'," Reuters, 10 January, 2008.
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these requirements during the negotiations process.7 *Ironically, the delay in meeting the 
Phase One Roadmap commitments, especially regarding Israeli settlements and
8Palestinian violence, both facilitated and later impeded the negotiations process.
The ‘shelf agreement’ strategy relied on two key assumptions. Firstly, it relied on the 
ability of Olmert and Abbas to insulate their ongoing discussions from the continued 
humanitarian and security crisis in the Hamas-controlled Gaza Strip, especially during 
periods of escalating violence between Hamas and the IDF. Secondly, the strategy 
relied on the assumption that both Olmert and Abbas, in the face of mounting domestic 
political pressures, would actually be able to reach an agreement on the final status 
issues. As this chapter demonstrates, neither of these assumptions proved correct.
Ultimately, a marginalised Hamas was able to act as both a distraction from and spoiler 
of the political process between Abbas and Olmert. The divided and dysfunctional 
Palestinian Authority machinery reduced Abbas’ capacity to make the political 
compromises necessary to reach a final status agreement on contentious issues. Equally, 
Olmert’s domestic political situation reduced his ability to negotiate free from 
constraint, and, as his Prime Ministership came to an end, reduced Abbas’ incentives to 
sign an agreement that might be undone by the next Israeli Prime Minister.
The Entrenchment of the Palestinian Division
The Palestinians cannot embrace Hamas as part of their community but must reject 
Hamas, because they need to realize there is no hope for Hamas. Hamas is the enemy 
of Israel, Hamas is the enemy of the Palestinians and Hamas is the enemy of the free 
world that is seeking peace.
- Tzipi Livni, Israeli Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign 
Minister (2006-2009).9 10
In the aftermath of Hamas’ takeover of Gaza, in June 2007, both the Abbas government 
in the West Bank and the Haniyah government in the Gaza Strip sought to consolidate 
their respective positions. This process continued in 2008, and encompassed competing 
institutional, economic and security reforms that solidified the division of the 
Palestinian territories, and reduced the prospects for re-unification. As one UN official
7 As US Secretary of State Rice noted, if the parties negotiated an agreement dividing the territory, then 
‘we can stop having the discussion about what's a settlement and what isn't.’ See: US Department of 
State, "Print Roundtable with US Secretary of State Rice," Washington, DC: 7 January, 2008.
KCrucially, in 2009 and 2010, the Palestinian leadership sought to reverse this approach, calling for a 
freeze in Israeli settlement activity as a precondition to restarting negotiations.
9 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Kassams in Sderot: Remarks to the Press by F.M. Livni," Jerusalem:
10 February, 2008.
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noted, the fracturing of the Palestinian Authority executive office from its legislative 
mechanism resulted in an ‘extra constitutional’ situation whereby two opposing 
Palestinian governments both presented themselves as legitimately elected authorities.10
After Abbas dismissed Hamas Prime Minister Haniyah, effectively ending the National 
Unity Government, the Palestinian Basic Law required the Palestinian Legislative 
Council (PLC) to approve a new government.* 11 With the PLC controlled by Hamas in 
Gaza, Abbas established his new government in the West Bank by presidential decree 
alone, appointing the unelected Salam Fayyad as a caretaker Prime Minister. With the 
Hamas government unable to have legislation signed into law by Abbas, and the West 
Bank government unable to write new legislation, both administrations were acting 
outside of any existing legal or constitutional framework. Within this legal vacuum,
1 Teach side sought to assert their authority and challenge the other’s.
In the West Bank, the Abbas government sought to compensate for its disputed legal 
foundations by pursuing economic and political outcomes, ostensibly to offer an 
appealing alternative model to the Gaza Strip. The two pillars of this approach were the 
institutional reform process led by Fayyad, and the ongoing negotiations between Abbas 
and Olmert.
In 2008, bolstered by international donor support, Fayyad oversaw growth in the 
construction sector, a rise in West Bank GDP, and minor reductions in poverty and 
unemployment.14 However, despite physical and political barriers, the Gaza economy 
and the West Bank economy remained linked, and a World Bank report concluded that 
Fayyad’s economic reforms were not capable of overcoming either the ongoing impact 
of the Israeli closure system in the West Bank, or the relative decline in the Gaza
10 UN official. Interview with the author, Jerusalem, November, 2011.
11 For an in-depth discussion of the Palestinian legal and institutional quagmire following June 2007 see: 
Brown, N., "What Can Abu Mäzen Do?," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 15 June, 2007.
12 Technically, legislation enacted by the PLC automatically becomes law after two months, even without 
a Presidential signature, but the Hamas courts refrained from applying those laws in order to ‘maintain 
unity.’ See: International Crisis Group, "Round Two in Gaza," Crisis Group Middle East Briefing 24: 11 
September, 2008, p. 11.
13 In Gaza, Hamas legislators continued to meet and discuss legislation, even allowing their absent West 
Bank colleagues to vote via proxy. In contrast, in the West Bank the Fatah PLC members did not continue 
to meet in an official capacity, but instead formed unofficial committees to monitor government behavior. 
See:Ibid.
14 International Crisis Group, "Ruling Palestine II: The West Bank Model?," Crisis Group Middle East 
Report 79: 17 July, 2008, p. 19.
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economy. 15 The West Bank administration continued to put economic pressure on 
Hamas, denying them revenue by declaring a tax holiday across Gaza, 16 and privately
17channeling funds to Fatah-affiliated public servants in Gaza.
In the security sector, the Abbas government launched a concerted campaign to reduce 
the operational capabilities of Hamas and the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade in the West 
Bank, aided in part by US Security Coordinator General Keith Dayton. This included 
the arrests of thousands of Hamas affiliates, and increased levels of cooperation with 
Israeli security services. 19 Furthermore, Abbas granted military courts jurisdiction over 
civilians, and also granted formal arrest power to the West Bank Preventative Security 
Organisation. However, the West Bank security operations were complicated by both 
the perception of PA collusion with Israel,21 and by the difficulties of factional 
crackdowns in the absence of meaningful progress in the negotiations process. Indeed, 
with no control over the situation in Gaza, Abbas was unable to provide either political 
or security guarantees to Israel outside of the West Bank.
15 The World Bank report noted that the 'formation of the Caretaker Government in mid-2007, and the 
resumption of aid have reversed the impacts of the aid boycott in 2006 and 2007, but only partially. Real 
GDP was negative in the first half of 2007 but began to recover in the West bank during the second half. 
Because of the situation in Gaza, real GDP growth in 2007 is estimated to be about 0 percent, which 
given the rapidly growing population indicates falling per capita income. The contributing effects of the 
closures and movement restrictions cannot be overestimated.’ See: The World Bank, "Implementing the 
Palestinian Reform and Development Agenda," 2 May, 2008.
16 International Crisis Group, "Ruling Palestine I: Gaza Under Hamas," Crisis Group Middle East Report 
73: 19 March, 2008, p. 3.
17 The West Bank government continued to pay the wages of around 75,000 Palestinian Authority salaries 
in the Gaza Strip. These payments were made directly into individual bank accounts, thus subverting any 
attempts by the Hamas government to re-appropriate the funds. See: International Crisis Group, "Round 
Two in Gaza," p. 13.
18 The position of United States Security Coordinator to the Palestinian Authority was established in 2005 
in response to Mahmoud Abbas assuming the Palestinian leadership after the death of Yasser Arafat. 
Originally headed by Lieutenant General Kip Ward, the USSC was responsible for overseeing the reforms 
of the PA security services called for in the Roadmap. In 2006 General Dayton assumed the role, and in 
the aftermath of the breakdown of the NUG, the USSC worked to bolster the capabilities of the West 
Bank security forces to both combat internal security challenges, and to oversee joint exercises with the 
IDF. For an in-depth discussion of this process, see: International Crisis Group, "Ruling Palestine II: The 
West Bank Model?," pp. 3-34.
19 Ibid., p. 4.
20 Ibid., p. 29.
21 Despite improvements in the Palestinian security forces in dealing with insurgencies and preventing 
terrorist attacks, the IDF maintained its extensive checkpoint system throughout the West Bank, and 
continued to make incursions into Palestinian territory. These operations embarrassed the Palestinian 
security services, and strengthened the perception that the Abbas government was helping to perpetuate 
the occupation. See: Ibid., p. 12.
22 According to a Palestinian policeman in the West Bank, ‘People who work in the security services read 
the same political map everyone else does. Negotiations aren’t going anywhere, the situation on the 
ground is worse than ever, and people are talking about the end of the PA. In this context you cannot go 
after your own”. See: Ibid., p. 17.
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In the Gaza Strip, the international and Palestinian Authority boycott created a power 
vacuum that Hamas filled. In response to ongoing financial sanctions from the 
international community, and restrictions on revenue collection imposed by the West 
Bank government, Hamas created and oversaw an ‘informal economy’ in Gaza. ‘ The 
Gaza economy was kept afloat by the public sector salaries paid by the West Bank 
government, humanitarian aid and salaries from organisations such as UNRWA, foreign 
funding from regional sponsors such as Iran, and profits from the smuggling trade 
conducted through tunnels between Gaza and Egypt.24 In particular, the tunnel system 
allowed Hamas to collect tariffs on goods passing through, and to acquire arms and 
other items prohibited by the Israeli blockade.25 With around 33 percent of the Gaza 
population unemployed, and with Israel tightening restrictions on goods entering the 
territory, the humanitarian crisis deepened. Compounding this situation, revenue 
collected by the Hamas government was used predominantly to bolster the security 
services and to pay salaries and ministerial expenses, with the bulk of the humanitarian
97assistance being paid by the international donor community.
In the security sector, Hamas divided its Executive Force into three separate branches; 
the Civil Police, the Internal Security Forces, and the National Security Forces. In 
addition, Hamas transformed the Qassam Brigades from a guerilla organisation into an 
official uniformed military force, and used this force to establish hegemony over 
competing armed groups within Gaza.24 Despite having total control over the internal 
security environment in Gaza, Hamas was either unable or unwilling to reign in armed 
factions firing rockets into Southern Israel. Ostensibly, these rockets were in response
23 International Crisis Group, "Round Two in Gaza," p. 14.
24 See: International Crisis Group, "Ruling Palestine I: Gaza Under Hamas," pp. 16-20.
25 By June 2008 there were an estimated 500-600 tunnels between Egypt and Gaza, and Hamas authorities 
had created a ‘Tunnel Administration’ within the Interior Ministry to oversee the construction of tunnels 
and the collection of taxes on tunnel operators. See: International Crisis Group, "Round Two in Gaza," p. 
14.
26 The World Bank, "Implementing the Palestinian Reform and Development Agenda."
27 During this period the nature of international aid to Gaza moved from developmental to entirely 
humanitarian. Furthermore, in the aftermath of the Hamas takeover, various donor organisations were 
forced to scale back programs dealing with construction or that relied on strong institutional contacts with 
Hamas. See: International Crisis Group, "Ruling Palestine I: Gaza Under Hamas," p. 4.
2X The Civil Police maintained Gaza’s internal security, the Internal Security Forces operated as an 
intelligence organisation, and the National Security Forces acted as a border patrol. See: Ibid., p. 9.
29 For example, on 25 July 2008 the Qassam Brigade launched a brutal crackdown on the prominent and 
powerful Hillis Family in the Gaza Strip, including numerous gruesome public executions, in response to 
the family’s alleged involvement in bombing attack that killed five field commanders of the brigade. See: 
International Crisis Group, "Round Two in Gaza," p. 2.
30 Ironically, Hamas found it difficult politically to restrain or disarm militant factions operating on the 
Gaza-Israeli border who argued that their weapons caches and rocket fire were in response to the Israeli
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to the ongoing Israeli blockade of Gaza, and in the first six months of 2008
' l  i
approximately 2,278 rockets were launched into Israel.' Israeli officials made it clear
32that any rocket fired from Hamas-controlled territory would be attributed to Hamas. 
Consequently, Israeli incursions into Gaza were frequent during this period, and the IDF 
extended its security buffer zone deep into the territory.33
Ongoing rocket fire originating in Gaza weakened Abbas’ ability to continue the 
negotiations process, and frictions between the competing Palestinian governments over 
this issue complicated reconciliation attempts.34 Furthermore, on 30 January 2008, 
Abbas declared that Palestinian unity would continue to depend on Hamas ending its 
‘coup’ in Gaza, accepting ‘all international obligations’ and agreeing to hold early 
elections.35
In essence, the possibility of progress towards Palestinian unity continued to rely on 
Hamas’ adherence to the Quartet’s conditions. Moreover, as this section has 
demonstrated, both Palestinian governments had altered their economic and security 
institutions to reflect the geographic and political divisions between them, and this 
entrenchment established power dynamics within these territories that would need to be 
undone in any future unity agreement. Ironically, by each deepening their domestic 
political control, the Palestinian factions had reduced the incentives for re-unification, 
which would inevitably require a dilution of this power. In the absence of unity, 
however, Hamas was unable to ease its fiscal and humanitarian crisis, and Abbas was 
unable to reduce rocket fire from Gaza. As the next sections demonstrate, these 
dynamics had an ongoing effect on the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations process.
occupation. Furthermore, rocket fire originating in Gaza was a key source of resistance to the Israeli 
blockade. See: International Crisis Group, "Ending the War in Gaza," Crisis Group Middle East Briefing 
26: 5 January, 2009, p. 11.
31 Ibid., p. 3.
32 On 17 March 2008 Israeli Deputy Prime Minister Livni stated: ‘I don't believe that we have to check 
which particular organization every terrorist belongs. Hamas bears responsibility for what is happening in 
the Gaza Strip.’ Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "FM Livni Responds to No-Confidence Motion 
Submitted in the Knesset," Jerusalem: 17 March, 2008.
33 According to the International Crisis Group, by the end of 2007, 17 percent of Gaza and 35 percent of 
its agricultural land was inside the Israeli buffer zone. See: International Crisis Group, "Ruling Palestine 
I: Gaza Under Hamas," p. 2.
4 As the next section discusses, on 5 March 2008, Abbas declared that he would not continue negotiating 
until Israel and Hamas reached either a truce or a ceasefire. See: Issacharoff, A., "Jerusalem Official: 
Peace Talks May Resume as Early as Thursday," Haaretz, 5 March, 2008.
35 Ravid, B., "Abbas Rejects Talks With Hamas on Control Over Gaza-Egypt Border," Haaretz, 30 
January, 2008.
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The Gaza Ceasefire and the Israeli-Palestinian Negotiations
There will be no peace unless terror is stopped, and terror will have to be stopped 
everywhere. We made it clear to the Palestinians; they know it, and they understand 
that Gaza must be a part of the package, and that as long as there will be terror from 
Gaza it will be very, very hard to reach any peaceful understanding between us and the 
Palestinians.
- Ehud Olmert, Israeli Prime Minister (2006-2009).36
Negotiations are not an excuse to stop fighting terrorism just as terrorism is not an 
excuse to stop negotiating.
- Tzipi Livni, Israeli Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign 
Minister (2006-2009).37
For Olmert and Abbas, the key challenge of the post-Annapolis period was insulating 
the bilateral negotiations process from both the deteriorating situation in Gaza, and from 
their respective domestic political circumstances. This section demonstrates that despite 
their best efforts, these processes were ultimately inseparable.
The final status negotiations were conducted on two levels, and the topics of discussion
T O
at each meeting were deliberately kept private by both parties to the conflict; At the 
lower level, Israeli Deputy Prime Minister Livni negotiated with Palestinian officials 
Ahmed Qurei (Abu Ala) and Saeb Erekat; At the upper level, Olmert negotiated with 
Abbas.40 Both levels of negotiations addressed the final status issues dividing the 
Israelis and the Palestinians, and progressed on the basis that nothing would be 
considered agreed until everything was agreed.41
36 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Joint Press Conference With Prime Minister Olmert and President 
Bush " Jerusalem: 9 January, 2008.
37 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "FM Livni Responds to No-Confidence Motion Submitted in the 
Knesset."
On 14 January 2008 Israeli Deputy Prime Minister Livni explained the logic of this approach: "The 
ongoing negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians are not secret, but are being conducted quietly. 
Past experience proves that when negotiations are conducted in the lights of the cameras, this results in 
the adoption of more extreme positions, the distortion of what is said in the negotiating room, the raising 
of expectations, followed by disappointment and violence. Faced with a choice between headlines and 
daily drama as opposed to results - 1 choose results.’ See: Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "FM Livni 
on Negotiations with the Palestinians," Jerusalem: 14 January, 2008.
39 Documents later published in the ‘Palestinian Papers’ surrounding the negotiations during this period 
show that Israeli representatives Tal Becker and Alon Bar were also present during these meetings, as was 
Palestinian representative Salah Ilayan. See: The Palestinian Papers, "Meeting Minutes: Ahmed Qurei, 
Saeb Erekat and Tzipi Livni: 27 January 2008," Aljazeera Transparency Unit, January, 2011.
40 In a 2009 interview, Olmert noted that: ‘From the end of 2006 until the end of 2008 I think I met with 
Abu Mäzen [Abbas] more often than any Israeli leader has ever met any Arab leader. I met him more than 
35 times. They were intense, serious negotiations.’40
41 US Department of State, "Quartet Press Statement," New York City: 15 December, 2008.
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In parallel to these negotiations, both parties began to meet with the US Roadmap 
monitor, General Fraser, to discuss their progress on implementing their Phase One 
Roadmap commitments.42 As discussed previously, both parties continued to interpret 
these commitments differently, a situation exacerbated by the recent events in the 
Palestinian territories. For example, Livni noted in a 28 January 2008 meeting with 
Fraser that the Roadmap did not differentiate between different Palestinian territories, 
and that the Palestinian security reforms contained in Phase One of the Roadmap ‘must 
be applied to the Gaza Strip as well.’41 Thus, despite the increased security coordination 
between Palestinian and Israeli forces in the West Bank, Abbas was being held 
accountable for the security situation in the Gaza Strip, over which he then had no 
control.
The issue of Israeli settlements was equally problematic. As discussed previously, Phase 
One of the Roadmap called for a total settlement freeze, including natural growth within 
settlements, but the Israeli reservations to the Roadmap had rejected this 
interpretation.44 On 9 January 2008, Olmert stated that the issue of settlements in 
Jerusalem was not open to discussion, and that while his government agreed to a freeze 
on the expansion of settlements, there would be no freeze on growth within existing 
settlements 45 According to Rice, the US response was to ‘raise with the Israelis the 
importance of creating an atmosphere that is conducive to negotiations of the final 
status agreement,’ and to provide guarantees to the Palestinians that settlement activity 
would not be allowed to ‘prejudice the final status negotiations.’46
By March 2008, tensions between Hamas and Israel could no longer be quarantined 
from the negotiations process. An IDF strike in Gaza, ostensibly to foil a ‘high profile 
attack in Israel,’ prompted a barrage of rockets from Hamas, which in turn produced
42 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "FM Livni Meets with US Envoy Gen. William Fraser," Jerusalem: 
28 January, 2008.
43 Ibid.
44 The text of the Roadmap stated: ‘Consistent with the Mitchell Report, GOI freezes all settlement 
activity (including natural growth of settlements).’ See: US Department of State, "A Performance-Based 
Roadmap to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict," Washington, DC: 30 
April, 2003. The ninth Israeli reservation positioned the settlements as a final status issue that would be 
decided on through an agreement between the parties. See: Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Israel's 
Response to the Roadmap," Jerusalem: 25 May, 2003.
45 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Joint Press Conference With Prime Minister Olmert and President 
Bush ".
46 US Department of State, "Joint Press Availability with Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas," 
Ramallah: 4 May, 2008.
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further Israeli reprisals.47 For Olmert, Israeli freedom to retaliate against Hamas was 
inherent in the post-Annapolis process 48 Conversely, for Abbas, continued negotiations 
during escalating violence between Israel and fellow Palestinians had become too 
politically damaging. On 5 March 2008, he announced that he would freeze the bilateral 
process until a truce was reached in Gaza.49 On the same day, however, Abbas was 
persuaded by Rice to reverse his position, a decision met with derision by Hamas 
officials.50 Despite agreeing to continue negotiations, Abbas did not stipulate when this 
would occur. Indeed, it was not until 5 April 2008 that Olmert and Abbas were able to 
reach agreement to conduct further meetings. These meetings did not take place until 
early May.51
With Israel unwilling to ease the Gaza closure system, and Hamas unwilling (and 
possibly unable) to end rocket fire in response to that system, cross border violence 
continued. During this period, Olmert’s domestic political standing continued to 
decline, and on 17 March 2008 the Israeli Knesset tabled a motion of no confidence in 
his government53 Crucially, as domestic pressure mounted on Olmert, Livni 
increasingly took charge of the negotiations process.54
On 2 May 2008, the Quartet members issued their first statement since December 2007, 
largely in support of Rice’s upcoming trip to the Middle East, and the renewal of the 
negotiations process. The statement encouraged further advancement in the bilateral 
track, noted ‘deep concern over humanitarian conditions in Gaza,’ and urged Israel to
47 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Cabinet Communique," Jerusalem: 2 March, 2008.
4S In a meeting with his cabinet on 16 November 2008, Olmert declared that: ‘When the diplomatic 
negotiations began, we made it clear that they would not, in any way, be conducted at the expense of our 
right to defend the residents of Israel against the intolerable actions of the terrorist organizations... The 
more that Hamas is hit, the greater the chances of reaching a diplomatic agreement and peace.’ See: Ibid.
49 Issacharoff, "Jerusalem Official: Peace Talks May Resume as Early as Thursday."
50 Hamas spokesman Fawzi Barhoum criticised Abbas' reversal, stating that ‘Abu Mäzen [Abbas] is a 
weak man, who couldn't protect the Palestinian people. America and Israel don't take him into account, 
but only use him as a tool to pass their plans on the Palestinians.’ See: Ibid.
51 The Associated Press, "Erekat: Abbas, Olmert to Meet Monday to Review Negotiations," Haaretz, 5 
April, 2008.
52 A series of corruption scandals originating in Olmert’s time as the Mayor of Jerusalem from 1993-2003 
gradually came to dominate the Israeli domestic political discourse during his time as Prime Minister. 
Olmert’s credibility and standing declined accordingly, and the setbacks in the peace process 
compounded this issue. In 2012, Olmert was acquitted of two charges of corruption but convicted of 
another. A fourth trial is ongoing at the time of writing. For a summary of the key charges, see: "Ehud 
Olmert: Corruption Allegations," BBC, 24 September, 2012.
53 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "FM Livni Responds to No-Confidence Motion Submitted in the 
Knesset."
54 On 1 May 2008, she briefed the Quartet members on the state of Israeli-Palestinian discussions, and 
argued in favour of Israel’s dual strategy of combating violence in Gaza while continuing final status 
negotiations. See: Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "FM Livni Briefs World Leaders on Israel’s Stance 
on Terrorism, Negotiations," Jerusalem: 1 March, 2008.
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allow the provision of essential services to Gaza ‘without obstruction.’56 The statement 
also called for Israel to ‘freeze all settlement activity including natural growth,’ and to 
dismantle the outputs erected since March 2001.56
Quartet inactivity during the preceding period could be explained by both the active US 
role in the post-Annapolis process, and the continued divisions within the grouping 
relating to the issue of Hamas. Tellingly, on 23 April 2008, the United States announced 
that Roadmap monitor General Fraser had been appointed as the head of the United 
States Transportation Command, a position that would require him to return to the 
United States later in the year.' For the second time, official US monitoring of the 
Roadmap process was terminated after a matter of months.
On 4 May 2008, Livni responded to the Quartet statement, noting that only the 
implementation of the final status agreement would be contingent on Israel meeting its 
Roadmap requirements and that natural growth within settlements would continue in the 
meantime.58 Crucially , despite the members of the Quartet and Rice continuing to raise 
the Roadmap commitments with the parties,59 the continuation of the negotiations 
process effectively superseded these demands.60
According to Rice, it was during this visit to the region that Olmert outlined his 
intention to forge a final status agreement personally with Abbas.6' In a private dinner at 
Olmert’s residence, he had confided in Rice that while he trusted Livni:
55 US Department of State, "Quartet Statement," London: 2 May, 2008.
56 The Israeli outposts in the West Bank had yet to be dismantled, despite the insistence of Israeli leaders 
dating back to Ariel Sharon that these outposts were illegal and would be removed. On 9 January 2008 
President Bush, in a meeting with Prime Minister Olmert, stated: ‘In terms of outposts, yes, they ought to 
go. Look, I mean, we've been talking about it for four years. The agreement was, get rid of outposts, 
illegal outposts, and they ought to go.’ See: Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Joint Press Conference 
With Prime Minister Olmert and President Bush ".
57 See: Katz, Y., "US Road Map Monitor Given New Post - Back Home," The Jerusalem Post, 23 April, 
2008.
58 US Department of State, "Joint Press Availability With Israeli Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni," 
Jerusalem: 4 May, 2008.
59 On 4 May 2008 Rice noted: ‘It is my intention to continue to raise Roadmap obligations until the 
parties have met them.’ US Department of State, "Joint Press Availability with Palestinian President 
Mahmoud Abbas."
60 In response, on 15 June 2008, Rice again noted that the United States ‘will not consider these activities 
[settlements] to affect any final status negotiations, including final borders. These are to be negotiated 
between the parties in accordance with UN Security Council resolutions 242 and 338.’ See: US 
Department of State, "Remarks With Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas," Ramallah: 15 June, 2008.
61 Rice, C., No Higher Honor: A Memoir o f My Years in Washington, 1st ed. (New York: Crown 
Publishers, 2011), p. 651.
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The problem is that the peace process with Abu Ala [Qurei] isn’t going to get it done 
in time. Israel needs to get an agreement with the Palestinians before you leave office.
I want to do it directly with Abu Mäzen [Abbas] .62
According to Rice, it was clear from their conversation that Olmert had not discussed 
this plan with Livni63 and the next day she met privately with Abbas to brief him on the 
situation, and to secure his cooperation with Olmert’s plan.64 Importantly, one of 
Olmert’s key requests of Rice was that:
...you won’t surprise me by offering other ideas before we’ve had a chance to talk 
about them. I’m taking an enormous risk here, and I can’t be blindsided by the United 
States. 65
In the period that followed, US officials, aided by their Quartet partners, sought to give 
political coverage to both Olmert and Abbas in order to support their secret discussions. 
Crucially, US officials were aware of Olmert’s prominent domestic political scandals 
during this period, but had decided to ‘ignore the storm clouds and work with the Prime 
Minister until it was no longer possible to do so .’66 Furthermore, Rice had decided to 
‘intensify my work with Abu Ala and Tzipi to see if we could sync the two negotiating 
tracks -  or at least get them closer.’67
Consequently, the trilateral meetings between US, Israeli and Palestinian representatives 
in early May were followed by further efforts to bolster the West Bank government 68 
During this period, without mentioning the private process now being carried out 
between himself and Olmert, Abbas noted that the negotiations process had become a
62 Ibid.
63 As Rice noted: ‘I started to ask about the relationship between what he was proposing and what Tzipi 
[Livni] was doing. I felt kind of awkward, because it was pretty clear that he hadn’t told her what he was 
telling me.’ See: Ibid.
64 The exact nature of Olmert’s offer to Abbas will be the focus of the next section. According to Rice’s 
account, Olmert had suggested initially that each leader appoint a trusted official to help draft the 
agreement, but Abbas had insisted that he conduct the negotiations with Olmert personally. See: Ibid., p. 
653.
65 Ibid., p. 651.
66 Ibid., p. 655.
67 Ibid.
6K On 13 May 2008, Quartet Representative Tony Blair announced an easing of restrictions on 
construction in the West Bank, and the extension of the opening hours of the Allenby Bridge, and on 21- 
23 May 2008, a Palestinian investment conference was held in Bethlehem that culminated in the 
announcement of $1.4 billion in funding for the Palestinian Authority. See: International Crisis Group, 
"Ruling Palestine II: The West Bank Model?," p. 19.
In addition, Rice continued to highlight the leadership credentials of Abbas. On 4 May 2008, she repeated 
several times that ‘President Abbas is the elected president of all Palestinians.’ See: US Department of 
State, "Joint Press Availability with Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas."
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race against time 69 Despite the urgency of the negotiations, however, the parties had 
reportedly yet to begin drafting an actual agreement.70 Upon her return from the Middle 
East, Rice was adamant that the negotiations process was moving forward in a ‘serious’ 
manner,71 and was mindful of the fact that the secret negotiations were making 
progress.72
On 19 June 2008, the negotiations process was given a further boost by the conclusion 
of a ‘calm’ agreement between Israel and Hamas, reached under Egyptian auspices after 
months of negotiations. Crucially, however, the specifics of the agreement remained 
private and informal, and both parties interpreted their commitments differently.74 
According to Egyptian sources, the broad outlines of the agreement were:
...the immediate cessation of hostile activities; a limited increase in the amount of 
goods entering Gaza after three days; and, after ten days, the crossings to be open for 
all products except materials used in the manufacture of projectiles and explosives. 
After three weeks, the two sides were to commence negotiations for a prisoner 
exchange and the opening of the Rafah crossing.7^
The Israeli interpretation of the agreement, however, stated that the easing of border 
restrictions was contingent upon a total cessation of rocket fire by all factions in Gaza,76
69 On 4 May 2008, Abbas declared that: ‘We are racing with time in our negotiations. It’s like marathon 
negotiations. We know that the time is very short, but the negotiations that we are conducting are almost 
on a daily basis, almost on an hourly basis whether with the Israeli side or, as you've noticed, mostly with 
the American administration because everybody is showing a serious commitment towards that.’ See: US 
Department of State, "Joint Press Availability with Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas."
70 According to Abbas, ‘not one single letter had been written yet,’ but if the parties were able to reach 
agreement, then ’90 percent’ of the work would have been completed, and the final drafting process 
would not be difficult. See: Ibid.
71 Rice noted during a press conference following discussions with the parties: ‘...a lot of analysts aren't 
in the room with these people when they talk about what it is they're actually doing. I was with them for 
two-and-a-half hours. I know how seriously they're negotiating. But they're not going to come out and 
talk in front of the cameras about what it is they're doing. And if they did, the negotiations would be dead 
on that day.’ See: US Department of State, "Press Briefing by Secretary Rice Aboard Air Force One," En 
Route Andrews Air Force Base, Maryland: 18 May, 2008.
72 Rice's later account of the meeting and the press conference illustrated the double-act she was 
performing at this time: ‘After meeting with Abu Ala and Tzipi, I could only point obliquely to the 
‘seriousness’ of the parties. Indeed they were methodically going through the issues and coming to 
agreement on a few -  some of consequence, including the need to negotiate on the basis of the 1967 line 
with agreed swaps (and, as Tzipi always added, taking into account the population realities on the ground, 
meaning the settlements). I could, of course, say even less about what Olmert and Abbas were doing. I 
swallowed my pride as pundits held forth about the empty Annapolis process. Keep your head in the 
game and your ego in check, I told myself. They don’t know what they’re talking about.’ Rice, No Higher 
Honor: A Memoir of My Years in Washington, p. 656.
73 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Humanitarian Assistance to Gaza From 27 Feb 2008 Escalation up 
to 19 June Calm Understanding," Jerusalem: 18 June, 2008.
74 For an in-depth discussion of this process, see: International Crisis Group, "Ending the War in Gaza," 
p. 17.
75 International Crisis Group, "Round Two in Gaza," p. 12.
76 As Deputy Israeli Prime Minister Livni noted, Israel would regard any rocket fire originating from 
Gaza to be the responsibility of Hamas: ‘We have one address in Gaza, and that is Hamas. We will not
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the end of the smuggling trade, and the safe return of captured Israeli soldier Gilad 
Shalit.77 Consequently, in the six months that followed the ‘calm’ agreement, sporadic 
rocket fire continued, and the Israeli closure system remained, with both sides claiming 
that the other had violated the agreement.78 In essence, the conditions that had 
necessitated a ceasefire in the first place had remained unresolved, and tensions 
mounted in the period that followed.
On 24 June 2008, the members of the Quartet met on the margins of the ‘Berlin 
Conference in Support of Palestinian Civil Security and the Rule of Law.’79 The 
conference had been designed to provide international support for civil security 
mechanisms in the West Bank, and was prepared jointly by Germany, the Netherlands, 
and the United Kingdom.80 The Quartet statement expressed ‘continuing support for 
Egyptian efforts to restore calm to Gaza and southern Israel,’ and welcomed ‘the period 
of calm that began on June 19.’ Furthermore, the Quartet members reaffirmed their 
support for the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations process, and ‘stressed the urgent need for 
tangible progress towards the shared goal of an agreement by the end of 2008...,82
Importantly, the 2008 deadline for reaching a final status agreement now not only 
coincided with the end of the Bush Administration, but also with the end of the Israel- 
Hamas ‘calm’ agreement. Compounding this situation further, Olmert, under the cloud 
of criminal investigations into his personal conduct, had recently announced that he 
would step down from the leadership in September 2008. With Abbas’ term due to 
expire in January 2009, the period of negotiations that followed were both urgent and 
politically problematic.
check who fires a Kassam rocket. Responsibility rests with Hamas.’ See: Israel Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, "FM Livni: We Will Not Accept a Period of Calm Used to Re-arm," Jerusalem: 18 June, 2008.
77 See: Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Behind the Headlines: Rocket and Mortar Fire Despite Calm in 
the South," Jerusalem,: 10 December, 2008.
78 Overall, there was still a dramatic reduction in the number of rockets fired during this period than in the 
preceding period. According to Israeli sources, in the six months between the ‘calm’ agreement and 
Operation Cast Lead, 362 rockets were fired from Gaza into Southern Israel. This was in contrast to the 
2,278 rockets fired in the in the preceding period. See: Ibid.
79 It is noteworthy that a successful ceasefire agreement between Israel and Hamas had been concluded 
five days before a scheduled international conference designed to strengthen Palestinian security 
capabilities in the West Bank. As the Quartet statement noted, the conference had been a ‘timely forum.’ 
See: US Department of State, "Quartet Statement."
80 European Union Parliament, "Berlin Conference in Support of Palestinian Civil Security and the Rule 
of Law," Berlin,: 24 June, 2008.
81 US Department of State, "Quartet Statement."
82 Ibid.
87 See: Dawar, A., "Q&A: Ehud Olmert Corruption Inquiry," The Guardian, 30 May, 2008.
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Prime Minister Olmert’s Peace Deal
Today’s context—political, practical, and most of all psychological —may be what is 
pushing Abbas and Olmert toward a solution, but it also is what may doom it. Olmert 
and Abbas almost certainly lack the requisite authority and backing to negotiate a 
historic compromise.
- Robert Malley and Hussein Agha.84
On 16 September 2008, Olmert offered Abbas the outlines of a final status agreement,
85and asked him to sign on the spot. Abbas refused, and the following day Olmert was 
replaced by Tzipi Livni as the leader of Kadima.86 This section argues that Olmert’s 
impending political demise accelerated his moves to conclude a final status agreement, 
but also undercut his ability to guarantee its implementation. Consequently, for Abbas, 
both the delayed nature of a ‘shelf agreement’ and the certainty of Olmert’s departure 
meant that any compromises the two reached would leave him politically exposed. In 
essence, both the circumstances in which the offer was presented and the specifics of 
the offer itself contributed to its failure.
For the members of the Quartet, the options for meaningful involvement within this 
context were limited, and ‘support for the negotiations process’ remained the modus
on
operandi. In the aftermath of Olmert’s unsuccessful offer, however, the members of
the Quartet moved swiftly to preserve the bilateral process and to lay the foundations for
88a possible deal between Livni and Abbas.
In the lead up to Olmert’s offer, the two tracks of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations had 
diverged further. According to Israeli officials, the tense relationship between Olmert 
and Livni, and Olmert’s desire to conclude an agreement with Abbas at all costs, led to
OQ
the complete cessation of coordination between the two negotiations teams.
Reportedly, when Olmert eventually presented Abbas with his outline on 16 September, 
he had not discussed the move with Livni.90
84 Malley and Agha, "Into the Lion's Den."
8s Sheridan, G., "Ehud Olmert Still Dreams of Peace," The Australian, 28 November, 2009.
86 Ravid, B., "Olmert Formally Submits his Resignation to Peres," Haaretz, 21 September, 2008.
87 According to UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon, during this period the Quartet was ‘re-invigorated,’ 
and had ‘come together in support of the bilateral negotiations conducted by Israel and the Palestinians.’ 
See: United Nations Security Council, "Report of the Secretary General on the Question of Palestine," 
United Nations: A/63/368-S/2008/612: 22 September, 2008, p. 12.
88 This period of Quartet activity is the focus of the subsequent section.
89 International Crisis Group, "Tipping Point? The Palestinians and the Search for a New Strategy," Crisis 
Group Middle East Report 95: 26 April, 2010, p. 5.
90 Ibid.
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Olmert had attempted to bolster his offer in August 2008 with the announcement of the 
release of 200 Palestinian prisoners as a gesture of ‘goodwill.’91 When he met with 
Abbas on 16 September 2008, he presented several maps and a summary of his key 
positions on the final status issues 92 Crucially, Olmert’s offer was neither technical nor 
detailed, but rather a series of positions on which a final agreement could theoretically 
be based. According to Rice’s account, relayed to her by Olmert, Abbas refused to sign 
any agreement until he consulted with his experts, and Olmert did not permit him to 
take any documents. According to Olmert, when the two leaders left the meeting:
He (Abbas) promised me the next day his adviser would come. But the next day Saeb
Erekat rang my adviser and said we forgot we are going to Amman today, let's make it
next week. I never saw him again.94
As the meeting itself was both private and unrecorded, the exact nature of Olmert’s 
offer and Abbas’ refusal remains unverified. However, subsequent accounts from both 
leaders confirmed that a number of factors contributed to the failure of this process. In 
essence, these factors related to both the manner of the offer, and the substance of the 
offer.
First, timing was a key factor for both leaders. With leadership changes nearing in both 
the United States and Israel, Olmert's offer was presented as ‘final,’ and provided little 
room for Abbas to negotiate specifics.95 With both Olmert and Bush essentially ‘lame 
ducks,’ the scope for implementation was also narrow.96 According to Abbas, had more 
time been built into the process, further negotiations might have yielded results.97
Second, and interrelated, Olmert’s offer lacked political credibility. According to Israeli 
officials, Palestinian representatives were warned by Livni that Olmert was in no 
position to deliver on his commitments, and that any deal should be concluded with her
91 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Notification on the Release of Palestinian Prisoners," Jerusalem: 18 
August, 2008.
92 "PA President Abbas, Interview with Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, Ramallah, 22 December 2009 (excerpts)," 
Journal of Palestine Studies 39, no. 3 (2010).
93 Rice, No Higher Honor: A Memoir of My Years in Washington, p. 723.
94 Sheridan, "Ehud Olmert Still Dreams of Peace."
95 Ibid.
96 Rice noted: ‘Olmert had announced in the summer that he would step down as Prime Minister. Israel 
would hold elections in the first part of the next year [20091. He was a lame duck, and so was the 
President [Bush].' See: Rice, No Higher Honor: A Memoir of My Years in Washington, p. 723.
97 In an interview on 22 December 2009, Abbas noted that: ‘I believe it would have been possible that I 
go up a little and he comes down a little. It was possible to find a solution.’ See: "PA President Abbas, 
Interview with Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, Ramallah, 22 December 2009 (excerpts)."
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once she was Prime Minister.9* This account was supported subsequently by Rice, who 
noted that ‘Abbas was told by numerous Israelis, including some of Olmert’s closest 
advisors, that the lame-duck Prime Minister did not have the legitimacy to deliver the 
deal.’99
Political credibility was also a factor for Abbas, whose ‘extra constitutional’ 
government was combating not only Hamas in Gaza but also the growing perception 
that the West Bank administration was beholden to Israel and the United States. As 
Malley and Agha noted, by the time of Olmert’s offer, Abbas spoke as ‘President of a 
hollow Palestinian Authority and chairman of a ghostly Palestinian Liberation 
Organisation.’100
Finally, inseparable from the political constraints shaping both Olmert’s offer and 
Abbas’ response were the difficulties of the specifics of the proposal itself. Indeed, even 
divorced from the context in which these details were presented, they remained 
problematic. The issues of territory, refugees, and security were particularly divisive.101
On the issue of territory, Olmert offered Abbas approximately 94 percent of the West 
Bank as it then existed, with the remaining six percent (composed of Israeli settlements) 
to become part of Israel. ‘ In return, Olmert offered a corresponding ‘swap of land [to 
the Palestinians] from Israel as it existed before 1967.' According to Abbas, these 
swaps would have created a Palestinian territory directly equivalent in size to that 
contained by the pre-1967 borders.104 Equal dimensions, however, failed to nullify 
Palestinian concerns regarding the viability of their future territory. Specifically, the 
incorporation of Israeli settlements in the West Bank into the state of Israel eroded the
9X International Crisis Group, "Tipping Point? The Palestinians and the Search for a New Strategy," p. 5.
99 Rice, No Higher Honor: A Memoir of My Years in Washington, p. 724.
100 Malley and Agha, "Into the Lion's Den."
101 Olmert’s proposal on Jerusalem received very little criticism from Abbas in the aftermath of the 
breakdown of the negotiations process. According to Olmert’s account, he offered Abbas a shared capital 
in Jerusalem, with the Israelis administering the West, and Palestinians administering the East. The 
municipal control o f Jerusalem would be proportional to population, with an Israeli mayor and Palestinian 
deputy. Finally, the so-called ‘holy basin’, composed of sites o f religious significance to both Israelis and 
Palestinians, would be administered by a committee of representatives from Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Israel, 
Palestine and the United States. See: Sheridan, "Ehud Olmert Still Dreams of Peace."
102 Rice, No Higher Honor: A Memoir of My Years in Washington, p. 651.
103 Sheridan, "Ehud Olmert Still Dreams of Peace."
104 Abbas noted in an interview after the offer that ‘[Olmert] said 100 percent. He would take from this 
side, and I would take from that side. He presented maps to me. The maps included that he would take the 
settlements blocs (in the West Bank) in exchange for territories in the north, west, and south of the West 
Bank, in addition to territories to the east of Gaza.’ See: "PA President Abbas, Interview with Al-Sharq 
Al-Awsat, Ramallah, 22 December 2009 (excerpts)."
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territorial contiguity of the future Palestinian state.105 As Abbas noted, ‘I cannot subject 
my people to an Israeli state and a Palestinian canton.’106 Furthermore, the notion of 
conceding Palestinian territory to Israeli settlers was politically problematic for 
Abbas.107
Olmert’s position on the issue of Palestinian refugees was also challenging for Abbas.108 
According to Olmert, while a compensation fund would be established for Palestinian 
refugees:
I told [Abbas] I would never agree to a right of return. Instead, we would agree on a 
humanitarian basis to accept a certain number every year for five years, on the basis 
that this would be the end of conflict and the end of claims. I said to him 1000 per
109year.
Given the political significance of Palestinian refugee mythologies, the size of the 
Palestinian Diaspora and Abbas’ domestic legitimacy problem within the Palestinian 
territories, Olmert’s refugee formulation was politically unfeasible for the Palestinian 
president. Indeed, when Rice informed Abbas about Olmert’s offer in May 2008, he 
immediately responded that ‘I can’t tell four million Palestinians that only five thousand 
of them can go home.’110 While it may be possible that the two leaders, under different 
circumstances, might have negotiated new totals based on the same template, Olmert’s 
fixed offer on 16 September 2008 proved to be unacceptable for Abbas.
Finally, the security elements of Olmert’s proposal were reportedly both 
underdeveloped and unpopular with Palestinian representatives.111 Specifically, the deal 
called for a demilitarised Palestinian state, in which Israel retained control over borders 
and airspace. “ Abbas argued that Israel could not have control as well as peace, and
105 Exemplifying this notion was Olmert’s proposal to join the West Bank to the Gaza Strip with a tunnel 
that would be administered by Palestinians but remain Israeli territory. See: Sheridan, "Ehud Olmert Still 
Dreams of Peace."
106 Abbas, M., "Israel and Palestine Can Still Achieve Peace," The Wall Street Journal, 19 September, 
2008.
107 In an op-ed for the Wall Street Journal, Abbas noted that: ‘[Israel] cannot perpetually and illegally 
build settlements in the West Bank, particularly in East Jerusalem, and then argue it must keep that 
territory because of the existing facts on the ground.’ See: Ibid.
108 In his conversation with Rice in May 2008 Olmert noted that the program could not be called ‘family 
reunification,’ because ‘they have too many cousins; we won’t be able to control it.’ See: Rice, No Higher 
Honor: A Memoir of My Years in Washington, p. 651.
109 Sheridan, "Ehud Olmert Still Dreams of Peace."
110 Rice, No Higher Honor: A Memoir of My Years in Washington, p. 653.
111 International Crisis Group, "Tipping Point? The Palestinians and the Search for a New Strategy," p. 4.
112 According to Abbas, the key to his discussions with Olmert about security measures was the 
involvement and approval of the United States: ‘First I suggested NATO and Olmert said the Americans 
wouldn't agree. Then I proposed the European Union and he explained that they couldn't. Then we agreed
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1 1 ^later stated that ‘partial freedom is a contradiction in terms.’ ' Conversely, for Olmert, 
Israel’s security requirements were paramount, and in his conversation with Rice, he 
noted that:
I can sell this deal, but not if the IDF says it will undermine Israel’s security. That’s 
the one thing no prime minister can survive. 114
Thus, with disagreement between two weakened leaders over substantive issues, and no 
time to develop the proposal further, the 16 September offer ultimately failed. The 
following day, Olmert was removed as Kadima leader, and on 21 September 2008, he 
announced his intention to resign as Israeli Prime Minister upon the formation of a new 
governing coalition by Livni.11^ Olmert’s resignation reflected his diminished standing 
in Israel after the 2006 Lebanon war, which had been compounded by both his handling 
of the Palestinian issue and his response to the global financial crisis.116 Despite being 
unable to reach a final status agreement with Abbas, Olmert contested the subsequent 
notion that the post-Annapolis negotiations were comparable to the Camp David 
process of 2000.“ ' As Malley and Agha noted, however, comparisons between the two 
processes were unavoidable, and for Abbas the episode was politically damaging:
After months of talks, Abbas declined a far more concessive Israeli proposal—on the 
size of the territory for Palestinians, for example—than the one Yasser Arafat turned 
down eight years ago and for which the then Palestinian leader was excoriated as an 
implacable enemy of peace.us
Indeed, in the period that followed Olmert’s offer, a political narrative emerged in 
Israeli politics in which Abbas’ refusal exemplified the notion of Palestinian 
rejectionism, which was used to discredit the very notion of negotiations. Furthermore, 
as details of Olmert’s offer continued to surface, future final status negotiations were 
confronted with a post-Annapolis reality: any Israeli leader that offered more than
to the presence of UNIFIL, led by the Americans. President Bush agreed to that, the Egyptians agreed and 
[Israel] agreed.’ See: Issacharoff, A., "Abbas to Haaretz: Peace Possible in 6 Months if Israel Freezes All 
Settlements," 16 December, 2009.
113 Abbas, "Israel and Palestine Can Still Achieve Peace."
114 Rice, No Higher Honor: A Memoir of My Years in Washington, p. 651.
115 In the Israeli political system, losing the leadership of one’s own party does not automatically remove 
one from the position of Prime Minister. It does, however, create a powerful political obligation to resign 
from this position as soon as possible. See: Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Remarks by President 
Peres Following Resignation of P.M. Olmert," Jerusalem: 21 September, 2008.
116 Ravid, "Olmert Formally Submits his Resignation to Peres."
117 On 28 November 2009 Olmert argued that: ‘The two are not alike. Yasser Arafat never wanted to 
make peace with Israel. Yasser Arafat was a murderer and a terrorist and remained so until the last day of 
his life. Abu Mäzen [Abbas] wants peace.’ See: Sheridan, "Ehud Olmert Still Dreams of Peace."
1 lx Malley, R. and Agha, H., "Obama and the Middle East," The New York Review of Books, 11 June, 
2009.
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Olmert and any Palestinian leader that accepted less than Abbas would appear weak by 
comparison.
Preserving the Annapolis Process
While I was disappointed that the Israelis and Palestinians could not finalise an 
agreement, I was pleased with the progress we had made. Eight years earlier, I had 
taken office during a raging intifada, with Yasser Arafat running the Palestinian 
authority, Israeli leaders committed to a Greater Israel policy and Arab nations 
complaining from the sidelines. By the time I left, the Palestinians had a president and 
prime minister who rejected terrorism. The Israelis had withdrawn from some 
settlements and supported a two-state solution. Arab nations were playing an active 
role in the peace process.
- George W. Bush, United States President (2001-2009).119
...there are a lot easier ways to build a legacy than to try to solve the Palestinian- 
Israeli issue.
- Condoleezza Rice, United States Secretary of State (2005- 
2009).120
In the midst of political uncertainty in both the United States and Israel, the members of 
the Quartet sought to codify the bilateral negotiations process, and to preserve the 
diplomatic momentum of the previous year. These efforts culminated in a 16 December 
2008 UN Security Council Resolution that declared the bilateral negotiations to be 
‘irreversible.’121 Ultimately, however, both the breakdown in the Hamas-Israel ceasefire 
and the electoral defeat of Tzipi Livni contributed to the abandonment of the post- 
Annapolis process.
Efforts to enshrine recent developments in the bilateral track were initially led by Rice, 
who sought to make the details of Olmert’s offer public. According to Rice, however, 
she was dissuaded by Tzipi Livni, who argued that Olmert ‘had no standing in Israel,’ 
and that any offer associated with his Prime Ministership would be politically 
unpopular.122 Consequently, the subsequent US and international strategy was to 
enshrine the process rather than the outcomes of the post-Annapolis bilateral 
negotiations.
119 Bush, G. W., Decision Points, 1st ed. (New York: Crown Publishers, 2010), p. 410.
120 US Department of State, "Press Conference by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice," Washington, 
DC: 21 December, 2007.
121 United Nations Security Council, "Resolution 1850: The Situation in the Middle East, Including the 
Palestinian Question," S/RES/1850: 16 December, 2008.
122 Rice, No Higher Honor: A Memoir of My Years in Washington, p. 723.
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On 26 September 2008, the Quartet members announced that Rice and Quartet 
representative Tony Blair had briefed them on the recent outcomes of the bilateral 
process and the situation on the ground in the West Bank respectively. ' Noting the 
‘significance’ of the negotiations process and the importance of ‘confidentiality in order 
to preserve its integrity,’ the statement announced that the parties to the conflict would 
update the Quartet members at their next meeting.124 Tellingly, in the press conference 
following the Quartet meeting, Tony Blair noted that ‘the last thing anyone should ever 
be in this situation is foolishly optimistic.’125
Indeed, during this period, Livni was attempting to form a coalition government amid 
strong resistance in the Israeli Knesset from Likud leader Benjamin Netanyahu, and on 
26 October 2008, she declared that she was unable to do so.126 Consequently, Ehud 
Olmert announced that he would remain the Israeli Prime Minister until the general 
elections were held in January 2009. In the period that followed, Israel was led by a 
discredited and unpopular Prime Minister, while the future of the negotiations process 
relied on the electoral success of his deputy.
Complicating this situation was the deterioration of the ceasefire agreement between 
Israel and Hamas. On 4 November, the IDF conducted a military incursion into Gaza to 
destroy a tunnel allegedly intended for abducting of Israeli soldiers. “ Hamas responded 
with a barrage of rocket fire, and between 4 and 30 November 138 rockets and 153 
mortars were launched from Gaza into Southern Israel.129 Israel argued that Hamas had 
been using the ceasefire to amass a more powerful and longer range arsenal, and Hamas
1 TOargued that the Israeli blockade was slowly killing the people of Gaza.
In the midst of increasing regional tensions, on 5 November 2008, Barack Obama was 
elected as the next President of the United States. Four days later, the members of the
123 US Department of State, "Quartet Press Availability," New York City: 26 September, 2008.
124 The 26 September 2008 Quartet statement also included reiterations of the Quartet’s recent position on 
the Israeli settlement process, and the need for the normalisation of the movement of people and goods 
into the Gaza Strip. See: US Department of State, "Quartet Statement."
125 US Department of State, "Quartet Press Availability."
126 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "FM Livni to President Peres: Not Able to Form a Government," 
Jerusalem: 26 October, 2008.
127 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Address by PM Olmert at Opening of Knesset Winter Session," 
Jerusalem: 27 October, 2008.
128 International Crisis Group, "Ending the War in Gaza," p. 4.
129 Of the 329 rockets fired from Gaza into Israel during the ceasefire, the period following 4 November 
accounted for 291. See: United Nations Security Council, "Report of the Secretary General on the 
Question of Palestine," United Nations: A/64/351-S/2009/464: 15 September, 2009, p. 17.
130 International Crisis Group, "Ending the War in Gaza," p. 1.
244
Chapter Eight: The Post-Annapolis Period, 2008-2010
Quartet met with Abbas and Livni in Sharm el-Sheikh.131 This meeting was the first 
time that the parties to the conflict had directly briefed the members of the Quartet, and 
the subsequent Quartet statement was an attempt at cementing the post-Annapolis 
process in the aftermath of both the US and Israeli elections. On 9 November 2008, 
the Quartet declared that the parties had reached a ‘mutual understanding on the 
principles governing their negotiating process.’ Specifically, these principles were:
The need for continuous, uninterrupted, direct, bilateral negotiations;
The principle that nothing would be considered agreed until everything is agreed;
The need to reach a comprehensive agreement addressing all issues, as agreed at 
Annapolis, rather than just announce agreement on selected items in isolation.133
For their part, the Quartet members expressed ‘commitment to the irreversibility of the 
bilateral negotiations,’ and ‘emphasized the importance of the continuity of the peace 
process.’134 Interrelated to the process was the parties’ adherence to their Roadmap 
commitments, which would continue to determine the implementation of any future 
agreement (as judged by the United States). In a direct reference to the incoming 
Obama Administration, Quartet representative Tony Blair noted that:
The single most important thing is that the new administration in the United States 
grips this issue from day one. And it can do so knowing that there is a foundation upon 
which we can build.136
After the Quartet meeting, Rice noted that while the ‘aspirational deadline’ of reaching 
a final status agreement by the end of 2008 had helped to stimulate a ‘sense of urgency’ 
in the parties to the conflict, ultimately, the political circumstances had ‘intervened.’137
In the weeks following the 9 November Quartet statement, the security situation in Gaza 
continued to unravel.138 Within this context, the Quartet members met on 15 December
131 US Department of State, "Quartet Press Statement."
132 US Department of State, "Remarks After the Quartet Meeting," Sharm el-Sheikh: 9 November, 2008. 
On 7 November, Rice called this Quartet meeting ‘unprecedented.’ See: US Department of State, 
"Remarks With Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas."
133 US Department of State, "Quartet Press Statement."
134 Ibid.
135 Ibid.
136 US Department of State, "Remarks After the Quartet Meeting."
137 US Department of State, "Remarks With Palestinian Prime Minister Salam Fayyad," Jenin: 8 
November, 2008.
138 On 11 November, Ehud Olmert declared that the situation between Hamas and Israel was that ‘before 
an unavoidable crash,’ and that it was merely a question of ‘when’ not ‘if’. See: Israel Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, "PM Olmert: Clash with Hamas Unavoidable," Jerusalem: 11 November, 2008.
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2008 and issued a statement condemning the recent ‘indiscriminate attacks on Israel,’ 
and calling for an ‘immediate cessation of violence.’ Tellingly, the Quartet members 
also urged Israel to reverse the recent tightening of its Gaza blockade, and to allow for 
an increase in the provision of humanitarian supplies.140 Ultimately, however, the 
purpose of this Quartet meeting was to announce the imminent passage of a UN 
Security Council Resolution on the Annapolis Process. According to UN Secretary 
General Ban Ki-Moon, the resolution had been ‘conceived by the Russian Federation,’ 
with the other members of the Quartet acting in support, and its purpose was to ‘put the 
international community on record in believing in the irreversibility of the Annapolis
, 141process.
Indeed, UNSCR 1850, passed on 18 December, encouraged the ‘Quartet’s ongoing 
work,’ and declared the ‘the irreversibility of the bilateral negotiations.’142 It supported 
the parties’ ‘agreed principles for the bilateral negotiating process,’ which ‘confirm the 
seriousness of the Annapolis process,’ and urged the parties to meet the requirements of 
the first phase of the Roadmap.143 Finally, the resolution called on the international 
community to support the Palestinian state-building project.144
The members of the Quartet had pursued collective action through the UN Security 
Council in an effort to protect the structures established in the post-Annapolis period 
from both political upheaval and regional violence. Ultimately, however, the post- 
Annapolis process could be protected from neither. On 18 December 2008, the six 
month Israel-Hamas ceasefire in Gaza ended officially, and on 24 December Israel’s 
security ministers approved military action to ‘bring about a long-term cessation of the
By 16 November Olmert had instructed his Defense Minister Ehud Barak to submit proposals for an 
‘action plan’ to ‘restore full quiet in the South.’ See: Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Cabinet 
Communique."
On 7 December, amid continuing rocket fire from Gaza, Olmert noted that the Israeli response to the 
situation would not ‘show restraint.’ Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Cabinet Communique."
139 US Department of State, "Quartet Press Statement."
140 Ibid.
141 US Department of State, "Remarks with Quartet Members," New York City: 15 December, 2008.
142 United Nations Security Council, "Resolution 1850: The Situation in the Middle East, Including the 
Palestinian Question."
143 Ibid.
144 Specifically, the resolution stated that the international community should support a ‘...Palestinian 
government that is committed to the Quartet principles and the Arab Peace Initiative and respects the 
commitments of the Palestinian Liberation Organization, to assist in the development of the Palestinian 
economy, to maximize the resources available to the Palestinian Authority, and to contribute to the 
Palestinian institution-building program in preparation for statehood.’ See: Ibid.
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rocket fire and terror attacks originating in Gaza.’14:1 The following day, Livni placed a 
courtesy call to outgoing Secretary of State Rice to inform her of the imminent Israeli 
offensive in Gaza.146 On 27 December 2008, the IDF launched operation ‘Cast Lead’ in 
the Gaza Strip, and the post-Annapolis process was buried in the rubble.
2009: Operation Cast Lead and Political Deadlock
[President Obama] wants to see a stop to settlements — not some settlements, not 
outposts, not ‘natural growth’ exceptions. That is our position. That is what we have 
communicated very clearly.
- Hillary Clinton, United States Secretary of State (2009-
2013).147
I don't quite understand the American approach. Every new president believes they 
have to start from square one. If they're lucky they last for eight years, and by the end 
there is almost peace. But the new administration then starts anew, because they 
always know best.
- Ehud Olmert, Israeli Prime Minister (2006-2009).148
The damage to the Israeli-Palestinian bilateral relationship caused by Operation Cast 
Lead has yet to be fully repaired. The three-week Israeli incursion into Gaza effectively 
ended the negotiations process, and in the year that followed Israeli and Palestinian 
leaders met face to face only once.149 The perceived failures of the Annapolis period 
were compounded by the destruction of Cast Lead, which led the parties to the conflict 
to re-evaluate the paradigms of the peace process itself, and Israeli and Palestinian 
hesitancy to resume negotiations in the absence of guarantees on issues of domestic 
political importance. Specifically, Palestinians argued that ongoing Israeli settlement 
construction in the West Bank nullified the outcomes of any future bilateral negotiations 
process, and must be halted entirely before talks could resume. Additionally, Israelis 
argued that their deep-seated concerns about the future legitimacy and viability of 
Israel, exemplified by discussions of the ‘Jewish’ character of the state, needed to be 
addressed publicly by the Palestinian leadership prior to the resumption of talks.
145 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Decision of Minister's Committee on National Security,"
Jerusalem: 24 December, 2008.
146 According to Rice, the purpose of the call was to give the US pre-warning: ‘the Israelis never asked for 
permission, and we never gave it.’ See: Rice, No Higher Honor: A Memoir o f My Years in Washington, p. 
725.
147 Landler, M., "Israeli Settlement Growth Must Stop, Clinton Says," The New York Times, 27 May,
2009.
14S Sheridan, "Ehud Olmert Still Dreams of Peace."
149 Under strong US pressure, President Abbas and Prime Minister Netanyahu met in September 2009 on 
the margins of the United Nations General Assembly. Importantly, this meeting was part of ongoing 
attempts to restart negotiations, and was not followed by further face-to-face contact.
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This predicament was compounded by the introduction of new political administrations 
in Israel and the United States. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and President 
Barack Obama both inherited the consequences of Operation Cast Lead, and both 
sought to forge new approaches to the Middle East peace process that distinguished 
them from their predecessors. Consequently, an active and engaged US Administration 
was paired with a wary and defiant Israeli Administration.
Throughout 2009, the members of the Quartet struggled to react to these developments, 
issuing only two statements.150 With the parties unwilling to meet, and with new US 
envoy George Mitchell working exclusively on re-establishing bilateral connections, the 
non-US members of the Quartet were again largely sidelined from the process. In 
essence, the diminished output of the grouping reflected both the degradation of the 
Israeli-Palestinian relationship and the dominant efforts of the United States to repair it.
Operation Cast Lead
[Operation Cast Lead! proved, if proof were still needed, that President Mahmoud 
Abbas cannot continue to talk peace with Israel when Israel is at war with Palestinians 
and that Palestinians cannot make peace with Israel when they are at war with 
themselves.
- Robert Malley and Hussein Agha.15'
Operation Cast Lead had severe political, social and economic ramifications for the 
population of Gaza, and was politically damaging for Israel. The conflict severely 
damaged the Israeli-Palestinian bilateral relationship at the leadership level, and further 
entrenched the Palestinian domestic division. For the members of the Quartet, Cast Lead 
was a difficult and divisive issue, and the legal and political legacy of the operation 
affected the work of the grouping. Ultimately, the Gaza conflict was the culmination of 
years of Israeli and Palestinian frustration, which only increased in the subsequent 
period.
Operation Cast Lead arose directly from the deficiencies of the June 2007 Israel-Hamas 
ceasefire. In the six months following the unofficial ‘calm’ agreement, Israel’s blockade 
of Gaza continued undiminished, Hamas increased its arsenal of rockets and mortars 
and rocket fire into Southern Israel decreased but did not cease. The ambiguous 
nature of the ceasefire resulted in both parties feeling aggrieved throughout, and neither
150 These statements were on 26 June 2009 and 24 September 2009.
151 Malley and Agha, "Obama and the Middle East."
152 International Crisis Group, "Ending the War in Gaza," p. 1.
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desiring a further extension of the prevailing conditions. When the ceasefire lapsed in 
December 2007, and with neither party willing to renegotiate, open conflict over 
unresolved issues eventuated. For Hamas, the seemingly indefinite continuation of the 
Israeli blockade left few options but violent retaliation. ' For Israel, easing the 
blockade in the midst of increasing security concerns was equally problematic, and 
ongoing rocket fire was a psychological and physical threat that had reached levels that 
were no longer tolerable. When the ceasefire lapsed, Israel saw an opportunity to reduce 
the operational capacity of Hamas in Gaza, and Hamas saw an opportunity for raising 
its domestic and regional profile by openly defying Israel. The goals of both actors 
determined the events that followed.
The mistakes of the 2006 Lebanon war informed the IDF strategy in Gaza.154 According 
to Defence Minister Barak, the target lists and strategic planning for the Gaza incursion 
had taken place over months, and ‘when we embarked on the operation, we did what we 
had to do.’155 Furthermore, after facing strong criticism for the maximalist objectives of 
the 2006 Lebanon war, the objectives for Operation Cast Lead were deliberately 
restrained.156 Indeed, the official goals of the operation were:
...to deal a heavy blow to the Hamas terror organization, to strengthen Israel's
deterrence, and to create a better security situation for those living around the Gaza
Strip that will be maintained for the long term.157
Notably, there was no official mention of either removing Hamas from power, or of 
ensuring the safe return of captured Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit.158 The ‘official’ success
153 A Hamas official in Lebanon argued: ‘We didn’t really have a choice. It was either die slowly because 
of the blockade or more quickly due to confrontation. Israel was telling us, “accept the blockade that is 
killing you”. See: Ibid., p. 11.
154 A former Israeli official noted: ‘...remember, Barak’s real foe is not Hamas. It is the memory of 
2006.’ See: Ibid., p. 18.
155 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Operation in Gaza: Statement by DM Ehud Barak," Jerusalem: 17 
January, 2009.
156 The Winograd committee on the Lebanon conflict concluded that: ‘The Prime Minister is responsible 
for the fact that...the declared goals were over-ambitious and not feasible. The Prime Minister did not 
adapt his plans once it became clear that the assumptions and expectations of Israel’s actions were not 
realistic and were not materialising. All of these add up to a serious failure in exercising judgment, 
responsibility and prudence.’ See: Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Winograd Committee Submits 
Final Report," Jerusalem: 30 January, 2008.
157 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Operation Cast Lead Expanded," Jerusalem: 3 January, 2009.
15S Determining the whereabouts of Gilad Shalit remained a high Israeli priority, even if not stated 
publicly. According to the report of the fact-finding mission on the Gaza conflict, numerous Palestinians 
captured during the Gaza conflict were questioned by Israeli soldiers about the location of Gilad Shalit. 
See: United Nations Human Rights Council, "Report of the United Nations Fact-Finding Mission on the 
Gaza Conflict," General Assembly A/HRC/12/48: 25 September, 2009, p. 26.
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of the Israeli operation in Gaza, therefore, was dependent on reducing the capabilities of 
Hamas as both an organisation and as a strategic threat.159
Hamas adopted a three pronged response to Operation Cast Lead. Firstly, they sought to 
thwart Israeli efforts to curb rocket fire by continuing to launch attacks in Southern 
Israel both during and after the conflict.160 Secondly, Hamas military operatives sought 
to draw Israeli soldiers into densely populated areas that had been prepared for counter 
attacks.161 Finally, in the midst of the Israeli incursion, Hamas operatives sought to 
solidify their domestic control over factional rivals.162 In essence, Hamas’ strategy 
throughout Operation Cast Lead was to defy the wishes of Israel irrespective of material 
losses, and to cultivate an image of steadfastness in the face of a more powerful and 
capable enemy.
Operation Cast Lead began on 27 December 2007 with a weeklong bombardment of 
targets in the Gaza Strip, which was followed by a two week ground offensive.163 
Throughout this period Hamas launched rockets into Southern Israel ‘almost 
continuously,’ and was still firing ten to twenty rockets daily by the time of the 
unilateral ceasefire on 18 January 2008.164 While the exact totals vary among sources,165 
by the end of the conflict approximately 1,300 Palestinians had been killed with 5,300 
injured, and 14 Israelis had been killed with approximately 530 injured.166
For the members of the Quartet, Operation Cast Lead was a divisive issue. As 
mentioned previously, the Quartet members were unable to form a common position on 
the situation in Gaza either during the conflict itself, or in the months that followed. 
Indeed, the Quartet silence from 15 December 2008 until 26 June 2009 was the second
159 Crucially, the IDF was later found to have employed a broad definition of what constituted Hamas 
infrastructure, and targeted both civilian and Palestinian Authority institutions that had little connection to 
Hamas, and no connection to military or security threats. See: Ibid., pp. 133-41.
160 A former Israeli foreign ministry official summarised this tactic: ‘There was no war. Hamas sat in its 
bunkers and came out when it was all over to resume firing up to twenty rockets per day and attack Israeli 
soldiers at the crossings. After the killing of 1,300 people, nothing changed.’ See: International Crisis 
Group, "Gaza's Unfinished Business," Crisis Group Middle East Report 85: 23 April, 2009, p. 21.
161 Ibid., p. 3.
162 Ibid., p. 4.
163 International Crisis Group, "Ending the War in Gaza," p. 4.
164 International Crisis Group, "Gaza's Unfinished Business," p. 3.
165 The UN fact-finding mission on the Gaza conflict noted that ‘statistics about Palestinians who lost 
their lives during the military operations vary. Based on extensive field research, non-governmental 
organizations place the overall number of persons killed between 1,387 and 1,417. The Gaza authorities 
report 1,444 fatalities. The Government of Israel provides a figure of 1,166.’ See: United Nations Human 
Rights Council, "Report of the United Nations Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict," p. 17.
166 United Nations Security Council, "Report of the Secretary General on the Question of Palestine," p.
18.
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longest period without an official Quartet statement in the history of the grouping.167 
While the length of this delay could be explained partially by the period of foreign 
policy re-adjustment following the introduction of the Obama Administration, 
throughout the conflict itself the Bush Administration had remained in office.
According to an UN official, during this period the Quartet members attempted to form 
a common position on many occasions, but ultimately could not reach agreement on the 
issue of the sequencing of any military drawdown.
Ironically, the diplomatic isolation of Hamas had left the international community with 
little leverage over the Gaza administration, and after Israel announced its ground 
invasion on 2 January 2009, efforts to halt the violence intensified.169 Given the 
differences of opinion within the Quartet on this issue, it was decided among the 
members that the most appropriate forum for further discussions was the United Nations 
Security Council.170 The efforts to issue a Security Council resolution on the ongoing 
violence in Gaza were spearheaded by the UN Secretary General.171
For the United States, the referral of the issue to the UN Security Council was 
politically problematic. On the one hand, the United States supported Israel’s 
prerogative to protect its borders from outside attacks, especially against Hamas. On the 
other hand, the deterioration of the humanitarian situation in Gaza and the high level of 
civilian casualties in Israel’s ongoing assault made inaction equally difficult. Thus, Rice
167 This period totaled 193 days. As mentioned previously, the period of Quartet inactivity following Ariel 
Sharon’s announcement of the disengagement plan (from 26 September 2003 until 4 May 2004) totaled 
220 days.
16S The official noted that there was a difference between inaction and a failure to form a common 
position: ‘Even though the Quartet was not actually issuing statements and having formal meetings, there 
was still a lot of diplomatic activity going on, but you didn’t see any of it, and it wasn’t particularly 
effective, but then each could and would have a different view of what was effective in that situation.’ 
Furthermore, the official described the nature of the Quartet’s disagreement during this period: 
‘...essentially you have an American position, with some Europeans in it as well, that argues that the way 
[Cast Lead] stops is for the terrorist entity involved to stop what it is doing, and that you should not be 
equating the parties, nor should you necessarily be putting in place an agreement at the end of it. Because 
the whole point of Hamas is to get equal legitimacy with Israel, and that would allow them to do so. As 
opposed to the Russians, the other half of Europe and others in the international community who see war 
and violence and bloodshed and want to stop it immediately...’ UN official. Interview with the author, 
Jerusalem, November, 2011.
169 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Security Cabinet Decision on Continuation of IDF Operation in 
Gaza," Jerusalem: 2 January, 2009.
170 UN official. Interview with the author, Jerusalem, November, 2011.
171 Rice, No Higher Honor: A Memoir of My Years in Washington, p. 725.
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pursued the dual approach of delaying UN action while privately urging Israeli officials 
to end the war.172
Ultimately, Rice was persuaded to adopt a more proactive approach by Abbas, who 
argued that he could no longer contain the escalating security situation in the West 
Bank. ' For Abbas, the Gaza conflict was extremely politically damaging, as his 
previous strategy of bilateral engagement and security cooperation with Israel now 
appeared at best naive and at worst disloyal.174 This impression was exacerbated by 
Abbas himself, when he made comments at the outset of the conflict that implied 
Hamas was to blame for the breakdown. ‘ Consequently, as the next section 
demonstrates, in the aftermath of the Gaza conflict, Abbas adopted a more politically 
uncompromising position on the resumption of negotiations.
With Israel five days into its ground offensive in Gaza, the United Nations Security 
Council issued Resolution 1860, calling for ‘an immediate, durable and fully respected 
ceasefire, leading to the full withdrawal of Israeli forces from Gaza.’ It also 
condemned ‘all violence and hostilities directed against civilians and all acts of 
terrorism,’ and called for ‘the unimpeded provision and distribution throughout Gaza of 
humanitarian assistance, including of food, fuel and medical treatment.’177 The United 
States had been integral to the drafting process, even if Rice ‘would have preferred a 
stronger condemnation of Hamas...,17s Ironically, despite playing a role in the
172 Rice later noted that: ‘I called Olmert and tried to get a sense of when he could end the operation. He 
was noncommittal, saying that he had to wipe out the threat to civilian populations. I told him I’d try to 
hold off a resolution.’ See: Ibid.
173 Rice’s subsequent account noted that: ‘My own view had been colored by a call from Abbas, who had 
begged me for a resolution. “There will be a ‘day of rage’ tomorrow, and I’m not sure we can keep the 
West Bank quiet. Salam [Fayyad] is very worried.’” See: Ibid., 726.
174 According to the findings of the UN fact-finding mission on the Gaza Conflict, there was a sharp rise 
in the use of force by Israeli security forces against Palestinians in the West Bank during Operation Cast 
Lead. The report concluded that: ‘A number of protestors were killed by Israeli forces during Palestinian 
demonstrations, including in support of the Gaza population under attack, and scores were injured. The 
level of violence used in the West Bank during the time of the operation in Gaza was sustained also after 
the operation.’ See: United Nations Human Rights Council, "Report of the United Nations Fact-Finding 
Mission on the Gaza Conflict," p. 28.
175 In a television interview soon after the launch of Operation Cast Lead, Abbas stated: T say in all 
honesty, we made contact with leaders of the Hamas movement in the Gaza Strip. We spoke with them in 
all honesty and directly, and after that we spoke with them indirectly, through more than one Arab and 
non-Arab side...We spoke with them on the telephone, and we said to them: We ask of you, don’t stop the 
ceasefire, the ceasefire must continue and not stop, in order to avoid what has happened, and if only we 
had avoided it.’ See: International Crisis Group, "Gaza's Unfinished Business," p. 14.
176 United Nations Security Council, "Resolution 1860: Security Council Calls for Immediate, Durable, 
Fully Respected Ceasefire in Gaza Leading to Full Withdrawal of Israeli Forces," SC/9567: 8 January, 
2009.
177 Ibid.
17x Rice, No Higher Honor: A Memoir o f My Years in Washington, p. 726.
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1 7Qauthorship process, the United States eventually abstained from resolution 1860. In 
Rice’s account, she received angry phone calls from both Prime Minister Olmert and 
Deputy Prime Minister Livni in response to the imminent passage of resolution 1860. 
When Rice later spoke to Bush, she asked him how she should cast the US vote:
I dialed the President and caught up with him in the White House residence. He’d just 
heard from the angry Olmert. All of my colleagues were gathered in the Security 
Council chamber. I knew that everyone would vote yes, and I had, after all, negotiated 
the resolution. “How do you want me to vote?” I asked the President.
“How do you want to vote?” he responded.
“On balance I would vote yes, but I’ll certainly understand if you want me to abstain.” 
“We need to abstain,” he said.180
In the press conference following the passage of UNSCR 1860, Rice awkwardly noted 
that the US abstention had been to allow Egyptian mediation efforts to further progress 
before endorsing a resolution that supported these efforts,181 but that the United States 
fully supported the ‘text’ and ‘objectives’ of the resolution.182
Ultimately, however, UNSCR 1860 was ineffective in ending Operation Cast Lead, and 
Olmert challenged the authority of the Council to interfere with Israel’s right to self 
defence. It was only after ten further days of intense fighting that both Hamas and 
Israel declared unilateral ceasefires.184 Crucially, once again, the ceasefire between 
Israel and Hamas was not based on a formal agreement, and in the period that
179 Of the 15 votes in the UN Security Council on resolution 1860, there were 14 in favour, and one 
abstention (US). See: United Nations Security Council, "Resolution 1860: Security Council Calls for 
Immediate, Durable, Fully Respected Ceasefire in Gaza Leading to Full Withdrawal of Israeli Forces."
1X0 Rice, No Higher Honor: A Memoir of My Years in Washington, p. 726.
181 Resolution 1860 encouraged ‘tangible steps towards intra-Palestinian reconciliation including in 
support of mediation efforts of Egypt and the League of Arab States as expressed in the 26 November 
2008 resolution, and consistent with Security Council resolution 1850 (2008) and other relevant 
resolutions.’ See: United Nations Security Council, "Resolution 1860: Security Council Calls for 
Immediate, Durable, Fully Respected Ceasefire in Gaza Leading to Full Withdrawal of Israeli Forces."
182 US Department of State, "Remarks at the UN Security Council Session on the Situation in the Middle 
East" UN Headquarters, New York City: 8 January, 2009.
183 On 9 January 2009 Israeli Prime Minister Olmert noted that: ‘The State of Israel has never agreed that 
any outside body would determine its right to defend the security of its citizens. The IDF will continue 
operations in order to defend Israeli citizens and will carry out the missions with which it has been 
assigned in the operation.’ See: Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "PM Olmert's Reaction to Diplomatic 
Developments & UNSC Resolution 1860," Jerusalem: 9 January, 2009.
184 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Operation in Gaza: Statement by DM Ehud Barak."
18:1 In ceasefire negotiations, Hamas had demanded an opening of the crossings, and Israel had demanded 
the release of Gilad Shalit. Neither was willing to meet the other’s demands. See: International Crisis 
Group, "Gaza's Unfinished Business," p. 27.
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followed, reprisals and counter-reprisals continued.186 Furthermore, Israel and Hamas 
both claimed victory in the aftermath of the Gaza conflict.
For Hamas, retaining political and security control over Gaza and withstanding an 
unprecedented Israeli bombardment enhanced the ability of the group to sell its 
‘resistance’ and ‘self reliance’ credentials.187 For Israel, both the technical success of the
operation and the limitations of the original objectives allowed for a narrative of
188stunning military success in the aftermath of Cast Lead.
Importantly, in the period following Operation Cast Lead, Israeli military tactics in 
Gaza came under increasing international scrutiny, and allegations of misconduct grew. 
Calls for an international investigation into the operation eventually led to the 3 April 
2009 establishment of the United Nations Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict, 
which was charged with investigating ‘all violations of international human rights law 
and international humanitarian law’ that might have occurred during the operation.189
Israel refused to cooperate with the fact-finding mission, and subsequently launched an 
internal inquiry into the conduct of the Israeli Defence Forces during Cast Lead.190 This 
internal inquiry concluded that the IDF had operated entirely within international law.191 
Conversely, the report of the UN fact-finding mission, released in September 2009, 
documented numerous breaches of international and humanitarian law by Israeli 
forces.192
186 Between 18 January and 23 April 2009, approximately 180 rockets were fired into Israeli territory, 
resulting in the death of one Israeli. Israeli incursions in Gaza also continued, and during this period 18 
Palestinians were killed, and 43 injured. See: Ibid., p.4.
187 Ibid., p. 6.
188 Israeli officials noted that Hamas was unable to destroy a single tank, down a single helicopter, kidnap 
a single Israeli soldier or even deploy a suicide bomber to lethal effect. Furthermore, Israeli fortifications 
in Southern areas and early warning systems resulted in a relatively low death toll in these areas. Thus, 
the operational aspects of Cast Lead were deemed a success. See: Ibid., p. 19.
189 The mission was headed by Justice Richard Goldstone, a former judge of the Constitutional Court of 
South Africa and former Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and 
Rwanda. See: United Nations Human Rights Council, "Report of the United Nations Fact-Finding 
Mission on the Gaza Conflict," p. 13.
190 By not cooperating with the UN fact-finding mission, the government of Israel also denied access for 
investigators into Israeli territory, as well as the West Bank. Access to Gaza was only granted by 
Egyptian authorities through the Rafah crossing. Crucially, this meant that the mission was unable to 
collect first hand data on Israeli victims of rocket fire, or to speak with Palestinian Authority officials. 
Participants from these areas instead had to travel to Geneva, where their testimonies were collected by 
the mission. See: Ibid., p. 15.
191 See: Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "IDF: Conclusion of Investigations into Claims in Operation 
Cast Lead-Part 1," Jerusalem: 22 April, 2009.
192 See: United Nations Human Rights Council, "Report of the United Nations Fact-Finding Mission on 
the Gaza Conflict."
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While the politics surrounding of the release of the UN fact-finding report are examined 
later in this section, the exact nature of the findings warrant further explanation here. 
First, despite Israeli arguments to the contrary, ' the report established that the 
indiscriminate firing of rockets into civilian territory by militants in Gaza had 
constituted a war crime by these actors. 194 Second, the report concluded that Hamas 
operatives ‘unnecessarily exposed the civilian population of Gaza to danger’ by 
launching attacks from heavily populated areas. 197 Importantly, the conclusions of the 
UN fact-finding mission pertaining to the conduct of the IDF throughout Operation Cast 
Lead established the extent of the Israeli destruction of Palestinian infrastructure. This 
had long-term ramifications for the people of Gaza, and was crucial to understanding 
the subsequent deterioration of the Israeli-Palestinian relationship.
Specifically, the report concluded that Israeli forces deliberately and criminally targeted 
Palestinian Authority infrastructure, and justified these attacks by arguing that political 
and administrative institutions in Gaza were part of the ‘Hamas terrorist 
infrastructure. ’ 196 Furthermore, the report concluded that non-government and civilian 
infrastructure was similarly destroyed by Israeli strikes, with no clear connection to 
Israeli security concerns. 197 The nature of Israeli attacks on industrial infrastructure such 
as food production, water installations, sewage treatment plants and housing led the UN 
mission to conclude that the IDF was implementing a deliberate and systematic policy 
of destruction in these cases. 198 In addition, the report documented numerous instances 
of Palestinian civilians being used by Israeli soldiers as human shields, 199 and criticised 
the use of phosphorous munitions by the Israeli military in heavily populated urban 
environments.200
193 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "MFA Briefing to the Foreign Press on the Goldstone Report," 
Geneva, Switzerland: 1 October, 2009.
194 The report concluded that: ‘Given the seeming inability of the Palestinian armed groups to direct the 
rockets and mortars towards specific targets and given that the attacks have caused very little damage to 
Israeli military assets, the Mission finds that there is significant evidence to suggest that one of the 
primary purposes of the rocket and mortar attacks is to spread terror among the Israeli civilian population, 
a violation of international law.’ See: United Nations Human Rights Council, "Report of the United 
Nations Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict," p. 32.
195 Ibid., p. 18.
196 In particular, the UN fact-finding mission focused on the destruction of the Palestinian Legislative 
Council Building and Gaza’s main prison. The report concludes that these were not legitimate targets for 
Israeli military strikes. See: Ibid., p. 17.
197 In particular, the report examined the shelling of the UNRWA field office on 15 January 2009 with 
phosphorous munitions, and the attack on al-Quds hospital in Gaza City. See: Ibid., pp. 133-41.
198 Ibid., p. 22.
199 See: Ibid., pp. 218-29.
200 Tu;, „
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Revelations concerning the conduct of the IDF throughout Operation Cast Lead were
politically damaging for Israel. However, the more profound legacy of the conflict was
the institutional and infrastructural devastation of the Gaza Strip. At the time of the 18
January ceasefire, Israeli airstrikes had hit every civil police station in Gaza, the
Ministries of Interior, Foreign Affairs, Finance, Public Works, Justice, Education,
201Labour and Culture, as well as the Prime Minister’s office and the parliament.
Civilian infrastructure was also affected deeply, with approximately 4,100 homes 
destroyed and another 17,000 structures damaged, and total damages to this sector alone 
estimated at $10 million.202 With Hamas unable to provide vital services, the 
humanitarian crisis in the territory worsened, and reconstruction efforts were hampered 
by continuing Israeli restrictions on goods entering Gaza. Furthermore, with the 
institutions of government virtually destroyed, future efforts to reintegrate the Gaza 
Strip into the Palestinian Authority structure were greatly complicated. Thus, at the 
conclusion of Operation Cast Lead, the human cost was enormous, and this in turn 
affected the political environment in the years to come.
Political Transition in Israel and the United States
The Israeli government never approved Annapolis, neither the Cabinet nor the 
Knesset, so anyone who wants to amuse himself can continue to do so. I have seen all 
the proposals made so generously by Ehud Olmert, but I have not seen any results.
- Avigdor Lieberman, Israeli Foreign Minister (2009-2012).204
Every time a new [Israelii Prime Minister comes in, we have to start over again. We 
reinvent the wheel over and over. It’s a huge waste of time.
- Palestinian Authority Minister.205
President Obama’s inauguration took place on 20 January 2009, two days after the 
conclusion of Operation Cast Lead, and 21 days before a new Israeli Prime Minister 
was to be elected. Two days after taking office, Obama gave the first indication of his 
intention concerning the Middle East peace process.206 On 22 January 2009, he
21)1 International Crisis Group, "Ending the War in Gaza," p. 7.
202 International Crisis Group, "Gaza's Unfinished Business," p. 1.
203 Ibid., p. 28.
204 This thesis uses the Hebrew spelling of ‘Lieberman,’ despite the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
employing the Russian version, ‘Liberman.’ See: Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Statement By 
Incoming Foreign Minister Avigdor Liberman at the Ministerial Inauguration Ceremony," Jerusalem: 1 
April, 2009.
205 International Crisis Group, "Tipping Point? The Palestinians and the Search for a New Strategy," p. 9.
206 On 28 May 2009 Obama noted that: ‘...when I was campaigning for this office I said that one of the 
mistakes I would not make is to wait until the end of my first term, or the end of my second term, before 
we moved on this issue aggressively. And we've been true to that commitment.’ See: The White House,
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instructed incoming Secretary of State Hillary Clinton to appoint George Mitchell as the 
US envoy for Middle East peace.207 As mentioned previously, Mitchell played a vital 
role in the authorship of Sharm el-Sheikh fact finding committee report on the causes of 
the second intifada. Importantly, one of the key findings of this report was that the 
Israeli settlements in the occupied territories contributed to the breakdown of the Oslo 
process, and that all settlement activity, including ‘natural growth,’ should be frozen 
immediately.209 According to Vice President Joe Biden, Mitchell’s appointment by the 
Obama Administration sent a ‘clear message at home as well as abroad,’ that ‘we are
9 1 ngoing to reinvigorate America’s commitment to diplomacy.’
Six days later Mitchell departed for the Middle East, meeting with Olmert, Barak, 
Egyptian President Mubarak, and Abbas. The talks centred on strengthening the 
ceasefire in Gaza, and coordinating the distribution of humanitarian aid.212 Indeed, with 
the elections in Israel set for 10 February 2009, the Obama Administration had sought 
to demonstrate its engagement with the peace process, but was waiting to launch any 
new initiatives. However, Clinton made clear on 3 February 2009 that the US 
position on Hamas would remain unchanged from that of the Bush Administration.214 
Importantly, while the Obama Administration had inherited membership in the Quartet 
from its predecessor, it was not clear initially whether it had any intention of continuing
"Remarks By President Obama and President Abbas of the Palestinian Authority in Press Availability," 
Washington, DC: 28 May, 2009.
207 US Department of State, "Secretary Clinton With Vice President Joe Biden Announce Appointment of 
Special Envoy for Middle East Peace George Mitchell and Special Representative for Afghanistan and 
Pakistan Richard Holbrooke," Washington, DC: 22 January, 2009.
208 According to US officials, Mitchell personally wrote the sections of the report concerning Israeli 
settlements. See: International Crisis Group, "Gaza's Unfinished Business," p. 45.
209 US Department of State, "Sharm El-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee Report," Washington, DC: 30 
April, 2001, p. 5.
210 US Department of State, "Secretary Clinton With Vice President Joe Biden Announce Appointment of 
Special Envoy for Middle East Peace George Mitchell and Special Representative for Afghanistan and 
Pakistan Richard Holbrooke."
211 See: US Department of State, "United States is Committed to Israel's Security," Tel Aviv: 28 January, 
2009., US Department of State, "Special Envoy Mitchell Meets With Israeli Defense Minister Ehud 
Barak," Jerusalem: 28 January, 2009., US Department of State, "Special Envoy Mitchell Meets With 
Egyptian President Mubarak," Cairo, Egypt: 28 January, 2009., US Department of State, "Commitment to 
a Better Future for all Palestinians," Ramallah: 29 January, 2009.,
212 US Department of State, "Remarks by Secretary Clinton and Special Envoy Mitchell After Their 
Meeting," Washington, DC: 3 February, 2009.
213 Upon Mitchell’s return from the Middle East, Secretary of State Clinton noted: ‘I’m grateful that 
[Mitchell] is also making clear to all of the interested parties and sides in the region who are concerned 
about the fate of the children on both the Israeli and the Palestinian sides of this conflict, that the United 
States is engaged, that we are determined and committed to working with all who will work in good faith 
to solve the problems that are obviously afflicting that region.’ See: Ibid.
214 Clinton noted that: ‘...we have a very clear policy toward Hamas, and Hamas knows the conditions 
that have been set forth. They must renounce violence. They must recognize Israel. And they must agree 
to abide by prior agreements that were entered into by the Palestinian Authority.’ See: Ibid.
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its involvement with the grouping, especially within the context of public efforts to 
distance the new government from the Bush years.
For Abbas, the violence of the recent Gaza conflict and the failure of the post-Annapolis 
negotiations process produced a re-evaluation of the nature of the bilateral relationship 
with Israel. In essence, Abbas was moving away from the logic of the post-Annapolis 
process, which had created a space for negotiations through a delayed approach to the 
issue of Roadmap commitments. Bolstered by a post-Gaza agreement with Hamas to 
extend his term until January 2010, Abbas sought to reverse this logic, and to pursue a 
more aggressive negotiations strategy. Thus, on 17 February 2009, he declared that 
‘unless settlements are brought to a halt, then talks [with Israel] will be meaningless and 
useless.’ On 5 March 2009, he went further, adding that ‘Israel must completely halt 
everything relating to settlements and [home] demolitions, otherwise it will be 
impossible to consider them a partner in the peace process.’ With a new and engaged 
US Administration, Abbas sought to take advantage of political uncertainty in Israel by 
strengthening his position on the renewal of talks.
The Israeli election on 10 February 2009 delivered an ambiguous result. With Tzipi 
Livni’s Kadima party securing 28 seats, and Benjamin Netanyahu’s Likud party 
securing 27, both leaders declared victory, and both sought to be the first to negotiate a 
majority governing coalition. Ultimately, after weeks of talks, Netanyahu was able to 
secure a centre-right governing coalition after co-opting the Israeli Labor party, and was 
sworn in as Prime Minister on 31 March 2009.219 With Olmert now retired and Livni 
assuming the position of opposition leader, all continuity with the post-Annapolis 
process in both the United States and Israel was severed.
In a clear nod to the politics of his governing coalition, Netanyahu appointed Avigdor 
Lieberman, controversial leader of the conservative Yisrael Beiteinu party, as his
215 International Crisis Group, "Gaza's Unfinished Business," p. 32.
216 "Abbas: Talks Will be Useless If Settlement Building Doesn't Stop," Haaretz, 17 February, 2009.
217 International Crisis Group, "Tipping Point? The Palestinians and the Search for a New Strategy," p. 6.
218 Galil, L., "Wooed by Kadima and Likud, Lieberman Agrees to More Talks with Livni " Haaretz, 11 
February, 2009.
219 Netanyahu overcame ideological differences between Likud and Labor by offering five ministries to 
Labor members in his Cabinet, including Defence. The Likud-led coalition included Labour, Yisrael 
Beiteinu, Shas, United Torah Judaism, and Jewish Home. See: International Crisis Group, "Gaza's 
Unfinished Business," p. 22.
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990Foreign Minister. On 31 March 2009, Netanyahu presented an initial approach to the
221Israeli-Palestinian conflict that essentially mirrored the post-Annapolis process. 
However, he also made clear that the Palestinian issue was a lower priority for his
999Administration than combating regional threats such as Iran.
The following day, Lieberman noted that the Annapolis process had ‘no validity,’ and 
that the only document signed by an Israeli government was the Roadmap document.223 
Lieberman noted that the sequencing of the Roadmap relied primarily on ‘dismantling 
terrorist organizations, establishing an effective government,’ and ‘making a profound 
constitutional change in the Palestinian Authority.’224
Further illustrating the proactive approach of the Obama Administration, Mitchell 
immediately revisited the region after the beginning of the Netanyahu government, 
meeting with Lieberman and Abbas. ~ Ultimately, the early comments from the new 
administrations in both Israel and the United states had largely maintained the 
established patterns of the Middle East peace process. In the period that followed, 
however, as these parties more explicitly outlined their intended approaches to the issue, 
the differences between them came into sharp relief.
The Politics of ‘Pre-conditions’
In May 2009, Abbas and Netanyahu travelled to Washington and met separately with 
Obama. The dynamics of these meetings were an important indication of the future 
direction of the Middle East peace process. Firstly, Netanyahu once again emphasised
220 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Statement By Incoming Foreign Minister Avigdor Liberman at the 
Ministerial Inauguration Ceremony."
221 The three tracks outlined by Netanyahu were economic development in the West Bank, security 
cooperation between Israel and the Palestinian Authority, and peace negotiations. See: Israel Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, "Incoming PM Benjamin Netanyahu Presents his Government to the Knesset,"
Jerusalem: 31 March, 2009.
222 Netanyahu declared that: ‘The greatest threat to humanity, and to the State of Israel, stems from the 
possibility that a radical regime will be armed with nuclear weapons or that nuclear weapons will find a 
home in a radical regime.’ Lieberman later made the same point more clearly, when he stated that: Tran 
with nuclear weapons and long-range missiles; Hamas and the Islamic Jihad in the Gaza Strip; and 
Hizbullah in Lebanon - this is the real problem. If we're looking for a stable solution to the Palestinian 
problem, we must first of all stop the intensification and expansion of the Iranian threat.’ See: Israel 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "FM Liberman Meets US Special Envoy Mitchell," Jerusalem: 16 April, 
2009.
22-’ Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Statement By Incoming Foreign Minister Avigdor Liberman at the 
Ministerial Inauguration Ceremony."
224 Ibid.
225 See: US Department of State, "Remarks by Special Envoy for Middle East Peace George Mitchell 
With Israeli Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman," Jerusalem: 16 April, 2009., US Department of State, 
"Special Envoy George Mitchell Meets With Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas," Ramallah,: 17 
April, 2009.
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the urgent nature of the Iranian threat to Israeli national security.226 In response, Obama 
indicated that he shared Israeli concerns regarding the Iranian nuclear program, but 
noted that addressing the Israeli-Palestinian issue would ‘strengthen our hand in the 
international community in dealing with a potential Iranian threat.’227 Secondly, Obama 
outlined the US approach to the resumption of negotiations, which would involve both 
parties addressing the ‘obligations that they’ve previously agreed to.’ Specifically, in a 
press conference with Netanyahu, Obama noted that:
...I shared with the Prime Minister the fact that under the roadmap and under 
Annapolis that there’s a clear understanding that we have to make progress on 
settlements. Settlements have to be stopped in order for us to move forward.228
In doing so, Obama had made clear that his Administration would prioritise the Israeli 
settlement issue as a key factor for resuming bilateral negotiations. On 27 May 2009, 
Clinton clarified that this expectation also included a freeze on ‘natural growth.’229 
Prime Minister Netanyahu avoided outlining the Israeli position on the issue of a total 
settlement freeze, but made clear that his government had expectations of their own 
regarding the resumption of negotiations. Indeed, Netanyahu noted that:
If we resume negotiations, as we plan to do, then I think that the Palestinians will have 
to recognize Israel as a Jewish state; will have to also enable Israel to have the means 
to defend itself.230
For Netanyahu, recognition as a Jewish state was an important part of guaranteeing the 
‘permanent legitimacy’ of Israel231 -  in other words, guaranteeing that the future ethnic 
composition of Israel included a permanent Jewish majority -  whereas for the 
Palestinians, recognition of Israel as a Jewish state would complicate or prevent the 
return of Palestinian refugees to their former homes, and might also be used to 
delegitimise the current Arab citizens of Israel. The notion of Israeli self defence 
referred to the well-established Israeli requirement that any future Palestinian state be
226 Specifically, Netanyahu noted that: ‘In this context, the worst danger we face is that Iran would 
develop nuclear military capabilities. Iran openly calls for our destruction, which is unacceptable by any 
standard.’ See: The White House, "Remarks By President Obama and Prime Minister Netanyah of Israel 
in Press Availability," Washington, DC: 18 May, 2009.
227 Ibid.
228 Ibid.
229 Landler, "Israeli Settlement Growth Must Stop, Clinton Says."
2311 The White House, "Remarks By President Obama and Prime Minister Netanyah of Israel in Press 
Availability."
231 Ibid.
260
Chapter Eight: The Post-Annapolis Period, 2008-2010
232demilitarised, with IDF restrictions on their borders and airspace. While Netanyahu 
argued that these issues should not be regarded as ‘preconditions’ to negotiations,233 the 
danger for Palestinians was that agreeing to future talks under these conditions would 
imply a form of agreement. Finally, in Obama’s meeting with Abbas the two leaders 
established that Palestinian Unity talks would continue to be contingent on Hamas 
recognising and adhering to the Quartet conditions -  Obama’s first mention of the 
grouping since taking office.234
In the period following the May meetings, the notion of a total freeze on Israeli 
settlement construction divided the Israeli and US administrations. In a strict sense, the 
Obama Administration position on this issue was consistent with the previous 
agreements of the parties, and with the stated positions of the Bush Administration. ~ In 
essence, Obama had discarded the understanding reached at Annapolis that the 
Roadmap Phase One commitments would be delayed until the implementation of the 
shelf agreement, and instead re-positioned these commitments as necessary precursors 
to the negotiations process. With Mitchell as his envoy, Obama had, in effect, returned 
to the original sequencing of the Roadmap document. This much was clear during 
Obama’s so-called ‘New beginning’ speech in Cairo, on 4 June 2009, when he noted 
that:
The obligations — the obligations that the parties have agreed to under the road map 
are clear. For peace to come, it is time for them — and all of us — to live up to our 
responsibilities.236
232 This implication was confirmed when Netanyahu noted: T want to make it clear that we don’t want to 
govern the Palestinians. We want to live in peace with them. We want them to govern themselves, 
absent a handful of powers that could endanger the state of Israel.' [Emphasis added] See: Ibid.
233 See: Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "PM Netanyahu: Israel National State of Jewish People," 
Jerusalem: 20 April, 2009.
234 Obama noted that T very much appreciate...that President Abbas I think has been under enormous 
pressure to bring about some sort of unity government and to negotiate with Hamas. And I am very 
impressed and appreciative of President Abbas’ willingness to steadfastly insist that any unity 
government would have to recognize the principles that have been laid by the Quartet.’ See: The White 
House, "Remarks By President Obama and President Abbas of the Palestinian Authority in Press 
Availability."
235 As discussed previously, the Roadmap document is clear on this issue, even if Israeli acceptance of 
this provision was not. Furthermore, in the post-Annapolis negotiations process the notion of a total 
freeze on Israeli settlements was often described as a condition that would ultimately determine the 
implementation of any future peace agreement.
236 US Department of State, "President Obama's Speech in Cairo: A New Beginning," Cairo University, 
Egypt: 4 June, 2009.
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Specifically, these responsibilities included the Palestinians abandoning violence and 
building institutional capacity, and the Israelis easing restrictions in the Palestinian 
territories and halting settlement construction.237
For the Israelis, however, US insistence that both ‘natural growth’ and settlements in 
East Jerusalem should also be frozen ignored the ‘understandings’ supposedly reached 
with the Bush Administration.2'8 Specifically, Israeli officials referred to the letters 
exchanged between Bush and Sharon, and between Weissglass and Rice in 2004.“' 
According to the Israeli interpretation of this period, the letters represented an unspoken 
agreement between the United States and Israel that settlement expansion would not 
continue, but that growth within existing settlements would. Former US Ambassador to 
Israel, Daniel Kurtzer dismissed these suggestions in an op-ed in the Washington Post:
The idea was to draw a line around the outer perimeter of built-up areas in settlements 
and to allow building only inside that line. This draft was never codified, and no effort 
was made then to define the line around the built-up areas of settlements. Nonetheless, 
Israel began to act largely in accordance with its own reading of these provisions, 
probably believing that U.S. silence conferred assent.240
As Clinton made clear on 17 June 2009, any informal arrangements on this issue 
reached between previous Israeli governments and the Bush Administration did not 
represent ‘enforceable agreements’ moving forward.2"*1
Thus, the Obama Administration position on settlements was not new; it was simply a 
rigid application of the Roadmap document. For Abbas, this presented a dilemma. 
While his position was essentially identical to Obama’s, a vocal and engaged US 
President calling for a total freeze on settlements compromised his ability to show 
flexibility on this issue. As Abbas noted later:
2 ,7 The language used by Obama on this occasion was particularly direct: ‘The United States does not 
accept the legitimacy of continued Israeli settlements. This construction violates previous agreements and 
undermines efforts to achieve peace. It is time for these settlements to stop.’ See: Ibid.
238 US Department of State, "Remarks With Israeli Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman," Washington, 
DC: 17 June, 2009.
239 See: Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Exchange of Letters between PM Sharon and President 
Bush," Washington, DC: 14 April, 2004., Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Letter from Dov Weissglas, 
Chief of the PM's Bureau, to National Security Adviser, Dr. Condoleezza Rice," Jerusalem: 18 April, 
2004.
24(1 Kurtzer, D., "The Settlements Facts," The Washington Post, 14 June, 2009.
241 Clinton noted that: ‘...in  looking at the history of the Bush Administration, there were no informal or 
oral enforceable agreements. That has been verified by the official record of the Administration and by 
the personnel in the positions of responsibility.’ See: US Department of State, "Remarks With Israeli 
Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman."
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Obama laid down the condition of halting the settlements completely. What could I 
say to him? Should I say this is too much? Moreover, halting the settlements is the 
second article of the road map, and it is something I want.242
Not wanting to appear ‘less Palestinian’ than the US President, Abbas outlined three 
conditions regarding the resumption of negotiations, including a total freeze on Israeli 
settlement construction, an agreement between Israeli and Palestinian representatives on 
the ‘terms of reference’ for negotiations, and for future negotiations to begin where the 
bilateral track of Annapolis had ended.24" The logic of this approach was later summed 
up by a Palestinian presidential advisor, who noted that ‘the problem isn’t getting 
negotiations going. The problem is getting negotiations going that are credible.’244 
Abbas chose to capitalise on the strong US position on Israeli settlements in the hope of 
extracting valuable (and politically essential) concessions from Netanyahu. The danger 
of this approach, however, was that if the United States softened its position, Abbas 
would be stranded. As the next section demonstrates, this was precisely what happened.
The UN General Assembly and the Israeli Settlement Moratorium 
On 14 June 2009, Netanyahu publicly responded to the demands of both the United 
States and the Palestinians regarding the resumption of negotiations. In a speech at Bar 
Ilan University, he noted that Palestinian demands were ‘inconsistent with a true desire 
to end the conflict,’ and that any further negotiations should resume ‘without 
preconditions.’2'0 In the same speech, however, he stated that ‘a fundamental 
prerequisite for ending the conflict is a public, binding and unequivocal Palestinian 
recognition of Israel as the nation state of the Jewish people.’246 Moreover, for the first 
time, Netanyahu made explicit the connection between the notion of a Jewish state and 
the Palestinian refugee issue:
To vest this declaration with practical meaning, there must also be a clear 
understanding that the Palestinian refugee problem will be resolved outside Israel's 
borders. For it is clear that any demand for resettling Palestinian refugees within Israel 
undermines Israel's continued existence as the state of the Jewish people.247
242 "PA President Abbas, Interview with Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, Ramallah, 22 December 2009 (excerpts)." 
24’ International Crisis Group, "Tipping Point? The Palestinians and the Search for a New Strategy," pp. 
6-14.
244 Ibid., p. 6.
20 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Address by PM Netanyahu at Bar-Ilan University," Bar-Ilan 
University, Tel Aviv: 14 June, 2009.
246 Ibid.
247 Ibid.
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Thus, while Netanyahu maintained that he had no preconditions for the resumption of 
negotiations, he simultaneously argued that the outcome of any future negotiations must 
meet his prerequisites -  a purely semantic distinction. In addition to the Jewish State 
issue, Netanyahu outlined his positions on several other final status issues. Specifically, 
he argued that ‘the territory under Palestinian control must be demilitarized with 
ironclad security provisions for Israel,’ and that:
Israel needs defensible borders, and Jerusalem must remain the united capital of Israel 
with continued religious freedom for all faiths. The territorial question will be 
discussed as part of the final peace agreement. In the meantime, we have no intention 
of building new settlements or of expropriating additional land for existing 
settlements.248
Netanyahu rejected both the US and Palestinian demands regarding a total freeze on 
settlement construction, and argued that the settlers were ‘neither the enemies of the 
people, nor the enemies of peace,’ but instead were ‘an integral part of our people, a 
principled, pioneering and Zionist public.’249 In the aftermath of Netanyahu’s speech, 
Mitchell returned to the region to pursue ‘meaningful steps’ from the parties to the 
conflict.250 However, with an Israeli leader ostensibly open to the resumption of 
negotiations, and with the Obama Administration pursuing the issue with a ‘sense of 
urgency,’ pressure mounted on the Palestinians to amend their position.251
During this period, the issues that divided the parties regarding the resumption of talks 
largely excluded the input of the non-US Quartet members. With Mitchell working to 
forge a common understanding between the parties themselves, contributions from 
international actors within this context were of little additional utility. Nevertheless, on 
26 June 2009, the Quartet members were briefed by Mitchell on the negotiations
252process, and issued their first statement since December 2008.
The 40th Quartet statement functioned entirely in support of recent US efforts, and urged 
the parties to the conflict to resume ‘negotiations to resolve all permanent status issues,
250 US Department of State, "Briefing by Special Envoy for Middle East Peace George Mitchell on His 
Recent Travel to the Region and Efforts Toward Achieving A Comprehensive Peace," Washington, DC: 
16 June, 2009.
251 Mitchell noted that: ‘We have a sense of urgency about this. We want to get going. We want to get this 
process moving, and we want to bring it to a conclusion.’ See: Ibid.
2:12 Mitchell met with the Quartet members at the Principals level, rather than as an envoy.
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without preconditions.’253 The Quartet members called upon Israel to ‘freeze all 
settlement activity,’ and underscored their desire for ‘Palestinian divisions to be 
overcome,’ but notably maintained that all Palestinians should ‘commit themselves to 
non-violence, recognition of Israel, and acceptance of previous agreements and 
obligations.’254 In essence, the Quartet members maintained their conditions on Hamas 
in the post-Gaza conflict period. The ongoing effects of the Palestinian division were 
mentioned further by the Quartet members, who noted a renewed commitment to 
discuss the implementation of the 2005 Agreement on Movement and Access in 
Gaza.255 The Quartet statement made no mention of Operation Cast Lead or of the 
ongoing humanitarian crisis in the Gaza Strip.
In spite of this, the issue of Israel’s ongoing blockade of Gaza in the aftermath of Cast 
Lead was thrust into the spotlight four days later, when a flotilla of international 
activists was intercepted by the Israeli navy attempting to deliver humanitarian supplies 
to the people of Gaza. The Greek cargo ship ‘Arion’ was boarded by Israeli commandos 
on 30 June 2009 and diverted to the port of Ashdod.246 The flotilla was designed to raise 
awareness of the humanitarian situation in Gaza, and to place pressure on Israel to ease 
the blockade. While this attempt was thwarted without major incident, ten months later 
a second flotilla of activists attempted to breach Gaza’s waters, and this time was met 
with deadly force by the Israeli navy, sparking international outrage and a diplomatic 
crisis for Israel.257
For Israel, international efforts to breach the naval exclusion zone surrounding Gaza 
diluted the ‘political and economic pressure on Hamas,’ and delegitimised Israeli 
security concerns.258 In the aftermath of the first flotilla incident, this Israeli sense of 
victimisation was compounded by the 15 September release of the UN fact-finding 
mission report on the Gaza conflict2:19 Israeli officials argued that the report unjustly 
impugned Israeli conduct throughout Operation Cast Lead without thoroughly
253 US Department of State, "Quartet Statement from the June 26, 2009 Meeting in Trieste," Trieste, Italy: 
26 June, 2009.
254 Ibid.
255 Ibid.
256 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Cargo Boat Attempting Illegal Entry to Gazan Coastal Waters 
Intercepted," Jerusalem: 30 June, 2009.
257 This incident is discussed in the next section of this chapter, covering the work of the Quartet members 
throughout 2010.
2:18 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Cargo Boat Attempting Illegal Entry to Gazan Coastal Waters 
Intercepted."
259 United Nations Human Rights Council, "Report of the United Nations Fact-Finding Mission on the 
Gaza Conflict."
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examining the root cause of the Israeli response, Palestinian rocket fire.260 Israeli
authorities presented the UN fact-finding mission as having waged a thinly-veiled
261‘political campaign against Israel,’ that ignored the Israeli right to self defence.“ 
Consequently, in the 2009 meeting of the United Nations General Assembly, Israel 
sought to persuade the members of the UN Human Rights Council to vote against the 
findings of the report, an issue that came to dominate the agenda of the peace process.
By September 2009 the Obama Administration was placing strong pressure on both the 
Israelis and Palestinians to resume a negotiations process, despite having failed to find a 
way to satisfy the stated needs of either party. On 22 September 2009, Obama 
convinced Abbas and Netanyahu to meet trilaterally with him in New York in an 
attempt to forge an understanding between the two leaders on the resumption of formal 
negotiations. In a statement to the press afterwards, Obama declared that ‘it is past time 
to talk about starting negotiations -  it is time to move forward.’ 262
For a clearly frustrated Obama Administration, eight months of efforts to restart 
negotiations failed to produce a change in position from either party, and even 
presidential intervention had proven ineffective. In a press conference following the 
trilateral, Mitchell noted that no agreement had been reached on the resumption of 
negotiations, ostensibly because the parties still disagreed on the terms of reference for 
such negotiations. ' When a reporter pointed out to Mitchell that this situation sounded 
like the parties were ‘starting from scratch,’ Mitchell’s response was indicative of the 
Administration’s approach to breaking the logjam:
...the implication of your question is that we should accept, as final, the parties’ first 
words, that when they say something and they disagree, well, we should accept that as 
final and walk away. We have the exact opposite point of view. Where there are
260 Former Israeli Prime Minister Olmert noted that ‘...to write a report that focuses only on Israel’s 
response to terror against innocent civilians was a moral indignity.’ See: Sheridan, "Ehud Olmert Still 
Dreams of Peace."
261 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Israel's Analysis and Comments on the Gaza Fact-Finding Mission 
Report," Jerusalem: 15 September, 2009.
262 Obama also added that: ‘It is time to show the flexibility and common sense and sense of compromise 
that’s necessary to achieve our goals. Permanent status negotiations must begin and begin soon. And 
more importantly, we must give those negotiations the opportunity to succeed.’ See: US Department of 
State, "Remarks by the President at Beginning of Trilateral Meeting With Israeli Prime Minister 
Netanyahu and Palestinian Authority President Abbas," New York City: 22 September, 2009.
263 Mitchell noted that the differences between the parties: ‘...relate to terms of reference -  where do you 
begin negotiations in relation to past efforts, what subjects are going to be covered, how are they to be 
identified, in what order do you begin, what sequence will therefore follow, a whole -  almost any 
imaginable issue that you could think of that affects both the process and the substance of negotiations.’ 
See: US Department of State, "Briefing by Special Envoy for Middle East Peace George Mitchell," New 
York City: 22 September, 2009.
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differences, we seek to resolve them. And that’s what we’re going to do over the next 
few weeks.264
In support of this goal, the Quartet members met on 24 September 2009. The statement 
issued by the members after this meeting reflected the more robust approach to 
restarting negotiations of the Obama Administration. Specifically, and for the first time, 
this statement introduced language that called for the parties to fulfill their Roadmap 
commitments ‘irrespective of reciprocity.’265 The introduction of this phrase coincided 
with US frustrations concerning the reluctance of the parties to proceed in the absence 
of guarantees and preconditions. By urging each party to jettison the notion of 
reciprocity, the Quartet members were returning to the principle of parallelism that 
underpinned the Roadmap document. Ultimately, however, this notion carried little 
sway with the parties to the conflict.
In their addresses to the UN General Assembly, both Abbas and Netanyahu reiterated 
their previous positions on the resumption of talks.266 However, Netanyahu focused a 
substantial portion of his address to the General Assembly on the report of the UN fact­
finding mission on Gaza, describing the report as a ‘farce,’ and urging UN members to 
reject its findings.267
With the UN Human Rights Council set to vote on the findings of the fact-finding 
mission on 2 October 2009, Israeli representatives applied diplomatic pressure on the 
Palestinians to postpone the vote.268 In a public relations blitz, Israeli Deputy Foreign 
Minister Danny Ayalon argued that ‘if the report is adopted, the Human Rights Council
265 The Quartet statement noted that: ‘The Quartet calls on Israel and the Palestinians to act on their 
previous agreements and obligations—in particular adherence to the Roadmap, irrespective of reciprocity- 
-to create the conditions for the resumption of negotiations in the near term.’ See: US Department of 
State, "Joint Statement by the Quartet," New York City: 24 September, 2009.
266 Netanyahu stated that ‘we ask the Palestinians to finally do what they have refused to do for 62 
years: Say yes to a Jewish state,’ while Abbas stated that ‘the settlement policy and the building of the 
separation Wall, which continue to be pursued by the Israeli occupation, will abort opportunities to re­
launch the peace process.’ See: Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Address by PM Netanyahu to the UN 
General Assembly," New York City: 24 September, 2009., United Nations General Assembly, "Statement 
by H.E. Mr. Mahmoud Abbas President of the State of Palestine at the General Debate of the 64th Session 
of the United Nations General Assembly " New York: 25 September, 2009.
267 See: Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Address by PM Netanyahu to the UN General Assembly."
268 Subsequent investigations by Israeli journalist Akiva Eldar uncovered evidence that Shin Bet Chief 
Yuval Diskin threatened Palestinian President Abbas with a dramatic increase in the Israeli closure 
system in the West Bank if Abbas did not postpone the vote on the UN fact-finding mission report. See: 
Eldar, A., "Diskin to Abbas: Defer UN Vote on Goldstone or Face 'Second Gaza'," Haaretz, 17 January,
2010.
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will become the “Terror Rights Council”.’269 With the United States and Israel in
970agreement on the issue, Abbas was diplomatically and politically isolated.
Furthermore, according to internal Palestinian Authority documents leaked in 2011, in 
exchange for Abbas postponing the Human Rights Council Vote, Mitchell offered 
Palestinian negotiator Saeb Erekat political guarantees in the event that bilateral 
negotiations were resumed." Given that the non-US Quartet members were all 
supportive of the findings of the UN report, it is safe to assume that this was exclusively 
a US initiative.272
Thus, under intense diplomatic pressure, on 2 October 2009, Abbas requested that the 
members of the UN Human Rights Council postpone the vote on the findings of the UN 
fact-finding mission on the Gaza conflict until March 2010.273 The political fallout for 
Abbas in both the Palestinian territories and the wider Arab world was immediate and 
damaging, and Abbas was accused of providing cover for Israeli actions in Gaza.274 
Despite reportedly promising to support his decision before the vote, Arab leaders 
publicly turned on Abbas after popular opinion in the region soured. Domestic 
pressure also mounted on Abbas to resign from office, particularly from Hamas 
representatives.276 Such was the strength of the campaign against Abbas’ decision, that, 
on 16 October 2009, he reversed his position, and called for a special sitting of the 
Human Rights Council to approve the fact-finding mission report.
The Council subsequently approved the conclusions of the UN fact-finding mission, and 
condemned the conduct of Israeli forces in the Gaza conflict.277 The final voting tally 
was 25 in favour, 11 abstentions, and six against, with the United States noticeably in
269 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "MFA Officials Brief Ambassadors, Foreign Press on Goldstone 
Report," Geneva: 1 October, 2009.
270 International Crisis Group, "Tipping Point? The Palestinians and the Search for a New Strategy," p. 9.
271 See: Mustafa, F., "Palestinian Authority Stonewalled the Goldstone Vote," Al Jazeera: The Palestine 
Papers, 26 January, 2011.
272 The UN Secretary General was supportive of the efforts o f the Human Rights Council, Russia voted in 
favour of the findings of the report, and in March 2010, the European Parliament also affirmed the report.
273 Mustafa, "Palestinian Authority Stonewalled the Goldstone Vote."
274 International Crisis Group, "Tipping Point? The Palestinians and the Search for a New Strategy," p. 9.
275 On 6 October Abbas noted: T believe all the Arab brothers are members of the organisation and they 
all know very well that the postponement of the vote happened with their knowledge and approval.’ See: 
"Pressure Mounts on Abbas to Quit," Al Jazeera, 6 October, 2009.
As a US official noted, Arab leaders rushed to condemn Abbas ‘the minute they saw how it was playing 
on al Jazeera.’ See: International Crisis Group, "Tipping Point? The Palestinians and the Search for a 
New Strategy," p. 10.
276 Mustafa, "Palestinian Authority Stonewalled the Goldstone Vote."
277 United Nations Human Rights Council, "Resolution Adopted by the Human Rights Council: The 
Huam Rights Situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem," A/HRC/RES/S- 
12/1: 16 October, 2009.
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the latter category.278 Predictably, the Israeli government rejected the Human Rights 
Council’s endorsement of the report, and noted that ‘Israel will continue to exercise its 
right to self defense.’ For Abbas, however, the entire incident was politically and 
personally humiliating. According to close associates of Abbas, he had been ‘deeply 
wounded’ by his recent treatment, and refused to take calls from close advisors, 
including US officials.281
Adding to Abbas’ frustrations was the deepening US-Israel dialogue during October 
2009, in which Washington reportedly agreed to soften its stance on the settlements 
issue.282 In response, on 26 October 2009, Abbas announced that Palestinian 
presidential elections would take place on 24 January 2010, and that he would not re- 
contest the position. He cited Washington’s recent ‘capitulation’ on the Israeli 
settlement issue, and the uncompromising approach of Prime Minister Netanyahu as the 
key factors behind his decision to effectively resign.284 With the situation worsening, 
Clinton travelled to the region to meet with the Palestinian President and the Israeli 
Prime Minister on 31 October. Meeting first with Abbas in Abu Dhabi, Clinton 
reportedly briefed him on the recent US-Israel dialogue, including a new Israeli policy 
of ‘restraint’ on settlement construction as a mechanism for restarting bilateral 
negotiations.285 At a news conference following the meeting, Abbas rejected the policy, 
telling Clinton that there would be no new negotiations until Israel completely froze 
settlement construction.286 When Clinton met with Netanyahu later on the same day, she 
offered praise for the ‘unprecedented’ policy that his government had recently 
developed and noted that, once announced officially, it would address ‘many of the
287concerns that have been expressed.’
278 See: Ibid.
279 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Israel's Reaction to the Decision of the UN Human Rights 
Council," Jerusalem: 16 October, 2009.
280 See: Malley, R. and Agha, H., "Israel and Palestine: Can They Start Over?," The New York Review of 
Books, 3 December, 2009.
281 International Crisis Group, "Tipping Point? The Palestinians and the Search for a New Strategy," p. 
10.
282 Haaretz Service, "Abbas to Obama: I'll Quit, There's No Chance for Peace with Netanyahu," Haaretz, 
26 October, 2009.
283 Ibid.
284 Ibid.
28:’ Ravid, B., "In Jerusalem, Clinton Hails 'Unprecedented' Israeli Settlement Concessions," Haaretz, 31 
October, 2009.
286 Ibid.
287 US Department of State, "Remarks With Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu," Jerusalem: 31 
October, 2009.
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Before this official announcement came, Abbas declared, on 19 November 2009, that 
the proposed January 2010 Presidential elections would be postponed in light of Hamas’
o o o
refusal to allow the citizens of Gaza to participate.“ While no new date was set for 
these elections, Abbas noted that whenever they did occur, he would not be a 
candidate. With elections postponed and Abbas’ term still set to expire, a solution 
was required to avoid further Palestinian leadership instability. Thus, on 16 December 
2009, the PLO executive committee extended President Abbas’ term ‘indefinitely.’“90 
As Hamas officials noted, the PLO had no constitutional authority to perform such an 
action.291 Ironically, in efforts to avert a constitutional crisis, the PLO had cemented a 
leadership limbo in the Palestinian territories, where Abbas could not hold elections, nor 
could his term end.
With the prospect of Abbas departing in the short term neutralised, Netanyahu unveiled 
Israel’s modified position on settlement construction. In a speech on 25 November 
2009, the Prime Minister declared that:
Today, my cabinet authorized a policy of restraint regarding settlements which will 
include a suspension of new permits and new construction in Judea and Samaria for a 
period of ten months.292
While packaged as a ‘far reaching step,’ the so-called Israeli ‘settlement moratorium’ 
included several crucial caveats.293 First, the construction freeze only included 
settlements in the West Bank, and did not cover East Jerusalem. Second, the freeze only 
applied to new projects, and did not cover any construction currently underway. Third, 
the freeze only applied to housing construction, and excluded schools, synagogues, 
public buildings necessary for the ‘continuation of normal life,’ and ‘any infrastructure’ 
related to Israeli national security.294 In essence, the ten month Israeli settlement 
moratorium allowed for all constructions in East Jerusalem to continue, and all existing 
housing developments and infrastructural projects in the West Bank to continue, after 
which time the Israeli government would ‘revert to the policies of previous governments
288 Abbas noted that ‘...because of the rejection of Hamas and its threat to prevent (voting) by force, 
naturally they will be delayed, or the time of the elections will come later.’ See: Haaretz Service, "Israel 
Conducting Secret Talks With Hamas, Abbas Says," Haaretz, 19 November, 2009.
289 Ibid.
290 Kershner, I., "PLO Extends President Mahmoud Abbas's Term," The New York Times, 16 December,
2009.
291 Ibid.
292 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Statement by PM Netanyahu on the Cabinet Decision to suspend 
new construction in Judea and Samaria," Jerusalem, Israel: 25 November, 2009.
293 See: Ibid.
294 TU • .
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in relation to construction.’293 As Mitchell noted modestly on the day of the 
announcement, the Israeli policy fell ‘short of a full settlement freeze...’
The United States was supportive of Netanyahu’s settlement policy, emphasising that it 
was ‘more than any Israel Government has done before,’ and ‘could have a substantial 
impact on the ground.’297 With the Obama Administration unable to secure a full 
settlement freeze, Mitchell was left defending a policy that ‘could mean much less 
settlement construction,’ while maintaining that the United States continued to view 
these settlements as ‘illegitimate.’298
Unsurprisingly, the Israeli settlement moratorium failed to meet the political 
requirements for Abbas. Bolstered by the recent support of the PLO, and still displeased 
by US ‘capitulation,’ Abbas categorically ruled out the resumption of negotiations 
unless Israel declared a full freeze to settlement construction, including in East 
Jerusalem.299 For the Palestinian leadership, the failure of the Obama Administration to 
elicit a more meaningful settlement freeze from the Israelis removed any remaining 
confidence in the ability of the United States to deliver outcomes favourable to the 
Palestinians.300
The Obama Administration had begun its first year by demanding a full freeze on Israeli 
settlement construction, and ended it praising a patently disingenuous Israeli position 
and recommending the resumption of negotiations on that basis. As Malley and Agha 
noted, this inconsistent approach had ‘increased friction with Jerusalem, squandered 
credibility with the Arab world, and weakened Abbas.’' As the next section 
demonstrates, the dynamics established in 2009 between the Obama Administration and 
the parties to the conflict continued throughout 2010, and the political process remained 
deadlocked. For the members of the Quartet, another year of support for Mitchell’s 
efforts produced little tangible progress.
295 Ibid.
296 US Department of State, "Briefing by Special Envoy for Middle East Peace George Mitchell" 
Washington, DC: 25 November, 2009.
297 Ibid.
298 Ibid.
299 Kershner, "PLO Extends President Mahmoud Abbas's Term."
’l)0 As a senior PA official noted ‘...the U.S. was unable to secure a settlement freeze and told us to just 
get on with it and negotiate. But how can I be sure that in six months I will not be confronted with a 
situation in which the U.S. says, “we wish we could have gotten you a better deal, but this is the best we 
can do, now just get on with it and sign?’” See: International Crisis Group, "Tipping Point? The 
Palestinians and the Search for a New Strategy," p. 16.
Malley and Agha, "Israel and Palestine: Can They Start Over?."
271
Chapter Eight: The Post-Annapolis Period, 2008-2010
2010: Shuttle Diplomacy
Conflicts are created, conducted, and sustained by human beings. They can be ended 
by human beings. I saw it happen in Northern Ireland, although, admittedly, it took a 
very long time. I believe deeply that with committed, persevering, and patient 
diplomacy, it can happen in the Middle East.
- George Mitchell, United States Envoy to the Middle East 
Peace Process (2009-2011).302
Proximity talks take us back almost twenty years, to a time when the two sides were 
not talking to each other at all. They basically throw overboard much of the 
substantive progress achieved during years of face to face negotiations.
- Daniel Kurtzer, United States Ambassador to Israel (2001- 
2005).303
In 2010, the Middle East peace process was reduced to US efforts merely to re-establish 
bilateral ties between the Israelis and the Palestinians. Diplomatic setbacks in the US- 
Israel relationship and international condemnation over the Gaza flotilla tragedy further 
complicated this task. While several rounds of sterile proximity talks eventually resulted 
in a relaunch of bilateral negotiations, this process was quickly derailed by the 
termination of the Israeli settlement moratorium, and the Palestinian pursuit of political 
outcomes in international forums such as the United Nations. Ultimately, neither the 
Israelis nor the Palestinians had confidence in the ability of the Obama Administration 
to facilitate a political process that would deliver their requisite domestic outcomes, nor 
was there agreement between the parties about the terms of reference for the resumption 
of negotiations. This situation was exacerbated by further regression in the Israeli- 
Palestinian relationship over the ongoing issue of the Gaza blockade, and by personal 
tensions between Obama and Netanyahu.
For the members of the Quartet, the year was characterised by ongoing support for US 
shuttle diplomacy, and efforts to assist in the re-launch of a bilateral negotiations 
process between the Israelis and Palestinians. While the grouping issued six official 
statements in 2010, only two coincided with Quartet meetings while the others were 
issued via teleconference.304 With the parties to the conflict either unable or unwilling to 
resume the negotiations process despite active engagement from the Obama
302 US Department of State, "Secretary Clinton With Vice President Joe Biden Announce Appointment of 
Special Envoy for Middle East Peace George Mitchell and Special Representative for Afghanistan and 
Pakistan Richard Holbrooke."
303 Kurtzer, D., "Proximity Talks: Prospects for Success?," Foreign Policy, 9 March, 2010.
304 These meetings were on 19 March 2010 and 21 September 2010.
272
Chapter Eight: The Post-Annapolis Period, 2008-2010
Administration on the issue, the members of the Quartet were largely inactive during 
this period.
Proximity Talks and Diplomatic Tensions
I certainly know the frustration of Israeli announcements of building new housing on 
disputed land; it often felt as though those bulletins were issued just after the Secretary 
of State had travelled there.
- Condoleezza Rice, US Secretary of State (2006-2009).305
With the Palestinians unwilling to relaunch direct negotiations on the basis of the Israeli 
settlement moratorium, Mitchell travelled to the region to establish a framework for 
‘proximity talks.’306 In essence, these talks would take place between Mitchell and the 
parties to the conflict separately, and would be centred on the resumption of bilateral 
negotiations between the parties themselves. This process was indicative of the deep 
divisions between the Israelis and Palestinians during this period, where the parties held 
such contrasting views on the final status issues that the resumption of direct 
negotiations in the absence of political guarantees was considered pointless.
After two months of meetings with the parties, on 8 March 2010, Mitchell announced 
that he had achieved the modest goal of relaunching ‘indirect talks.’307 Notably, the 
structure and scope of the talks had yet to be determined, and it was also likely that 
Mitchell’s success coincided with the imminent visit of US Vice President Joe Biden to 
the region to meet with the parties to the conflict. The US pursuit of proximity talks 
drew heavy criticism from former US Ambassador to Israel Daniel Kurtzer, who argued 
that the process was ‘a poor excuse for American diplomacy and a recipe for the slow 
but ultimate demise of this round of peacemaking.’ Ultimately, even the launch of the 
proximity talks proved politically problematic for the Obama Administration.
On 9 March 2010, during Biden’s visit to Israel, Israel’s Interior Ministry announced 
the approval of 1,600 new housing units in Ramat Shlomo, an ultra-Orthodox Jewish
305 Rice, No Higher Honor: A Memoir of My Years in Washington, p. 724.
306 Mitchell travelled to the region in January 2010 and met with Israeli and Palestinian officials. See: US 
Department of State, "Remarks After Meeting With Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas," West Bank: 
25 January, 2010.
307 Somewhat prophetically, Mitchell also noted that the parties to the conflict should ‘refrain from any 
statements or actions which may inflame tensions or prejudice the outcome of these talks.’ See: US 
Department of State, "Statement by Special Envoy for Middle East Peace George Mitchell," Washington, 
DC: 8 March, 2010.
308 Kurtzer, "Proximity Talks: Prospects for Success?."
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neighbourhood in East Jerusalem.304 While Netanyahu described the timing of the 
announcement as coincidental, the incident caused public tensions between the United 
States and Israel, and underscored Palestinian concerns that the settlement moratorium 
had never included Jerusalem. In a statement issued from the Office of the US Vice 
President soon after the Israeli announcement, Biden declared:
I condemn the decision by the government of Israel to advance planning for new 
housing units in East Jerusalem. The substance and timing of the announcement, 
particularly with the launching of proximity talks, is precisely the kind of step that 
undermines the trust we need right now and runs counter to the constructive 
discussions that I’ve had here in Israel.’10
As the diplomatic crisis deepened, Israeli Ambassador to the US Michael Oren argued
o i l
that US-Israel relations were at their lowest point in 35 years. Seeking to de-escalate 
the situation, on 11 March 2010, Netanyahu released a statement expressing his 
‘displeasure at the timing of the announcement of another stage in the planning process 
of a Jerusalem building project,’ and noting that he had conducted a frank discussion
312with his Interior Minister concerning future announcements.
For the Obama Administration, the incident exacerbated existing frustrations with the 
Netanyahu government, whose lukewarm apology had only served to further inflame 
the situation.313 On 12 March, Clinton phoned Netanyahu to express her displeasure at 
both the timing and the content of the housing announcement, and urged him to take 
concrete steps to redress the situation.314 On the same day, the Quartet members issued a 
statement following a teleconference that condemned the Israeli ‘decision to advance 
planning for new housing units in East Jerusalem,’ and to ‘keep under consideration
309 Bronner, E., "As Biden Visits, Israel Unveils Plan for New Settlements," The New York Time, 9 
March, 2010.
’I() The White House Office of the Vice President, "Statement by Vice President Joseph R. Biden, Jr.," 
Jerusalem: 9 March, 2010.
311 Ravid, B., "Israel Envoy: US Ties At Their Worst in 35 Years," Haaretz, 15 March, 2010.
312 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Building in Jerusalem: Statement from PM Netanyahu's Bureau," 
Jerusalem: 11 March, 2010.
313 In a similarly dismissive fashion, Netanyahu noted during an Israeli cabinet meeting on 14 March that 
‘there was a regrettable incident, that was done in all innocence and was hurtful, and which certainly 
should not have occurred,’ but that there was ‘no reason to add any more [on the topic].’ See: Israel 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Cabinet Communique," Jerusalem: 14 March, 2010.
314 According to State Department Spokesperson P.J. Crowley, Clinton spoke to Netanyahu to reiterate 
that: ‘...the United States considers the announcement a deeply negative signal about Israel’s approach to 
the bilateral relationship -  and counter to the spirit of the Vice President’s trip; and to reinforce that this 
action had undermined trust and confidence in the peace process, and in America’s interests. The 
Secretary said she could not understand how this happened, particularly in light of the United States’ 
strong commitment to Israel’s security. And she made clear that the Israeli Government needed to 
demonstrate not just through words but through specific actions that they are committed to this 
relationship and to the peace process.’ See: US Department of State, "Daily Press Briefing: Philip J. 
Crowley," Washington, DC: 12 March, 2010.
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o i c
additional steps that may be required to address the situation on the ground.’ ' While 
the Quartet members’ support for the US reactive campaign was unsurprising, the 
timing of the statement was indicative of the urgency of the issue. Indeed, the Quartet 
members were already scheduled to meet face to face on 19 March 2010, in Moscow, 
but opted to express their condemnation a week earlier via teleconference.316
For Israeli officials, the international criticism of the housing announcement was a
o  i n
disproportionate response to the initial incident. As one noted in an interview with the 
International Crisis Group, the settlement in question was in an area that ‘under virtually 
all existing peace plans,’ would be under Israeli sovereignty, and although the timing of 
the announcement was ‘hugely embarrassing,’ they questioned whether this justified
3 1 g
such a ‘public dressing down.’
On 18 March 2010, Netanyahu phoned Clinton to ‘follow up’ on their previous 
conversation, and the two discussed ‘specific actions that might be taken to improve the 
atmosphere for progress toward peace.’319 Notably, the call took place the day before 
Clinton was due to meet with her Quartet colleagues in Moscow, a meeting that 
Mitchell had postponed his planned visit to the Middle East to attend.320 The subsequent 
Quartet statement reaffirmed support for the proximity talks, and once again urged the 
parties to the conflict to meet their previous commitments ‘irrespective of 
reciprocity.’ Crucially, the statement also urged the government of Israel to freeze all 
settlement activity, including natural growth, and expanded on the recent criticism of 
Israel’s housing announcement:
Recalling that the annexation of East Jerusalem is not recognized by the international 
community, the Quartet underscores that the status of Jerusalem is a permanent status 
issue that must be resolved through negotiations between the parties and condemns the 
decision by the government of Israel to advance planning for new housing units in 
East Jerusalem.322
315 United Nations Department of Public Information, "Statement by the Middle East Quartet," New York 
city: 12 March, 2010.
316 Ibid.
317 International Crisis Group, "Tipping Point? The Palestinians and the Search for a New Strategy," p. 
35.
318 Ibid.
319 US Department of State, "Prime Minister Netanyahu's Call to Secretary Clinton," Washington, DC: 18 
March, 2010.
3211 International Crisis Group, "Tipping Point? The Palestinians and the Search for a New Strategy," p. 
34.
321 US Department of State, "Joint Statement by the Quartet" Moscow, Russia: 19 March, 2010.
322 Ibid.
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In the press conference following the Quartet statement, Russian Foreign Minister 
Sergei Lavrov praised his fellow members for issuing a ‘frank’ and ‘important’ 
statement, that he was sure the Israeli government would hear, and ‘understand 
correctly.’ “ According to Clinton, the message being presented by the Quartet members 
was that ‘unilateral actions by either party are not helpful,’ but, given the events of the 
previous period, the subtext was actions that embarrassed US officials would not be 
tolerated.324 This message was further re-enforced when Netanyahu visited the United 
States in late March 2010, and was denied a photo opportunity or official press 
conference with President Obama after their meeting.325
Despite the parties agreeing to launch proximity talks on 8 March, the diplomatic crisis 
following Biden’s visit to the region sidelined the process. On 9 May 2010, the parties 
once again affirmed their commitment to indirect negotiations,326 a move welcomed by 
the Quartet members in a short statement.327 Consequently, the first round of indirect 
negotiations was conducted by Mitchell on 20 May 2010,' and was followed by a 
second round on 23 April 2010. “ However, as the following section demonstrates, the 
process was sidelined once again by developments in the region.
323 US Department of State, "Remarks With United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon, Russian 
Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, EU High Representative Catherine Ashton, and Quartet Special 
Representative Tony Blair After Their Meeting," Moscow, Russia: 19 March, 2010.
324 In a March 22,2010 speech to AIPAC, Clinton noted that the housing announcement ‘exposed 
daylight’ between the US and Israel that ‘undermines America’s unique ability to play a role -  an 
essential role -  in the peace process.’ See: US Department of State, "Remarks at the 2010 AIPAC Policy 
Conference," Washington, DC: 22 March, 2010.
For comments following the Quartet statement of 19 March 2010, see: US Department of State, "Remarks 
With United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, EU High 
Representative Catherine Ashton, and Quartet Special Representative Tony Blair After Their Meeting."
’2:i Numerous commentators speculated on the cause of the diplomatic snub in the aftermath of 
Netanyahu’s trip. One possible factor was Netanyahu’s speech to AIPAC that preceded his meeting with 
Obama, in which he noted that ‘Jerusalem is not a settlement. It is our capital.’ See: Israel Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, "Address by PM Benjamin Netanyahu at AIPAC Conference," Washington, DC: 22 
March, 2010.
Another possible cause was the perception among US officials that Netanyahu was using his trip to rally 
domestic support against President Obama. See: Benn, A., "Netanyahu Leaves US Disgraced, Isolated 
and Weaker," Haaretz, 25 March, 2010.
326 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "PM Netanyahu Welcomes Beginning of Proximity Talks," 
Jerusalem: 9 May, 2010.
327 The statement was the product of a teleconference, and noted only support for proximity talks, and 
noted the Quartet member’s calls for both parties to create an atmosphere conducive to the talks. See: US 
Department of State, "Joint Statement of the Quartet," Washington, DC: 11 May, 2010.
328 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Proximity Talks: PM Netanyahu Meets with Senator Mitchell in 
Jerusalem," Jerusalem: 20 May, 2010.
329 See: US Department of State, "Meeting With Saeb Erekat, Chief Palestinian Negotiator," Ramallah: 23 
April, 2010., US Department of State, "Meeting With Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu," 
Jerusalem: 23 April, 2010.
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The Gaza Flotilla Incident
This was not a love boat. This was a hate boat. These weren't pacifists. These weren't 
peace activists. These were violent supporters of terrorism.
- Benjamin Netanyahu, Israeli Prime Minister (1996-1999, 
2009-Present).330
On 31 May 2010, a flotilla of six ships organised by the ‘Free Gaza Movement’ was 
intercepted by the Israeli navy after attempting to breach the blockade of the Gaza Strip. 
When Israeli commandos boarded the Mavi Marmara (the lead ship of the flotilla), the 
operation resulted in the deaths of nine civilians, and injuries to 50 others, including 
seven IDF soldiers. * In the period that followed, criticisms of the conduct of the IDF 
during Gaza flotilla incident dominated the discourse of the Middle East peace process, 
and sidelined the proximity process.
On the evening of the raid, the UN Security Council issued an urgent statement 
expressing ‘deep regret at the loss of life,’ condemning ‘acts which resulted in civilian 
deaths,’ and calling for an independent investigation into the events.332 The official 
Israeli response presented the incident as a ‘clear case of self defence,’ and argued that 
when Israeli commandos boarded the Mavi Marmara they were met with violent 
resistance by protestors. In a well-established pattern, Israel announced that it would 
conduct its own internal inquiry into the events of 31 May, and challenged the 
legitimacy of international efforts to form an independent fact-finding mission.334 The 
subsequent report of Israel’s ‘Türkei Commission,’ named after former Israeli Supreme 
Court justice Jacob Türkei, was released on 24 January 2011, and concluded that the 
Israeli blockade of Gaza as well as the IDF takeover of the Mavi Marmara both met the 
requirements of humanitarian and international law.335 International efforts to 
investigate the flotilla incident developed in parallel to the Israeli inquiry, and were led
330 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Statement by Prime Minister Netanyahu: "No Love Boat"," 
Jerusalem: 2 June, 2010.
331 United Nations Security Council, "Report of the Secretary General on the Question of Palestine," 
United Nations: A/65/380-S/2010/484: 17 September, 2010, p. 19.
332 United Nations Security Council, "Security Council Condemns Acts Resulting in Civilian Deaths 
during Israeli Operation Against Gaza-Bound Aid Convoy, Calls for Investigation, in Presidential 
Statement," SC/9940: 31 May, 2010.
33 See: Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Gaza Flotilla: Statement by PM Netanyahu," Jerusalem: 31 
May, 2010.
334 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Government Establishes Independent Public Comission," 
Jerusalem: 14 June, 2010.
335 See: Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Special Update: Türkei Commission Report on Gaza Flotilla 
Incident" Jerusalem: 24 January, 2011.
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by the UN Secretary General and the UN Human Rights Council.336 Ultimately, the UN 
fact-finding mission on the Gaza Flotilla incident concluded that:
...a series of violations of international law, including international humanitarian and 
human rights law, were committed by the Israeli forces during the interception of the 
flotilla and during the detention of passengers in Israel prior to deportation.337
While the discourse surrounding the flotilla incident essentially adhered to the 
established patterns of the Israeli-UN relationship, the specific responses of the 
Netanyahu government in the aftermath of the incident were of particular relevance to 
the work of the Quartet members.
Indeed, Israel’s heavy-handed response to the Gaza flotilla had brought international 
attention to the humanitarian crisis in the Gaza Strip, and had accelerated international 
calls for the easing of the Israeli blockade. On 9 June 2010, after a meeting with Abbas, 
Obama noted that:
With respect to the broader issue of lifting the blockade, as I said before, I think the 
key here is making sure that Israel’s security needs are met, but that the needs of 
people in Gaza are also met. And it seems to us that there should be ways of focusing 
narrowly on arms shipments, rather than focusing in a blanket way on stopping 
everything and then in a piecemeal way allowing things into Gaza.338
Obama concluded that US officials would be conducting ‘hard-headed discussions with 
Israelis’ regarding amendments to their blockade policy.3’9 Subsequently, on 17 June 
2010, the Israeli government announced a plan to ‘liberalize the system by which 
civilian goods enter Gaza,’ while still maintaining existing security procedures to limit 
the inflow of weapons and war materiel. ’40 After gaining the approval of his Security 
Cabinet, Netanyahu launched officially the amended Israeli policy on 20 June 2010, and 
was joined notably by Quartet representative Tony Blair.341
336 United Nations Security Council, "Report of the Secretary General on the Question of Palestine," p.
19.
" 7 For the full report, see: United Nations Human Rights Council, "Report of the International Fact- 
Finding Mission to Investigate Violations of International Law, Including International Humanitarian and 
Human Rights Law, Resulting From The Israeli Attacks on the Flotilla of Ships Carrying Humanitarian 
Assistance," General Assembly A/HRC/15/21: 27 September, 2010.
38 US Department of State, "Remarks By President Obama and President Abbas of the Palestinian 
Authority After Meeting," Washington, DC: 9 June, 2010.
339 Ibid.
340 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Security Cabinet Decision," Jerusalem: 17 June, 2010.
341 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Prime Minister's Office statement following the Israeli Security 
Cabinet meeting," Jerusalem: 20 June, 2010.
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The new Israeli policy towards Gaza reversed the logic of the existing restrictions, 
which had previously relied on a list of ‘permitted’ items to determine the entry of 
goods into the territory, and instead relied on a list of ‘non-permitted’ goods, allowing 
for the import of all other items into Gaza.342 Additionally, the policy allowed for the 
limited importation of construction materials for United Nations-approved 
reconstruction projects in Gaza, and a general boost to the production capacity of the 
various crossings into the territory.343 According to Netanyahu, Blair was an important 
part of the negotiations surrounding the liberalisation of Israel’s blockade policy, and 
the Prime Minister thanked Blair for his ‘statesmanship’ and for his ‘friendship.’344 The 
United States was quick to welcome the Israeli announcement,345 and in his 6 July 
meeting with Netanyahu, Obama also noted that the Quartet had been ‘very helpful’ in 
securing ‘real progress on the ground,’ in Gaza.346
The Quartet members noted on 21 June 2010 that:
...the Quartet and the Quartet Representative have worked with Israel, as well as 
consulting the Palestinian Authority, Egypt, and other concerned parties, to effect a 
fundamental change in policy in Gaza. The new policy towards Gaza just announced 
by the Government of Israel is a welcome development.347
Furthermore, the Quartet statement urged ‘all those wishing to deliver goods to do so 
through established channels so that their cargo can be inspected and transferred via 
land crossings into Gaza.’348
While the easing of the Israeli blockade of Gaza failed to address the fundamental issues 
concerning the international relationship with the Hamas government, it did provide 
diplomatic breathing space for the resumption of indirect negotiations. On 6 July 2010, 
Netanyahu met with Obama, and declared that it was ‘high time’ for the parties to 
resume direct talks.344 With the Israeli settlement moratorium set to expire in
342 For an in-depth official explanation of the specifics of this policy by the Israeli government, see: Israel 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Briefing: Israel's New Policy Towards Gaza," Jerusalem: 5 July, 2010.
343 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Prime Minister's Office statement following the Israeli Security 
Cabinet meeting."
344 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Remarks by PM Netanyahu and Tony Blair, Quartet Envoy to the 
Middle East," Jerusalem: 20 June, 2010.
345 US Department of State, "Statement by the Press Secretary on Israel’s announcement on Gaza," 
Washington, DC: 20 June, 2010.
346 US Department of State, "Remarks by President Obama and Prime Minister Netanyahu of Israel in 
Joint Press Availability," Washington, DC: 6 July, 2010.
347 US Department of State, "Statement by the Middle East Quartet," Washington, DC: 21 June, 2010.
348 Ibid.
349 US Department of State, "Remarks by President Obama and Prime Minister Netanyahu of Israel in 
Joint Press Availability."
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September, Obama agreed, declaring that he hoped to restart direct negotiations as a
350means to ‘create a climate in which everybody feels a greater investment in success.’'
In pursuit of this objective, Mitchell travelled to the region on 17 July, and again on 10 
August.351 The culmination of these efforts was the 20 August 2010 announcement of
352the resumption of bilateral negotiations between the Israelis and Palestinians.
These talks were scheduled to take place on 1 September 2010, and to include bilateral 
discussions with President Obama, followed by a dinner at the White House. Notably, 
alongside President Mubarak of Egypt and King Abdullah of Jordan, Quartet 
representative Blair was also invited to attend the dinner, in ‘view of his important work 
to help Palestinians build the institutions of their future state.’ ' When US envoy 
Mitchell was asked to explain Blair’s invitation further, he noted that:
We think it important that there be a broad basis of international support. We take 
seriously the Quartet’s role, and that’s reflected in Prime Minister Blair’s presence at 
the dinner tomorrow evening.374
Further commendations for the recent efforts of the Quartet members followed in press 
conference after the announcement, where Mitchell noted the ‘enormous support and 
assistance’ he had received from the other members of the Quartet.355 Mitchell noted 
further that the sustained and active role of the United States in urging the parties to 
resume bilateral negotiations had been aided by the ‘full participation, full input, full 
consultation,’ and ‘full support’ of a ‘wide variety of allies whose efforts have been 
extremely important getting us to this phase and will be extremely important in reaching 
a conclusion.’356 Later on the same day, the Quartet members issued a statement 
reaffirming their ‘strong support’ for direct negotiations, and noting that the parties 
should aim to complete an agreement within one year.357 As the following section
350 Ibid.
351 US Department of State, "Special Envoy Mitchell Returns to the Middle East to Urge Peace Talks," 
Ramallah, West Bank: 10 August, 2010.
352 US Department of State, "Briefing on Middle East Peace Process," Washington, DC: 20 August, 2010.
353 Ibid.
354 US Department of State, "Press Briefing by Special Envoy for Middle East Peace Senator George 
Mitchell," Washington, DC: 31 August, 2010.
355 Mitchell noted that these members included: ‘the United Nations under Secretary General Ban Ki- 
moon, who has been extremely helpful in this process; the European Union, with Lady Ashton as the 
Foreign Minister; and the -  Russia, with Foreign Minister Lavrov, have all been active and very helpful 
along with other European states.’ See: US Department of State, "Briefing on Middle East Peace 
Process."
356 Ibid.
357 US Department of State, "Statement by the Quartet," Washington, DC: 20 August, 2010.
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demonstrates, the parties were unable to sustain more than two bilateral meetings before 
the process collapsed.
The Collapse of the Negotiations Process
While the parties to the conflict announced, on 2 September 2010, that the bilateral 
process had been officially ‘relaunched,’ the issues that had plagued the previous two 
years of the peace process remained unchanged/' Indeed, Netanyahu declared that the 
‘two pillars of peace’ that would enable the parties to resolve the outstanding issues 
remained ‘legitimacy and security,’ and to the Palestinian representatives present, he 
noted that:
Just as you expect us to be ready to recognize a Palestinian state as the nation-state of 
the Palestinian people, we expect you to be prepared to recognize Israel as the nation­
state of the Jewish people.359
In an obvious rebuff to the Israeli Prime Minister, Abbas argued that the 1993 Oslo 
Accords remained a relevant document of mutual recognition between the Israeli and 
the Palestinian peoples, and that no further declaration was necessary on this issue 
because ‘we respect our commitments and our agreements.’360 Despite the parties to the 
conflict still disagreeing over the terms of reference for their negotiations, Mitchell 
announced that the second round of direct talks would take place on 14 and 15 
September and would be followed by further meetings two weeks thereafter, and ‘every 
two weeks thereafter.’361
With the Israeli settlement moratorium due to expire on 26 September 2010, the second 
round of bilateral negotiations, hosted by Egypt at Sharm el-Sheikh, was overshadowed 
by efforts to extend the deadline. In a 10 September 2010 press conference, Obama 
urged Israel to extend the settlement moratorium, and noted that the issue was a ‘major 
bone of contention’ between the parties.362 With Abbas declaring that he would not
358 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "The Relaunching of Peace Talks: US Secretary Clinton, Israel PM 
Netanyahu and PA President Abbas," Washington, DC: 2 September, 2010.
359 Ibid.
360 Ibid.
361 US Department of State, "Briefing by Special Envoy for Middle East Peace George Mitchell on 
Middle East Peace Talks," Washington, DC: 2 September, 2010.
362 US Department of State, "Press Briefing By President Obama," The White House: 10 September, 
2010.
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continue talks in the absence of an extension, and Netanyahu declaring that no such
36^extension would be granted, the bilateral process had reached an impasse.'
Seeking to avert the collapse of the political process, the Quartet members issued their 
47th statement on 21 September 2010, noting that ‘the commendable Israeli settlement 
moratorium instituted last November has had a positive impact,’ and ‘urged its 
continuation.’364 When the settlement moratorium ended on 26 September 2010, Abbas 
declared that he would require authorisation from the Arab League in order to continue 
negotiations, thus allowing the United States time to pursue an Israeli extension.365 
Ultimately these efforts were unsuccessful, and on 8 October 2010, the Arab League 
‘endorsed the decision of the Palestinian leadership to halt talks with Israel over 
renewed construction in West Bank settlements.’ Notably, President Abbas refused to 
rule out categorically a return to indirect negotiations, and in the period that followed 
the United States attempted to return the parties to a political framework. These 
attempts included a trip to the region by Clinton on 11 November,' and a follow-up 
trip to the region by Mitchell on 13 December 2010.' Ultimately, both efforts ended in 
failure, and as 2010 drew to a close, Palestinian officials began to express their interest 
in pursuing political objectives outside of existing frameworks with Israel or the United 
States.
Indeed, with the prospects for a negotiated solution at their lowest point in years, 
Palestinian leaders placed greater emphasis on the ongoing state-building process of 
Prime Minister Salam Fayyad.366 Launched with little fanfare in August 2009, Fayyad’s 
two year plan sought to lay the groundwork for the creation of a Palestinian state by 
August 2011 through a process of Palestinian institutional development, and economic 
cooperation with Israel and the United States. The Quartet members had endorsed
363 Ravid, B., "Israel and Palestinians Clash Over Agenda for Direct Peace Talks," Haaretz, 12 
September, 2010.
364 US Department of State, "Statement by the Quartet."
365 Reuters, "Abbas: Settlement Construction Will 'Force' Us to Quit Talks," Haaretz, 28 September, 
2010.
366 Reuters, "Arab League Endorses Palestinian Decision to Halt Peace Talks," Haaretz, 8 October, 2010.
367 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Joint statement by PM Netanyahu and US Sec Clinton," 
Washington, DC: 11 November, 2010.
368 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Remarks Before Meeting Between PM Netanyahu and US Special 
Envoy Mitchell," Jerusalem: 13 December, 2010.
369 For an in-depth analysis of the evolution of the Fayyad state-building project, see: Danin, R., "A Third 
Way to Palestine: Fayyadism and its Discontents," Foreign Affairs 90, no. 1 (2011).
370 International Crisis Group, "Tipping Point? The Palestinians and the Search for a New Strategy," p. 
22 .
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Fayyad’s strategy on numerous occasions, and had noted particular support for the
371cooperation between Quartet representative Blair and Fayyad on this project.
In 2011, the Middle East was shaken by a series of popular uprisings in Arab countries, 
unconnected to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. By 13 May 2011, Mitchell had resigned, 
citing the end of his two year appointment, and his desire to return to his family.372 
Consequently, Palestinian frustrations were channelled into efforts to seek recognition 
of the Palestinian state-building project at the United Nations, and the prospects of a
373negotiated solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict diminished further.
371 The 24 September 2009 Quartet statement had welcomed ‘the Palestinian Authority's plan for 
constructing the institutions of the Palestinian state within 24 months as a demonstration of the PA's 
serious commitment to an independent state that provides opportunity, justice, and security for the 
Palestinian people and is a responsible neighbor to all states in the region.’ See: US Department of State, 
"Joint Statement by the Quartet."
Furthermore, the 19 March 2010 Quartet statement had noted that: ‘The Quartet endorses fully the efforts 
of the Quartet Representative in support of Prime Minister Fayyad’s state-building and economic 
development program which has seen significant improvement in the Palestinian Authority’s performance 
with respect to security and law and order and improved economic growth.’ See: US Department of State, 
"Joint Statement by the Quartet".
72 US Department of State, "Statement by the President on the Resignation of Middle East Envoy George 
Mitchell," Washington, DC: 13 May, 2011.
373 For expert analysis of this period, see: Malley, R. and Agha, H., "Who's Afraid of the Palestinians? ," 
The New York Review of Books, 10 February, 2011.
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Diplomacy is always a judgement call about how much you should declare that certain 
things must happen when you cannot deliver them, and how much you should focus 
on what you can deliver, what can build more confidence and trust between the 
parties, what can create more political space for the parties to do some of these things 
that otherwise they’re not doing. These are difficult judgement calls, and we’re 
constantly debating them and discussing them and arguing them.
- United Nations official.1
Without its special relationship with Israel, American would have little influence in 
Arab-Israeli peacemaking. That simple fact is one of the best-kept secrets of American 
diplomacy.
- Aaron David Miller, senior advisor on Arab-Israeli 
negotiations to United States Secretary of State Colin Powell 
(2001-2003).2
Introduction
The previous chapters established the factors that underpinned the formation of the 
Quartet, and contextualised the work of the grouping in relation to the Israeli- 
Palestinian conflict from 2001-2011. This concluding chapter evaluates the results of 
the grouping’s deliberations and actions in aggregate throughout this period, focusing 
less on what the Quartet did, and more on an assessment of its performance. It examines 
the extent to which the Quartet members achieved their various objectives throughout 
the period of analysis. It also offers a more general discussion of the utility of the 
Quartet as a mechanism for both harmonisation and collaboration efforts.
The chapter argues that the fundamental characteristics of the Quartet, including its 
membership and practices, dictated the outputs and shaped to a large extent the eventual 
outcomes of the grouping’s efforts. While the design of the Quartet excluded the parties 
to the conflict, the internal decision-making processes of the grouping could not be 
isolated from regional developments, nor could the Quartet members ensure that their 
policies would be implemented without cooperation from the Israelis and Palestinians.
Furthermore, although the Quartet’s consensus-based approach allowed for robust 
internal discussion and disagreement, it also often led to the dilution of the grouping’s 
normative influence, and frequently reduced statements to the lowest common 
denominator. In both the creation and implementation of Quartet positions, the United
1 UN official. Interview with the author, Jerusalem, November, 2011.
2 Miller, A. D., The Much Too Promised Land: America's Elusive Search for Arab-Israeli Peace (New  
York: Bantam Books, 2008), p. 79.
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States consistently protected its role as the primary third-party actor in the Middle East 
peace process, and much of the Quartet’s work functioned to legitimise and promote US 
initiatives.
The fundamental constraints and paradigms of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict also 
played a significant role in limiting the utility of the Quartet as an actor in this context, 
often more than any particular policy or initiative that the Quartet pursued as a group.3 
As the previous chapters have demonstrated, from 2001-2011, the Quartet members 
adapted their work to fit the changing nature of the conflict, and in response to specific 
developments in the region.4 In many cases, regional developments, especially those 
that originated in Israel, altered the discourse of the peace process, and derailed Quartet 
initiatives.5
However, neither regional setbacks nor internal Quartet disagreements and limits to its 
influence represented a failure of the Quartet as a mechanism. Indeed, it is argued that 
both the formation and flexible and informal operation of the Quartet matched 
reasonably well and realistically the needs and capabilities of its members, and the key 
global and regional paradigms (especially regarding the US-Israel relationship). 
Disagreements between the Quartet members, or miscalculations made by them, were 
not caused by the Quartet mechanism itself.
This chapter is divided into three main sections, each focusing on a different -  but still 
related -  aspect of Quartet activity. Section One examines the strengths and limitations 
of the Quartet as a mechanism for the pursuit of collective outcomes within the context 
of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It concludes that the Quartet had a limited ability to 
influence the policies of Israel, and the United States maintained its role as the key 
third-party mediator within the peace process at the expense of an enhanced role for the 
Quartet. Section Two examines the strengths and limitations of the Quartet as a 
mechanism for its members to pursue their individual organisational and national goals 
within the context of the Middle East peace process. This section concludes that the
3 A UN official argued: ‘It’s hard to determine how much of this reflects the fundamental intractability of 
the conflict, and also the multiple complexities of international politics surrounding the issue, and how 
much of it is the Quartet’s shortcomings as an instrument. My analysis is more the former.’ UN official. 
Interview with the author, Jerusalem, November, 2011.
4 For example, in 2005 the Quartet members created a Quartet envoy position for former World Bank 
President James Wolfensohn in order facilitate his involvement in the Israeli disengagement from Gaza 
on their behalf.
5 For example, the way in which Prime Minister Sharon’s disengagement plan sidelined the Roadmap 
implementation process.
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factors that underpinned the formation of the Quartet remained relevant for each of the 
Quartet members throughout the period of analysis, and that the primary role of the 
grouping within this context was as a mechanism for the harmonisation of competing 
policies among the members. Section Three briefly examines the continuation of the 
Quartet, including the extent to which the Quartet can or might be improved as a 
mechanism. It concludes that the design of the Quartet is based on the requirements of 
its members, and that any modification to the central components of the grouping -  
namely the informal and consensus-based approach -  could render the Quartet either 
undesirable or unnecessary for its members. Thus, any significant changes in the outputs 
or outcomes of the Quartet must originate in changes to the foreign policies of the 
Quartet members rather than in changes to the nature of the grouping. Finally, the 
chapter concludes by revisiting the research question, and summarising the findings of 
the thesis.
Critiquing the Quartet
Before beginning Section One, it is important to identity and address the key challenges 
of determining the outcomes of the Quartet. Firstly, the work of the Quartet members 
was not a discrete historical event that can be contained neatly within a defined period. 
While this thesis established the key historical precedents to the Quartet and examined 
the work of the grouping within a ten year window, this timeframe reflects both the 
practical constraints of the thesis as well as the emerging factors in the Middle East that 
complicated further analysis of the grouping. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict does not 
exist in isolation from the broader regional context, and recent changes to this context 
necessarily led to changes in the political and strategic calculations of the Israelis and 
Palestinians as well as global actors with interests in the region.6 Thus, despite the Arab 
uprisings of January 2011 marking the end-point of the analysis of the outputs of the 
Quartet, the grouping has continued to work and to evolve.
6 Agha and Malley argue that the Arab Uprisings threaten to complicate further the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict, and to diminish the prospects for resolution: ‘In the age of Arab Islamism, Israel may find 
Hamas’s purported intransigence more malleable than Fatah’s ostensible moderation. Israel fears the 
Islamic awakening. But the more immediate threat could be to the Palestinian national movement. There 
is no energy left in the independence project; associated with the old politics and long-worn-out 
leaderships, it has expended itself. Fatah and the PLO will have no place in the new world. The two-state 
solution is no one’s primary concern. It might expire not because of violence, settlements, or America’s 
inexpert role. It might perish of indifference.’ See: Malley, R. and Agha, H., "This is Not a Revolution," 
The New York Review of Books, 8 November, 2012.
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Secondly, throughout the period of analysis neither the Quartet itself nor the nature of 
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict remained static. Personnel changes affected the 
performance of the grouping,7 and the members utilised the Quartet in differing ways 
over time in response to regional and organisational contexts. For example, the Quartet 
has been used as tool for exerting normative pressure on the parties to the conflict, 
developing a framework for the resolution of the conflict, caucusing with regional 
actors, fundraising and institution building, laying the foundations for UN Security 
Council action, and supporting and legitimising US initiatives. Furthermore, as a UN 
official noted, these variations in Quartet activities were carried out by the members in a 
way that was ‘constantly discussed, but never fully defined.’8 Thus, the fluid and 
ambiguous nature of the Quartet during the period of analysis makes both general and 
specific conclusions about the effectiveness of the grouping problematic, as its 
effectiveness varied depending on context and application. Compounding this problem 
was the changing nature of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which underwent several 
paradigm shifts during the period of analysis.
The challenge in assessing the work of the Quartet members, therefore, is that the many 
changes in the social, political and economic conditions in both Israel and the 
Palestinian territories from 2001-2011 cannot be isolated as factors. In essence, the 
Quartet members were not able to take action independently from prevailing political 
and strategic contexts that were, in many respects, fluid. Consequently, even in the 
context of the emergence and promotion of the Roadmap, it is difficult to identify clear- 
cut changes to political or policy baselines which might assist in determining the exact 
impact of the Quartet alone, or which could enable one to draw absolute conclusions 
about the grouping’s performance.
Finally, and inseparable from the above, there was no ‘non-Quartet’ scenario with 
which to compare the record presented in this thesis. Given that the Quartet acted as a 
conduit for the competing agendas of its members within a multifaceted environment, 
determining the exact extent of the Quartet’s impact within this environment is highly 
problematic. Conclusions regarding what might have occurred in the absence of the 
Quartet, therefore, are neither feasible nor constructive.
7 At the time of the 21 September 2010 Quartet statement (the final Quartet statement discussed in this 
thesis) no principal or envoy to the Quartet remained from the formation of the grouping. As a grouping 
inherently designed to rely on interpersonal cooperation and with little to no organisational structure, the 
changing nature of Quartet personnel inherently affects the outputs and outcomes of the grouping.
* UN official. Interview with the author, Jerusalem, November, 2011.
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Likewise, recommendations concerning alternate policies or positions that the Quartet 
members should have taken within any given regional context are also unhelpful. This 
problem also complicates discussions of the value of the Quartet as a tool for reducing 
competition between its members or preventing a total regression of the Israeli- 
Palestinian relationship, because both positions rely on the absence of an occurrence as 
evidence of success. These variables are not just unknown, they are unknowable.
For these reasons, a ‘report card’ style evaluation of the Quartet members that measures 
the effectiveness of the grouping in isolation from its organisational and regional 
context, and in relation to a handful of key metrics, is much more likely to misrepresent 
the Quartet itself, or to misunderstand the nature of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. One 
example of such an assessment is the September 2008 Oxfam International ‘Progress 
Report’ on the work of the Quartet.9 The report evaluated the Quartet members on the 
basis of progress made in several key areas of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.10 It relied 
on a single Quartet statement to establish the objectives of the Quartet members, and 
provided no explanation of either the internal decision-making processes of the 
grouping or of the responses of the parties to the conflict to Quartet initiatives.
Ultimately, the report concluded that the Quartet had failed in almost every objective it 
had laid out (as determined by Oxfam), and argued that the grouping needed to ‘hold all 
parties accountable to their obligations under international law through the 
implementation of tangible measures to ensure accountability and prevent impunity.’* 11 
In addition, the report recommended that the Quartet members should ‘channel greater 
efforts into bringing a swift end to the blockade of Gaza and reinstating the Agreement 
on Movement and Access,’ and to take ‘concrete measures’ to address the Israeli 
closure policy in the West Bank.12 Without further elaboration on the form these 
measures might take, such analysis brings little value to discussions of either the Quartet 
as a mechanism or the Israeli-Palestinian conflict more generally, and more recent work 
from other scholars repeats this formula. ' By downplaying or ignoring the complexities
9 Oxfam International, "The Middle East Quartet: A Progress Report," 25 September, 2008, p. 6.
10 Specifically, these areas were ‘settlements, access and movement, Gaza, Palestinian security sector 
reform, donor pledges, and the revival ofprivate sector activity in the occupied Palestinian territories.’ 
See: Ibid., p. 4.
11 Ibid., p. 24.
12 Ibid., p. 12.
13 Tocci’s 2013 analysis of the Quartet reviews key actions taken by the members and evaluates the 
grouping through a ‘multilateralist’ framework. Consequently, the author concludes that the Quartet was 
an ineffective mechanism for collective action, but fails to examine the role played by the parties to the
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of Quartet behavior, such research exaggerates the capabilities of the Quartet members 
to affect change within the peace process, and understates the extent to which the 
Israelis and Palestinians are able to resist or undermine the efforts of third parties within 
this same context. As argued previously, it is important to maintain a distinction 
between the failings of the Quartet in regard to its actual or perceived objectives, and 
the limitations of the Quartet in pursuit of those objectives.
Consequently, this thesis has adopted a complex and comprehensive approach to 
examining the Quartet that attempts -  to the maximum extent possible -  to present a 
complete picture of Quartet behaviour. In evaluating this behaviour in aggregate, this 
chapter discusses the strengths and limitations of the Quartet as a platform for achieving 
either individual or collective outcomes for its members. It focuses more on observable 
trends in the work of the Quartet members than it does on specific Quartet responses to 
individual events, which have been discussed in detail in the previous chapters. This 
chapter concludes that the Quartet has significant limitations as a tool for its members, 
but none that preclude arguments for the continuation of the grouping.
Section One: The Collective Outcomes of the Quartet
However vehemently they may deny it, Palestinians secretly latch on to the belief that 
the US will someday save them; Israelis cling to the notion that the US will forever 
protect them. Too often, both display greater interest in gaining America’s support 
than in persuading each other.
- Robert Malley and Hussein Agha.14
If the Israelis are not going to deal with the Quartet and are only going to deal with the 
United States, then either we all don’t play, or one of us plays a more significant role, 
and it ended up the latter almost all the time.
- Daniel Kurtzer, United States Ambassador to Israel (2001- 
2005).15
The Quartet is underpinned by the notion that the parties to the conflict are inherently 
unable to resolve their differences without outside intervention.16 The most effective
conflict in responding to, and acting as the stimulus for, Quartet initiatives. See: Tocci, N., "The Middle 
East Quartet and (In)effective Multilateralism," Middle East Journal 67, no. 1 (2013).
14 Malley, R. and Agha, H., "Who's Afraid of the Palestinians? ," The New York Review o f Books, 10 
February, 2011.
15 Kurtzer, D., Former United States Ambassador to Israel, interview with the author, Princeton, NJ, 
October, 2011.
16 Kurtzer and Lasensky argue that ‘simply stated, large asymmetries of power require a robust third-party 
role. Power dynamics in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict are deeply unbalanced, leaving the parties unable 
to reach viable negotiated arrangements on their own.’ Kurtzer, D. and Lasensky, S., Negotiating Arab-
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forms and functions of such interventions, however, were a matter of constant debate 
between the Quartet members, who sought to maximise their collective influence within 
the established constraints of the peace process. These constraints, especially stemming 
from the nature of the US-Israel relationship, played a central role in determining the 
collective outcomes of the Quartet from 2001-2011.
The strengths of the Quartet as a vehicle for collective outcomes largely reflected the 
capacity of the grouping to support fundraising and state-building initiatives, and the 
extent to which the Quartet was utilised as a platform for normative influence.
However, in neither sphere did the Quartet demonstrate unqualified success.
Throughout the period of analysis, there were numerous examples of the Quartet 
members either leading or facilitating international fundraising efforts in support of 
Palestinian state-building or humanitarian projects. The extent to which such efforts 
produced lasting outcomes within the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, 
however, was largely dictated by the political processes within both the region and the 
Quartet itself. For example, Quartet envoy James Wolfensohn raised substantial funds 
in support of Palestinian agricultural projects in the Gaza Strip during the 
disengagement period, but his efforts were ultimately undermined by both US and 
Israeli handling of the Agreement on Movement and Access. Another such example 
was the creation of the Temporary International Mechanism (TIM) in June 2006 by the 
Quartet members -  at the insistence of European officials -  as a tool for channelling 
funds to President Abbas during the Palestinian fiscal crisis.19 While the TIM was an 
important mechanism for addressing the payroll deficits within the Palestinian Authority 
at the time, it was only made necessary by the international financial and political 
boycott of the Hamas-led government championed by the Quartet members during 
2006. This demonstrated that the Quartet had the capacity to marshal the fundraising 
potential of the international community, but that the outcomes of such activities were
Israeli Peace: American Leadership in the Middle East (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace 
Press, 2007), p. 7.
17 For example, the participation of the Quartet in the Task Force on Palestinian Reform in July 2002, the 
London conference on Palestinian state-building in March 2005, and the Paris donor conference of 2007 
discussed in the previous chapters.
18 Wolfensohn concluded that the funds raised in support of the Palestinian greenhouse project in the 
Gaza strip (left by departing Israeli settlers), were ultimately squandered by the continuation of Israeli 
restrictions, supported by the United States, on the export of goods from Gaza in the aftermath of the 
disengagement (Chapter Six: The Disengagement Process).
19 As Chapter Seven: The Palestinian Divide established, the TIM was proposed and developed by 
European Commissioner Benita Ferrero-Waldner, and was only accepted reluctantly by the US as a 
mechanism that the Quartet should publicly endorse.
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subject to political constraints the Quartet members showed only limited success in 
mitigating.
Likewise, as a normative instrument, the collective outcomes of the Quartet members 
were varied. The Quartet demonstrated a capacity to withstand both regional and 
organisational change, and provided a forum for its members to channel their messages 
to the Israelis and Palestinians. However, while the Quartet statements functioned as an 
important record of the discourse of the peace process -  and the work of the members 
within it -  the extent to which these statements had tangible impacts on the parties to the 
conflict was both limited and unequal. The consensus-based approach to statement 
authorship resulted in the frequent dilution of Quartet messaging throughout the period 
of analysis, and even to the complete cessation of Quartet activity during periods of 
regional upheaval. As a Palestinian aide to President Abbas, Mohammed Shtayyeh, 
declared publicly in 2012:
The Quartet has been useless, useless, useless... the statements of the Quartet really 
meant nothing because [they were] always full of what they call constructive 
ambiguity that really took us nowhere...You need a mediator who is ready to engage 
and who is ready to say to the party who is destroying the peace process ‘You are 
responsible for it.’21
The extent to which the Quartet could act as a mechanism for such ‘robust’ diplomatic 
statements, however, was entirely reliant on the level of agreement among its members 
to adopt such an approach. The nature of the US-Israel relationship made such
99normative clarity a rare occurrence.
Thus, the central challenge for the Quartet members was translating their common 
positions into tangible results on the ground, often in the absence of a strong internal 
consensus. For this reason some Quartet members asserted that the grouping functioned 
best as a ‘buffer,’ maintaining the semblance of a ‘process’ in the midst of deep
20 Chapter Four: The General Practices of the Quartet established that the frequency of Quartet 
statements was closely linked to regional circumstances, and that the most divisive periods in the region 
often coincided with extended periods of Quartet inaction.
21 Kalman, M., '"Useless, Useless, Useless': The Palestinian Verdict on Tony Blair's Job," The 
Independent, 16 December, 2012.
22 The 19 March 2010 Quartet statement was described by a UN official as a ‘highpoint of Quartet 
normative clarity.’ Crucially, and as established in Chapter Eight: The Post-Annapolis Period, this 
statement took place within the context of strained relations between the Netanyahu and Obama 
Administrations over the announcement of an Israeli settlement project during the visit of Vice President 
Biden. The statement made clear references to international law, condemned the Israeli housing 
announcement, and called for a total freeze on Israeli settlement construction. See: US Department of 
State, "Joint Statement by the Quartet" Moscow, Russia: 19 March, 2010.
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divisions between the parties to the conflict, and preventing a full-scale regression of the 
Israeli-Palestinian relationship.23 This claim is challenged by two interrelated examples 
during the period of analysis. Firstly, in December 2008, the Quartet members 
attempted to preserve the political progress that had been made between President 
Abbas and Prime Minister Olmert by facilitating UNSCR 1850, which declared that 
bilateral negotiations were ‘irreversible.’24 This resolution was followed by Israeli 
Operation Cast Lead and by the election of Prime Minister Netanyahu, both of which 
altered the Israeli-Palestinian political landscape, and upturned the negotiations process. 
Secondly, during Operation Cast Lead, when Israeli-Palestinian violence reached a 
critical level, the members of the Quartet were unable to reach a common position on 
the issue.“' While such a position would have provided no guarantee of an Israeli 
withdrawal -  especially when UNSCR 1860 failed to do so -  the inability of the Quartet 
members to form a common position in a moment of crisis calls into question the utility 
of the grouping as a ‘buffer’ during periods of violence. In both instances, neither the 
Quartet members nor the UN Security Council were able to prevent or reduce 
diplomatic or security crises between the Israelis and Palestinians.26 As a protector of 
the Middle East peace process, the Quartet can be easily divided or ignored, particularly 
by Israel.
Thus, the central limitation of the Quartet as a vehicle for collective action was the 
inability of the grouping to influence the policies of Israel. This inability stemmed from 
both Israeli opposition to the ‘internationalisation’ of the conflict, and from the US 
preservation of its exclusive relationship with Israel -  and corresponding role as the 
primary third-party in the MEPP.“ Two related trends stemmed from this central
23 Jouret, C., Middle East Advisor, European External Action Service (EEAS), interview with the author, 
Brussels, November, 2011.
24 United Nations Security Council, "Resolution 1850: The Situation in the Middle East, Including the 
Palestinian Question," S/RES/1850: 16 December, 2008.
25 Chapter Eight: The Post-Annapolis Process established that the US prevented effective Quartet action 
during this context, and also delayed the UN Security Council response to Operation Cast Lead.
26 For this reason, the Quartet member’s demonstrated ability to facilitate supportive UN Security Council 
Resolutions, such as UNSCR 1397 and UNSCR 1515, is undercut by Israel’s equally established ability 
to resist the demands of such resolutions.
27 Heller argued that Israel’s resistance to an enhanced international role in the conflict reflected the 
asymmetry between the two parties: Tn conflicts, especially international conflicts, the stronger party is 
more resistant to internationalisation of the conflict and the weaker party is more welcoming of 
internationalisation of the conflict. And you find this everywhere; it’s not just an Israeli peculiarity.’ 
Heller, M., Principal Research Associate at the Institute for National Security Studies, Tel Aviv 
University, interview with the author, Tel Aviv, November, 2011.
2S de Soto expands on the nature and rationale of US leadership within this context: ‘There is a curious 
asymmetric coincidence between Israel and the Palestinians regarding the U S’s third-party role in 
negotiations between them: when push comes to shove Israel can accept an intrusive US third- party role
292
Chapter Nine: Conclusion -  The Outcomes o f the Quartet, 2001-2011
limitation of the Quartet. One was that the policies of the Quartet disproportionately 
affected the Palestinians, who were less able to resist international pressure than their 
Israeli counterparts, and the other was that the United States, in maintaining its bilateral 
prerogatives regarding Israel, became the guarantor of Quartet collective action.
The Roadmap process exemplified these associated dynamics. Firstly, Israel’s resistance 
to a Quartet role in the peace process was evident in both the Israeli reservations to the 
Roadmap document,“ and in Prime Minister Sharon’s refusal to meet with the grouping 
as a collective .30 In light o f Israel’s strong objections to a Quartet monitoring role, the 
United States assumed the position of Roadmap monitor to the exclusion of the other 
Quartet members. For UNSG Annan, US capitulation to Israeli preferences in this 
regard undercut the Roadmap implementation process:
The United States’ unwillingness to contemplate empowering a joint platform that 
could criticise not just the Palestinians but Israel too undid much of the potential of the 
Roadmap.32
It should be noted that the crux of the monitoring issue was not determining whether the 
parties were implementing their Roadmap commitments, but rather, determining what 
political consequences either the United States or the Quartet members were willing to
because they know that the US is a close ally which can be counted on not to betray it or even pull any 
surprises — the US usually floats proposals with the Israelis before presenting them to the Palestinians. 
Israelis also take advantage of their unique ability to influence the formulation of US policy. The 
Palestinians, for their part, accept and indeed have traditionally encouraged the US role because they 
believe that only the US, if anyone, can deliver Israel. These factors put the US in a quasi-indispensable 
position.’ See: de Soto, A., "End of Mission Report," The Guardian, 12 June, 2007, p. 25.
29 The fourth Israeli reservation specifically ruled out any ‘combined or unified mechanism’ to monitor 
the Roadmap, and stated that any verification activity would be the sole purview of the United States, and 
would only focus on Palestinian performance. See: Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Israel's Response 
to the Roadmap," Jerusalem: 25 May, 2003.
30 Chapter Five: The Roadmap Process established that the Israeli Prime Minister refused to meet directly 
with the Quartet members when presented with the Roadmap document by US Ambassador to Israel, 
Daniel Kurtzer. An EU official noted later that Sharon was consistently able to ‘restrain his enthusiasm’ 
in regard to the Quartet in the subsequent period. Jouret. Interview with the author, Brussels, November, 
2011.
31 Terje Roed-Larsen noted that this decision reflected US concerns the entire process might be derailed 
by this issue: ‘The Israelis were always massively and monumentally and totally resistant to any 
monitoring mechanism. So we pushed very hard for it, but what, in particular, the Americans emphasised 
is that there is no way that you will get the Israelis to move along if there is a monitoring mechanism. So 
what was agreed a long time ago was that the Americans would basically monitor, and then report to the 
Quartet. But that’s still too weak, and this is one of the major weaknesses of the Roadmap, as I see it.’ 
Roed-Larsen, T., Former United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East peace process, 
interview with the author, New York City, October, 2011.
l2 Annan, K., Interventions: A Life in War and Peace (New York: Penguin Press, 2012), p. 284.
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impose for non-compliance.3' With the United States allowing for an ambiguous Israeli 
interpretation of the Roadmap’s sequencing and core components, and actively 
excluding the other Quartet members from the implementation process,"34 such 
consequences -  especially concerning Israel non-compliance -  were politically 
unlikely. Accordingly, the Roadmap process became skewed towards Israel’s 
requirements of the Palestinians.36 Notably, the presentation of the Roadmap document 
to the Palestinians became conditional upon the appointment, by Arafat, of an 
‘empowered’ Prime Minister, and the early focus of the Quartet members revolved
37entirely around Palestinian security sector reform."
While the Quartet members struggled as a collective to influence the policies of Israel, 
two qualifications to this conclusion are necessary. Firstly, throughout the period of 
analysis, the United States also had limited success in influencing the policies of Israel, 
particularly in the security sphere. Secondly, the parties to the conflict were both 
capable -  albeit to varying extents -  to resist third-party intervention in the peace 
process, and the driving forces for regional change were often the result of the decisions 
made by the Israelis and Palestinians.
While some have argued that the United States lacks the willpower to exert pressure on 
their Israeli counterparts, the nature of the US-Israel relationship also involves 
limitations on the circumstances in which the United States is capable of influencing 
Israel.38 This distinction was emphasised by Kurtzer, who argued that what the United
33 As a UN official noted: ‘We all know what is happening with settlements, or rocket smuggling, or 
incitement, it’s not that we don’t know it. The issue there would be, is there a political consensus about 
what to do about it?’ UN official. Interview with the author, Jerusalem, November, 2011.
34 As discussed previously, the US response to the Israeli reservations was to proceed on the basis that 
such issues would be ‘addressed’ but without signaling specific acceptance of them. The launch of the 
Roadmap at Aqaba in June 2003 excluded the non-US Quartet members, with President Bush meeting 
directly with Abbas and Sharon.
35 Kurtzer noted that there are three components to effective monitoring: ‘There’s monitoring, there’s 
accountability, and then there’s the implications of failure. And none of those was really done right. There 
was some monitoring done, but the other two, no.’ Kurtzer. Interview with the author, Princeton, NJ, 
October, 2011.
36 EU official Christian Jouret noted that the Palestinians were in ‘no position to refuse the Quartet,’ 
during the early work of the grouping, and that the Quartet became a way to ‘pressure the Palestinians to 
do more on security.’ Jouret. Interview with the author, Brussels, November, 2011.
37 Kurtzer noted that the early work of the Quartet ‘focused almost entirely on the Palestinian side,’ in 
response to the fact that: ‘We found that the Israelis didn’t like the Quartet particularly, even though they 
may have liked each individual component, and that they basically wouldn’t deal with the Quartet as a 
Quartet. So there was a lot of consulting and coordinating among the four, but in practical terms, most of 
the action then was directed towards the Palestinians, up to and including the Roadmap process.’ Kurtzer. 
Interview with the author, Princeton, NJ, October, 2011.
38 Muasher argued that: ‘The success or lack of success [of the Quartet] came because everybody deferred 
to the US, and the US did not have the political will to push this forward. So there was nothing the
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States can do in relation to Israel and what the United States wants to do in relation to
-5Q
Israel are two separate issues that are often conflated.' These dynamics were also 
illustrated by Condoleezza Rice, in her explanation of US policy regarding Israel’s 
Operation Defensive Shield in 2002:
First, there is an assumption, particularly among the Arabs and even the Europeans, 
that if the United States threatens Israel with diplomatic isolation or perhaps 
limitations on financial or military assistance, Israel will comply immediately and 
completely. That, of course, isn’t true, particularly in the midst of a military operation 
deemed necessary for Israel’s security by its democratically elected government. What 
is more, what U.S. President wants to threaten the United States’ ally in this way when 
Israel is responding to an attack? Second, the President has to be careful because if he 
calls for the Israelis to stop and they do not, his credibility and that of the United 
States will be severely damaged.40
Thus, throughout the period of analysis, the imbalance of power did not always dictate 
the outcomes of US efforts to influence Israel.41 Indeed, there were instances of the 
United States both choosing not to exert influence on Israel, and attempting to exert 
influence to little effect.42 A key example of the latter was the fluctuating US efforts to 
curb Israeli settlement construction.43 Furthermore, throughout the period of analysis, 
Israeli leaders also demonstrated a clear capacity to influence US policies concerning 
the Middle East peace process. In particular, Ariel Sharon’s successful efforts to secure 
political concessions from President Bush in the lead-up to the Israeli disengagement 
from Gaza. In short, while the success of Quartet initiatives relied on the support of the 
United States, it was not guaranteed by it.
Quartet could do, no matter what structure it had.’ Muasher, M., Former Jordanian Foreign Minister and 
current Vice President for studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, interview with the 
author, Washington, DC, October, 2011.
39 Kurtzer argued that the US has always maintained a differential approach to Israeli security concerns, 
and noted that if the US ever wanted to ‘go to the mat’ with Israel, it certainly could, but that the only 
area in which the US would be motivated to pursue such an approach would be security, where it has no 
intention of doing so.’ Kurtzer. Interview with the author, Princeton, NJ, October, 2011.
40 Rice, C., No Higher Honor: A Memoir of My Years in Washington, 1st ed. (New York: Crown 
Publishers, 2011), p. 138.
41 Miller argues that: ‘In conflicts where memory, identity, and history figure prominently, a great power 
-  especially a great power from far away -  has far less stake in a particular outcome than does a small 
power in the heart o f the contested region.’ See: Miller, The Much Too Promised Land: America's Elusive 
Search for Arab-Israeli Peace, p. 37.
42 According to Rice, during the 2006 Israel-Lebanon war, she resisted efforts at the G8 Summit to issue a 
statement calling for an Israeli ceasefire, noting to her colleagues that ‘We can call for a ceasefire until 
w e’re blue in the face. It isn’t going to happen until Israel has completed its operation.’ Rice, No Higher 
Honor: A Memoir of My Years in Washington, p. 473.
43 In particular, the Obama Administration’s insistence on the need for a total settlement freeze in 2009 
and 2010, and the ability of Prime Minister Netanyahu to resist such demands.
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Furthermore, from 2001-2011, both the Israelis and the Palestinians demonstrated a 
capacity to shape regional events in the absence of outside involvement, and the Quartet 
members -  including the United States -  frequently operated in response to these 
developments. While the Quartet as a mechanism provided its members with a platform 
for the quick coordination of policy in the event of regional developments, it provided 
no guarantees that these policies would produce outcomes preferred by the Quartet 
members. As Otte noted:
The Israelis and Palestinians don’t wait for westerners to come to them. They know 
each other. They work together privately and hate each other in public as they have 
always done. They’re surprisingly close to each other at the same time as engaging in
44a zero-sum game.
An example of such coordination was the close working relationship between Israeli 
Prime Minister Olmert and Palestinian President Abbas throughout 2007 and 2008, 
which was supported -  but not initiated -  by the Quartet members. Similarly, the 
Quartet members were not able to prevent the outcome of the 2006 PLC elections, nor 
were they able to affect change in the organisational nature of Hamas in the post 
election period. Instead, the Quartet members operated in an unpredictable regional 
context, in which no single actor was decisive, but multiple actors could spoil. They 
attempted to shape regional developments as they emerged ,45 but were frequently 
limited in their capacity to produce meaningful outcomes in the region -  regardless of 
the strength of their internal consensus.
The culmination of the Quartet’s challenging internal and external environments was 
that much of the work of the grouping from 2001 -2011 revolved around either 
supporting US initiatives, or promoting and maintaining the core terms of reference of 
the conflict.46 It is in this latter category that Quartet insiders have relegated the 
Roadmap document, useful now only as a reminder to parties of their previous 
commitments, and as a ‘baseline’ for future efforts.47 The danger of this approach, as
44 Otte, M., Former European Union Quartet envoy, Interview with author, Brussels, November, 2011.
45 A key example was the 2010 Gaza Flotilla incident, after which Quartet Representative Tony Blair, 
among others, leveraged international condemnation o f IDF conduct to achieve an easing of the Israeli 
blockade on Gaza.
46 One notable example was the Quartet’s consistent support for the Arab Peace Initiative throughout the 
period of analysis. In addition to introducing the API into the terms of reference of the Roadmap, the 
Quartet members frequently noted the importance of the initiative to the final resolution of the Arab- 
Israeli conflict. For one such example, see: US Department of State, "Joint Statement of the Quartet," 
Berlin, Germany: 30 May, 2007.
47 Annan described the Roadmap as: ‘still the reference point around which any effort to re-energize a 
political effort on the Israeli-Palestinian track should be centred. It remains the only document of recent
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Jouret noted, was that the Quartet was operating as a ‘lifeline to a process that is dead,’ 
essentially preserving the defunct notion that the parties to the conflict were able to 
resolve their differences through negotiations. Furthermore, as the post-Annapolis 
period demonstrated, the conditions of the Roadmap document could be used by the 
parties to the conflict as a justification for both action and inaction. Ultimately, as a UN 
official noted, despite its imperfections, the Roadmap document will remain relevant 
until something better is created to replace it.49 The same conclusion could be reached 
regarding the Quartet itself.
Section Two: The Individual Outcomes of the Quartet
The Quartet was, and still is I suppose, a genuine place where different players who 
have an interest in this region are consulting, confronting their positions, and 
influencing each other.
- Marc Otte, European Union Special Representative to the 
Middle East Peace Process (2003-2011).50
Any grouping that operates on the basis of consensus is at the mercy of the lowest 
common denominator, and that denominator is defined by the United States, which 
has very serious qualms about exerting pressure on Israel.
- Alvaro De Soto, United Nations Special Coordinator for the 
Middle East Peace Process (2005-2007).51
The Quartet members did not each have a quarter of the power within the grouping. As 
a platform for diplomacy, the Quartet functioned as a microcosm of the broader 
dynamics that existed between its members, including their different characteristics and 
capabilities. In forming and continuing the Quartet, each of the members pursued both 
collective and individual outcomes within the context of the Middle East peace process. 
By default, the individual objectives of the Quartet members were less publicised, and 
thus more difficult to evaluate, than the collective objectives. From 2001-2011, a key 
justification for the Quartet by its members was as a mechanism for the reduction of 
competition and for coordinating policies concerning the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
The corollary benefit of membership for the non-US members was the enhancement of 
their profile and involvement in the Middle East peace process, even if this involvement
years accepted — albeit with substantial reservations by Israel — by Palestinian and Israeli leaderships 
alike, by the Arab States, and by the Security Council.’ United Nations Security Council, "Report of the 
Secretary General on the Middle East," United Nations: S/2006/956: 11 December, 2006, p. 12.
4K Jouret. Interview with the author, Brussels, November, 2011.
49 UN official. Interview with the author, Jerusalem, November, 2011.
0 Otte. Interview with author, Brussels, November, 2011.
51 de Soto, "End of Mission Report," p. 25.
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rarely extended beyond regular consultation with the United States on their policy 
preferences. Inherent within this process was a tension between US efforts to co-opt the 
other Quartet members into supporting US initiatives, and the remaining members’ 
efforts to influence US policies and promote their own. This section examines the 
strengths and limitations of the Quartet as a mechanism for the pursuit of these 
individual objectives. It concludes that the flexible nature of the Quartet allowed each of 
its members to enhance their organisational interests through membership -  even in the 
absence of meaningful collective outcomes within the peace process.
From an organisational standpoint, the Quartet was conceived as both a mechanism for 
the re-engagement of the US Secretary of State in the Middle East peace process 
(despite the hesitancy of the White House) and for the inclusion of input from
CO
international actors that had previously been excluded from this arena. ' The concept of 
harmonisation was a key justification for this process, and, from 2001-2011, remained 
an important aspect of the work of the grouping. This notion was underpinned by the 
dual objectives of reducing destructive competition between key international actors, 
and potentially enhancing the aggregate bargaining position of the members vis-ä-vis 
the parties to the conflict. As Kurtzer noted:
.. .as long as there is any outlet for either of the parties to escape the diplomatic 
approaches of outsiders, they will avail themselves of that outlet - especially if it’s 
with their best friend, in the case of Israel and the US. When you shut down the exit 
points, then in a sense you’re forcing the parties to confront some of these issues. It 
doesn’t mean you’re going to succeed but it reduces their degree of ‘playfulness.’ And 
in that respect, having a concerted international position, as much as we could, on 
some of these issues was quite important.54
The Quartet provided a mechanism for the creation of common approaches by its 
members, but provided no guarantees that such approaches would deliver desirable 
outcomes in the region. For the Quartet members, the key question was whether a less 
coordinated approach between these same actors would have proven more effective 
within this context. As Powell argued during the Roadmap implementation process, in 
the absence of the Quartet, ‘each member of the Quartet and many other individuals and
52 de Soto noted that: ‘If you want something to happen, if you want the Quartet to do something, you 
have to get the US on board, that’s the number one priority.’ de Soto, A., Former United Nations Special 
Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process, interview with the author, New York City, October, 2011.
53 See Chapter Three: The Formation of the Quartet, for in-depth discussion of these organisational 
objectives.
54 Kurtzer. Interview with the author, Princeton, NJ, October, 2011.
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countries and organizations represented by the Quartet would be going off with different 
plans and suggestions every day of the week . 0 5
Determining the extent to which the Quartet prevented such an eventuality is 
problematic, because it relies on the absence of an outcome as proof of success. 
However, in this regard, a limited general observation is possible. While the period of 
analysis saw examples of Quartet member frustrations over the handling of divisive 
issues,56 and Quartet member organisations seeking to play a more active role in 
regional developments, there were no examples of Quartet members launching 
substantial competing initiatives within the context of the Middle East peace process.
An important caveat to this observation is that it only applies to the non-US members of 
the Quartet. Indeed, as an EEAS official noted:
There is no doubt that when the United States chooses to have the lead role, it has that 
automatically. There is a sort of tacit agreement within the Quartet that we will 
support the United States in their efforts. This doesn’t mean that we won’t also push 
for our own interests, but the understanding tends to be that we wouldn’t just go off 
and have our own initiative without consulting the Quartet. In a sense we’re more 
‘faithful’ to the Quartet than the United States. The United States will go off and do 
their own thing, but it’s understood that they will, that’s just the way the world is. In a 
way I think it’s acknowledging everybody’s capabilities and everybody’s standing.58
In essence, involvement in the Quartet benefitted its individual members unequally, 
because the members themselves were not equals. For the United States, as the most 
powerful third-party actor within the peace process, the Quartet served as a mechanism 
for reducing competing initiatives -  from the European Union in particular -  that also 
preserved their capacity to act unilaterally within this context. It allowed for 
collaboration, but did not impose it. Nor did the Quartet infringe on the US-Israel 
relationship, except in instances where it was encouraged to do so by the United
55 US Department of State, "Press Availabilty With UN Secretary General Kofi Annan; Foreign Minister 
Franco Frattini o f Italy in the Capacity of European Union Presidency; European Union High 
Representative Javier Solana; and Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov of the Russian Federation," New York 
City: 26 September, 2003.
56 See ‘Quartet frustrations go public’ in Chapter Six: The Disengagement Process, for an example of 
Quartet members, particularly the European Union, venting frustration with the breakdown of the 
Roadmap implementation process.
57 For example, see the insistence of European officials that the European Union Border Assistance 
Mission (EUB AM) be responsible for the monitoring of the Rafah crossing, despite the reservations of 
both the Israelis and the US. This process was discussed in Chapter Six: The Disengagement Process. See 
also the Russian maintenance of direct lines of communication with Hamas, despite the international 
diplomatic and economic boycott of the group.
88 EEAS Official. Interview with the author, Brussels, November, 2011.
299
Chapter Nine: Conclusion -  The Outcomes o f the Quartet, 2001-2011
States.59 In essence, the Quartet enabled the United States to moderate the involvement 
of other international actors within the peace process -  and to benefit from their 
frequent support -  without any significant political or diplomatic cost. Indeed, from a 
US perspective, at best the Quartet was an important mechanism for co-opting key 
international actors and sharing the burdens of the peace process, and at worst it was a 
forum for discussion and information sharing that carried no legal or financial 
obligations.60 For these reasons, the United States has maintained its association with 
the Quartet through both the Bush and Obama Administrations, and -  at the time of 
writing -  four separate Secretaries of State have acted as US representatives at the 
principal level.61
For the non-US members of the Quartet, membership in the grouping presented 
opportunities to affect US policy and to enhance their visibility as actors in the peace 
process, but provided no guarantee of either outcome. The United States maintained the 
exclusivity of its relationship with Israel, and resisted attempts by the other Quartet 
members to become more involved in mediation efforts.62 However, the Quartet 
functioned as a way for the non-US members to ‘listen to American views, coordinate 
with them, and meet them on a regular basis. ’61 In the absence of opportunities for more 
meaningful involvement in the peace process -  as limited by both political and 
organisational factors -  this function alone was deemed to be of some value for the non- 
US Quartet members.
For the United Nations Secretary General, membership in the Quartet was both an 
opportunity and a potential liability. While the grouping provided a platform for the 
UNSG to emphasise the importance of UN resolutions and to elevate his political
39 Indyk claimed that the US occasionally used the Quartet as a tool for increasing its leverage on Israel, 
by arguing that ‘if you don’t give us something, w e’re not going to be able to resist this from the Quartet, 
so pick your poison.’ This claim is supported by the events surrounding the Israeli housing announcement 
in March 20 10, when both George Mitchell and Secretary of State Clinton used the Quartet as a forum for 
expressing displeasure with Israeli actions, and for applying diplomatic pressure on Prime Minister 
Netanyahu (Chapter Eight: The Post Annapolis Period).
60 Condoleezza Rice noted that the ‘Quartet was a very effective mechanism for coordinating policy 
toward all aspects o f the peace process.’ See: Rice, No Higher Honor: A Memoir of My Years in 
Washington, p. 5 8 1.
61 Specifically, these representatives were Colin Powell, Condoleezza Rice, Hillary Clinton, and John 
Kerry.
62 As discussed in Chapter Seven: The Palestinian Divide, Secretary of State Rice noted in the lead-up to 
the Annapolis conference that it would serve to ‘discipline the Europeans and Arabs by highlighting 
bilateral negotiations,’ but also give ‘these other players some pride of ownership and some 
responsibility.’ See: Rice, No Higher Honor: A Memoir of My Years in Washington, p. 601.
63 Jouret. Interview with the author, Brussels, November, 2011.
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visibility within the context of the peace process, it also established a linkage between 
the work of the Quartet and the United Nations more generally that was -  at times -  
problematic.64
While the Quartet afforded the UNSG an opportunity to influence key actors involved 
in the Middle East peace process, his ability to apply tangible pressure to those actors 
was limited by the donor-recipient dichotomy within the grouping.65 The UNSG was 
able to offset this limitation by utilising his extensive information gathering capacity -  
through both UN institutions operating in the Palestinian territories and his regional 
contacts -  and by leveraging the inherent legal and moral authority of his position. 
However, the danger for the UNSG -  in participating in a forum which he did not lead -  
was that the work of the grouping would be associated with the United Nations 
irrespective of whether its positions reflected the values of the body. For example, 
during the international boycott of the Hamas-led Palestinian Authority in 2006, UN 
personnel in the field were put in ‘the uncomfortable position of trying to alleviate the 
effects of the ‘siege’ while being seen as one of those who have imposed that siege, or 
at least having condoned it, and also as part of the international effort to maintain it.’66
As de Soto argued, such an outcome risked diminishing the standing of the Secretary 
General:
Ultimately the Secretary-General is useful to his partners because he carries the UN’s 
brand name. His participation confers to the Quartet a measure of legitimacy, or at 
least the impression of it, as well as cover against criticism. Therein also lies the 
greatest danger he faces: legitimacy is a currency which can all too easily be 
devalued.67
However, while membership in the Quartet inherently affected international perceptions 
of both the UNSG and the UN more generally, so too did separate developments within 
the context of Israeli-Palestinian conflict. As a UN official noted, ‘the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict, more than any other, shapes the perceptions of large percentages of the world 
about the United Nations.’68 Thus, for the UNSG, membership in the Quartet
64 As Kofi Annan noted, his participation in the Quartet’s 2006 position vis-ä-vis the Hamas government 
was particularly controversial within the United Nations. See: Annan, Interventions: A Life in War and 
Peace, p. 290.
65 As discussed in Chapter Seven: The Palestinian Divide, when the UNSG’s envoy to the Quartet,
Alvaro de Soto, refused to agree to the US position on the newly elected Hamas government, US officials 
threatened that such a position could affect US funding for the United Nations.
66 de Soto, "End of Mission Report," p. 33.
67 de Soto, A., "The Role of the United Nations in the Middle East," in Italianieuropi,2 July 2009.
6X UN official. Interview with the author, Jerusalem, November, 2011.
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epitomised the tension inherent in his role between acting as an impartial arbiter -  at the 
price of exclusion from politics -  and involving himself personally in processes that are 
of inherent importance to the UN -  at the risk of damaging his reputation for 
neutrality.69
In essence, the UNSG’s membership in the Quartet was a choice between observation 
and participation that reflected the fact that neither was ideal. As Roed-Larsen noted, 
‘the UN Secretary General would hardly have any political role if he was not in the 
Quartet, and both Kofi Annan and Ban Ki-Moon understood that fully.’ Indeed, while 
Annan was an original driving force behind the formation of the Quartet, Ban Ki-Moon 
inherited -  and accepted -  his position in the grouping when he was under no serious 
obligation to do so .71 Despite setbacks in the peace process, controversy surrounding 
Quartet positions, and internal resistance from the United States, the Quartet remains an 
important mechanism for the pursuit of organisational objectives for the UNSG.
For the European Union, membership in the Quartet was an important tool for managing 
trans-Atlantic relations that also provided an opportunity for expanded European 
involvement within the political sphere of the Middle East peace process. As with the 
other non-US members of the Quartet, however, the development of European 
participation within this sphere relied on the approval of the United States, which was 
both infrequent and lukewarm.72 Furthermore, the United States demonstrated both the 
capacity and inclination to override European preferences within the Quartet, or to 
sideline the EU from the peace process altogether.73 For European External Action
69 A UN official characterised this choice as being between ‘standing Olympian at a distance from the 
conflict, or rolling your sleeves up and getting your hands dirty.’ UN official. Interview with the author, 
Jerusalem, November, 2011.
70 Roed-Larsen. Interview with the author, New York City, October, 2011.
71 Annan’s 2006 ‘End of Mission’ report on the work of the Quartet recommended tactical changes for the 
Quartet members, but did not include a reconsideration of the UNSG’s involvement in the grouping 
moving forward. See: United Nations Security Council, "Report of the Secretary General on the Middle 
East," United Nations: S/2006/956: 11 December, 2006.
72 Martin Indyk argued that US resistance to the involvement of European actors within the peace process 
was based on an assessment that such involvement would only serve to complicate the US-Israel 
relationship. He noted that: ‘if there’s peace to be made, it’s going to be made because the US uses its 
influence on Israel. And so why would we share that with somebody else? Not because we want to steal 
the limelight, although that’s part of it... but that getting other people involved, when we’re the ones that 
have got to deliver Israel, it just makes it very complicated, because they’re always going to offer the 
Palestinians a better deal than we can get them from Israel.’ Indyk, M., Former United States Ambassador 
to Israel, interview with the author, Washington, DC, November, 2011.
73 For example, the exclusion of European representatives from the 2003 Aqaba Summit by the Bush 
Administration, and the appointment of Tony Blair as the Quartet representative in 2007 despite the 
resistance of European officials.
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Service officials, however, such outcomes merely reflected the established paradigms of 
the peace process:
Within the Quartet, we are equal in a way. We can say whatever we want, we express 
our positions, we try to convince, and sometimes we even oppose the Americans.
This is part of the game, and everybody is fine with that. Having said that, we remain 
what we are, meaning that the Americans have the lead as far as politics is 
concerned.74
Indeed, despite the US propensity to lead the Middle East peace process, European 
officials reported that within the Quartet there was a ‘real exchange and a real influence 
on each other,’ including ‘attention and respect for the situations and positions of 
others.’75
For European officials, inherently more constrained by consensus requirements as 
foreign policy actors than their US counterparts,76 the informal nature of the Quartet 
allowed for a flexible form of policy coordination, in which European interests could be 
pursued in a less institutionalised setting. Crucially, this setting did not preclude the 
formulation of European Common Foreign and Security Policies, but instead functioned 
as a forum for those policies to interact with and potentially influence the approaches 
adopted by the United States. Membership in the Quartet was a tool for information 
gathering and coordination that provided a conduit to the foreign policies of the United 
States, and an opportunity for European influence in an area of organisational concern. 
For the member countries of the EU, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict remained an issue of 
historical significance that was increasingly seen as a regional security concern. 
European Union influence within this sphere was an organisational priority that was 
served -  to a limited extent -  by participation within the Quartet.
For Russia, membership in the Quartet created a regular platform for organisational 
involvement in the peace process, but this involvement was ultimately restricted to 
consultation with European, US and UN officials. Russian efforts, for example, to 
sponsor an international peace Summit in Moscow were a frequent feature of Quartet
74 Jouret. Interview with the author, Brussels, November, 2011.
75 Otte. Interview with author, Brussels, November, 2011.
76 European foreign policy creation necessarily involves consensus building between the 27 member 
states as a precondition to consensus building within the Quartet. Consequently, the EU can only occupy 
a foreign policy space that its constituents permit it to occupy, and this space is further constrained by the 
slow moving nature of its bureaucratic framework. An EEAS official noted: ‘We are limited by the fact 
that we work within an institution based on consensus, and from time to time we are a prisoner of that 
consensus.’ EEAS Official. Interview with the author, Brussels, November, 2011.
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77statements, but failed to materialise throughout the period of analysis. While this may 
be explained partly by developments within the peace process that precluded the 
possibility of such a conference, Russian officials also faced resistance within the 
Quartet -  especially from US officials -  to the expansion of the Russian role in this
7Rcontext.
Russian involvement in the Quartet came at no diplomatic or financial cost, nor did it 
prevent Russian officials from maintaining policies that were in contrast to the stated 
positions of the grouping.79 Furthermore, Russian officials did not set out to create or 
promote divisions within the Quartet, and Russian positions consistently complemented 
or mirrored European and US positions. As Rice noted:
In some matters we worked very effectively with Moscow. This was certainly the case 
in the Middle East, where Sergei’s support in the Quartet of our approach to the 
Israeli-Palestinian issue was unwavering.81
Furthermore, the complementarity of Russian positions within the Quartet was 
enhanced by the preference of Russian officials to remain disengaged from the 
operational issues of the peace process.82 Ultimately, Russian membership in the 
Quartet allowed for the utilisation of Russian diplomatic resources, and for coordination
7 The Roadmap document mentions the need for two international conferences, but does not specify their 
proposed locations. Quartet specificity regarding a conference in Moscow peaked in 2008, when the 
grouping mentioned the need for such a conference on four separate occasions -  2 May, 24 June, 26 
September, and 9 November. The Quartet members stated that the Moscow conference should take place 
in Spring 2009, and repeated this phrasing on 26 June 2009. The Moscow conference did not appear again 
in official Quartet statements until 19 March 2010 when the members declared that the conference would 
take place ‘at the appropriate time.’ See: US Department of State, "Joint Statement by the Quartet".
78 Martin Indyk noted that US resistance to Russian initiatives has been a consistent feature of the 
relationship within the Quartet: ‘All the Russians want is a conference in Moscow, it’s all they’ve ever 
wanted. And all we ever say is “at the appropriate time.’” Indyk. Interview with the author, Washington, 
DC, November, 2011.
79 The primary example during the period of analysis was Russian diplomatic contacts with Hamas 
officials concurrent to the Quartet advocating a financial and diplomatic boycott of the Palestinian 
organisation.
80 European Quartet envoy Marc Otte referred to his Russian colleagues within the Quartet as ‘pragmatic, 
and results-oriented,’ and noted that Russian positions vis-ä-vis the Israeli-Palestinian conflict closely 
aligned with European positions during his time in the grouping. Otte. Interview with author, Brussels, 
November, 2011.
81 Rice, No Higher Honor: A Memoir o f My Years in Washington, p. 581.
82 A UN official noted that: ‘They don’t get into the weeds of the precise details of the peace process.
They focus on ensuring that the Arab League and Arab world is taken into consideration. They seek to 
focus on Palestinian reconciliation as much as they can, and they also seek to ensure that the legal basis of 
the peace process as embodied by Security Council Resolutions is somehow respected. But getting into 
the engineering of how the peace process is going to work is not their thing.’ UN official. Interview with 
the author, Jerusalem, November, 2011.
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with actors that had previously acted in cross purposes during the Soviet period, with 
minimal negative consequences.83
In summary, the Quartet functioned as a useful mechanism for communication between 
its members during the period of analysis -  despite the limitations of the grouping as a 
tool for enhancing non-US participation in the peace process. The Quartet members’ 
decisions to continue their association with the grouping were grounded in the 
usefulness of regular coordination and collaboration, even in the absence of an 
associated enhancement of collective outcomes.
Section Three: The Future of the Quartet
In my view, until the Member States match their professions of concern with a 
concerted effort to empower the United Nations to make a strategic difference, I am 
convinced that other forums will be sought to ensure effective multilateral engagement 
on the conflict. The formation of the Quartet and my participation in it embody this 
conviction.
- Kofi Annan, United Nations Secretary General (1997-2006).84
Quite frankly, there doesn’t seem to be any other show in town. This is the only thing 
we’ve got.
- European External Action Service Official.85
The continuation of the Quartet relies entirely on the preferences of its members. As a 
non-institutionalised and entirely voluntary mechanism, the members of the Quartet are 
free to end their association with the grouping at any time. Crucially, throughout the 
period of analysis, none of the Quartet members chose to do so, even during periods of 
organisational transition that would have easily justified such a move.86 Furthermore, 
neither the Israelis nor the Palestinians -  in an official capacity -  have asked the Quartet 
members to disband or to cease their collective activities. Thus, the Quartet as a 
mechanism has survived numerous political and social changes in both its constituent
87 As argued in Chapter Three: The Formation of the Quartet, for the non-Russian members of the 
Quartet, Russian membership in the grouping reduced the potential for Russia to act as a spoiler to 
Quartet initiatives.
84 United Nations Security Council, "Report of the Secretary General on the Middle East," p. 11.
88 EEAS Official. Interview with the author, Brussels, November, 2011.
86 For example, Secretary of State Rice chose to retain the US membership in the Quartet despite the role 
of Colin Powell in the formation of the grouping and the public schism between the State Department and 
the White House during his tenure as Secretary of State. Equally, the Obama Administration, despite 
seeking to disassociate itself from the policies of the Bush Administration, chose to continue US 
involvement in the Quartet. Furthermore, in 2007 incoming UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon chose to 
continue the involvement of the office of the UNSG in the Quartet despite the cautionary statements 
issued by outgoing Secretary General Kofi Annan.
87 UN official. Interview with the author, Jerusalem, November, 2011.
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member organisations as well as in the parties to the conflict, and -  despite some 
extended periods of inactivity -  has retained a persistent presence in the Middle East 
peace process since its formation. From this it is reasonable to conclude that the 
continuation of the grouping is likely, if not assured, in the absence of dramatic regional 
or organisational change. As an EEAS official noted, ‘the Quartet will die when a peace
o o
agreement is signed, meaning that it will be here for a long time.’
The flexible and informal nature of the Quartet has allowed it to withstand robust 
internal disagreements between its members as well as regional upheavals. Furthermore, 
the consensus-based approach to policy formation did not limit the political prerogatives 
of its members unless they consented to such limitations. While this approach has 
affected both the outputs and outcomes of the Quartet, there is no viable alternative to 
consensus within the context of the peace process. Indeed, if the Quartet was to disband, 
the United States, the European Union, the UN Secretary General and the Russian 
Federation would all still remain as actors seeking input into the search for a solution to 
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. While the extent to which a less coordinated series of 
interventions by these actors would produce better outcomes is impossible to establish, 
the ongoing preference of the Quartet members to continue their association indicates 
that they have determined otherwise.
With the Quartet likely to continue its involvement within the context of the peace 
process, it is reasonable to question the extent to which the outputs and outcomes of the 
grouping might be modified by the members over time -  even if such a discussion 
inherently involves a degree of speculation. Firstly, expansion of the Quartet’s core 
membership is unlikely, especially considering that such expansion was ruled out during 
the formation of the grouping. Secondly, modifications to the central operating 
principles of the Quartet seem equally unlikely, as the informal and consensus-based 
approach allows each member a degree of policy flexibility that underpins their 
continuing involvement in the grouping. In essence, a Quartet with either extra members 
or with a more formal structure would cease to be the ‘Quartet’. Changes to the outputs 
and outcomes of the Quartet, therefore, rely on changes in the behaviour of the Quartet 
members both inside and outside the grouping, rather than on changes to the structure of 
the grouping.
Jouret. Interview with the author, Brussels, November, 2011.
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For the Quartet members, the modification of the functioning of the grouping is thus a 
matter of tactics. The key tactical shift advocated by former UNSG Annan, and 
similarly echoed by current Quartet officials, concerned the ‘robustness’ of the 
grouping’s diplomacy. As Annan noted:
We must admit our own weaknesses, and we have been too hesitant in emphasizing 
those very elements that most distinguished the road map from the Oslo process — 
parallelism, monitoring and clear end goals.89
Of note, however, is that Quartet ‘hesitancy’ was the product of internal dissention 
between the Quartet members that could only be reversed through changes to individual 
Quartet member positions. As the previous chapters have demonstrated, such consensus 
building was -  and remains -  reliant on the United States modifying the way in which it 
approaches Israel through the Quartet. Thus, Annan’s calls for the Quartet members to 
present ‘greater clarity at the outset regarding the parameters of an end-game deal,’ to 
ensure that the Quartet members ‘monitor consistently the actions of the parties to 
implement existing commitments,’ and to ‘ensure that the results of this monitoring are 
systematically acted upon,’ are bound to remain subject to both the internal and external 
political contexts.90 Crucial to both contexts are the policy preferences of the United 
States and Israel, who have continued to resist the expansion of Quartet monitoring, and 
undermined more substantive Quartet messaging.
In essence, if the Quartet is to adopt a more ‘robust’ approach, then this approach must 
first be adopted in each -  and all -  of the Quartet member organisations. Such change 
would be reliant on the working relationships of the individuals within the Quartet, the 
political and policy choices of leaders of the Quartet member organisations, and the 
social, political and economic conditions in the region. Ultimately, the Quartet appears 
likely to continue unchanged in its role as a platform for coordination, operating within 
complex and shifting environments.
89 United Nations Security Council, "Report of the Secretary General on the Middle East," p. 5.
90 Ibid., p. 13.
307
Chapter Nine: Conclusion -  The Outcomes o f the Quartet, 2001-2011
Concluding Thoughts
People ask whether the long history of negotiation has been beneficial or harmful. It’s 
actually been both, in some respects. Beneficial in the sense that this has been 
discussed so often that people have a good sense of what the principal issues are and 
how they might be resolved; harmful in the sense that it’s created attitudes among 
many in the region that it’s a never-ending process, that it’s gone on for a very long 
time and will go on forever.
- George Mitchell, United States Envoy to the Middle East
Peace Process (2009-2011)91
There is always an easy solution to every human problem — neat, plausible, and 
wrong.
- Henry Louis Mencken, author.92
This thesis has evaluated the Quartet as a mechanism for the pursuit of collective and 
individual outcomes for its members. It has concluded that these outcomes reflected 
both the nature of the grouping itself, and the nature of the broader political dynamics 
that existed in the region and beyond. As a platform for collective action within the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the Quartet was limited by the exclusivity of the US-Israel 
relationship, the restrictions on Quartet messaging, and the unpredictable nature of 
regional developments during the period of analysis.
Arguably, the greater utility of the Quartet for its members was as a platform for 
information sharing and for regular consultation with the United States that was both 
flexible and resistant to setbacks. As a mechanism, the Quartet did not seek to neutralise 
US dominance within the peace process or within the grouping itself, nor did it 
overcome Israeli and Palestinian resistance to third-party intervention in the peace 
process. In essence, the Quartet provided its members with regular opportunities for 
constructive collaboration, the outcomes of which were as varied as could be expected 
given the complexity of the issues being confronted, and the inherent impediments to 
consensus building. For the Quartet members, this opportunity was -  and will likely 
continue to be -  justification enough for the continuation of the grouping.
The thesis posed the question, why did the Quartet form, and what were the outputs and 
outcomes o f the grouping from 2001-20112
91 US Department of State, "Press Briefing by Special Envoy for Middle East Peace Senator George 
Mitchell," Washington, DC: 31 August, 2010.
92 Mencken, H. L., A Mencken Chrestomathy, 1st ed. (New York: A. A. Knopf, 1949), p. 443.
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In essence, it has been argued that the dynamics underlying the formation of the Quartet 
had historical and contemporary precedents. These included both the legacies of 
Quartet-member involvement in the Middle East peace process, and the changing nature 
of the conflict at its core. For the members of the Quartet, the grouping provided a 
mechanism for addressing the perceived deficiencies of previous peace initiatives and 
for orchestrating the involvement of actors excluded traditionally from these processes. 
Furthermore, the working relationships between the envoys of the Quartet members 
underpinned both the formation and subsequent operation of the grouping.
Examination of the general working practices of the grouping, and the impacts of these 
practices on the utility of the Quartet, established clearly the relationship between 
Quartet inaction and internal Quartet division -  especially regarding the statement 
authorship process. The outputs of the Quartet varied in accordance with changes in its 
internal and external contexts, and the primary parties to the conflict -  Israel and the 
Palestinians -  and the United States remained the key determinants of progress within 
the Middle East peace process, irrespective of Quartet collective action.
And yet, although the pursuit of collective and individual outcomes by Quartet members 
were constrained by the nature of US involvement in both the grouping and its role in 
developments in the Israeli-Palestinian context, as well as by bilateral developments in 
the Israeli-Palestinian context, the Quartet remained capable of withstanding setbacks, 
paradigm shifts and personnel changes. In doing so, it also provided enough added 
value to the foreign policy interests and objectives of its members to be considered 
worthy of continuation, more or less unchanged, from the form and functions it 
possessed on its creation in 2001. Ultimately, the continuation of the Quartet throughout 
the period of analysis was testament to the role that it was deemed to have played within 
each of its members’ approaches to the peace process. As a UN official remarked, ‘if 
there wasn’t a Quartet, we’d need something like it.’93
93 UN official. Interview with the author, Jerusalem, November, 2011.
309
Bibliography
Primary Sources: Interviews
de Soto, A. Former United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace 
Process, Interview with the Author, New York City, October, 2011.
EEAS Official. Interview with the Author, Brussels, November, 2011.
EU Official. Interview with the Author, Brussels, Belgium, November, 2011.
Freedman, R. O., Professor at Johns Hopkins University, Interview with the Author, 
Baltimore, USA, October, 2011.
Heller, M., Principal Research Associate at the Institute for National Security Studies,
Tel Aviv University, Interview with the Author, Tel Aviv, Israel, November, 
2011.
Indyk, M. Former United States Ambassador to Israel, Interview with the Author, 
Washington, DC, November, 2011.
Jouret, C., Middle East Advisor, European External Action Service (EEAS), Interview 
with the Author, Brussels, November, 2011.
Khatib, G. Former Director of Palestinian Authority Media Centre, Interview with the 
Author, Ramallah, Palestinian Territories, November, 2011.
Kurtzer, D., Former United States Ambassador to Israel, Interview with the Author, 
Princeton, NJ, October, 2011.
Muasher, M. Former Jordanian Foreign Minister and current Vice President for studies 
at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Interview with the Author, 
Washington, Dc, October, 2011.
Otte, M., Former European Union Quartet envoy, Interview with Author, Brussels, 
November, 2011.
Roed-Larsen, T., Former United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East peace 
process, Interview with the Author, New York City, October, 2011.
Said Aly, A., President of Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies,
Interview with the Author, Cairo, Egypt, November, 2011.
UN official. Interview with the Author, Jerusalem, November, 2011.
Primary Sources: Documents
Annan, K. Interventions: A Life in War and Peace. New York: Penguin Press, 2012.
"Arab Peace Initiative: Full Text." The Guardian, 29 March, 2002.
Blair, T. A Journey: My Political Life. 1st ed. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2010.
Bush, G. W. Decision Points. 1st ed. New York: Crown Publishers, 2010.
de Soto, A. "End of Mission Report." The Guardian, 12 June, 2007.
European Union Council. "EU Council Conclusions - Middle-East Peace Process." 
Brussels, Belgium, 30 January, 2006.
-------- . "Presidency Conclusions." Brussels, Belgium, 26 March, 2004.
-------- . "Press Release: External Relations." Luxembourg, 18 June, 2007.
European Union External Action Service. "EU Parliament - M.E.P.S Oversee Historic 
Palestinian Election." Brussels, Belgium, 30 January, 2006.
European Union Parliament. "Berlin Conference in Support of Palestinian Civil Security 
and the Rule of Law." Berlin, 24 June, 2008.
Indyk, M. Innocent Abroad: An Intimate Account o f American Peace Diplomacy in the 
Middle East. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2009.
International Court of Justice. "Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the 
Occupied Palestinian Territory." The Hague, 9 July, 2004.
Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs. "Acting PM Olmert's Remarks at the Start of Special 
Cabinet Meeting." Jerusalem, 5 January, 2006.
310
. "Address by PM Ariel Sharon at the Fourth Herzliya Conference." Herzliya, 
Israel, 18 December, 2003.
. "Address by PM Benjamin Netanyahu at Aipac Conference." Washington, DC, 
22 March, 2010.
. "Address by PM Netanyahu at Bar-Ilan University." Bar-Ilan University, Tel 
Aviv, 14 June, 2009.
. "Address by PM Netanyahu to the UN General Assembly." New York City, 24 
September, 2009.
. "Address by PM Olmert at Opening of Knesset Winter Session." Jerusalem, 27 
October, 2008.
. "Address by Prime Minister Ariel Sharon to the Foreign Press Corps in Israel." 
Jerusalem, Israel, 11 January, 2004.
. "Address to the Knesset by PM Olmert on Presentation of 31st Government." 
Jerusalem, 4 May, 2006.
. "Agreed Documents on Movement and Access from and to Gaza." Jerusalem,
15 November, 2005.
. "Behind the Headlines: Rocket and Mortar Fire Despite Calm in the South." 
Jerusalem, 10 December, 2008.
. "Briefing: Israel's New Policy Towards Gaza." Jerusalem, 5 July, 2010.
. "Building in Jerusalem: Statement from PM Netanyahu's Bureau." Jerusalem,
11 March, 2010.
. "Cabinet Communique." Jerusalem, 7 December, 2008.
. "Cabinet Communique." Jerusalem, 16 January, 2005.
. "Cabinet Communique." Jerusalem, 19 February, 2006.
. "Cabinet Communique." Jerusalem, 14 March, 2010.
. "The Cabinet Resolution Regarding the Disengagement Plan." Tel Aviv, Israel, 
6 June, 2004.
. "Cargo Boat Attempting Illegal Entry to Gazan Coastal Waters Intercepted." 
Jerusalem, 30 June, 2009.
. "Decision of Minister's Committee on National Security." Jerusalem, 24 
December, 2008.
. "Evacuation of Civilians from the Gaza Strip Completed." Jerusalem, 22 
August, 2005.
. "Evacuation of Northern West Bank." Jerusalem, 23 August, 2005.
. "Excerpts from Interview by PM Olmert." Jerusalem, 9 June, 2006.
. "Exchange of Letters between PM Sharon and President Bush." Washington, 
DC, 14 April, 2004.
. "FM Liberman Meets US Special Envoy Mitchell." Jerusalem, 16 April, 2009.
. "FM Livni Briefs World Leaders on Israel’s Stance on Terrorism, 
Negotiations." Jerusalem, 1 March, 2008.
. "FM Livni Meets with US Envoy Gen. William Fraser." Jerusalem, 28 January, 
2008.
. "FM Livni on Negotiations with the Palestinians." Jerusalem, 14 January, 2008. 
. "FM Livni Responds to No-Confidence Motion Submitted in the Knesset." 
Jerusalem, 17 March, 2008.
. "FM Livni to President Peres: Not Able to Form a Government." Jerusalem, 26 
October, 2008.
■. "FM Livni: We Will Not Accept a Period of Calm Used to Re-Arm."
Jerusalem, 18 June, 2008.
-. "Gaza Flotilla: Statement by PM Netanyahu." Jerusalem, 31 May, 2010.
311
. "Government Establishes Independent Public Comission." Jerusalem, 14 June, 
2010.
. "Government Meeting About the Prime Minister's Statement on the Roadmap 
".Jerusalem,25 M ay,2003.
. "Humanitarian Assistance to Gaza from 27 Feb 2008 Escalation up to 19 June 
Calm Understanding." Jerusalem, 18 June, 2008.
. "IDF: Conclusion of Investigations into Claims in Operation Cast Lead-Part 1," 
Jerusalem, 22 April, 2009.
. "Incoming PM Benjamin Netanyahu Presents His Government to the Knesset." 
Jerusalem, 31 March, 2009.
. "Interview by Prime Minister Sharon to Nikkei." Jerusalem, 3 January, 2006.
. "Israel's Analysis and Comments on the Gaza Fact-Finding Mission Report." 
Jerusalem, 15 September, 2009.
. "Israel's Reaction to the Decision of the UN Human Rights Council."
Jerusalem, 16 October, 2009.
. "Israel's Response to the Roadmap." Jerusalem, 25 May, 2003.
. "Israeli Defence Force Strikes at Targets in Gaza." 28 June, 2006.
. "Joint Press Conference with FM Livni and US Secretary of State Rice." 
Jerusalem, 5 March, 2008.
. "Joint Press Conference with Prime Minister Olmert and President Bush ". 
Jerusalem, 9 January, 2008.
. "Joint Statement by PM Netanyahu and US Sec Clinton." Washington, DC, 11 
November, 2010.
. "Kassams in Sderot: Remarks to the Press by F.M. Livni." Jerusalem, 10 
February, 2008.
. "Letter from Dov Weissglas, Chief of the Pm's Bureau, to National Security 
Adviser, Dr. Condoleezza Rice." Jerusalem, 18 April, 2004.
. "Meeting between Israeli and Palestinian Representatives." Jerusalem, 26 
January, 2005.
. "MFA Briefing to the Foreign Press on the Goldstone Report." Geneva, 
Switzerland, 1 October, 2009.
. "MFA Officials Brief Ambassadors, Foreign Press on Goldstone Report." 
Geneva, 1 October, 2009.
. "Notification in Respect to the Release of Palestinian Prisoners." Jerusalem, 20 
November, 2007.
. "Notification on the Release of Palestinian Prisoners." Jerusalem, 18 August,
2008.
. "Operation Cast Lead Expanded." Jerusalem, 3 January, 2009.
. "Operation in Gaza: Statement by DM Ehud Barak." Jerusalem, 17 January,
2009.
. "Operation Summer Rain: IDF Enters Southern Gaza Strip to Secure Release of 
Abducted Soldier." 28 June, 2006.
. "Palestinian-Israeli Security Implementation Work Plan: Tenet Cease-Fire 
Plan." Jerusalem, 14 June, 2001.
. "PM Netanyahu Welcomes Beginning of Proximity Talks." Jerusalem, 9 May,
2010.
-. "PM Netanyahu: Israel National State of Jewish People." Jerusalem, 20 April, 
2009.
-. "PM Olmert's Reaction to Diplomatic Developments & Unsc Resolution 1860." 
Jerusalem, 9 January, 2009.
312
. "PM Olmert and FM Livni Report to Cabinet on Annapolis Conference." 
Jerusalem, 2 December, 2007.
. "PM Olmert Meets with P.A. President Mahmoud Abbas." Jerusalem, 10 
September, 2007.
. "PM Olmert Orders Implementation of Steps to Ease Restrictions on 
Palestinians in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip." Jerusalem, 25 December, 
2006.
. "PM Olmert: Clash with Hamas Unavoidable." Jerusalem, 11 November, 2008. 
. "PM Sharon Meets with US Secy of State Condoleezza Rice." Jerusalem, 14 
November, 2005.
. "PM Sharon Meets with US Senator Kerry." Jerusalem, 10 January, 2005.
. "Press Conference: Prime Minister Olmert Meets with US President Bush." 
Washington, 19 June, 2007.
. "Prime Minister's Office Statement Following the Israeli Security Cabinet 
Meeting." Jerusalem, 20 June, 2010.
. "Prime Minister Ariel Sharon Addresses the Nation on the Day of the 
Implementation of the Disengagement Plan." Jerusalem, 15 August, 2005.
. "Prime Minister Olmert Addresses Kadima Knesset Faction after Trilateral 
Meeting." Jerusalem, 19 Feburary, 2007.
. "Prime Minister Olmert Meets with Palestinian Authority President Abbas." 
Jerusalem, 24 December, 2006.
. "Prime Minister Sharon Announces New Party and Calls for Elections." 
Jerusalem, 21 November, 2005.
. "Prime Minister Sharon Speaks with Egyptian President Mubarak." Jerusalem, 
17 March, 2005.
. "Proximity Talks: PM Netanyahu Meets with Senator Mitchell in Jerusalem." 
Jerusalem, 20 May, 2010.
. "Remarks before Meeting between PM Netanyahu and US Special Envoy 
Mitchell." Jerusalem, 13 December, 2010.
. "Remarks by Foreign Minister Livni in the Knesset on the Political Process 
with the Palestinians." Jerusalem, 4 September, 2007.
. "Remarks by PM Netanyahu and Tony Blair, Quartet Envoy to the Middle 
East." Jerusalem, 20 June, 2010.
. "Remarks by President Peres Following Resignation of P.M. Olmert." 
Jerusalem, 21 September, 2008.
. "Response of Foreign Minister Livni to the Quartet Statement." Jerusalem, 4 
February, 2007.
-. "Security Cabinet Decision." Jerusalem, 17 June, 2010.
-. "Security Cabinet Decision on Continuation of IDF Operation in Gaza." 
Jerusalem, 2 January, 2009.
-. "Security Cabinet Declares Gaza Hostile Territory." Jerusalem, 19 September, 
2007.
-. "Special Update: Türkei Commission Report on Gaza Flotilla Incident". 
Jerusalem, 24 January, 2011.
-. "Speech by Prime Minister Ariel Sharon at the Herzliya Conference." Institute 
of Policy and Strategy, Herzliya, 4 December, 2002.
-. "Statement by Incoming Foreign Minister Avigdor Liberman at the Ministerial 
Inauguration Ceremony." Jerusalem, 1 April, 2009.
-. "Statement by PM Ariel Sharon at the Sharm El-Sheikh Sum m it". Sharm el- 
Sheikh, 8 February, 2005.
313
-------- . "Statement by PM Netanyahu on the Cabinet Decision to Suspend New
Construction in Judea and Samaria." Jerusalem, Israel, 25 November, 2009.
-------- . "Statement by Prime Minister Ehud Olmert at the Sharm El-Sheikh Summit."
Sharm el-Sheikh, 25 June, 2007.
-------- . "Statement by Prime Minister Netanyahu: "No Love Boat"." Jerusalem, 2 June,
2010.
-------- . "Statement from PM Sharon's Bureau." 23 May, 2003.
-------- . "Terror Attack at Kami Crossing." Jerusalem, 13 January, 2005.
-------- . "Two Soldiers Killed, One Missing in Kerem Shalom Terror Attack." 25 June,
2006.
-------- . "The Relaunching of Peace Talks: US Secretary Clinton, Israel PM Netanyahu
and PA President Abbas." Washington, DC, 2 September, 2010.
-------- . "The Second Lebanon War (2006)." Jerusalem, 12 July, 2006.
-------- . "Winograd Committee Submits Final Report." Jerusalem, 30 January, 2008.
Office of the Special Envoy for Disengagement. "Fourth Report on the Implementation 
of the Agreement on Movement and Access." Jerusalem, 10 January, 2006.
Rice, C. No Higher Honor: A Memoir of My Years in Washington. 1st ed. New York: 
Crown Publishers, 2011.
The Palestinian Papers. "Meeting Minutes: Ahmed Qurei, Saeb Erekat and Tzipi Livni: 
27 January 2008." Aljazeera Transparency Unit, January, 2011.
The White House. "Press Briefing by National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley on
Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process ". Dan Panarama Hotel, Jerusalem, 10 January, 
2009.
-------- . "Remarks by President Obama and President Abbas of the Palestinian
Authority in Press Availability." Washington, DC, 28 May, 2009.
-------- . "Remarks by President Obama and Prime Minister Netanyah of Israel in Press
Availability." Washington, DC, 18 May, 2009.
The White House Office of the Vice President. "Statement by Vice President Joseph R. 
Biden, Jr.". Jerusalem, 9 March, 2010.
United Nations Department of Public Information. "Statement by the Middle East 
Quartet." New York city, 12 March, 2010.
-------- . "Statement Read by Mr. Terje Roed-Larsen." New York City, 25 October,
2001.
-------- . "Temporary International Mechanism (Tim) Makes Fifth Payment from
European Funds to Public Service Providers and Pensioners." 2 February, 2007.
-------- . "Transcript of Press Conference on Middle East, by Secretary-General Kofi
Annan, Quartet Foreign Ministers, at United Nations Headquarters." New York 
City, 20 September, 2005.
-------- . "UN Rights Expert Paints Dire Picture of Situation in Occupied Palestinian
Territory." UN News Centre, 22 June, 2006.
United Nations General Assembly. "Illegal Israeli Actions in Occupied East Jerusalem 
and the Rest of the Occupied Palestinian Territory." A/RES/ES-10/14, New 
York City, 8 December, 2003.
-------- . "Resolution 181 (Ii): Future Government of Palestine." A/RES/181 (II), 29
November, 1947.
-------- . "Resolution 3379: Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination." 2400th
Plenary M eeting,, 10 November, 1975.
-------- . "Statement by H.E. Mr. Mahmoud Abbas President of the State of Palestine at
the General Debate of the 64th Session of the United Nations General Assembly 
". New York, 25 September, 2009.
314
United Nations Human Rights Council. "Report of the International Fact-Finding
Mission to Investigate Violations of International Law, Including International 
Humanitarian and Human Rights Law, Resulting from the Israeli Attacks on the 
Flotilla of Ships Carrying Humanitarian Assistance." General Assembly 
A/HRC/15/21,27 September, 2010.
-------- . "Report of the United Nations Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict."
General Assembly A/HRC/12/48,25 September, 2009.
-------- . "Resolution Adopted by the Human Rights Council: The Huam Rights
Situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Including East Jerusalem." 
A/HRC/RES/S-12/1, 16 October, 2009.
United Nations Information System on the Question of Palestine. "Conclusions of the 
London Meeting on Supporting the Palestinian Authority." London, 2 March, 
2005.
United Nations Relief and Works Agency. "Prolonged Crisis in the Occupied
Palestinian Territories: Socio-Economic Impacts of the New Phase on Refugees 
and Non-Refugees." November, 2006.
United Nations Security Council. "Report of the Secretary General on the Question of 
Palestine." United Nations: A/57/621-S/2002/1268, 29 November, 2002.
-------- . "Report of the Secretary General on the Question of Palestine." United Nations:
A/58/416-S/2003/947, 10 October, 2003.
-------- . "Report of the Secretary General on the Question of Palestine." United Nations:
A/59/574-S/2004/909, 29 November, 2004.
-------- . "Report of the Secretary General on the Question of Palestine." United Nations:
A/60/539-S/2005/701,7 November, 2005.
-------- . "Report of the Secretary General on the Middle East." United Nations:
S/2006/956, 11 December, 2006.
-------- . "Report of the Secretary General on the Question of Palestine." United Nations:
A/62/344-S/2007/553, 20 September, 2007.
-------- . "Report of the Secretary General on the Question of Palestine." United Nations:
A/63/368-S/2008/612, 22 September, 2008.
-------- . "Report of the Secretary General on the Question of Palestine." United Nations:
A/64/351-S/2009/464, 15 September, 2009.
-------- . "Report of the Secretary General on the Question of Palestine." United Nations:
A/65/380-S/2010/484, 17 September, 2010.
-------- . "Resolution 242 ". S/RES/242, 22 November, 1967.
-------- . "Resolution 1397: The Situation in the Middle East, Including the Palestinian
Question." S/RES/1397, 12 March, 2002.
-------- . "Security Council Fails to Adopt Draft Resolution Declaring Illegal Israeli
Construction of Wall in Occupied Territories." 4842nd Meeting, 14 October, 
2003.
-------- . "Resolution 1515: The Situation in the Middle East, Including the Palestinian
Question." S/RES/1515, 19 November, 2003.
-------- . "Resolution 1850: The Situation in the Middle East, Including the Palestinian
Question." S/RES/1850, 16 December, 2008.
-------- . "Resolution 1860: Security Council Calls for Immediate, Durable, Fully
Respected Ceasefire in Gaza Leading to Full Withdrawal of Israeli Forces." 
SC/9567,8 January, 2009.
-------- . "Security Council Condemns Acts Resulting in Civilian Deaths During Israeli
Operation against Gaza-Bound Aid Convoy, Calls for Investigation, in 
Presidential Statement." SC/9940, 31 May, 2010.
315
United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. "Hearing before the 109th
Congress: Post-Palestinian Election Challenges in the Middle East." S. HRG. 
109-903, 15 March, 2006.
US Department of State. "Announcement of Annapolis Conference." Washington, DC, 
20 November, 2007.
-------- . "Briefing by Special Envoy for Middle East Peace George Mitchell
Washington, DC, 25 November, 2009.
-------- . "Briefing by Special Envoy for Middle East Peace George Mitchell." New
York City, 22 September, 2009.
-------- . "Briefing by Special Envoy for Middle East Peace George Mitchell on His
Recent Travel to the Region and Efforts toward Achieving a Comprehensive 
Peace." Washington, DC, 16 June, 2009.
-------- . "Briefing by Special Envoy for Middle East Peace George Mitchell on Middle
East Peace Talks." Washington, DC, 2 September, 2010.
-------- . "Briefing on Middle East Peace Process." Washington, DC, 20 August, 2010.
-------- . "Briefing on Situation in the Middle East: Secretary Colin L. Powell."
Washington DC, 29 March, 2002.
-------- . "Bush, Blair Discuss Sharon Plan; Future of Iraq in Press Conference." The
White House, Washington, DC, 16 April, 2004.
-------- . "Challenges of the Middle East: William J. Bums, Assistant Secretary for the
Bureau of near Eastern Affairs." Remarks at Dickinson College, Carlisle, 
Pennsylvania, 26 February, 2003.
-------- . "Commitment to a Better Future for All Palestinians." Ramallah, 29 January,
2009.
-------- . "Daily Press Briefing: Philip J. Crowley." Washington, DC, 12 March, 2010.
-------- . "Final Quartet Statement." New York City, 26 September, 2003.
-------- . "Hopeful Moment for Progress toward Middle East Peace." The White House,
Washington DC, 14 March, 2003.
-------- . "Interview by the Washington Post: Secretary Colin L. Powell." Washington,
DC, 3 October, 2003.
-------- . "Interview with Reuters." Washington, DC, 30 July, 2003.
-------- . "Joint Press Availability with Israeli Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni." Jerusalem,
4 May, 2008.
-------- . "Joint Press Availability with Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas."
Ramallah, 4 May, 2008.
-------- . "Joint Press Briefing at the World Economic Forum with United Nations
Secretary General Kofi Annan, Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov, European 
Union High Representative Javier Solana, and Greek Foreign Minister George 
Papandreou." Dead Sea, Jordan, 22 June, 2003.
-------- . "Joint Press Briefing with Israeli Prime Minister Sharon Following Their
Meeting." Prime Minister's Residence, Jerusalem, 11 May, 2003.
-------- . "Joint Press Conference with Israeli Prime Minister Sharon." Prime Minister's
Office, Jerusalem, 20 June, 2003.
-------- . "Joint Press Conference: Secretary of State Colin L. Powell and Palestinian
Prime Minister Mahmoud Abbas." Oasis Intercontinental Hotel, Jericho, 11 
May, 2003.
-------- . "Joint Statement by the Quartet." Washington, DC, 20 December, 2002.
-------- . "Joint Statement by the Quartet". Moscow, Russia, 19 March, 2010.
-------- . "Joint Statement by the Quartet." New York City, 24 September, 2009.
-------- . "Joint Statement by the Quartet." London, England, 1 March, 2005.
316
. "Joint Statement of Quartet Envoys London." Washington, DC, 20 February, 
2003.
. "Joint Statement of the Quartet." Washington, DC, 11 May, 2010.
. "Joint Statement of the Quartet." Berlin, Germany, 30 May, 2007.
. "Joint Understanding Read by President Bush at Annapolis Conference." 
Annapolis, Maryland, 27 November, 2007.
. "Meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Beniamin Netanyahu." Jerusalem, 23 
April, 2010.
. "Meeting with Saeb Erekat, Chief Palestinian Negotiator." Ramallah, 23 April, 
2010.
. "The Middle East and the Roadmap for Peace." Washington, DC, 30 April, 
2003.
. "Middle East Quartet Communique of September 17, 2002." New York City,
17 September, 2002.
. "A Performance-Based Roadmap to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the 
Israeli-Palestinian Conflict." Washington, DC, 30 April, 2003.
. "President Bush's Remarks at the United Nations General Assembly." New 
York City, 12 September, 2002.
. "President Bush and President Uribe of Colombia Comment on the Roadmap 
and Terrorism: Remarks at Photo Opportunity." Washington, DC, 30 April, 
2003.
. "President Bush and Secretary Powell Discuss the Middle East." The Oval 
Office, Washington, DC, 18 April, 2002.
. "President Bush Announces Combat Operations in Iraq Have Ended." USS 
Abraham Lincoln, At Sea Off the Coast of San Diego, California 1 May, 2003.
. "President Bush Calls for New Palestinian Leadership." Washington, DC, 24 
June, 2002.
. "President Bush Discusses Middle East Peace with Prime Minister Sharon." 
The Rose Garden, The White House, Washington, DC, 29 July, 2003.
. "President Bush Discusses the Middle East." Washington, DC, 16 July, 2007.
. "President Bush Meets with Leaders of Jordan, Israel and Palestinian 
Authority." Aqaba, Jordan, 4 June, 2003.
. "President Bush Meets with Palestinian President Abbas." Washington, DC, 26 
May, 2005.
•. "President Bush Presses for Peace in the Middle East." Remarks in 
Commencement Address at the University of South Carolina, Columbia, South 
Carolina, 9 May, 2003.
-. "President Bush Welcomes Prime Minister Abbas to White House." The Rose 
Garden, The White House, Washington, DC, 25 July, 2003.
-. "President Bush Welcomes Prime Minister Sharon to White House; Question 
and Answer Session with the Press." The Oval Office, The White House, 
Washington, DC, 16 October, 2002.
-. "President Obama's Speech in Cairo: A New Beginning." Cairo University, 
Egypt, 4 June, 2009.
-. "President to Send Secretary Powell to Middle East." The Rose Garden, 
Washington, DC, 4 April, 2002.
-. "President Welcomes Quartet Principals to White House." The Oval Office, 
The White House, Washington, DC, 20 December, 2002.
-. "Press Availability with Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas." 
Ramallah, 14 January, 2007.
317
. "Press Availability with President Bush, Prime Minister Blair, President Aznar, 
and Prime Minister Barroso." Azores, Portugal, 16 March, 2003.
. "Press Availability with Quartet Members." London, England, 30 January, 
2006.
. "Press Availability with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, UN 
Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon, High Representative for European Foreign and 
Security Policy Javier Solana, German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter 
Steinmeier, and European Commissioner for External Relations Benita Ferrero- 
Waldner." Berlin, Germany, 30 May, 2007.
. "Press Availability with UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon; Russian FM 
Sergei Lavrov; European High Representative Javier Solana; German FM 
Frank-Walter Steinmeier; EU Commissioner Benita Ferrero-Waldner." 
Washington, DC, 2 February, 2007.
. "Press Availability with UN Secretary General Kofi Annan; Foreign Minister 
Igor Ivanov of the Russian Federation; Foreign Minister Per Stig Möller of 
Denmark in the Capacity of EU Presidency; and Javier Solana, High 
Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU." New York 
City, 16 July, 2002.
. "Press Availabilty with UN Secretary General Kofi Annan; Foreign Minister 
Franco Frattini of Italy in the Capacity of European Union Presidency; European 
Union High Representative Javier Solana; and Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov of 
the Russian Federation." New York City, 26 September, 2003.
. "Press Briefing by President Obama." The White House, 10 September, 2010.
. "Press Briefing by Secretary Rice Aboard Air Force One." En Route Andrews 
Air Force Base, Maryland, 18 May, 2008.
. "Press Briefing by Special Envoy for Middle East Peace Senator George 
Mitchell." Washington, DC, 31 August, 2010.
. "Press Briefing on Board Plane." En Route, Madrid, 9 April, 2002.
. "Press Conference by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice." Washington, DC, 
21 December, 2007.
•. "Press Conference with Jordanian Foreign Minister Marwan Muasher." Dead 
Sea, Jordan, 16 May, 2004.
-. "Prime Minister Netanyahu's Call to Secretary Clinton." Washington, DC, 18 
March, 2010.
■. "Print Roundtable with US Secretary of State Rice." Washington, DC, 7 
January, 2008.
-. "Print Roundtable: Secretary Condoleezza Rice." Washington, DC, 15 
February, 2007.
-. "'Quartet' Joint Statement." New York City, 16 July, 2002.
-. "Quartet Press Availability." New York City, 26 September, 2008.
-. "Quartet Press Conference." New York City, 9 May, 2006.
-. "Quartet Press Statement." Sharm el Sheikh, Egypt, 9 November, 2008.
-. "Quartet Representative - Quartet Statement." Washington, DC, 27 June, 2007. 
-. "Quartet Statement." Washington, DC, 17 June, 2006.
-. "Quartet Statement." New York City, 26 September, 2008.
-. "Quartet Statement." Washington, DC, 26 November, 2007.
-. "Quartet Statement." Moscow, Russia, 9 May, 2005.
-. "Quartet Statement Following July 19 Meeting." Washington, DC, 20 July, 
2007.
-. "Quartet Statement from the June 26, 2009 Meeting in Trieste." Trieste, Italy, 
26 June,2009.
318
. "Quartet Statement on Middle East Peace." New York City, 9 May, 2006.
. "Quartet Statement on Middle East Peace." New York City, 5 December, 2005.
. "Quartet Statement on Palestinian Legislative Council Elections." Washington, 
DC, 26 January, 2006.
. "Quartet Statement on Palestinian Legislative Council Elections." Washington, 
DC, 28 December, 2005.
. "Quartet Statement on the Agreement to Form a Palestinian National Unity 
Government." Washington, DC, 9 February, 2007.
. "Quartet Statement on the Middle East." New York City, 28 October, 2005.
. "Quartet Statement on the Middle East Peace Process." New York City, 20 
September, 2005.
. "Quartet Statement on the Situation in the Middle East." London, England, 30 
January, 2006.
. "Redesignation of Foreign Terrorist Organizations." Washington, DC, 2 
October, 2003.
. "Remarks after Meeting with Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas." West 
Bank, 25 January, 2010.
. "Remarks after Meeting with Special Envoy for Gaza Disengagement James 
Wolfensohn." Washington, DC, 1 May, 2006.
. "Remarks after the Quartet Meeting." Sharm el-Sheikh, 9 November, 2008.
. "Remarks at the 2010 Aipac Policy Conference." Washington, DC, 22 March, 
2010.
. "Remarks at the American Israel Public Affairs Committee's Annual Policy 
Conference." Washington DC, 30 March, 2003.
. "Remarks at the UN Security Council Session on the Situation in the Middle 
E ast". UN Headquarters, New York City, 8 January, 2009.
. "Remarks by President George Bush and Prime Minister Ariel Sharon in Photo 
Opportunity." White House, 7 February, 2002.
. "Remarks by President Obama and President Abbas of the Palestinian 
Authority after Meeting." Washington, DC, 9 June, 2010.
. "Remarks by President Obama and Prime Minister Netanyahu of Israel in Joint 
Press Availability." Washington, DC, 6 July, 2010.
. "Remarks by Secretary Clinton and Special Envoy Mitchell after Their 
Meeting." Washington, DC, 3 February, 2009.
. "Remarks by Special Envoy for Middle East Peace George Mitchell with 
Israeli Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman." Jerusalem, 16 April, 2009.
. "Remarks by the President after Meeting with Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia." 
Bush Ranch, Crawford, Texas, 25 April, 2002.
. "Remarks by the President and Prime Minister Ariel Sharon of Israel in Photo 
Opportunity." The Oval Office, The White House, 20 March, 2001.
. "Remarks by the President at Beginning of Trilateral Meeting with Israeli 
Prime Minister Netanyahu and Palestinian Authority President Abbas." New 
York City, 22 September, 2009.
. "Remarks by US Secretary of State Colin Powell and UN Secretary-General 
Kofi Annan on "Madrid Quartet" Initiative to Convene a Regional Peace 
Conference in the Middle East." Washington, DC, 2 May, 2002.
•. "Remarks En Route Andrews Air Force Base." On Board Plane, 23 May, 2003. 
. "Remarks En Route London, United Kingdom." En Route to London, UK, 29 
January, 2006.
"Remarks En Route Washington, Dc." Washington, DC, 31 January, 2006.
319
. "Remarks on the Appointment of James Wolfensohn as Special Envoy for 
Gaza Disengagement." Washington, DC, 14 April, 2005.
. "Remarks with Foreign Minister of Spain Josep Pique, United Nations 
Secretary General Kofi Annan, Foreign Minister of Russia Igor Fvanov and 
European Union Senior Official Javier Solana." Madrid, Spain, 10 April, 2002.
. "Remarks with Foreign Minister Prince Saud A1 Faisal of Saudi Arabia after 
Their Meeting." Washington, DC, 6 May, 2002.
. "Remarks with High Representative Javier Solana of the European Union." 
Washington, DC, 20 April, 2004.
. "Remarks with Israeli Foreign Minister Avigdor Fieberman." Washington, DC, 
17 June,2009.
. "Remarks with Israeli Foreign Minister Silvan Shalom before Meeting." 
Jerusalem, 6 February, 2005.
. "Remarks with Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon." Crawford, Texas, 11 
April, 2005.
. "Remarks with Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon before Meeting."
Jerusalem, 6 February, 2005.
. "Remarks with Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu." Jerusalem, 31 
October, 2009.
. "Remarks with Palestinian Authority Prime Minister Ahmed Qurei." Amman, 
Jordan, 15 May, 2004.
. "Remarks with Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas." Ramallah, 7 
November, 2008.
. "Remarks with Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas after Their Meeting." 
Ramallah, 7 February, 2005.
. "Remarks with Palestinian Prime Minister Salam Fayyad." Jenin, 8 November, 
2008.
. "Remarks with Quartet Members." New York City, 15 December, 2008.
. "Remarks with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, United Nations 
Secretary General Kofi Annan, and European Union President Jean Asselborn 
after Their Quartet Meeting ". Moscow, Russia, 9 May, 2005.
. "Remarks with the King of Jordan." Washington, DC, 6 May, 2004.
. "Remarks with United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon, High 
Representative for European Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana, 
European Union Commissioner for External Relations Benita Ferrero-Waldner, 
Portuguese Foreign Minister Luis Amado, Russian Foreign Minster Sergey 
Lavrov, and Quartet Representative Tony Blair." UN Headquarters, New York 
City, 23 September, 2007.
-. "Remarks with United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon, Russian 
Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, EU High Representative Catherine Ashton, and 
Quartet Special Representative Tony Blair after Their Meeting." Moscow, 
Russia, 19 March, 2010.
-. "Remarks with United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan after Their 
Meeting New York city, 21 August, 2003.
-. "Road Map for Peace in the Middle East: Secretary Colin L. Powell and 
National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice ". Aqaba, Jordan, 4 June, 2003.
-. "Roundtable with Traveling Press." Jerusalem, 19 February, 2007.
-. "Secretary Clinton with Vice President Joe Biden Announce Appointment of 
Special Envoy for Middle East Peace George Mitchell and Special 
Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan Richard Holbrooke." Washington, 
DC, 22 January, 2009.
320
-------- . "Secretary of State Colin Powell: Interview on Aptv with Barry Schweid and
George Gedda." Washington, DC, 19 April, 2004.
-------- . "Sharm El-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee Report." Washington, DC, 30
April, 2001.
-------- . "Special Briefing by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice." Washington, DC,
18 June, 2007.
-------- . "Special Envoy George Mitchell Meets with Palestinian President Mahmoud
Abbas." Ramallah,, 17 April, 2009.
-------- . "Special Envoy Mitchell Meets with Egyptian President Mubarak." Cairo,
Egypt, 28 January, 2009.
-------- . "Special Envoy Mitchell Meets with Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak."
Jerusalem, 28 January, 2009.
-------- . "Special Envoy Mitchell Returns to the Middle East to Urge Peace Talks."
Ramallah, West Bank, 10 August, 2010.
-------- . "Statement by Secretary of State Colin L. Powell and National Security
Advisor Condoleezza Rice." Washington, DC, 23 May, 2003.
-------- . "Statement by Special Envoy for Middle East Peace George Mitchell."
Washington, DC, 8 March, 2010.
-------- . "Statement by the Middle East Quartet." New York City, 23 September, 2004.
-------- . "Statement by the Middle East Quartet." Washington, DC, 21 June, 2010.
-------- . "Statement by the President on the Middle East." The Bush Ranch, Crawford,
Texas, 29 April, 2002.
-------- . "Statement by the President on the Resignation of Middle East Envoy George
Mitchell." Washington, DC, 13 May, 2011.
-------- . "Statement by the Press Secretary on Israel’s Announcement on Gaza."
Washington, DC, 20 June, 2010.
-------- . "Statement by the Quartet." Washington, DC, 20 August, 2010.
-------- . "Statement by the Quartet." Movenpick, Dead Sea, 22 June, 2003.
-------- . "Statement of the Middle East Quartet." Washington, DC, 21 March, 2007.
-------- . "Statement of the Quartet." Washington, DC, 16 June, 2007.
-------- . "Statement of the Task Force on Palestinian Reform, November 14-15."
Jordan, 16 November, 2002.
-------- . "Statement on Middle East: Conclusions of the Meeting of the G8 Foreign
Ministers' Meeting." Rome, Italy, 19 July, 2001.
-------- . "Statement on Palestinian Assistance." Washington, DC, 7 April, 2006.
-------- . "United Nations Quartet: Kofi Anna, Sergey Lavrov, Brian Cowen, Javier
Solana, Chris Patten, and Colin L. Powell." New York, 4 May, 2004.
-------- . "United States Is Committed to Israel's Security." Tel Aviv, 28 January, 2009.
-------- . "United States Position on Terrorists and Peace in the Middle East." Remarks
at the McConnell Center for Political Leadership, University of Louisville, 
Kentucky, 19 November, 2001.
-------- . "US President Bush's Speech to the United Nations General Assembly." United
Nations Headquarters, New York City, 10 November, 2001.
Wolfensohn, J. A Global Life: My Journey among Rich and Poor, from Wall Street to 
the World Bank: Pan Macmillan Australia Pty. Limited, 2009.
Secondary Sources
"Abbas Achieves Landslide Poll Win." BBC News, 10 January, 2005.
"Abbas Denounces Hamas, Tells P.L.O. He Will Seek Early Elections." Haaretz, 18 
July, 2007.
321
Abbas, M. "Israel and Palestine Can Still Achieve Peace." The Wall Street Journal, 19 
September, 2008.
"Abbas: Talks Will Be Useless If Settlement Building Doesn't Stop." Haaretz, 17 
February, 2009.
Abunimah, A. "Why the UN Must Abolish the 'Quartet'." Al Jazeera English, 5 
October, 2011.
Andoni, L. "The PLO at the Crossroads." Journal of Palestine Studies 21, no. 1 (1991): 
54-65.
Aoun, E. "European Foreign Policy and the Arab-Israeli Dispute: Much Ado About 
Nothing?" European Foreign Affairs Review 8, no. 3 (2003): 289-312.
Asseburg, M. "The EU and the Middle East Conflict: Tackling the Main Obstacle to
Euro-Mediterranean Partnership." Mediterranean Politics 8, no. 2 (2003): 174 - 
93.
B'Tselem. "Land Grab: Israel's Settlement Policy in the West Bank." Israel Information 
Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories, March, 2002.
Bauman, K. "The Middle East Quartet of Mediators: Understanding Multiparty
Mediation in the Middle East Peace Process." 3372461, University of Denver,
2009.
Baxter, K., and Akbarzadeh, S. US Foreign Policy in the Middle East. New York: 
Routledge, 2008.
Beatty, A. "EU Backs Down on Role in Mid East." EU Observer, 23 May, 2003.
Ben Ami, S. Scars of War, Wounds of Peace: The Israeli-Arab Tragedy. New York, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006.
Benn, A. "Netanyahu Leaves US Disgraced, Isolated and Weaker." Haaretz, 25 March,
2010 .
-------- . "US Backs Israel on Aid for Humanitarian Groups, Not Hamas." Haaretz, 16
February, 2006.
Bennet, J. "Sharon Laments "Occupation" and Israeli Settlers Shudder." The New York 
Times, 1 June, 2003.
"Blair Says Talks Laid Foundation for Palestinian State." The Guardian, 2 March, 2005. 
Bloxham, A. "Tony Blair Wrote to Gaddafi 'to Suggest Investment Projects'." The 
Telegraph, 20 September, 2011.
Boutrous Ghali, B. "Supplement to the Agenda for Peace." Position Paper of the
Secretary General on the Occassion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United 
Nations, 3 January, 1995.
Bowker, R. Palestinian Refugees: Mythology, Identity, and the Search for Peace. 
Boulder; London: Lynne Rienner, 2003.
Bregman, A. Elusive Peace: How the Holy Land Defeated America. London; New 
York: Penguin, 2005.
-------- . Israel's Wars: A History since 1947. Third ed. New York: Routledge, 2010.
Bronner, E. "As Biden Visits, Israel Unveils Plan for New Settlements." The New York 
Time, 9 March, 2010.
Brown, N. "What Can Abu Mäzen Do?" Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 
15 June,2007.
Bruck, C. "Back Roads." The New Yorker, Vol. 79, no. 39 (2003): pp. 86-97.
"Bush Names General to Monitor Mideast 'Road Map'." Reuters, 10 January, 2008. 
"Bush Says World Owes Sharon a "Thank You”." Ha’aretz, 21 April, 2004.
Campbell, J. C. Defense of the Middle East: Problems of American Policy. [1st] ed. 
New York: Harper, 1958.
Christison, K. "'All Those Old Issues': George W. Bush and the Palestinian-Israeli 
Conflict." Journal of Palestine Studies 33, no. 2 (2004): 36-50.
322
Clinton, B. My Life. New York: Knopf, 2004.
Cook, J. "Tony Blair's Tangled Web: The Quartet Representative and the Peace 
Process." Journal of Palestine Studies 42, no. 2 (2013): pp. 43-60.
Creswell, J. W. Research Design : Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed Methods 
Approaches. 2nd ed. Thousand Oaks, Calif: Sage Publications, 2003.
Crowe, B. "A Common European Foreign Policy after Iraq?" International Affairs 79, 
no. 3 (2003): 533-46.
Dajani, O. M. "Forty Years without Resolve: Tracing the Influence of Security Council 
Resolution 242 on the Middle East Peace Process." Journal of Palestine Studies 
37, no. 1 (2007): 24-38.
Danin, R. "A Third Way to Palestine: Fayyadism and Its Discontents." Foreign Affairs 
90, no. 1 (2011).
Dannreuther, R. "The Middle East: Toward a Substantive European Role in the Peace 
Process?" In European Union Foreign and Security Policy: Towards a 
Neighbourhood Strategy, edited by Roland Dannreuther. London; New York: 
Routledge, 2004.
-------- . The Soviet Union and the PLO. Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1998.
Dawar, A. "Q&A: Ehud Olmert Corruption Inquiry." The Guardian, 30 May, 2008.
de Soto, A. "The Role of the United Nations in the Middle East." In Italianieuropi, 2 
July 2009.
Druckman, D. "Stages, Turning Points, and Crises: Negotiating Military Base Rights, 
Spain and the United States." The Journal of Conflict Resolution 30, no. 2 
(1986): 327-60.
"Ehud Olmert: Corruption Allegations." BBC, 24 September, 2012.
Eldar, A. "Bush Likes Dahlan, Believes Abbas, and Has a 'Problem with Sharon'." 
Haaretz, 10 June, 2003.
-------- . "Diskin to Abbas: Defer UN Vote on Goldstone or Face 'Second Gaza'."
Haaretz, 17 January, 2010.
-------- . "The Peace That Nearly Was at Taba." Haaretz, 12 February, 2002.
Elgindy, K. "The Middle East Quartet: A Post Mortem." The Saban Center for Middle 
East Policy, Brookings Institute, 25 (2012).
Enderlin, C. Shattered Dreams: The Failure of the Peace Process in the Middle East, 
1995-2002. New York: Other Press, 2003.
Erlanger, S. "Hamas Routes Ruling Faction, Casting Pall on Peace Process." The New 
York Times, 27 January, 2006.
"EU Defuses Tension with US over Mideast." China Daily, 17 April, 2004.
"EU/Middle East: Ministers Discuss Israel's Gaza Strip Withdrawal Plan." Europolitics, 
27 April, 2004.
Evans, G. "Israel and the Quartet Must Seize the Moment." Financial Times, 19 
September, 2006.
Falk, R. "Forty Years after 242: A "Canonical" Text in Disrepute?" Journal of Palestine 
Studies 37, no. 1 (2007): 39-48.
Fattah, H. "Hamas and Fatah Reach Deal in Mecca." The New York Times, 8 February, 
2007.
Finnemore, M. National Interests in International Society. Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1996.
-------- .Rules for the World: International Organizations in Global Politics. New
York: Cornell University Press, 2004.
-------- . "Israeli-Russian Relations since the Collapse of the Soviet Union." Middle East
Journal 49, no. 2 (1995): 233-47.
323
-------- . "Russian Policy toward the Middle East: The Yeltsin Legacy and the Putin
Challenge." Middle East Journal 55, no. 1 (2001): 58-90.
Friedman, T. L. "An Intriguing Signal from the Saudi Crown Prince." The New York 
Times, 17 February, 2002.
Fukuyama, F. The End of History and the Last Man. New York Maxwell Macmillan 
International, 1992.
Galil, L. "Wooed by Kadima and Likud, Lieberman Agrees to More Talks with Livni " 
Haaretz, 11 February, 2009.
George, A. L. "US-Soviet Global Rivalry: Norms of Competition." In New Issues in 
International Crisis Management, edited by Gilbert R. Winham, pp. 67-90. 
Boulder: Westview Press, 1988.
Gianniou, M. "The Policies of the Mediterranean EU Countries Towards the Israeli- 
Palestinian Conflict: Leaders or Followers?" The Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnership (EMP): Perspectives from the Mediterranean EU countries, 
Rethimnon, Crete, 25-27 October 2007.
Glasser, S. "'The Law of Politics' According to Sergei Lavrov: An Exclusive Interview 
with Russia's Top Diplomat." Foreign Policy, 15 May, 2013.
-------- . "Minister No: Sergei Lavrov and the Blunt Logic of Russian Power." Foreign
Policy, 15 May, 2013.
Greilsammer, L, and Weiler, J. "European Political Cooperation and the Palestinian- 
Israeli Conflict: An Israeli Perspective." In European Foreign Policy-Making 
and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, edited by David Allen and Alfred Pijpers, pp. 121- 
59. The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1984.
Gross Stein, J. "The Managed and the Managers: Crisis Prevention in the Middle East." 
In New Issues in International Crisis Management, edited by Gilbert R.
Winham, pp. 171-99. Boulder: Westview Press, 1988.
Gunning, J. Hamas in Politics: Democracy, Religion, Violence. New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2008.
Haaretz Service. "Abbas to Obama: I'll Quit,There's No Chance for Peace with 
Netanyahu." Haaretz, 26 October, 2009.
-------- . "Israel Conducting Secret Talks with Hamas, Abbas Says." Haaretz, 19
November, 2009.
Halliday, F. The Middle East in International Relations: Power, Politics and Ideology. 
Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge, 2005.
Hatuqa, D. "European Foreign Policy and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict." Nice,
France: Institut Europeen Des Hautes Etudes Internationales, 2003.
Herrmann, R. K. "Russian Policy in the Middle East: Strategic Change and Tactical 
Contradictions." Middle East Journal 48, no. 3 (1994): 455-74.
Hirst, D. The Gun and the Olive Branch: The Roots of Violence in the Middle East. 
London: Faber and Faber, 1984.
Hollis, R. "Europe in the Middle East." In International Relations of the Middle East, 
edited by L Fawcett, pp. 307-27. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 
2009.
Hudson, M. C. "To Play the Hegemon: Fifty Years of US Policy toward the Middle 
East." Middle East Journal, 50, no. 3 (1996): 329-43.
International Crisis Group. "After Gaza." Crisis Group Middle East Report 68, 2 
August, 2007.
-------- . "After Mecca: Engaging Hamas." Crisis Group Middle East Report 62,28
February, 2007.
-------- . "Dealing with Hamas." Crisis Group Middle East Report 21,26 January, 2004.
324
-------- . "Ending the War in Gaza." Crisis Group Middle East Briefing 26, 5 January,
2009.
-------- . "Enter Hamas: The Challenges of Political Integration." Crisis Group Middle
East Report 49, 18 January, 2006.
-------- . "Gaza's Unfinished Business." Crisis Group Middle East Report 85, 23 April,
2009.
-------- . "The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: Annapolis and After." Middle East Briefing
22,20 November, 2007.
-------- . "A Middle East Roadmap to Where?". Crisis Group Middle East Report 14, 2
May, 2003.
-------- . "Palestinians, Israel, and the Quartet: Pulling Back from the Brink." Crisis
Group Middle East Report 54, 13 June, 2006.
-------- . "Round Two in Gaza." Crisis Group Middle East Briefing 24, 11 September,
2008.
-------- . "Ruling Palestine I: Gaza under Hamas." Crisis Group Middle East Report 73,
19 March, 2008.
-------- . "Ruling Palestine Ii: The West Bank Model?". Crisis Group Middle East
Report 79, 17 July, 2008.
-------- . "Tipping Point? The Palestinians and the Search for a New Strategy." Crisis
Group Middle East Report 95,26 April, 2010.
Issacharoff, A. "Abbas to Haaretz: Peace Possible in 6 Months If Israel Freezes All 
Settlements." 16 December, 2009.
-------- . "Jerusalem Official: Peace Talks May Resume as Early as Thursday." Haaretz,
5 March, 2008.
Kalman, M. "'Useless, Useless, Useless': The Palestinian Verdict on Tony Blair's Job." 
The Independent, 16 December, 2012.
Katz, M. "Major World Powers and the Middle East." Symposium by the Middle East 
Policy Council, United States Capitol Building, Washington, DC, 23 October, 
2009.
Katz, Y. "US Road Map Monitor Given New Post - Back Home." The Jerusalem Post, 
23 April, 2008.
Kershner, I. "PLO Extends President Mahmoud Abbas's Term." The New York Times,
16 December, 2009.
Kessler, G. "For Mideast Envoy, Rookie Status May Be an Advantage." The 
Washington Post, 22 July, 2003.
-------- . "'Road Map' Setbacks Highligh US Pattern." The Washington Post, 6 October,
2003.
Khalidi, W. "The Palestine Problem: An Overview." Journal o f Palestine Studies 21, 
no. 1 (1991): 5-16.
Khatib, G. "The Collapse of the Peace Process and the Rise of Hamas " Durham
University: School o f Government and International Affairs Working Paper 
Series (December, 2007).
-------- . "Where Is President Bush's Vision?" Bitterlemons, 26 April, 2004.
Korany, B. "The Middle East since the Cold War: Tom between Geopolitics and
Economics." In International Relations o f the Middle East edited by L Fawcett, 
pp. 59-76. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2009.
-------- . "Proximity Talks: Prospects for Success?" Foreign Policy, 9 March, 2010.
-------- . "The Settlements Facts." The Washington Post, 14 June, 2009.
Kurtzer, D., and Lasensky, S. Negotiating Arab-Israeli Peace: American Leadership in 
the Middle East. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2007.
Lally, W. "Fighting Words, Hard Choices." Newsweek, Vol. 141, no.4,2003, pp. 46-47.
325
Landler, M. "Israeli Settlement Growth Must Stop, Clinton Says." The New York Times, 
27 May, 2009.
Laub, K. "Arafat Appoints New Prime Minister." The Guardian, 20 March, 2003.
Lazaroff, T. "Sharon: 'Arafat Won't Be Buried in Jerusalem'." Jerusalem Post, 1 
November, 2004.
Lewis, S. W. "The United States and Israel: Evolution of an Unwritten Alliance."
Middle East Journal 53, no. 3 (1999): 364-78.
Malley, R., and Agha, H. "Camp David: The Tragedy of Errors." New York Review o f 
Books, 9 August, 2001.
-------- . "Into the Lion's Den." The New York Review o f Books, 1 May, 2008.
-------- . "Israel and Palestine: Can They Start Over?" The New York Review o f Books, 3
December, 2009.
-------- . "Obama and the Middle East." The New York Review o f Books, 11 June, 2009.
-------- . "The Road from Mecca." The New York Review o f Books, 10 May, 2007.
-------- . "This Is Not a Revolution." The New York Review o f Books, 8 November,
2012.
-------- . "Who's Afraid of the Palestinians? ." The New York Review o f Books, 10
February, 2011.
Mansour, C. "The Impact of 11 September on the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict." Journal 
of Palestine Studies 31, no. 2 (2002): 5-18.
McCarthy, R. "Tony Blair Urges Israel to Lift Economic Blockade of Gaza." The 
Guardian, 2 March, 2009.
Medding, S. "Sharon Shakes up Israeli Politics." CNN, 22 November, 2005.
-------- . "Officials: Suicide Bomber Injures 21 in Israel." CNN, 29 August, 2005.
Mencken, H. L. A Mencken Chrestomathy. 1st ed. New York: A. A. Knopf, 1949.
Miller, A. D. The Much Too Promised Land: America's Elusive Search for Arab-Israeli 
Peace. New York: Bantam Books, 2008.
Miller, A. D., and Malley, R. "The Road after Gaza." The Washington Post, 24 August, 
2005.
Milton-Edwards, B. Contemporary Politics in the Middle East. 2nd ed. Cambridge, UK; 
Malden, MA: Polity, 2011.
Morris, B. Righteous Victims: A History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict, 1881-2001. New 
York: Vintage Books, 1999.
Muasher, M. The Arab Center: The Promise o f Moderation. New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2008.
Mustafa, F. "Palestinian Authority Stonewalled the Goldstone Vote." Al Jazeera: The 
Palestine Papers, 26 January, 2011.
Musu, C. "The Madrid Quartet: An Effective Instrument of Multilateralism?"
International Studies Association 48th Annual Convention, Chicago, USA, 28 
February 2007.
Myre, G. "A Mild Stroke Sends Sharon to the Hospital." The New York Times, 19 
December, 2005.
Neilan, T. "Israeli Causes Uproar over Status of Road Map." The New York Times, 6 
October, 2004.
Nizameddin, T. Russia and the Middle East: Towards a New Foreign Policy. New 
York: St. Martin's Press, 1999.
"Officials: US to Delay Mideast Plan until after Israeli Election." CNN World, 18 
December, 2002.
Oxfam International. "The Middle East Quartet: A Progress Report." 25 September, 
2008.
326
"PA President Abbas, Interview with Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, Ramallah, 22 December 2009 
(Excerpts)." Journal of Palestine Studies 39, no. 3 (2010).
Parsens, N. The Politics of the Palestinian Authority: From Oslo to Al-Aqsa. New York: 
Routledge, 2005.
Patten, C. Not Quite the Diplomat: Home Truths About World Affairs. London; New 
York: Allen Lane, 2005.
Perthes, V. "America's "Greater Middle East" and Europe: Key Issues for Dialogue." 
Middle East Policy 11, no. 3 (2004): 85.
Peters, J. "Europe and the Israel-Palestinian Peace Process: The Urgency of Now." 
European Security 19, no. 3 (2010): pp. 511-29.
-------- . Pathways to Peace: The Multilateral Arab-Israeli Peace Talks. London: Royal
Institute of International Affairs, 1996.
"Pressure Mounts on Abbas to Quit." Al Jazeera, 6 October, 2009.
Quandt, W. B. Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict since 
1967 - Revised Edition. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2001.
Rabinovich, I. Waging Peace: Israel and the Arabs, 1948-2003. Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press, 2004.
Ravid, B. "Abbas Rejects Talks with Hamas on Control over Gaza-Egypt Border." 
Haaretz, 30 January, 2008.
-------- . "In Jerusalem, Clinton Hails 'Unprecedented' Israeli Settlement Concessions."
Haaretz, 3\ October, 2009.
-------- . "Israel and Palestinians Clash over Agenda for Direct Peace Talks." Haaretz,
12 September, 2010.
-------- . "Israel Envoy: US Ties at Their Worst in 35 Years." Haaretz, 15 March, 2010.
-------- . "Olmert Formally Submits His Resignation to Peres." Haaretz, 21 September,
2008.
Reuters. "Abbas: Settlement Construction Will 'Force' Us to Quit Talks." Haaretz, 28 
September, 2010.
-------- . "Arab League Endorses Palestinian Decision to Halt Peace Talks." Haaretz, 8
October, 2010.
Reynolds, P. "Meeting to Bolster Palestinian Leadership." BBC News, 28 February, 
2005.
Richardson, J. L. "The Ethics of Neoliberal Institutionalism." In The Oxford Handbook 
of International Relations, edited by Christian Reus-Smit and Duncan Snidal, 
pp. 222-33. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2008.
Rondot, P. "France and Palestine: From Charles De Gaulle to Francois Mitterand." 
Journal of Palestine Studies 16, no. 3 (1987): 87-100.
Rose, D. "The Gaza Bombshell." Vanity Fair, April, 2008.
Ross, D. The Missing Peace: The inside Story of the Fight for Middle East Peace. New 
York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2005.
Said, E. W. The Question of Palestine. New York: Vintage Books, 1980.
-------- . "Reflections on Twenty Years of Palestinian History." Journal of Palestine
Studies 20, no. 4 (1991): 5-22.
Saikal, A. "The Role of the United Nations in the Middle East." In Peacekeeping and 
Peacemaking : Towards Effective Intervention in Post-Cold War Conflicts, 
edited by Tom Woodhouse, Robert H. Bruce and Malcolm Dando, pp. 133-44. 
Houndsmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire :New York: Macmillan; St. Martin's 
Press, 1998.
Sarsar, S. "The Question of Palestine and United States Behavior at the United 
Nations." International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society 17, no. 3 
(2004): 457-70.
327
Schwarze, E. "Public Opinion, Polling and the Conduct of Palestinian Political
Leadership." Doctoral Thesis, Australian National University: Centre for Arab 
and Islamic Studies, 2011.
Shamir, S., Benn, A., and Yoaz, Y. "Israel Firmly Rejects Icj Fence Ruling." Haaretz,
11 July, 2004.
Shavit, A. "Top PM Aide: Gaza Plan Aims to Freeze the Peace Process." Haaretz, 6 
October, 2004.
Sheridan, G. "Ehud Olmert Still Dreams of Peace." The Australian, 28 November, 2009.
Sherwood, H. "Israel Unfreezes Palestinian Authority Tax Millions." The Guardian, 1 
December, 2011.
-------- . "Palestinian Leaders Renew Attack on Tony Blair over Israel." The Guardian,
2 October, 2011.
Siniver, A. "The EU and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict." In The European Union as a 
Global Conflict Manager, edited by Richard G. Whitman and Stefan Wolff, pp. 
80-92. New York: Routledge, 2012.
Smooha, S. "All the Dreams We Had Are Now Gone." Haaretz, 19 July, 2007.
S turkey, D. The Limits of American Power: Prosecuting a Middle East Peace. 
Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2007.
Taylor, C. "Neutrality in Political Science." In The Philosophy of Social Explanation, 
edited by Alan Ryan, pp. 139-70. London: Oxford University Press, 1973.
Thakur, R. C. The United Nations, Peace and Security: From Collective Security to the 
Responsibility to Protect. Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2006.
The Associated Press. "Erekat: Abbas, Olmert to Meet Monday to Review 
Negotiations." Haaretz, 5 April, 2008.
The World Bank. "The Impending Palestinian Fiscal Crisis, Potential Remedies." 7 
May, 2006.
-------- . "Implementing the Palestinian Reform and Development Agenda." 2 May,
2008.
-------- . "Investing in Palestinian Economic Reform and Development." Paris, 17
December, 2007.
-------- . "Movement and Access Restrictions in the West Bank: Uncertainty and
Inefficiency in the Palestinian Economy." 9 May, 2007.
Tocci, N. "The Middle East Quartet and (in)Effective Multilateralism." Middle East 
Journal 67, no. 1 (2013): 29-44.
Urquhart, B. "The United Nations in the Middle East: A 50-Year Retrospective."
Middle East Journal 49, no. 4 (1995): 572-81.
Usher, G. "The Calm before the Storm?" Al-Ahram, Issue No. 735 (2005).
-------- . "Facing Defeat: The Intifada Two Years On." Journal of Palestine Studies 32,
no. 2 (2003): 21-40.
Vdovin, A. "Coexisting Peacefully with the US: An Interview with Andrey Vdovin." 
Bitterlemons, 17 July, 2003.
Walker, K. "Blair’s £400,000-a-Year Bill to Taxpayers: Multi-Millionaire Ex-P.M. 
Enjoys Perks and Pension." Daily Mail, 23 August, 2012.
Ward Anderson, J. "Palestinians Wary of Peace Plan Shift: Some Call New Approach 
One-Sided." Washington Post, 24 July, 2003.
Weissman, S. "Rice Admits US Underestimated Hamas Strength." The New York Times, 
30 January, 2006.
Whitfield, T. Friends Indeed?: The United Nations, Groups of Friends, and the
Resolution of Conflict. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 
2007.
328
Wolfensohn, J. "A Global Life." The 7.30 Report with Kerry O'Brien, ABC, Sydney, 28 
October 2010.
Woodward, B. State o f Denial. 1st Simon & Schuster trade pbk. ed. New York: Simon 
& Schuster Paperbacks, 2007.
Wright, R., and Lynch, C. "US Pressed to Revive Mideast Peace Process; UN, Europe, 
Russia Explore Alternatives." Washington Post, 7 January, 2004.
Wright, R., and Wilson, S. "Rice Negotiates Deal to Open Gaza Crossings." The 
Washington Post, 16 November, 2005.
Zunes, S. "The United States and the Breakdown of the Israeli-Palestinian Peace 
Process." Middle East Policy 8, no. 4 (2001): 66-85.
329
